Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. D427704, Thomas Hendrix, Judge.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
Sandra Sinai (Sandra) appeals from an order terminating spousal support from her former husband James Ooi (James). She asserts (1) the trial court abused its discretion in ruling she should no longer receive support; and (2) the trial court's termination of jurisdiction over support violated the parties' marital settlement agreement. We reject her arguments and affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married in 1980 and separated in 1996. Their 16-year marriage was dissolved in 1997. Pursuant to the parties' marital settlement agreement (MSA), James was ordered to pay Sandra $2,000 monthly spousal support commencing on April 1, 1997. The MSA consisted of an original agreement, plus an addendum that modified some of its terms. The original agreement stated that the spousal support was to terminate after seven years, and that the trial court did not retain jurisdiction over termination of the support. The addendum changed this, providing for the possibility of extended spousal support after 10 years. Specifically, the addendum stated that (1) after 10 years (i.e., on April 1, 2007), James's monthly obligation would be reduced to zero unless Sandra demonstrated she was unable to be self-sufficient and had a continuing need for spousal support, and (2) the court should continue to reserve jurisdiction over spousal support but could award it only if Sandra was not self-sufficient and had a continuing need for financial assistance.
The original agreement stated in relevant part: "James shall pay to Sandra as spousal support the sum of $2,000 per month. This support shall terminate on the earlier of the following: seven years, Sandra's remarriage, or Sandra's death. During the term of spousal support payment, the court retains jurisdiction to modify the amount of support only in the event of the disability or unemployment of James. Except for those two specific exceptions, the court does not retain jurisdiction over spousal support during the term of its payment. The court does not retain jurisdiction of any variety with reference to the provisions regarding termination of spousal support."
The addendum stated in relevant part: "a. JAMES shall pay to SANDRA, as and for her support and maintenance, the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000) per month commencing on April 1, 1997. . . . Commencing on April 1, 2002, spousal support shall automatically increase to the sum of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000) per month provided that SANDRA provides verification to JAMES that her gross earnings from all employment for the previous twelve (12) months (April 1, 2001 to March 31, 2002) did not exceed the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000). The spousal support provided in this section shall be nonmodifiable except for Sandra's death or remarriage. If SANDRA dies or remarries prior to March 31, 2007, spousal support shall terminate upon SANDRA's death or remarriage. Spousal support shall not terminate upon JAMES' death, but shall be a charge against his estate. [¶] b. Commencing on April 1, 2007, JAMES' monthly obligation to SANDRA for spousal support shall be reduced to zero unless SANDRA demonstrates that she is unable to be self-sufficient and has a continuing need for spousal support from JAMES. The Court shall continue to reserve jurisdiction over spousal support, but may only award spousal support to SANDRA upon a finding that SANDRA is not self-sufficient and has a continuing need for financial assistance from JAMES."
During the marriage, the parties had two children, born in 1980 and 1983. James was a medical doctor and Sandra (who obtained a college degree in 1971) was primarily a homemaker. In the 1980's Sandra worked about six hours per week at an elementary school. When the children were older, she sometimes assisted with office duties in James's medical office. In 1995, she commenced working a few hours a week as an instructional assistant for the San Diego Unified School District.
At the time of the dissolution in 1997, the parties' two children were ages 16 and 14. James, age 46, had a monthly gross earning capacity of at least $6,933. Sandra, age 47, earned $387 gross per month and had approximately 90 percent custody of the children. In the MSA, Sandra acknowledged that she had been informed, pursuant to Family Code section 4330, of the goal that each party make reasonable, good faith efforts to become self-supporting, and that failure to do so could be a factor considered by the Court as a basis for modifying or terminating support.
After the parties' dissolution, James moved to Northern California.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Family Code.
In January 2007, nearing the end of the 10-year support period, Sandra (now age 57) filed an order to show cause requesting continued spousal support because she was not self-sufficient and continued to need financial assistance. Sandra submitted a declaration stating that when she signed the MSA addendum, she had expected to become self-supporting by April 1, 2007, but due to several difficulties in her life this had not occurred. She provided the court with the following information. She works full-time as an "ESL (English Second Language) Assistant/EL Coordinator" for the school district, but does not get paid for school vacations or holidays. In 2006, she earned $20,062.57 (i.e., $1,672 gross earnings per month on an annualized basis). She has reached the school district's highest earning level for her category and can advance no further without a teaching credential, which she does not have. She considered obtaining her teaching credential, but was unable to do so because of several intervening events in her life, including the death of her son five years earlier which caused extreme depression, the development of severe arthritis, and hip replacement surgeries in the summers of 2003 and 2006. Her monthly expenses are approximately $5,127, which includes $2,100 monthly rent for a two-bedroom home under lease until June 2007. Her former fiancé paid one-half the rent until they broke off their engagement in July 2006, and she has been unable to find a roommate. She has incurred substantial indebtedness because her expenses exceed her income, including over $35,000 credit card debt. She has borrowed money from her son (age 23) and other family members and withdrawn money from her IRA.
Opposing Sandra's request for continued support, James submitted a declaration stating his view that Sandra did not make good faith efforts to become self-sufficient. Noting that Sandra already had a college degree, he asserted she could have become an English teacher, particularly teaching to Spanish-language children. He stated that she took the C-BEST exam but did not pass the math section, and thereafter did not take classes to help her pass and did not retake the test. James believed Sandra's seven-year relationship with her former fiancé contributed to her lack of initiative. Her fiancé moved to Australia during their engagement. James posited that Sandra, who planned to move to Australia in 2005, did not feel the need to improve her employment situation in San Diego. James acknowledged that he had the financial resources to continue to pay support, but argued the support obligation should be terminated because he had paid for 11 years and Sandra had not made an adequate effort to work to the best of her ability.
James's income and expense declaration showed average gross monthly earnings of $31,166.
In a reply declaration, Sandra elaborated on the circumstances that prevented her from obtaining a teaching credential. She stated that for the first five years after the dissolution, she was fully involved during non-working hours with their two teenage sons because James was in Northern California and provided virtually no help. Thereafter, she suffered the severe depression following the death of her son and the severe physical problems that required two surgeries. Further, for the 10-year period of support she was barely able to pay her bills and had no extra money to pay for the education required to obtain a teaching credential. She stated that contrary to James's claim, she had retaken, and passed, the CBEST test nine years earlier to increase her compensation and had also increased her pay by taking a test qualifying her as a bilingual instructional assistant. Further, in 2005 she took a test and received a TEFL (Teaching English as a Foreign Language) certificate. She acknowledged that she had intended to move to Australia with her former fiancé, but denied that this relationship had affected her initiative to try to become self-supporting, stating that her fiancé only paid one-half the rent and they did not otherwise share expenses. She stated she has tried to supplement her income by working during the summers, including providing private tutoring.
At a hearing on June 18, 2007, the trial court ordered a vocational evaluation for Sandra. After performing the evaluation, vocational expert Kathleen Young submitted a report providing the following information. According to Sandra's doctor, Sandra suffers from osteoarthritis, which limits her physical activity, but does not prevent her from working full-time or attending school. However, Young opined that it was not currently a "solid vocational option" for Sandra to return to school to obtain a teaching credential. Young explained that to obtain a teaching credential, it would take Sandra about one and one-half years at a private college (at a cost of more than $15,000), or four or more years at a public college. Although Sandra's tri-lingual skills (Spanish, French, and English) would be of benefit, her age (over 60 by the time she obtained a credential) would be a significant barrier to obtaining permanent employment as a teacher. She could, however, investigate whether she was eligible for an emergency substitute teaching credential, which would allow her to work as a substitute teacher and could also assist her with her search for supplementary work as a tutor. However, Young opined it would not be to her advantage to quit her current job and start substitute teaching under an emergency credential because she would not be assured full-time work and would not receive benefits. Young concluded that Sandra's best vocational option was to continue with her current position and augment her earnings through temporary office work during the summer months. Further, she could increase her summer earnings by taking computer classes at a community college continuing education program, and by obtaining (if eligible) an emergency substitute teaching credential which would allow her to seek substitute teaching jobs during the summer.
Young also evaluated other occupations for which Sandra might be qualified, including clerical-related jobs. Young stated that Sandra's earnings equated with about $10.40 per hour on an annualized basis, whereas if she upgraded her computer skills she could potentially obtain clerical jobs that paid a higher wage. However, Young noted that although her earnings might increase in a clerical job, many of these types of employers do not provide a benefit package as does her present job. Further, she might have difficulty obtaining such a job given her age.
After a hearing on September 19, 2007, the trial court found that although pursuing a teaching credential was not currently a solid vocational option for Sandra, the record did not show she was unable to obtain a credential in a gradual fashion during the 10 years of spousal support. The court stated that Sandra's "choice to co-habit [with her former fiancé] and her expectations to remarry (after the nonmodifiable support terminated) were primary in her life and that the achievement of self-support was secondary. If [Sandra's] request for continuing support is granted, she is in effect asking for spousal support for the rest of her or her former husband's life. This would completely ignore her duty under the Gavron [self-supporting] concept." The court concluded that Sandra had "unreasonably delayed her quest to become self-sufficient based upon her abilities to become self-sufficient and that she made unwise decisions regarding self-sufficiency." The court ruled that Sandra could no longer rely on spousal support, but exercised its equitable powers to allow her "a lead time to reorganize her life." The court extended the $2,000 monthly spousal support for another 15 months, until December 31, 2008, and ordered that the support would terminate at that time.
DISCUSSION
Decision to End Spousal Support
Sandra argues the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that she should no longer receive spousal support after December 31, 2008.
We review a trial court's rulings on spousal support for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 454; In re Marriage of Berland (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1257, 1261.) We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the court's ruling, and if there is substantial evidence to support the ruling it will not be disturbed on appeal even if the record can also support a different order. (In re Marriage of Berland, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1262-1263; In re Marriage of Shaughnessy (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1235.)
Under the terms of the MSA addendum, Sandra was entitled to continued spousal support only if she could demonstrate she was unable to be self-sufficient. The record supports the court's ruling that Sandra did not carry her burden to show this inability. James provided Sandra support for a 10-year period. During this time period, the parties' children were teenagers and then adults. Sandra already had a college degree. Given the advanced age of the children and her college education, the trial court could reasonably find that Sandra was capable during this 10-year period of going back to school part-time to continue her education and increase her earning capacity, for example by obtaining a teaching credential. The court was not required to find that she was precluded from doing so because of the unfortunate death of her son, her illnesses, and her financial constraints. The court could reasonably assess that these matters, although tragic and difficult, did not create insurmountable barriers to self-sufficiency given the long period of time she was given to achieve this status. Further, because she lived with her former fiancé and intended to marry him, the court could infer that her failure to rearrange her life to become financially independent was influenced by the expectation this relationship would continue. The court could properly find that James was not obligated to continue to support her beyond the 10-year period merely because her relationship with her fiancé ended and caused her to lose the benefit of his shared housing expenses.
To support her challenge to the court's ruling, Sandra points to various items of evidence in the record, including evidence that she was primarily a homemaker during the marriage, she developed health problems, she suffered from severe depression after the death of her son, and she did not have the financial resources to return to school. Although we are sympathetic to her challenges and the trial court could have relied on this evidence to continue support beyond 2008, it was not required to do so. As stated, the record supports the court's conclusion that Sandra was able to be self-supporting, and it is not our role to disturb this ruling when it is supported by the evidence. (In re Marriage of Shaughnessy, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235.)
Sandra also argues that the court's reduction of support to zero based on a finding that she made "unwise decisions" was improper because when she signed the MSA addendum, she was not warned she had to obtain a teaching credential or risk losing support at the end of the 10-year support period. The court's ruling terminating support was based on a finding that Sandra had the ability to become self-supporting during the 10-year period. The finding that she could have, but did not, obtain a teaching credential was merely a factor that supported this conclusion. Sandra was warned that she was required to make a good faith effort to become self-supporting. This warning was sufficient to put her on notice that after the 10-year period, the trial court would be evaluating the decisions she made, including those pertaining to schooling, when ruling on a request for continued support.
Finally, Sandra contends that she carried her burden to justify continued support merely by showing she was not self-supporting, and that the burden then shifted to James to show she had not made reasonable efforts to become self-supporting. This assertion is inconsistent with the language in the MSA addendum stating that "support shall be reduced to zero unless SANDRA demonstrates that she is unable to be self-sufficient . . . ." (Italics added.) To demonstrate that she was unable to be self-sufficient, Sandra needed to demonstrate not merely that she was not self-sufficient, but also that she had made reasonable efforts to become self-sufficient. (See In re Marriage of Berland, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1263-1264.) In any event, even if James had the burden to show she did not make reasonable efforts, the court was persuaded that the record established this fact and, as stated, the record supports the court's conclusion.
Termination of Jurisdiction over Spousal Support
Sandra argues the trial court violated the terms of the MSA addendum by terminating jurisdiction over spousal support after December 31, 2008. She asserts the court should have "awarded support to December 2008 and then reserved jurisdiction at zero pursuant to the terms of the stipulated MSA."
The trial court's statement of decision does not expressly state the court was terminating jurisdiction over spousal support, but merely states: "At that time [December 31, 2008] the support will terminate." However, Sandra apparently interprets the court's ruling to mean it was terminating jurisdiction, and we agree with this interpretation. (See §§ 4335, 4336.)
Preliminarily, we reject James's contention that Sandra has forfeited her right to challenge the ruling terminating jurisdiction because she did not raise this issue before the trial court. In her arguments urging the trial court to continue spousal support, Sandra asserted that under the plain language of the MSA addendum, the court "shall continue to reserve jurisdiction over spousal support after April 1, 2007." This was sufficient to preserve the termination of jurisdiction issue for appellate review.
We construe marital settlement agreements under the rules of contract interpretation. (In re Marriage of Iberti (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439.) We seek to carry out the parties' reasonable expectations, consider the agreement as a whole, and interpret the language in context rather than based on isolated provisions. (Fergus v. Songer (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 552, 574; Employers Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 906, 919; County of Marin v. Assessment Appeals Bd. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 319, 325.) The " 'intention of the parties must be first determined from the language of the contract itself. . . . However, where the language of the contract is ambiguous, it is the duty of the court to resolve the ambiguity by taking into account all the facts, circumstances and conditions surrounding the execution of the contract . . . .' " (Frankel v. Bd. of Dental Examiners (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 534, 544.) A contract includes not only the express terms, but " 'all such implied provisions as are indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties and as arise from the language of the contract and the circumstances under which it was made . . . .' " (Id. at pp. 544-545.) The question is: "to whet did the parties expressly or by reasonable implication agree?" (In re Uriah R. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1157.)
Here, the MSA addendum states that "[t]he court shall continue to reserve jurisdiction over spousal support . . . ." This statement is included in a paragraph which addresses what is to occur after the end of the 10-year support period: i.e., support is to be reduced to zero unless Sandra demonstrates she is unable to be self-sufficient. Read in context, the provision for continued jurisdiction was designed to allow the court to adjudicate the issue of continued support at the expiration of the 10-year period, and if support is ordered to continue beyond the 10-year period, to permit the court to thereafter reevaluate the continued need for support.
The MSA addendum contains no express statement about whether the court should continue to retain jurisdiction if (as here) it orders support should end because Sandra has not carried her burden to show she was unable to be self-sufficient. However, termination of jurisdiction in the event of termination of support is an implicit, logical term. The MSA addendum provides for reservation of jurisdiction based on the possibility that support will be continued beyond the 10-year period because of Sandra's inability to be self-sufficient. It follows that if support is not continued because of Sandra's ability to be self-sufficient, the parties would reasonably expect there would be nothing more to adjudicate and no reason for the trial court to maintain jurisdiction.
Sandra argues the intent of the parties was for the trial court to retain jurisdiction over spousal support to protect her in the event of a severe medical emergency or accident causing her to lose her ability to earn any income or a state budget shortfall causing large scale layoffs in the schools. The court had a reasonable basis to conclude that this was not the parties' intent. Such a construction would effectively translate the spousal support agreement into an insurance policy and unemployment benefits. There is nothing in the language of the agreement, nor in the circumstances of this case, which suggests the parties intended James to provide this type of insured support to Sandra. The trial court properly interpreted the MSA addendum to provide for termination of jurisdiction once support to Sandra was discontinued based on a finding that she had the ability to be self-supporting.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: O'ROURKE, J., IRION, J.