Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. John I. Kelly, Judge, Super. Ct. No. HC009540A
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Jessica N. Blonien and Krista L. Pollard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant.
Mark A. Arnold, Public Defender, and David L. Kelly, Deputy Public Defender, for Respondent.
OPINION
Gomes, J.
The trial court granted Ray Medina’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) could not order forfeiture of his work time credits following a disciplinary hearing because notice of the charges was not provided to Medina within the applicable time limits. Consequently, the trial court ordered the Department to restore Medina’s work time credits. The Department appeals, contending the trial court erred in so ordering because all applicable time frames were satisfied. As we shall explain, we agree with the Department and reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 16, 2005, a correctional officer issued a rules violation report (RVR; also referred to as a CDC Form 115) charging Medina, a prison inmate, with battery on a peace officer. A copy of the RVR was given to Medina on August 25, 2005. Following a disciplinary hearing held on September 24, 2005, the hearing officer found Medina guilty and assessed a forfeiture of 150 days work time credits.
Medina filed an administrative appeal challenging the disciplinary decision, contending, among other things, that he was denied the presence of a requested witness and the hearing was not timely. In a second level appeal response, the Department granted the appeal in part and issued a modification order. The response, signed by the chief deputy warden, stated that all disciplinary time constraints were met pursuant to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, as Medina was issued the first copy of the RVR within 15 days from the date staff discovered the information leading to the charges, he was issued all non-confidential documentation relied on at the hearing at least 24 hours before the hearing, and the hearing was conducted within 30 days of the date he received his first copy of the RVR. The response also stated, however, that there had been a due process error when the hearing officer denied Medina a witness he requested, and in the interest of justice “this RVR will be reissued and reheard,” and a modification order generated to ensure Medina would be afforded the right to witnesses at the hearing. The response further stated: “This section of the appeal is GRANTED, due to the fact the disposition is being vacated and the RVR will be reissued and reheard. Additionally, [Medina] will be provided another opportunity to present his defense at the hearing. Time constraints were not met for this RVR, therefore credit forfeiture may not be assessed if found guilty at the rehearing.” (Emphasis in original.)
On January 11, 2006, a modification order was issued which stated that as a result of a “Level II Decision,” Medina’s appeal had been granted in part and the RVR should be reissued and reheard due to denial of a witness. The RVR was reissued on January 23, 2006, and a copy was given to Medina on January 25, 2006. A disciplinary hearing on the reissued RVR was held on February 24, 2006, at which Medina was allowed his requested witnesses. After considering the evidence, the senior hearing officer (SHO) found Medina guilty and assessed a forfeiture of 150 days work time credits. In discussing the modification order, the SHO noted the second level appeal response indicated the time frames in the original hearing were violated, thereby precluding the assessment of a credit forfeiture in this hearing, but he had reviewed the original hearing and “the alleged violation of time frames is unfounded,” as the date of discovery was August 16, 2005, the first RVR was issued on August 25, 2005, and the hearing was held on September 24, 2005. The SHO concluded that the times frames were met and credit forfeiture was appropriate.
Medina filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court challenging the assessed credit loss on the grounds the first disciplinary hearing was untimely and the guilt finding was not supported by the evidence. The superior court issued an order to show cause and appointed counsel for Medina. While the court rejected Medina’s sufficiency of the evidence claim, it found a prima facie case for relief was stated based on the discrepancy between the statement in the second level appeal response prohibiting forfeiture of credits on rehearing and the SHO’s re-assessment of credits following the second disciplinary hearing. The court therefore granted the petition in part and issued an order to show cause “limited to the issue of whether or not the hearing officer possesses the power to forfeit his credits in conjunction with the re-hearing more than 30 days after the misconduct.” Specifically, the court ordered the Department to show cause why Medina may be deprived of work credits “for the reasons articulated by [the SHO] in his February 24th, 2006, hearing report or why the credits shall not be restored as ordered in the January 3, Response ...”.
The court noted that Medina’s administrative appeal from the February 24, 2006 decision was denied as untimely, but nevertheless excused Medina’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies because the loss of credits was substantial.
The Department filed a return, arguing the first disciplinary hearing was timely and the SHO at the second disciplinary hearing could properly conclude he was authorized to consider and reject Medina’s time constraints claim. In response, Medina pointed out that the first disciplinary hearing “was flawed by a due process violation,” and argued nothing in the California Code of Regulations provides that “a defective, nullified hearing somehow acts to toll the mandatory time-frames” contained in California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3320, subdivision (b), which states that charges shall be heard within 30 days from the date the inmate is provided a copy of the CDC Form 115.
All further statutory references are to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, unless otherwise noted.
The trial court issued an order granting the petition. The court noted the issue could be decided without a hearing because it involved interpretation of regulations. The court found the first disciplinary hearing was conducted within the time guidelines set forth in section 3320, subdivision (b), but the January 25, 2006, service of the reissued RVR was untimely because it was not served within 15 days of the August 16, 2005 misconduct. The court concluded the failure to serve the reissued RVR within that time period deprived the Department of the ability to forfeit Medina’s credits and ordered the Department to restore them.
The Department filed a request for reconsideration of the order, asserting reconsideration was appropriate because it did not know from Medina’s petition that it should address the timeliness of the second disciplinary hearing. The Department pointed out, for the first time, that under section 3084.5, subdivision (h)(3), when a disciplinary hearing is ordered reissued and reheard, the time constraints begin on the date the new CDC Form 115 is written, and since here the CDC Form 115 was reissued on January 23, 2006, and provided to Medina less than 15 days later, on January 25, 2006, it was timely. Medina filed an opposition to the request for reconsideration. The superior court denied the Department’s request for reconsideration, noting that while section 3084.5, subdivision (h)(3) “does apply to commence new time periods again after an appeal results in the vacation of a disciplinary hearing,” this was not new law and therefore did not warrant reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
The Department contends the trial court’s order must be reversed because both of Medina’s disciplinary hearings were timely under the Penal Code and California Code of Regulations. We agree.
As the trial court recognized, the resolution of this issue turns on interpretation of the applicable regulations. Since the trial court granted relief without an evidentiary hearing, there are no disputed issues of fact and our review of the trial court’s decision is necessarily de novo. (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 677 [where trial court granted habeas petition “based solely upon documentary evidence,” appellate court will “independently review the record”]; In re Zepeda (2006)141 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1496-1497.)
Before a credit loss may be assessed for violating prison rules, the disciplinary hearing must be held within the time frames defined by the Penal Code and California Code of Regulations. (Pen. Code, § 2932, subd. (c)(1); § 3320, subd. (f).) An inmate must be provided a copy of the CDC Form 115 within 15 days after the discovery of information leading to the charges and a disciplinary hearing must be held within 30 days after being given the CDC Form 115. (Pen. Code, § 2932, subd. (c); § 3320, subd. (a) [“A classified copy of the CDC Form 115 ... shall normally be provided to the inmate within 15 days from the date the information leading to the charges is discovered by staff ...”] & (b) [“The charges shall be heard within 30 days from the date the inmate is provided a classified copy of the CDC Form 115 ...”].) Applying these time limits to Medina’s first disciplinary hearing shows that the hearing was timely, as Medina was given the first CDC Form 115 on August 25, 2005, which is within 15 days of the August 16, 2005 incident, and the hearing was held 30 days later on September 24, 2005.
As applicable here, when certain due process requirements provided inmates in disciplinary proceedings have been violated, such as the denial of witnesses, the original disposition may be vacated and a new hearing ordered. (§ 3084.5, subd. (h)(2)(D).) When a disciplinary charge is ordered reheard, a new CDC Form 115 is written and processed, and “[t]he disciplinary time constraints shall begin on the date the new CDC Form 115 is written ...” (§ 3084.5, subd. (h)(3); see also § 3320, subd. (a)(2) [“Time limitations for a re-issued CDC Form 115 shall commence on the date the chief disciplinary officer orders the re-hearing pursuant to Subsection 3320(a)(1) above.”] & subd. (b)(1) [“The Hearing for a CDC Form 115 ordered re-issued/re-heard shall be conducted pursuant to Subsection 3320(b) above relative to the re-issued copy.”].) Pursuant to these regulations, when a new disciplinary hearing is ordered, the 15- and 30-day time periods begin anew and run from the date a reissued CDC Form 115 is given to the inmate.
Applying these time limits here, Medina’s second disciplinary hearing was also timely. The modification order authorizing the rehearing was issued on January 11, 2006, a new CDC Form 115 was issued on January 23, 2006, and Medina was given a copy of the reissued CDC Form 115 on January 25, 2006, which all occurred within 15 days. The hearing was held 30 days later on February 24, 2006. Since both hearings were timely, the Department was authorized to assess Medina with a credit loss.
The statement in the second level appeal response prohibiting forfeiture of credits for “this RVR” does not compel a different result. The response determined the first hearing was timely. As shown above, the second hearing was also timely. Whatever was meant by the statement in the response, the SHO at the second disciplinary hearing correctly concluded the time constraints were not violated and therefore forfeiture of credits could be ordered.
Medina asserts that nothing in the regulations tolls the mandatory time frames contained in section 3320, subdivision (b). Medina ignores, however, the clear statements in section 3320, subdivision (b)(1) and section 3084.5, subdivision (h)(3), which provide that the time frames contained in section 3320, subdivision (b) begin anew after a rehearing is ordered. Medina argues the chief deputy warden exercised her proper authority when she interpreted the regulations and ordered the RVR reheard without the possibility of imposing credit forfeiture. While it is appropriate to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation within its area of expertise, we do not do so if the interpretation is contrary to the regulation’s clear language and purpose. (County of Sacramento v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1579, 1587.) Here, to the extent the chief deputy warden interpreted the regulation to prohibit forfeiture of credits because the reissued CDC Form 115, and the hearing thereon, would be untimely, it is contrary to section 3084.5, subdivision (h), which resets the time within which the form may be issued and rehearing held.
In sum, the SHO correctly determined the time limits for the hearings were satisfied and credit forfeiture was therefore appropriate. Accordingly, the trial court erred in ordering the Department to restore the forfeited credits.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order requiring the Department and the Warden of the California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi to restore Medina’s “‘good time’” credits taken away from him by the February 24, 2006 disposition is reversed.
WE CONCUR: Cornell, Acting P.J., Kane, J.