Opinion
F052499
4-15-2008
In re the Marriage of JOSEPH CRAWFORD and LEETTA D. JONES. JOSEPH CRAWFORD JONES, Appellant, v. LeETTA D. JONES, Respondent.
Joseph Crawford Jones, in pro. per., for Appellant. Kilpatrick & White and Michael R. Kilpatrick for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Cornell, J. and Gomes, J.
We are charged with deciding an appeal with an inadequate record. Not only does the lack of record make our task more difficult, it makes it impossible to address fully the merits of the appeal. From the record provided, however, we conclude the trial courts order awarding temporary support must be affirmed.
It appears from the briefs that appellant Joseph Crawford Jones filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to respondent LeEtta D. Jones. We have pulled the following information from the reporters transcript of a March 2, 2007, hearing, the only transcript (either reporters or clerks) included in the record. The hearing apparently was calendared to establish temporary spousal and child support. Joseph represented himself at the hearing, as he is doing on appeal. LeEtta was represented by counsel.
We will refer to the parties by their first names, not out of disrespect but to avoid any confusion to the reader.
Counsel informed the trial court that this hearing was continued from a prior date to allow Joseph to produce documents related to his income. Joseph apparently had been served with a subpoena on January 24, 2007, but had not produced all of the documentation requested. Joseph also was served with a demand to produce a preliminary declaration of disclosures. (Fam. Code, §§ 2100, subd. (c), 2102, subd. (a)(1).) Counsel also stated that LeEtta was living in the community residence, and she was unable to make mortgage payments because Joseph was not paying any spousal support or child support for their 15-year-old son.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise noted.
Joseph stated he produced his W-2 form, but was going to file a motion to quash the remainder of the documents sought by the subpoena. Counsel replied that he needed additional documents because Joseph had formed a corporation, and it appeared he was hiding income in the corporation.
The trial court informed the parties that it was unwilling to delay support orders any longer and instructed counsel to determine appropriate temporary support orders utilizing the DissoMaster computer program and the best estimate of Josephs income.
Counsel returned a few minutes later and stated that LeEtta estimated that Joseph earned approximately $10,000 per month, even though he was paid only $5,000 per month by his corporation, and this figure was utilized to calculate appropriate support. Relying on the information provided by counsel, Joseph was ordered to pay temporary spousal support of $1,773 and temporary child support of $1,374, for a total of $3,148 in temporary support per month. It appears Joseph is appealing this order.
Josephs first argument is related to a motion he claims was to be heard at a hearing on January 24, 2007. We do not have a reporters transcript from this hearing, nor is there a clerks transcript containing the motion. We reject, therefore, any argument related to this motion because it is unsupported by the record. It is the appellants responsibility to provide this court with an adequate record affirmatively proving error. (Ermoian v. Desert Hospital (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 475, 494.) In the absence of an adequate record to demonstrate error, we are bound by the presumption that the order is correct. (Ibid.)
Joseph next claims that he provided the trial court with an income and expense declaration. We do not know if he did so or not, but we do know there is no such document in the appellate record. Therefore, as above, we reject any argument related to this document.
Joseph also asks that we instruct the trial court to abide by a previously issued order that apparently ordered LeEtta to make mortgage payments on the community residence. This order is not part of the record. Therefore, we will not address any issue related to that order.
Joseph next claims that his right to equal protection of the laws was violated. He cites statistics that he claims establish that a majority of litigants represent themselves in family law proceedings. He claims these self-represented litigants are denied equal protection of the laws because the trial court treats them unfairly.
"`"`The concept of the equal protection of the laws compels recognition of the proposition that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment." [Citation.] `It is basic that the guarantees of equal protection embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 11 and 21, of the California Constitution, prohibit the state from arbitrarily discriminating among persons subject to its jurisdiction. This principle, of course, does not preclude the state from drawing any distinctions between different groups of individuals, but does require that, at a minimum, classifications which are created bear a rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose. [Citations.] Moreover, "in cases involving `suspect classifications or touching on `fundamental interests. . . the state bears the burden of establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but that distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose." [Citation.]" (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 198-199.)
Even if we were to presume that self-represented litigants constitute a separate class for equal protection purposes, we reject Josephs argument because there is nothing in the record that suggests he, as a self-represented litigant, was treated differently than represented litigants. The events at the March 2, 2007, hearing do not demonstrate any hostility towards Joseph. The trial court obviously was concerned that there had not been any temporary support orders made and that Joseph had failed to provide discovery to support his claimed income. This concern does not evidence hostility towards self-represented litigants.
Josephs main complaint, it appears, is that the trial court disregarded his claim that he earned only $5,000 per month. But the trial court also was informed that Joseph formed a corporation and that it appeared he was using the corporation to hide income. Josephs failure to document through discovery the income and expenses of this corporation, which also appears to be a community asset, and which he was required to disclose (§§ 2100, subd. (c), 2102, subd. (a)(1)), left the trial court with few options. The trial court determined that, under the circumstances, temporary support should be based on the information provided by LeEtta.
There is no evidence the trial court deviated from the mandatory formula for establishing child support. (§ 4055.) Nor can we say the trial court abused its discretion in setting temporary spousal support utilizing LeEttas representations about Josephs income when Joseph ignored his statutory disclosure obligations. (§§ 3600, subd. (a), 2100, subd. (c); In re Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1327.)
Nor do we find any support for a claim that the trial court discriminated against Joseph because it recommended he retain counsel. While it may be true that the majority of litigants in dissolution proceedings represent themselves, this does not mean that this course of action is prudent. The trial court obviously recognized that Joseph was employing delaying tactics and warned him there were possible adverse consequences should he continue the tactics. A suggestion that he retain counsel was nothing more than an attempt to help Joseph avoid the adverse consequences of his ill-advised tactics.
Finally, Josephs reference to section 4320 is inapposite. Section 4320 is limited to permanent spousal support orders. The order at issue was for temporary spousal support.
We do not share Josephs confusion about the temporary nature of this order. The trial court specifically stated it was making a temporary order.
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed. LeEtta D. Jones is awarded her costs on appeal.