Opinion
F051041 F052092
4-15-2008
In re MELVIN J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MELVIN J., Defendant and Appellant.
Edgar Eugene Page, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, J. Robert Jibson, Judy Kaida and Jesse Witt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Melvin J. made a plea agreement in juvenile court. He contends the disposition is wrong for a number of reasons. We disagree with his contentions and affirm the order of the juvenile court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
A petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 was filed on July 6, 2004, in Sacramento County Superior Court, Juvenile Division (Sacramento Juvenile Court). The petition alleged that Melvin J. had committed forcible rape, in violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(2). At the time of the incident, Melvin was 17 years old.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
A warrant for Melvins arrest was issued on July 27, 2004. In May 2005 Melvin was arrested in Fresno and transported to Sacramento. At the detention hearing, Melvin was released on his own recognizance.
The defense filed a motion for a jury trial that the Sacramento Juvenile Court denied on October 5, 2005.
On January 31, 2006, pursuant to a plea agreement, Melvin admitted to a felony sexual battery, in violation of section 243.4, subdivision (a). The terms of the plea agreement were: (1) the maximum period of confinement would be four years; (2) there would be no initial commitment to the California Youth Authority (CYA); (3) the charge would not constitute a strike; (4) the charge would not be reduced to a misdemeanor; and (5) Melvin would not be required to register as a sex offender.
The California Youth Authority is now known as the California Department of Corrections, Juvenile Justice. For the sake of clarity and consistency with the designation used by the trial court, we will refer to that entity as CYA in this opinion.
The Sacramento County Probation Department filed a report recommending that the case be transferred for disposition to Fresno County, where Melvin lived and worked. The case was transferred and on March 21, 2006, Fresno County Superior Court, Juvenile Division (Fresno Juvenile Court) accepted the transfer.
Melvin moved to withdraw his admission. The Fresno Juvenile Court denied the request on July 7, 2006. Also on July 7, the juvenile court adjudged Melvin a ward of the court and placed him under the supervision of the Fresno County Probation Department until March 10, 2007. The juvenile court also committed Melvin to the Ashjian Treatment Center for a period not to exceed 240 days. The juvenile court stayed imposition for seven days in order to allow Melvin to "get his affairs in order" prior to entering the treatment center.
Melvin failed to turn himself in as ordered in the original disposition and the juvenile court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. Melvin was arrested pursuant to the bench warrant on November 20, 2006.
On January 11, 2007, Melvin appeared before the Fresno Juvenile Court. Melvin stated he had failed to turn himself in because he was scared of being in custody. He expressed regret for his decision.
After considering the circumstance of the offense and Melvins failure to appear, the Fresno Juvenile Court ordered that Melvin be confined in CYA for a period of three years.
On August 18, 2006, Melvin filed an appeal from the original disposition order committing him to the Ashjian Treatment Center. That appeal was assigned case No. F051041. On January 11, 2007, Melvin appealed from the subsequent disposition order committing him to CYA. That appeal was assigned case No. F052092. By order dated March 5, 2008, the two appeals were ordered consolidated.
DISCUSSION
Melvin contends that there was a mutual mistake of fact relative to the plea agreement and the Fresno Juvenile Court abused its discretion when it denied his request to withdraw his plea. Melvin also argues that the Sacramento Juvenile Court failed to determine that a transfer to the Fresno Juvenile Court furthered his best interests. Additionally, Melvin claims that he was entitled to a jury or, alternatively, his request for a jury should have been treated as a request to be tried as an adult. Finally, Melvin contends the Fresno Juvenile Court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to CYA.
I. Plea Agreement
Melvin contends there was a mutual mistake of fact regarding the terms of the plea agreement. He claims that, based upon discussions with his attorney in Sacramento, he was under the impression he would not serve any in-custody time. The record does not support this contention.
At the time the Sacramento Juvenile Court accepted his plea, the terms of the agreement were set forth on the record. With respect to in-custody time, the plea agreement provided that Melvin "cant get the youth authority at the outset." There was no discussion or agreement that Melvin would not be placed into custody in any other setting. At the time the juvenile court accepted Melvins plea, the court found that the plea was "freely and voluntarily made with full knowledge of his rights."
Additionally, a second settled statement was filed on August 3, 2007. In that document it was agreed that the plea bargain provided that Melvin would not be sent to CYA at original disposition. All other options remained available, including juvenile hall, a youth center, a boys ranch, county jail, and in-and-out-of-state placement. The Sacramento Juvenile Court and the parties specifically understood that all options short of a youth authority commitment were to remain available to the Fresno Juvenile Court.
Furthermore, when Melvin asked to withdraw his plea, he did not testify or submit any declaration from himself or his Sacramento attorney to support his assertion that the plea agreement included a provision of no in-custody time. There was virtually no evidence presented in support of the motion to withdraw the plea. (People v. Brotherton (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 195, 200.)
It is clear there was no mutual mistake regarding the terms of the plea agreement. The original disposition complied with the plea agreement because there was no prohibition against in-custody time other than an initial commitment to CYA. Thus, the Fresno Juvenile Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Melvins request to withdraw his plea.
II. Transfer to Fresno Juvenile Court
Melvin contends that the Sacramento Juvenile Court failed to determine whether a transfer to the Fresno Juvenile Court was in his best interests, which he argues is required by rule 5.610(e) of the California Rules of Court. Rule 5.610(e) provides in relevant part that a juvenile court must consider whether to transfer a case to the county of residence of the childs custodian and, prior to transferring the case, must ascertain whether the transfer is in the best interest of the child.
The transfer order stated that Melvins legal residence was in Fresno County and that the transfer to Fresno County was in Melvins best interest because it was where he resided. The second settled statement states that at the time the matter was transferred from Sacramento County to Fresno County, Melvin was 18 years old; he had no parent or sibling in Sacramento; and he had no current ties to Sacramento. The transfer to Fresno County was determined to be in Melvins best interest because Fresno was his county of residence and he had no ties to the Sacramento community.
The Sacramento County Probation Department recommended the transfer to Fresno County. Melvin did not object to the transfer at or before the time it was ordered. Failure to object to the transfer at the time it was ordered constitutes a forfeiture of any claim of error for purposes of appeal. (People v. Remington (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 423, 431.)
Furthermore, the record supports the transfer order. Although Melvin had an aunt in Sacramento, whom he had been visiting at the time he committed the offense, at the time of his arrest he was living in Fresno with the mother of his three-year-old child. Melvin was employed as an apartment manager in the complex where he resided, had two sisters living in the same complex, and claimed to be attending school in Fresno and working toward a high school diploma. These facts were all before the Sacramento Juvenile Court prior to issuance of the transfer order.
We conclude the Sacramento Juvenile Court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Melvins case transferred to Fresno County.
III. Right to Jury Trial
Melvin contends that since certain juvenile adjudications can be used as a strike for purposes of sentence enhancement under the three strikes law, he should have been afforded a jury trial upon request. He makes this argument even though his adjudication could not be used as a strike without violating the terms of his plea agreement. In any event, his argument does not persuade us.
Juveniles are not entitled to jury trials. (In re Myresheia W. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 734, 736.) Furthermore, even if the juvenile adjudication can be used as a strike, there is no right to a jury in a juvenile proceeding. (People v. Buchanan (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 139, 149.) We agree with the cited authorities.
We also reject Melvins contention that his request for a jury trial in the juvenile adjudication should have been interpreted as a request to be tried as an adult. Throughout his motion, Melvin asserted that he was entitled to a jury trial in the context of a juvenile adjudication. Neither in that motion nor after the Sacramento Juvenile Court denied the motion did Melvin request he be tried as an adult.
IV. CYA Commitment
Melvin contends that the Fresno Juvenile Court abused its discretion when it ordered him committed to CYA without first determining if less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate.
The states purpose in juvenile proceedings is rehabilitative. "The proceedings are intended to secure for the minor such care and guidance as will best serve the interests of the minor and the state and to impose upon the minor a sense of responsibility for his or her actions." (In re Myresheia W., supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 741.) The juvenile court must consider several relevant factors in determining what order to issue when a petition is sustained, including the age of the minor, the circumstances and gravity of the offense, and the minors prior delinquent history. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 725.5.)
Here, the probation report noted that Melvin had admitted to using alcohol, marijuana, and methamphetamine. He had not graduated from high school, and he had been the subject of prior sustained juvenile petitions.
Melvin first had been ordered committed to the Ashjian Treatment Center and was given seven days to report. Instead, he failed to report and an arrest warrant had to be issued. His failure to appear caused a delay that reduced the juvenile courts options. As he was 20 years old at the time of disposition, there were no local programs available and his educational and treatment needs could not be met locally.
The Fresno Juvenile Court found that the original offense "involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness." The juvenile court also stated that it had considered less restrictive programs and determined that they were inappropriate dispositions. The juvenile court further found it was "probable that the former minor will benefit by the reformatory and educational discipline or other treatment as provided for by the California Youth Authority." At CYA, Melvin could complete his high school education, be treated for substance abuse, and receive anger management counseling. He also would receive counseling regarding his participation in the sexual offense.
A juvenile courts commitment order will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329-1330.) The Fresno Juvenile Court properly considered not only the nature and gravity of the offense, but also circumstances unique to Melvin. Under these facts, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Melvin to CYA. (Id. at p. 1330.)
Because we earlier concluded that the transfer of Melvins case to the Fresno Juvenile Court was appropriate, we need not address Melvins contention that the Fresno Juvenile Court lacked jurisdiction because the transfer was improper.
DISPOSITION
The commitment order is affirmed.
We concur:
VARTABEDIAN, Acting P.J.
GOMES, J.