Opinion
No. 107511
05-02-2019
IN RE: M.J., a Minor Child
Mark A. Stanton, Public Defender, and Britta M. Barthol, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. Michael C. O'Malley, Prosecuting Attorney, and David Elias, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Mark A. Stanton, Public Defender, and Britta M. Barthol, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Michael C. O'Malley, Prosecuting Attorney, and David Elias, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.: {¶1} Defendant-appellant, M.J., appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, which vacated the court's previously entered adjudication and disposition order. M.J. raises the following assignment of error for review:
The trial court erred when it vacated its judgment order of January 30, 2018 and set the matter for further prosecution as jeopardy had attached with the order of disposition.
{¶2} After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we reverse the juvenile court's judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Procedural History
{¶3} On January 8, 2018, the state filed a complaint in Cuyahoga Juvenile C.P. No. DL-18-100319, alleging that then 17-year-old M.J. was a delinquent child for committing the offenses of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), with a one-year firearm specification; grand theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) ; and theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1).
{¶4} On January 16, 2018, the state filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction and a notice of mandatory bindover. In these filings, the state moved the juvenile court to hold a mandatory bindover hearing to determine whether the court was required to relinquish jurisdiction and transfer M.J. to the general division for criminal prosecution.
{¶5} Later that same day, the parties appeared before the juvenile court for an arraignment hearing. Over the state's objection, and without addressing the state's request to relinquish jurisdiction to the adult court, the juvenile court accepted M.J.'s admissions to the allegations of the complaint and adjudicated M.J. delinquent of burglary, with a one-year firearm specification, grand theft, and theft. The court immediately proceeded to disposition. M.J. was committed to the legal custody of the Department of Youth Services for an indefinite term consisting of a minimum period of six months and a maximum period not to exceed the child's attainment of the age of 21 years. On January 30, 2018, the trial court issued a journal entry, memorializing the adjudication and disposition.
{¶6} The state did not file a direct appeal from the juvenile court's adjudication and disposition order. Rather, the state filed a motion to vacate the court's judgment on March 1, 2018. The state argued the dispositional order "must be deemed void as a nullity" because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to accept M.J.'s admission to the juvenile complaint where he was subject to mandatory transfer to adult court pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(A)(2). The state further maintained that pursuant to R.C. 2152.02(C)(5), M.J. was no longer considered a "child" for the purposes of juvenile court jurisdiction because he "previously pled guilty to a felony in a case that was transferred to a criminal court."
{¶7} M.J. opposed the motion to vacate, arguing that the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter an adjudication and disposition order, and therefore, "jeopardy has attached."
{¶8} On June 22, 2018, the trial court granted the state's motion and vacated the January 30, 2018 adjudication and disposition entry. On July 10, 2018, M.J. filed a motion to dismiss his complaint with prejudice. M.J. argued that "further prosecution of this matter would be a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of both the U.S. Constitution and the Ohio Constitution." On July 20, 2018, the juvenile court denied the motion to dismiss and set the case for arraignment. This appeal followed.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶9} In his sole assignment of error, M.J. argues the juvenile court erred when it vacated its prior adjudication and disposition order. M.J. contends the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over his delinquency proceedings and that jeopardy attached once he was "adjudicated delinquent and received disposition." Thus, M.J. maintains the juvenile court committed further error by denying his motion to dismiss with prejudice, because "any further prosecution in this matter is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of both the U.S. Constitution and the Ohio Constitution."
{¶10} As stated, the state's motion to vacate was predicated on its belief that the juvenile court's January 30, 2018 adjudication and disposition order "was void for lack of jurisdiction." Generally, a trial court has no authority outside the Ohio Civil Rules to vacate a final judgment. See Maxwell v. Univ. Hosps. Health Sys. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104100, 2016-Ohio-7401, 2016 WL 6139091, ¶ 5. However, a trial court possesses the inherent authority to vacate its own void judgments. Patton v. Diemer , 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941 (1988), paragraph four of the syllabus. A motion to vacate a judgment for lack of jurisdiction is a direct attack on an alleged void judgment, and is authorized by common law. Security Ins. Co. v. Regional Transit Auth. , 4 Ohio App.3d 24, 28, 446 N.E.2d 220 (8th Dist.1982) ; Lincoln Tavern, Inc. v. Snader , 165 Ohio St. 61, 64, 133 N.E.2d 606 (1956).
{¶11} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he general term ‘jurisdiction’ can be used to connote several distinct concepts, including jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction over the person, and jurisdiction over a particular case." Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta , 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 18. "Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to entertain and adjudicate a particular class of cases" and "is determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case." Id. at ¶ 19.
Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived and may be challenged at any time. United States v. Cotton , 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) ; State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster , 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). It is a "condition precedent to the court's ability to hear the case. If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void." Id. ; Patton v. Diemer , 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus.
Pratts v. Hurley , 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11.
{¶12} In contrast, jurisdiction of the particular case, otherwise referred to as the "exercise" of jurisdiction, is the trial court's authority to decide a particular case within the class of cases within its subject-matter jurisdiction. See Pratts at ¶ 12. If a court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the invocation or exercise of jurisdiction over a particular case causes a judgment to be voidable rather than void. Id. A voidable judgment "can be set aside only if successfully challenged on direct appeal." State v. Payne , 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 28, citing State v. Filiaggi , 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 240, 714 N.E.2d 867 (1999). Relevant to this appeal, "[c]ompliance with statutory requirements," including the bindover provisions of R.C. Chapter 2152, "are components of a court's exercise of jurisdiction." Huffman v. Huffman , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-698, 2002-Ohio-6031, 2002 WL 31466435, ¶ 40.
{¶13} On appeal, M.J. argues the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to accept his admissions to the juvenile complaint. According to M.J., the juvenile court was not immediately divested of jurisdiction upon the state's filing of the motion for mandatory bindover. Thus, M.J. asserts the juvenile court's adjudication and disposition order was merely voidable and not subject to a common law motion to vacate. For the reasons that follow, we agree.
{¶14} Ohio juvenile courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over cases " ‘concerning any child who on or about the date specified in the complaint, indictment, or information is alleged * * * to be * * * a delinquent * * * child.’ " State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch , 134 Ohio St.3d 421, 2012-Ohio-5697, 983 N.E.2d 302, ¶ 18, quoting R.C. 2151.23(A)(1). "The exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court cannot be waived." State v. Wilson , 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶15} Under certain circumstances, however, " ‘the juvenile court has the duty to transfer a case, or bind a juvenile over, to the adult criminal system.’ " State v. Beauregard , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101418, 2015-Ohio-1021, 2015 WL 1276458, ¶ 12, quoting In re M.P. , 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 11 ; R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12. Under Ohio's juvenile justice system, there are two types of transfers: mandatory and discretionary.
"Discretionary transfer, as its name implies, allows judges the discretion to transfer or bind over to adult court certain juveniles who do not appear to be amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system or appear to be a threat to public safety." State v. Hanning , 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 90, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000).
Mandatory transfer, on the other hand, removes discretion from judges in the transfer decision in certain situations. Id.
Beauregard at ¶¶ 13-14.
{¶16} Mandatory transfers are guided by R.C. 2152.10(A), which provides that, under certain circumstances, a juvenile court must transfer cases to adult court for criminal prosecution "as provided in section 2152.12 of the Revised Code." Relevant to the state's motion to vacate, R.C. 2152.10(A)(2)(c) states that an alleged juvenile delinquent is eligible for mandatory transfer when " Division (A)(2) of section 2152.12 of the Revised Code applies." In turn, R.C. 2152.12(A)(2) provides that the juvenile court shall transfer a case if (1) the circumstances described in R.C. 2152.02(C)(5) apply, or (2) if either of the following applies:
(a) A complaint is filed against a child who is eligible for a discretionary transfer under section 2152.10 of the Revised Code and who previously was convicted of or pleaded guilty to a felony in a case that was transferred to a criminal court.
(b) A complaint is filed against a child who is domiciled in another state [with laws that do not require transfer by the juvenile court].
R.C. 2152.12(A)(2)(a)-(b).
{¶17} Generally, a "child" for the purposes of juvenile delinquency cases is "a person who is under eighteen years of age." R.C. 2152.02(C). However, pursuant to R.C. 2152.02(C)(5) :
Any person whose case is transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant to section 2152.12 of the Revised Code and
who subsequently is convicted of or pleads guilty to a felony in that case, unless a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence is imposed on the child for that offense under division (B)(2) or (3) of section 2152.121 of the Revised Code and the adult portion of that sentence is not invoked pursuant to section 2152.14 of the Revised Code, and any person who is adjudicated a delinquent child for the commission of an act, who has a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence imposed for the act pursuant to section 2152.13 of the Revised Code, and whose adult portion of the dispositional sentence is invoked pursuant to section 2152.14 of the Revised Code, shall be deemed after the conviction, plea, or invocation not to be a child in any case in which a complaint is filed against the person.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2152.02(C)(5).
{¶18} On appeal, the state reiterates its position that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter an adjudication and disposition order in this case because M.J. was subject to mandatory transfer pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(A)(2)(a) and, alternatively, was no longer a "child" under R.C. 2152.02(C)(5) due to his previous bindover and adult criminal conviction. The state asserts that "where the juvenile court mistakenly entertained jurisdiction by accepting the admission rather than transferring the case for adult prosecution or operating under the mistaken belief that [M.J.] was still a child subject to juvenile jurisdiction, the disposition in this case must be deemed void as a result of a nullity." The state further opposes M.J.'s double jeopardy argument, noting that the Ohio Supreme Court has held that " ‘a plea of former jeopardy cannot be based on a void judgment.’ " In re S.J. , 106 Ohio St.3d 11, 2005-Ohio-3215, 829 N.E.2d 1207, ¶ 14, quoting Foran v. Maxwell , 173 Ohio St. 561, 562, 184 N.E.2d 398 (1962).
{¶19} After careful review, we reject the state's assertion that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to accept M.J.'s admissions and enter an order of adjudication and disposition. Pursuant to the language of R.C. 2152.12(A)(2), it is the juvenile court who is to declare whether a transfer is mandatory due to the existence of the circumstances described in R.C. 2152.12(A)(2)(a) or 2152.02(C)(5). See State v. Baker , 7th Dist. Columbiana, 2017-Ohio-7795, 97 N.E.3d 981, ¶ 18. Interpretation and application of these statutes is a matter within a juvenile court's exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 22. It follows, therefore, that a juvenile court does not relinquish jurisdiction over the juvenile complaint until such an analysis is performed and the person has been transferred following a proper bindover procedure as provided in R.C. 2152.12 and Juv.R. 30. Wilson , 73 Ohio St.3d at 44, 652 N.E.2d 196 ("[A]bsent a proper bindover procedure pursuant to [ R.C. 2152.12 ], the juvenile court has the exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged to be a delinquent."). Exclusive jurisdiction was not relinquished in this case. Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate M.J. delinquent and enter a disposition order despite the court's failure to consider the applicable bindover statutes.
{¶20} We do not intend to diminish the significance of the juvenile court's failure to assess whether M.J. was subject to the mandatory transfer provisions of R.C. 2152.12. However, the juvenile court's failure to comply with the statutory requirements or procedures outlined in R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12 implicates an improper exercise of the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. As the Ohio Supreme Court has explained:
"[W]here it is apparent from the allegations that the matter alleged is within the class of cases in which a particular court has been empowered to act, jurisdiction is present. Any subsequent error in the proceedings is only error in the ‘exercise of jurisdiction,’ as distinguished from the want of jurisdiction in the first instance."
Filiaggi , 86 Ohio St.3d at 240, 714 N.E.2d 867, quoting In re Waite , 188 Mich.App. 189, 200, 468 N.W.2d 912 (1991).
{¶21} Thus, in this case, the juvenile court's adjudication and disposition order was merely a voidable exercise of jurisdiction. While the court's failure to consider the statutory requirements of R.C. Chapter 2152 may have resulted in reversible error; it did not divest the court of its subject-matter jurisdiction. See Pratts , 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, at ¶ 34 (finding the trial court's failure to comply with the Ohio Revised Code did not divest the court of its subject-matter jurisdiction). Accordingly, we find the state's motion to vacate M.J.'s original adjudication and disposition for lack of jurisdiction amounted to an impermissible collateral attack on a voidable judgment. The state's only alternative to attack the trial court's improper exercise of jurisdiction was through a timely direct appeal — not a motion to vacate for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the state did not file a direct appeal, it effectively waived any challenge to juvenile court's exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 32. Thus, we are foreclosed from addressing the juvenile court's error in failing to follow the proper statutory procedure for mandatory transfer under R.C. 2152.12.
{¶22} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not have the authority to vacate the voidable judgment. M.J.'s sole assignment of error is sustained. The trial court's judgment vacating the adjudication and disposition order is reversed, and the January 30, 2018 order is reinstated. See Mayfield Hts. v. N.K. , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93166, 2010-Ohio-909, 2010 WL 877524, ¶ 32 (reinstating order sealing defendant's record of conviction where the trial court did not have the authority to vacate the voidable judgment); State v. Powers , 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 02 CA 39, 2002-Ohio-6672, 2002 WL 31730985, ¶¶ 12-14. Our disposition renders M.J.'s arguments regarding the motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds to be moot.
{¶23} Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., and MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR