Opinion
No. 96-CA-1685.
July 30, 1997.
APPEAL FROM CIVIL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS, NO. 84-1612, STATE OF LOUISIANA, HONORABLE GERALD P. FEDOROFF, J.
Robert E. Arceneaux, Jerry B. Jordan, Barham Arceneaux, New Orleans, for Appellees Carol and Alan Melancon.
Andrew A. Braun, Carole Cukell Neff, Sessions Fishman, New Orleans, for Appellee First National Bank of Commerce.
Keith Couture, Chalmette, for Appellant Alan J. Abadie.
Before BARRY, KLEES and LANDRIEU, JJ.
Appellant Alan J. Abadie appeals the judgment of the district court declaring him no longer a beneficiary of the Merlin A. Abadie Inter Vivos Trust. Upon our review of the record, we reverse.
The Merlin A. Abadie trust was created in July of 1975 by the United States Air Force as settlor in a settlement of the tort claim brought by Alan J. Abadie and his then-wife, Carol Abadie, on behalf of their minor child, Merlin. Merlin is the first beneficiary of the Trust; the funds are primarily used for his considerable health care expenses. However, Alan and Carol were described within the instrument, respectively, as the second and third beneficiaries of the Trust. Each received a payment of $50,000.00 at the outset, to compensate them for mental anguish; furthermore, the instrument provided for an annual payment of $5,000.00 to be paid to the Abadies jointly, "as compensation for extraordinary services they may have rendered the First Beneficiary during the preceding calendar year because of his medical condition." This money was to be paid as long as Merlin remained in the family home and was not institutionalized.
Merlin had been injured during delivery at an Air Force hospital; his injuries rendered him permanently and severely disabled.
The Abadies were legally separated in June of 1978, and divorced in January of 1980. Merlin remained in the custody of Carol Abadie, who remarried and is now Carol Melancon. The Trust instrument contained no provisions as to how or if the Trust was to be modified upon the dissolution of the parents' marriage. This has created some difficulties over the years, beginning with Carol and Alan's disagreement as to how the annual payment of $5,000.00 should be disbursed. The trustee bank, First National Bank of Commerce ("FNBC"), filed an action regarding the interpretation of these Trust provisions.
In this first case in district court, the trial judge found that the $5,000.00 was intended to compensate the parents for hands-on care given to Merlin throughout the year; since Carol had custody, and Alan had only very infrequent contact with Merlin, the trial court found that Carol should receive the entire $5,000.00. A law appealed to this court, which affirmed that holding. In re Merlin A. Abadie Inter Vivos Trust, 483 So.2d 1292 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1986.) (Hereinafter Abadie I.)
The Abadie I litigation dealt only with the issue of the $5,000.00. Neither the trial court nor this court of appeal dealt directly with the issue of Alan's status in regards to the Trust.
Carol Abadie Melancon, her new husband, and Merlin have since moved away from Louisiana, and now reside in Nebraska. Relations between Carol and Alan have, by both their accounts, been somewhat strained in the years following their separation. Alan professes, in his brief, to have had long-standing suspicions about Carol's administration of the funds for Merlin's care. These suspicions were aggravated by a recent event in which Carol was apparently over-reimbursed for the purchase of a new wheelchair for Merlin. Although Carol repaid the Trust, Alan now wished to examine the Trust records and evaluate her expenditures for himself.
Trustee FNBC originally consented to this examination; Abadie was described in the Trust instrument as a beneficiary and as such should have the right to inspect these records. However, this consent was later withdrawn. FNBC was uncertain as to Alan's status in the Trust; since he no longer received any form of compensation or benefit from the Trust, could he still be called a beneficiary?
The present suit was filed in an effort to resolve this question. The trial court found that, as Alan no longer received any benefits from the Trust, the first judgment had had the effect of removing him as a beneficiary. A second judgment was issued, stating that since Alan was no longer a beneficiary, he no longer had the right to inspect the books and records of the Trust. From this judgment he appeals.
L.C.C.P. article 1951 describes the circumstances in which a final judgment can be amended. The trial court may do this with or without notice, on its own motion or that of any party, to alter the phraseology of the judgment, but not the substance, or to correct errors of calculation. A judgment may only be amended where the later judgment takes nothing from or adds nothing to the original judgment. Where an amendment to a judgment adds to, subtracts from, or in any way affects the substance of this judgment, such judgment may not be amended under article 1951. Starnes v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 94-1647 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/6/95), 670 So.2d 1242. Alan argues that this second judgment by the trial court has substantially altered the first judgment, and as such should be considered invalid. We find merit in this argument.
Absent timely motion for new trial or appeal.
Article 1951 does not permit the trial court to substantively alter a final judgment even if the amendment merely expresses the trial court's actual intention. McLemore v. Fox, 609 So.2d 1209, 1211 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1992.) The trial court's written judgment is controlling even though the trial court may have intended otherwise. Starnes, supra, at 1246. A second judgment containing substantive amendments to the original judgment is an absolute nullity. Magill v. State of Louisiana, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, 27,802 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/24/96), 666 So.2d 1260, 1263.
In Abadie I, the case and judgment focused strictly on the issue of the $5,000.00 annual payment. At no time is Alan's continued status as a beneficiary mentioned, much less expressly revoked.
Appellee Carol Melancon argues that, since the first judgment cut off any future payments to Alan, his interest in the Trust ended there. By this reasoning, the second judgment is not a modification of Abadie I, but the only possible interpretation of its effects. However, Alan points out that his interest in the Trust is not only pecuniary; he has a continued interest in his son Merlin's well-being, and in the continued careful management of the Trust funds that will ensure Merlin's security. His rights as a beneficiary — including the right to inspect the books and records — do not terminate, as long as he has this important interest. It is precisely these rights which were not taken into account in Abadie I, and thus forbid the second judgment's later, broader interpretation.
Carol Abadie Melancon argued, in her brief, for sanctions for frivolous appeal; as we have found merit in Alan Abadie's argument, we dismiss her plea for sanctions without further comment.
Accordingly, for the reasons expressed above, we reverse the judgment of the lower court and find that Alan Abadie remains a beneficiary of the Merlin A. Abadie Inter Vivos Trust.
REVERSED .
BARRY, J., concurs with reasons.
LANDRIEU, J., concurs.
The 1984 judgment declared that Carol Melancon should receive the annual $5,000 payment provided that she fulfilled the trust provisions. Years later FNBC filed a rule for judicial interpretation and instructions pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2233 which provides that a trustee in an ordinary or summary proceeding may apply to the court for instructions concerning the trust, the interpretation of the trust instrument, or the administration of the trust. In its rule FNBC noted Mr. Abadie's request for all records and supporting documentation submitted by Carol Melancon and requested a determination as to Mr. Abadie's status as a beneficiary and the scope of his right to inspect. On March 4, 1996 the trial court rendered judgment declaring that Mr. Abadie had no beneficial interest in the trust and no right to request records. Mr. Abadie appeals that judgment. He also filed a motion to remand for an evidentiary hearing which was denied by this Court.
Mr. Abadie argues that under La.C.C.P. art. 1951 the trial court improperly amended the 12 year old 1984 judgment. FNBC did not file a motion to amend, its rule was for a judicial interpretation, and the 1996 judgment was not an amended judgment. In reasons the trial court noted that the clear intent of the 1984 judgment was to remove Mr. Abadie as a beneficiary: however, the court did not change the judgment. At issue in the rule was whether Mr. Abadie was a beneficiary and whether he should be allowed to inspect the trust records. There is no merit to FNBC's arguments relating to La.C.C.P. art. 1951.
If there were merit to the argument that the 1996 judgment was an improper amendment of the 1984 judgment, the 1996 judgment would be an absolute nullity and there would be no judgment to reverse.
The 1984 judgment did not decide Mr. Abadie's beneficiary status. FNBC filed a rule for a decision on that issue. The trial court erred when it declared that Mr. Abadie, the father of Merlin Abadie, had no beneficiary interest in the trust. He remains a beneficiary.
I respectfully concur.
In the event of the death or incapacity of Carol Melancon or her mistreatment of Merlin, Alan Abadie might once again be the recipient of funds from the trust or the caretaker of his major son. The fact that he temporarily receives no funds from the trust does not terminate his status as a named beneficiary.