Opinion
J-S60041-15 No. 1063 EDA 2015 No. 1064 EDA 2015
02-17-2016
ESTATE OF JOHN W. MEYERS, DECEASED APPEAL OF: WILLIAM H. MEYERS, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN W. MEYERS, SR. AND TRUSTEE OF THE TRUST OF JOHN W. MEYERS, DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1991 IN RE: TRUST OF JOHN W. MEYERS, SR., SETTLOR APPEAL OF: WILLIAM H. MEYERS, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN W. MEYERS, SR. AND TRUSTEE OF THE TRUST OF JOHN W. MEYERS, DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 1991
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Dated March 26, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Orphans' Court at No(s): OC No. 2008-X3532 Appeal from the Order Dated March 26, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Orphans' Court at No(s): OC No. 2009-X3732 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:
William H. Meyers ("Meyers"), Executor of the Will of John W. Meyers, Sr. ("Decedent") and Trustee of the Trust of John W. Meyers dated September 10, 1991, appeals from the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Orphans' Court Division, declaring that Appellee, Jane M. Algard, established the existence of an enforceable oral contract to make a will between herself and Decedent. Upon careful review, we affirm on the opinion authored by the Honorable Lois E. Murphy.
The within matter was filed under two separate docket numbers in the lower court, one for the decedent's estate case-type, in which an appeal from probate and account were filed, and one for the trust matter, in which a petition to void an intervivos trust was filed. The trial court issued identical orders on each docket and the matter has been consolidated on appeal.
Decedent died a resident of Montgomery County on October 15, 2008, leaving a will dated March 7, 2006, and a Revocable Deed of Trust dated February 16, 2006. Decedent's wife, Eva, predeceased him on December 22, 1983. Surviving Decedent were his five children, William H. Meyers, Mildred Trumbauer, John W. Meyers, Jr., Paul Meyers and Jane Meyers Algard ("Jane"). Pursuant to Decedent's will, his entire estate, including the family farm ("Farm"), was to pour over into a Revocable Trust. The Trust, in turn, provided, in relevant part, that upon Decedent's death, the Farm be distributed to his grandson, William R. Meyers, son of William H. Meyers.
At issue in this case was whether an oral contract to make a will existed between the Decedent and his daughter, Jane. Specifically, Jane claimed that Decedent had agreed to give her the Farm upon his death in exchange for living with him after the death of his wife (her mother) and providing him with assistance. Jane asserted this claim in two separate filings before the court: an appeal from probate and a petition to void an inter vivos trust, both alleging lack of capacity and undue influence and breach of contract to will. Jane ultimately opted not to pursue her lack of capacity and undue influence claims and proceeded to trial solely on the claim of contract to will.
A trial was held on January 14 and 15, 2014, after which Judge Murphy issued an opinion and order finding that an oral contract to will existed between Jane and the Decedent and that Jane was entitled to enforce her claim against the estate for a sum equal in value to the value of the Farm as of the date of Decedent's death. This timely appeal followed, in which Meyers raises the following issues for our review:
Pursuant to Pa.O.C.R. 7.1, the filing of exceptions to a decree of the Orphans' Court are optional and the failure to do so will not result in the waiver of any issue on appeal that has been otherwise properly preserved. We note that the Orphans' Court did not order William to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
1. Did the [c]ourt err in finding, in footnote 3 on page 2 of the [o]pinion, that [William] failed to reflect in the First and Final Account the value of assets held jointly between [William] and Decedent which were contributed back to the estate, which joint
accounts were reflected as "Subsequent Principal Receipts" on pages 1-2 of the First and Final Account?Brief of Appellant, at 3-4.
2. Did the [c]ourt err in finding that the evidence offered as proof of a contract to will, including offer, acceptance and consideration, was shown with certainty and lucidity and was clear, direct, precise and convincing, in light of testimony of multiple different alleged agreements between the parties?
3. Did the [c]ourt err in finding that the Statute of Frauds did not apply to the alleged agreement to transfer real estate pursuant to an alleged contract to will?
4. Did the [c]ourt err in finding that [Jane] did not breach the alleged contract to will when she voluntarily vacated the farm property and ceased providing the alleged services to Decedent?
5. Did the [c]ourt err in finding that, as a creditor of Decedent's estate, [Jane] was entitled to the full value of the entire farm, less the excluded animals and equipment, rather than the value of the services provided prior to breach, based on quantum meruit?
We begin by noting our standard of review:
When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans' Court, this Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error and the court's factual findings are supported by the evidence. Because the Orphans' Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we will not reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of that discretion. However, we are not constrained to give the same deference to any resulting legal conclusions. Where the rules of law on which the court relied are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable, we will reverse the court's decree.Estate of Fuller , 87 A.3d 330, 333 (Pa. Super. 2014), quoting In re Estate of Hooper , 80 A.3d 815, 818 (Pa. Super. 2013).
William first claims that the Orphans' Court erred by noting in its opinion that the account he filed in the Decedent's estate failed to reflect the value of certain assets held jointly between him and Decedent, which he asserts he "contributed back" to the estate. William asserts that these accounts were, in fact, included in the account under "Subsequent Principal Receipts." We find this issue to be moot.
Upon review of the account, it does appear that the joint accounts were included as receipts of principal. See First and Final Account, 10/27/11, at 1-2. However, we are unable to discern the manner in which William was prejudiced by the statement made by Judge Murphy, in passing, in a footnote, in the opinion supporting her order of March 26, 2015. In the March 26, 2015 order, the court, inter alia, directed William to restate his account and file an amended petition for adjudication "reflecting the claim of Jane M. Algard and taking a position with respect to the value of the claim." Orphans' Court Order, 3/26/15. Thus, it is clear that the restatement of the account was necessitated not by any failure on William's part to include the value of the joint assets, but by the changed circumstances created by the court's resolution of Jane's claim, as well as by the passage of time. For this reason, William is entitled to no relief on this claim.
We note that an order directing the filing of an account is not an appealable order as defined by Pa.R.A.P. 342.
William's remaining claims all relate to Judge Murphy's rulings regarding the existence of a contract to will and the value of Jane's claim with respect thereto. "A contract to make a will in a certain manner or to bequeath by will a specific monetary sum is recognized in Pennsylvania as valid, provided the creation of such contract and its terms are proven with clarity and conviction and valid consideration shown[.]" Fahringer v. Estate of Strine , 216 A.2d 82, 85 (Pa. 1966) (citation omitted). A party seeking to enforce a contract to will must bear an "exacting evidentiary burden," Estate of Friedman , 398 A.2d 615, 625 (Pa. 1978), which our Supreme Court has summarized as follows:
Certain rules have been established in this area of the law: (a) a contract to make a will or to bequeath by will, as other contracts, must be established by proof of an offer, an acceptance and legal consideration; (b) the terms of the contract must be shown with certainty and lucidity; (c) the evidence must be scrutinized with great care; (d) there must be "direct evidence" in proof of the contract; [and] (e) as in the case of other claims against a decedent's estate, the evidence in proof of the contract, must be "clear, direct, precise and convincing[.]"Fahringer , 216 A.2d at 85 (internal citations omitted). The testimony of a third party is sufficient to establish the existence of an oral contract. Petro v. Secary Estate , 170 A.2d 325, 327 (Pa. 1961) (testimony of claimant's son, who was sole witness to claimant's contract with decedent, deemed sufficient to satisfy burden of proof and establish oral contract).
Where, as here, the subject of the contract is real property, the Statute of Frauds must be satisfied. Although "[t]he statute itself contains no directive as to what writing constitutes a sufficient memorandum[,] . . . decisions demonstrate that a sufficient memorandum need contain only two basic items: (1) a sufficient statement of the terms of the agreement, and (2) the signature of the grantor, i.e., the party against whom enforcement is sought[.]" Beeruk Estate , 241 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. 1968) (citations omitted).
The Statute of Frauds, Act of March 21, 1772, 1 Sm. L. 389, sec. 1, 33 P.S. 1, requires that a transfer of title to real estate be in writing, or by act and operation of law.
Instantly, we have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the record and the applicable law, and conclude that Judge Murphy's opinion thoroughly and correctly addresses William's claims numbered two and three, and we affirm on that basis. Specifically, the court found that: (1) credible testimony proved the existence of an oral contract to will by clear and convincing evidence; and (2) the 1991 deed of trust, in which Decedent named Jane as remainder beneficiary, unambiguously memorializes the Decedent's intention under the parties' agreement and constitutes a sufficient memorandum so as to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 3/23/15, at 9-14.
Under the 1991 trust, Jane was to receive the Farm and all household property. Decedent gave his son, John, Jr., the option to continue farming the land for a period of one year after the Decedent's death, and thereafter by lease from Jane at her discretion. In 2006, Decedent executed a Revocable Trust Agreement that amended and restated the 1991 agreement in its entirety and gave the Farm to Decedent's grandson, William R. Meyers. --------
In his final issues, William asserts that the court arrived at an incorrect measure of damages in awarding to Jane the value of the entire Farm, rather than the value of the services she performed prior to her alleged breach. William claims that, because the agreement between Jane and the Decedent is unenforceable, Jane is entitled only to quantum meruit. William further asserts that, because claims in implied contract are subject to six-year statute of limitations, Jane's claim is barred because it accrued prior to July 15, 2003, six years prior to the date the estate accounting was filed in this matter. Brief of Appellant, at 21, citing Estate of Koonce , 161 A. 578 (Pa. Super. 1932) (statute of limitations bars claims for wages earned in performance of services more than six years before filing of debtor's estate account). We have already concluded that Judge Murphy properly determined that an enforceable contract to will existed. Thus, this argument fails.
In the alternative, William asserts that, even if the parties did have an enforceable agreement, Jane breached the agreement in October 2001 when she moved out of Decedent's home. Thus, William argues, the statute of limitations on Jane's claim for quantum meruit began to run in October 2001, such that Jane's claim was barred as of 2007. We find this claim to be without merit.
Judge Murphy found that the credible evidence and testimony adduced at trial demonstrated that "the circumstances and events that occurred in the spring of 2001 through October 2001 caused Jane to leave [Decedent's] home and prevented Jane's continued performance" under the parties' agreement. Orphans' Court Opinion, 3/23/15, at 15. Specifically, following Decedent's hospitalization for a quadruple bypass in April 2001, family discord arose that appeared to originate with Jane's suggestion that Decedent sell his cows because of his ill health. Id. at 16. Although Decedent had agreed to sell the cows, "it appears that Jane's exercise of authority regarding the sale of the cows and the proposed sale of the farm equipment provoked a negative reaction from the rest of the family." Id. at 16-17. Decedent became cold towards Jane and began to "shun" her. Id. at 18. Decedent ignored Jane and refused to speak to her. Living under these conditions took an emotional toll on Jane and caused her lupus to flare up. Id. at 17-18. Jane had difficulty sleeping, her hair fell out in clumps, she lost her appetite, and her walking became "stilted and rigid." Id. at 18. As a result of the adverse impact the situation was having on her health and emotional well-being, Jane and her husband decided to leave Decedent's home. Id.
In light of the foregoing, the court concluded that Jane fulfilled her obligations under the parties' agreement until such time as the Decedent's actions no longer permitted her to do so. As such, the court concluded that Jane did not breach the contract and was entitled to enforce the agreement against the estate. Our review indicates that the Orphans' Court's findings are all supported by competent evidence of record. Estate of Fuller , supra .
Moreover, the court did not err in awarding Jane the full value of the Farm as of the date of Decedent's death. "It is well settled, as a principle of fundamental justice, that where one party to a contract is himself the cause of a failure of performance by the other party, he cannot take advantage of his own breach of the contract in so doing, to prevent a recovery by the other party[.]" Edelman v. Boardman , 2 A.2d 393, 395 (Pa. 1938) (citation omitted). As Decedent's own actions prevented Jane from performing her obligations under the agreement, Jane is entitled to receive the full benefit of her bargain.
Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 2/17/2016
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