Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. J206370. Miriam Morton, Temporary Judge. Affirmed.
Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Gil Gonzalez and Garrett Beaumont, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI, J.
A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleged that M. R., (minor), robbed R. R. (victim) pursuant to Penal Code section 211. Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the allegation true. At a disposition hearing, the juvenile court placed minor on probation in his mother’s custody.
On appeal, minor alleges that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he committed the crime of robbery. For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The victim noticed minor and codefendant walking behind him as he walked home from high school on November 8, 2007. The victim then heard them approach the victim from behind. As the victim turned the corner, one of the defendants asked the other if he knew what time it was. The victim was holding his cell phone at the time. The victim stopped and turned around as he heard the question. At this time, the defendants stopped as well.
The victim identified both minor and his codefendant in court as the persons who followed the victim, and ultimately, ran off with the victim’s property. Although the victim identified the codefendant as the person who took the victim’s property in an in-field lineup, the victim could not remember which defendant spoke to the victim and which defendant took his property when the victim testified in court. Therefore, both minor and his codefendant will be referred to as “defendants” when the victim’s testimony is being summarized.
When the victim was facing the two defendants, one of them told the victim to, “give it up.” When the victim made a “weird face,” one of the defendants told the victim not to run. The victim was scared.
The victim then ran to his house, approximately “30 steps” away, but found that his door was locked. One of the defendants chased the victim and caught up with him at the front door. After a struggle for the cell phone, defendant successfully grabbed the cell phone from the victim. The other defendant—who initially asked the victim to give up his cell phone—waited by the stop sign where the defendants confronted the victim. After grabbing the cell phone, the defendant ran back toward his cohort. The defendants then ran away together.
The victims’ cousin saw the struggle from inside the victim’s house after hearing the victim bang on the front door. According to the cousin, minor’s codefendant was the person who physically took the cell phone from the victim. The victim’s cousin called 911 on her phone as she ran after minor and codefendant; they ran together toward a nearby Metro Link train station. At one point, the codefendant yelled back at the victim’s cousin, “Back up or I will shoot you!” The cousin eventually lost sight of minor and codefendant at the train station as the defendants “hopped the trains” together.
Another witness who saw the incident from the street also identified minor as the one who waited by the stop sign and codefendant as the one who grabbed the cell phone from the victim. When the witness told codefendant to give back the cell phone, he replied, “Do you want to get shot?”
An officer who got the descriptions later apprehended both defendants. In an in-field lineup, the victim’s cousin and the witness identified codefendant as the person who had taken the cell phone, and minor as the one who had waited at the street corner.
II
ANALYSIS
Minor’s sole contention on appeal is that “the evidence is insufficient to prove that [minor] shared the intent of his codefendant to rob [the victim] of his cell phone and, therefore, the petition should have been dismissed for lack of evidence.” We disagree.
Our review of any claim of insufficiency of the evidence is limited. If the evidence presented below is subject to differing inferences, the reviewing court must assume that the trier of fact resolved all conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 326.) A reviewing court is precluded from making its own subjective determination of guilt. (Id. at p. 319, fn. 13.) “In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; see also People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 848-849.) Here, the record discloses ample evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that minor committed robbery.
Under the theory of aiding and abetting, “ ‘All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, . . . whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, . . . are principals in any crime so committed.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, an aider and abettor ‘shares the guilt of the actual perpetrator.’ [Citation.] The mental state necessary for conviction as an aider and abettor, however, is different from the mental state necessary for conviction as the actual perpetrator. [¶] The actual perpetrator must have whatever mental state is required for each crime charged, . . . An aider and abettor, on the other hand, must ‘act with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.’ [Citation.] The jury must find ‘the intent to encourage and bring about conduct that is criminal, not the specific intent that is an element of the target offense . . . .’ [Citations.] Once the necessary mental state is established, the aider and abettor is guilty not only of the intended, or target, offense, but also of any other crime the direct perpetrator actually commits that is a natural and probable consequence of the target offense. [Citation.]” (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1122-1123, citing Pen. Code, § 31; People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259-262, People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560, and People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12, fn. 5.)
“[P]resence at the scene of the crime, while insufficient of itself to make one an aider and abettor, is one factor which tends to show intent. Other factors which may be considered include the defendant’s failure to take steps to prevent the commission of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the crime. [Citation.]” (People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 893; see also In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
In this case, the evidence presented during the trial shows that the two defendants acted as a team. Both defendants rapidly approached the victim from behind as the victim walked home, holding his cell phone. When the victim stopped and turned around, both defendants also stopped. At that time, one of the defendants told the victim to, “Give it up.” When the victim started to run toward his house, one of the defendants chased the victim to his front door, fought the victim for the cell phone, and grabbed the cell phone from the victim. The other defendant—the one who told the victim to give up the phone—waited at the corner by the stop sign where the initial exchange took place. Thereafter, both defendants ran off toward the Metro Link station.
Moreover, as provided above, both the victim’s cousin and the witness who saw the incident identified minor and his codefendant as the persons involved in the robbing the victim of his cell phone. They both identified minor’s codefendant as the person taking the victim’s phone. They both also saw minor and his codefendant run away together.
Notwithstanding the above, minor contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the robbery conviction because “it is far more likely that [the codefendant] uttered [the] phrase—‘Give it up. Don’t’ run’—rather than [minor].” The weakness in minor’s argument is that we, as a reviewing court, must assume that the trier of fact resolved all conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution. (Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 326.) Here, although the victim was uncertain at first, the victim eventually testified that he believed that the defendant who stayed behind, minor, was the person who asked the victim to “give it up.” This testimony reasonably supports an inference that minor, by demanding that the victim give up his cell phone, aided and abetted in the robbery.
Based on the above, we find that the juvenile court’s true finding is supported by substantial evidence.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER, Acting P. J., KING, J.