Opinion
J-S29015-15 No. 2076 WDA 2014 No. 2077 WDA 2014
06-23-2015
IN RE: M.G., A MINOR APPEAL OF: M.A.B. IN RE: M.A., A MINOR APPEAL OF: M.A.B.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order entered November 25, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans' Court, at No(s): TPR 004 of 2014
Appeal from the Order entered November 25, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division, at No(s): TPR 005 of 2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.
Retired Senior Judge specially assigned to the Superior Court.
M.A.B. ("Mother") appeals from orders entered November 25, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her male child, M.G., born in July 2001, and to her male child, M.A., born in March 2008, ("Children"), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We affirm.
The alleged father of M.G., M.G., Sr., is deceased. The alleged father of M.A., M.A., Sr., was unknown when M.A. came into the Allegheny County Department of Children, Youth and Families's ("CYF") custody. An address for M.A., Sr., was eventually located, but M.A., Sr., did not contact CYF throughout the case.
On November 15, 2012, the Allegheny County Department of Children, Youth and Families ("CYF") presented an Application for Shelter Care for M.G. and M.A. when Mother's October 15, 2012 voluntary placement agreement ("VPA") signed by Mother was about to expire. Mother had voluntarily placed the Children into CYF's care because her drug habit had relapsed and she was still in an inpatient treatment program. A shelter care order was signed following a hearing on November 16, 2012. On January 23, 2013, the trial court adjudicated M.G. and M.A. dependent.
The lower court refers to itself as the "trial court," as does Mother. They also refer to the termination proceeding as a "trial." For ease of reference, we utilize their terminology. Of course, as we are sure everyone is aware, the correct term for the proceeding is "hearing." See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2513; 17 West's Pa. Prac., Family Law § 32:6 (7th ed.). --------
Mother's Family Service Plan Goals were: (1) to submit to a drug and alcohol evaluation and to follow any recommended treatments, (2) to maintain contact with CYF and notify it of any change of address or phone number within twenty-four hours, (3) to attend all meetings and court hearings, (4) to have regular visitation with the Children, (5) to obtain housing free of health and safety concerns and maintain it, (6) to keep in contact with Mother's service coordinator, and (7) to follow all recommendations for her mental health treatment.
Mother had a mental health coordinator with whom she kept in touch, but Mother's contact with CYF and other service providers was sporadic. Mother had many phone numbers, but, at times, she moved, changed phone numbers, or her phone had been disconnected. Mother did call CYF intermittently. Mother did not work on all her goals, had a history of homelessness, has been in several different treatment centers, and has a long history of bipolar disease. Mother was previously involved with CYF in 1998 after a positive drug screen following the birth of one of her older children. Mother has seven children, four of whom are older than M.A. None of the four older children remains in Mother's care.
Mother has relapsed repeatedly with regard to her drug and alcohol issues. Since January 23, 2013, Mother has been called for approximately sixty-seven drug screens. She did not show up for twenty-seven of the drug screens. Some of Mother's urine screens were positive for "Benzos" (Benzodiazepines such as Xanax or Ativan).
Mother's visitations with the Children have all been supervised since the Children came into CYF's care because of concerns about Mother's drug and alcohol and mental health issues. CYF filed a motion in March 2014, requesting a reduction in the frequency of Mother's visits with the Children because she was making inappropriate comments to the Children, and CYF was concerned that Mother was not treating the Children fairly, by bringing some of the Children gifts, and allowing some Children to eat and not others. M.A. was one of the Children who was not given gifts—or food.
M.A. has refused to see Mother on some occasions. On August 20, 2014, the trial court reduced Mother's visits with the Children to every other week and changed the goal to adoption. The court found that Mother never demonstrated the ability to parent the Children since the case began and she has never had a stable home environment.
CYF filed a Petition for Termination of Mother's parental rights on January 17, 2014. Neither M.G. nor M.A. was in a pre-adoptive placement at the time of the trial. CYF's petitions were scheduled for a hearing in May 2014. The matters were continued on the motion of CYF to July 2014, and continued again with the consent of all parties to October 17, 2014. On that date, a trial was held, and the trial court took the matters under advisement. On November 25, 2014, the trial court entered an order granting CYF's Petitions for Involuntary Termination of Mother's parental rights to M.G. and M.A. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b).
On December 23, 2014, Mother filed timely notices of appeal, along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(i) and (b). This Court consolidated the appeals filed at 2076 WDA 2014 and 2077 WDA 2014 sua sponte on January 14, 2015.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), which provide as follows.
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
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(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions with a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
Instantly, Mother concedes that CYF presented clear and convincing evidence that her parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Mother's brief states that CYF, the petitioner, did clearly and convincingly establish threshold grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a). See Mother's Brief at 15. Thus, we need only consider whether the court abused its discretion by terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). We have discussed our analysis under Section 2511(b) as follows.
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term 'bond' is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of our analysis. While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and citations omitted).[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In this case, the trial court noted that the nexus between Section 2511(b) and the absence of an imminent adoption home and the termination of parental rights has been addressed in both the Supreme and Superior Courts:
The Superior Court has rejected the suggestion that termination of parental rights is inappropriate when adoption is not imminent and has allowed termination even if it results in the child temporarily being without one or both parents. Additionally, the Superior Court has observed that termination may improve the likelihood of finding an adoptive home. Indeed, in some cases, a child's bond with a parent, who has proven incapable of caring for the child, may impede the child's ability to attach to a pre-adoptive family who can provide the needed care and stability. Nonetheless, the Superior Court has expressed concern for terminating parental rights absent a pre-adoptive home especially in the case of an older child, whose consent is needed for adoption, lest the child age out of foster care without any permanent family.Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/15, at 13 (quoting In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268) (internal citations omitted).
However, as in In re T.S.M., after reviewing the record and the testimony in the case, the trial court ultimately concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights would best serve the Children's needs and welfare. The trial court stated that it considered the nature and the status of the bond between Mother and the Children, and the effects of severing that bond. The court observed that the Children are doing well in foster care and will be in position to be adopted. Although Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., did not recommend terminating Mother's parental rights because of the uncertainty regarding securing an adoptive resource, the trial court credits the testimony of the Children's caseworker that there is a good chance that the Children will be adopted. The trial court concluded that the termination of Mother's parental rights will improve the Children's prospects for adoption because prospective adoptive parents will not risk making a commitment to adopt a child who may not be adoptable since the birth parents' rights may not yet be terminated. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/15, at 14.
The trial court is aware of the risk of terminating Mother's parental rights when no one is presently considering adoption of these Children. Mother, however, has an abysmal record of compliance. Mother has a long history of drug use, mental health issues, and housing issues—all of which Mother has failed to remedy. See id. at 14. The trial court must "choose between the risk that the [C]hildren may not be adopted because parental rights are not terminated versus the risk that these [C]hildren will remain in care until they age out of the system." Id. The trial court found that it is in the best interest of the Children to be adopted and that the probability the Children will be adopted is increased if parental rights are terminated. See id.
The trial court also found that the Children's futures cannot be held hostage to the unlikely possibility that Mother will be a proper parent to the Children sometime in the future in light if her history of addiction, treatment, and relapse over three decades. See id. Although there is no one immediately available to adopt them, the trial court reasoned that the Children are good prospects for adoption, and termination of Mother's parental rights will enhance their prospects. See id. at 14-15.
The trial court's findings are eminently reasonable. Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children, we affirm the orders of the trial court.
Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/23/2015