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In re M.S.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division
Jul 22, 2008
No. B199086 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 22, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. JJ14478, Robert Ambrose, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)

Nicole Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Lauren E. Dana, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


PERLUSS, P. J.

M.S. appeals from the juvenile court’s order declaring him a ward of the court and ordering him home on probation after finding he had committed indecent exposure. M.S. contends the evidence is insufficient to establish he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct and the trial court abused its discretion by basing its disposition, in part, on his decision to contest the charges against him by proceeding to adjudication. We affirm the order as modified.

M.S. contends, the People acknowledge and we agree the May 3, 2007 minute order should be corrected to reflect the juvenile court’s oral pronouncement of 20 hours, rather than 40 hours, of community service. (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385-386; People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.)

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging M.S. had committed two misdemeanor offenses, sexual battery against D.R., a classmate, (count 1) and indecent exposure (count 2).

Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

1. The Jurisdiction Hearing

a. The people’s evidence

On August 16, 2006 D.R., then 13 years old, was in class at middle school, sitting in a front corner of the classroom. M.S., who was 12 years old, was standing in the back of the classroom. D.R. turned her head and saw M.S. with his pants and boxers pulled down, exposing his erect penis.

M.S. approached D.R. She initially testified M.S. stopped about one foot behind her and thrust his lower body toward her without making any contact. D.R. pushed M.S. away from her. After refreshing her memory with a police report, D.R. testified M.S. pressed his penis into her body. M.S. said to D.R., “Shut up. Fuck you. Ho.” D.R. told M.S. to leave her alone and pushed M.S. away from her. D.R. called to the teacher, who was at his desk. As the teacher was telephoning the principal, M.S. pulled up his pants and ran from the classroom.

b. The defense evidence

M.S. did not testify. His friend Victor P., testifying for the defense, said he was in the classroom with M.S. on August 16, 2006, was sitting one seat over from D.R. in the row immediately behind her. He denied M.S. exposed himself to D.R., pushed his body into her or fled from the classroom. Victor P. testified M.S. pulled his pants down to his knees, but not his “P.E. shorts.”

c. The juvenile court’s findings

The juvenile court found the sexual battery allegation not true and the indecent exposure allegation true.

2. The Disposition Hearing

Prior to disposition defense counsel asked the juvenile court to place M.S. on six months probation under section 725, subdivision (a), rather than adjudging him a ward of the court. The court responded, “I don’t think this should have gone to trial. I think it is unnecessary to put these people through . . . .” Defense counsel interrupted, “I would ask for [section] 725,” to which the court answered, “No.” When defense counsel requested the court state its reasons on the record, the court explained, “I think it was flagrant to lower his pants. I think that was flagrant, and I think it went beyond lowering his pants. I think he lowered his shorts.” The court then added, “I felt very sorry for [D.R.] I think she was subjected to unwarranted conduct. I don’t know what went on in that class; I don’t know the whole picture. . . . I don’t like the situation. I didn’t like hearing about it. I think that he did most of what was charged.”

The probation officer had recommended M.S. be placed on six months informal probation without adjudging him a ward of the court pursuant to section 654.2.

The juvenile court adjudged M.S. a ward of the court and ordered him home on probation, subject to certain terms and conditions including that M.S. perform 20 hours of community service.

DISCUSSION

1. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding M.S. Committed Indecent Exposure

Penal Code section 26 creates a rebuttable presumption a child under the age of 14 years is incapable of committing a crime in the absence of clear proof he or she appreciated its wrongfulness at the time of committing the act. (See People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378.) M.S. contends the record does not contain substantial evidence he understood the wrongfulness of his conduct.

a. Standard of review

The same standard of appellate review is applicable in considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding as in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction. (In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404; In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275.) In either case we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value -- from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)

We resolve all conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility in favor of the verdict or judgment and indulge every reasonable inference the trier of fact could draw from the evidence. (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless “‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331.)

“This standard of review applies with equal force to claims that the evidence does not support the determination that a minor understood the wrongfulness of his [or her] conduct.” (In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872.) Although in the present case the juvenile court made no express findings under Penal Code section 26, “we must affirm an implied finding that the [minor] understood the wrongfulness of his [or her] conduct if the implied finding is supported by substantial evidence.” (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 297-298.)

b. Substantial evidence supports the implied finding M.S. knew his conduct was wrong

A minor’s knowledge of the wrongfulness of an act may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 900.) “A trier of fact making a [Penal Code] section 26 determination does not attempt to read the mind of the minor, but considers the objective attendant circumstances of the crime -- such as its preparation, the method of its commission, and its concealment -- to determine whether the minor understood the wrongfulness of his or her conduct.” (People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 379; see In re Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) “Moreover, a minor’s ‘age is a basic and important consideration [citation], and, as recognized by the common law, it is only reasonable to expect that generally the older a child gets and the closer [he or she] approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that [he or she] appreciates the wrongfulness of [his or her] acts.’” (Lewis, at p. 378.)

There was ample circumstantial evidence to establish by clear and convincing proof M.S. knew it was wrong to expose himself to D.R. According to D.R.’s testimony, M.S. not only exposed himself, but also thrust his penis toward her while using crude terms for the act of sexual intercourse and a prostitute. That M.S. committed the offense when he was 12 years, 11 months old makes it even more likely he understood the wrongfulness of his act. In today’s society it would be difficult to conclude someone nearly 13 year old would not know it was wrong to show his erect penis to a female classmate. (Cf. People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 379 [“we would find it difficult to conclude that a 13 year old would not know” that certain criminal conduct was wrong]; compare In re James B., supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 873 [minor who was 12 years, 10 months old understood wrongfulness] with In re Michael B. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 443, 446 [minor who was nine years old did not understand wrongfulness].) Finally, M.S.’s sudden flight when the teacher notified the school administrator alone constitutes substantial evidence M.S. knew his conduct was wrong. “There is a rational basis for inferring that if a person flees immediately after a crime to avoid detection, he may do so because he believes himself to be guilty.” (People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1244; see also In re Clyde H. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 338, 344.)

It appears from the petition and probation report M.S. was born in September 1993 and the offense occurred on August 16, 2006.

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Declaring M.S. a Ward of the Court and Ordering Him Home on Probation

M.S. argues the colloquy between the juvenile court and defense counsel at the disposition hearing establishes the court refused to consider his counsel’s request for a disposition pursuant to section 725, subdivision (a), at least in part because M.S. insisted on contesting the charges. He contends this refusal to consider an alternative disposition constituted an abuse of discretion.

a. Standard of review

As M.S. recognizes, a juvenile court’s commitment decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (In re Antoine D. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1320; In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) It is the duty of the juvenile court, not the reviewing court, to determine the most appropriate placement for the minor. The juvenile court’s determination will be reversed only if it has acted beyond the scope of reason. (In re Khamphouy S. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1135.)

b. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a proposed section 725, subdivision (a), disposition

The juvenile court’s initial response to defense counsel’s request for a section 725, subdivision (a), disposition -- “I don’t think this should have gone to trial. I think it is unnecessary to put these people through . . . .” -- is troublesome. Similar language has been found indicative of an impermissible intent to punish a defendant for going to trial. (See, e.g., In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 279 [trial court responded to defense counsel’s suggestion at sentencing hearing that informal probation would suffice by saying, “You mean whether or not there’s a disposition or not after a jury trial?”]; In re Edy D. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1202 [juvenile court’s statement, if minor were to inconvenience witnesses by having them come to court for adjudication, option of disposition under § 725, subd. (a), would no longer be available]; see also People v. Morales (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 537, 542, fn. 4.)

Whatever the juvenile court might have started to say on this point, however, defense counsel guided the court onto the right track by asking it to state its reasons on the record for rejecting the requested alternative disposition. In response the court explained its ruling was based on the nature of the offense and its effect on the victim. Thus, despite the court’s initial remarks, the record demonstrates the court rejected the proposed section 725, subdivision (a), disposition on proper grounds, not because M.S. had elected to proceed to adjudication. The decision to declare M.S. a ward of the court and order him home on probation itself was not an abuse of discretion, and M.S. does not contend to the contrary.

DISPOSITION

Probation condition 8 of the May 3, 2007 minute order is modified to read, “Perform 20 hours of work under the supervision of the Probation Officer.” As modified, the juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

We concur: WOODS, J., ZELON, J.


Summaries of

In re M.S.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division
Jul 22, 2008
No. B199086 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 22, 2008)
Case details for

In re M.S.

Case Details

Full title:In re M. S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division

Date published: Jul 22, 2008

Citations

No. B199086 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 22, 2008)