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In re Marriage of Dunlap

California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division
Jul 9, 2008
No. A118967 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 9, 2008)

Opinion


In re the Marriage of VIVIAN S. and BRIAN C. DUNLAP. VIVIAN S. DUNLAP, Respondent, v. BRIAN C. DUNLAP, Appellant. A118967 California Court of Appeal, First District, Second Division July 9, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. FL060148

Lambden, J.

On March 17, 2006, Vivian S. Dunlap (Vivian) filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage with Brian C. Dunlap (Brian). After a trial regarding unresolved property disputes, child support, and spousal support, the court issued its judgment on August 2, 2007. Brian challenges various distributions made by the court and the amounts of child and spousal support ordered by the court. We agree that his challenges have merit and reverse on the issues raised by his appeal. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Vivian and Brian married on May 20, 2000, and separated on March 9, 2006. One week after separation, on March 17, 2006, Vivian filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage with Brian. A bench trial ensued regarding property disputes, child support for their two children, and spousal support. Vivian had legal representation; Brian was in propria persona.

Brian has legal representation on appeal and had legal representation in the proceedings below until just before the trial.

At trial, the evidence established that the couple’s community property included two homes, 3097 18th Street (3097 home) and 3099 18th Street (3099 home), on adjacent lots on 18th Street in Eureka (the adjacent lots are referred to as the 18th Street properties), and four acres of undeveloped land referred to as the Walker Point property. Brian testified that Vivian and he had hired Pacific Affiliates, Inc. (Pacific Affiliates), an engineering firm, to subdivide the 18th Street properties to create a third lot at the back of the two homes. The subdivision had not been completed by the time of trial and there was an outstanding bill from Pacific Affiliates for $19,437. In addition to the unpaid bill, Brian testified that the cost to complete the subdivision would be approximately $30,000.

Stuart Rosenberg, a real estate appraiser, was a witness for Vivian. He appraised the 18th Street properties based on an assumption that the subdivision would be completed and there would be a third lot in addition to the two homes. Based on the expected subdivision, he valued the 3097 home at $348,000, the 3099 home at $205,000, and the third lot to be created at $130,000. Rosenberg opined that the cost to complete the subdivision would be $20,000 to $25,000.

After Brian and Vivian separated, Brian lived at the 3097 home. He had received an offer from a person on January 30, 2007, to rent this home for $1,800 a month, but he did not rent it. Brian collected $4,700 in rent on the 3099 home. Brian paid the mortgages on all of the community properties.

Brian claimed that he made the following postseparation payments of community debt: $12,451.73 for credit cards, $1,120 for a student loan, $2,785.30 for insurance, $11,856.27 for property taxes, $5,606.65 for expenses to cure a default, and $121.78 for a utility bill for the residence where Vivian was living. He also admitted that he deposited $169,000 into his personal accounts in the six-month period following separation from Vivian from “lines of credit and other sources.”

In other testimony, Vivian stated that Brian gave her a diamond ring at the time of their fifth wedding anniversary and that it was a replacement for her wedding ring. Brian testified that the ring was an investment.

Brian reported his gross business income in 2006 as about $75,344. He asserted that his net business income was about $4,180 per month.

The trial court issued its memorandum of decision on June 1, 2007, and its amended memorandum of decision on June 4, 2007. In its amended memorandum of decision the court indicated that it was using Brian’s gross income of $75,000 when calculating child support. It stated that Vivian had no income. The court found that Brian had the children 30 percent of the time. The court set child support at $1,533 per month and spousal support at $500 per month.

The trial court awarded the Walker Point property to Vivian and valued it at $350,000, less indebtedness of $216,000, for a net distribution of $134,000. It distributed the 18th Street properties to Brian with a value of $675,000, less $30,000 to complete the lot split and $433,000 debt indebtedness, for a net value to Brian of $212,000. The court did not give Brian credit for real estate payments made postseparation, nor did it charge him for the rent he could have collected on the 18th Street properties; it concluded that these two amounts offset each other.

The trial court awarded Brian the proceeds of the sales of the Porsche and Mercedes, totaling $24,500. Brian was also awarded the golf cart, with a value of $500, and stock with a value of $540. Vivian was awarded the Lexus but, because of its debt, no equity value was assigned to this asset.

The parties notified the trial court of remaining issues regarding personal property and the court took additional testimony on June 22, 2007. The court issued its ruling regarding distribution of personal property on July 5, 2007. The court found, among other things, that the diamond ring was a gift from Brian to Vivian and that she should retain it. Judgment was filed on August 2, 2007. The court stated that the division as set forth in its judgment resulted in Vivian receiving $104,000, and Brian receiving $180,080. To equalize the division, the court ordered Brian to pay Vivian an equalizing payment of $38,040. Brian filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Under Family Code section 2550, the court must divide the community estate of the parties equally. “This task constitutes a nondelegable judicial function [citation] which must be based upon substantial evidence [citation].” (In re Marriage of Andresen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 873, 880.) Section 2552 concerns the method the court should use to value the property. As long as the court exercises its discretion in a legal manner, its decision will be affirmed on appeal if there is substantial evidence to support it. (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480.) Similarly, we review a judgment for child or spousal support under the abuse of discretion standard (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 282-283), but the trial court’s discretion must be exercised within the limits of the applicable statutes (In re Marriage of Fini (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1044).

All further unspecified code sections refer to the Family Code.

The trial court’s findings on the characterization and valuation of assets in a dissolution proceeding are factual determinations which are reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887.) “In this regard, the court has broad discretion to determine the manner in which community property is divided and the responsibility to fix the value of assets and liabilities in order to accomplish an equal division. Citations. The trial court’s determination of the value of a particular asset is a factual one and as long as that determination is within the range of the evidence presented, we will uphold it on appeal.” (In re Marriage of Duncan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 617, 631-632.)

“ ‘When a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of fact. [Citations.] [¶] When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (Scott v. Common Council (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 684, 689, quoting Green Trees Enterprises, Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 782, 784-785.) The testimony of a single credible witness may constitute substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614.)

II. The Valuation of the 18th Street Properties

The trial court distributed the 18th Street properties to Brian. The court set the value of the 18th Street properties at $675,000 and subtracted from this sum $30,000 to complete the planned subdivision and $433,000 for debt on the property, for a net value to Brian of $212,000. Brian contends that the lower court erred by valuing this property as if the subdivision had been completed, because the undisputed evidence established that the subdivision had not occurred by the time of trial. He maintains that the trial judge must value community assets “as near as practicable to the time of trial.” (§ 2552, subd. (a).)

Section 2552 provides as follows: “(a) For the purpose of division of the community estate upon dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, except as provided in subdivision (b), the court shall value the assets and liabilities as near as practicable to the time of trial. [¶] (b) Upon 30 days’ notice by the moving party to the other party, the court for good cause shown may value all or any portion of the assets and liabilities at a date after separation and before trial to accomplish an equal division of the community estate of the parties in an equitable manner.”

Here, Brian contends that the lower court’s valuation method was not proper because it valued the property as if it had been subdivided but the subdivision had not been completed by the time of trial. Courts have uniformly held that “it is not proper to place a valuation upon property which is suitable for subdivision taking the market value of contemplated lots and subtracting therefrom the cost of subdivision.” (Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrim Corp. (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 255, 260; see also In re Marriage of Folb (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 862, 869, disapproved on other grounds in In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 749, fn. 5.)

Vivian acknowledges that cases have held that subdivided values should not be used when the subdivision process had not been completed by the time of trial. She argues, however, that the trial court based its decision on Rosenberg’s testimony, which came in without objection. She asserts that, since Rosenberg testified without any objection regarding the value of the property based on the completed subdivision, Brian has waived raising this argument. Had Brian objected to Rosenberg’s testimony, the court could have, according to Vivian, considered additional evidence. (See Redevelopment Agency v. City of Berkeley (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 158, 167; Berry v. Chrome Crankshaft Co. (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 549, 552.)

The record establishes that Brian did not object to Rosenberg’s testimony. However, he did object to assessing the property on the basis of the completed subdivision. When Vivian submitted her valuation of the 18th Street properties to the court, Brian complained: “[Y]ou can’t give value to something that doesn’t exist, and there is no lot on 18th Street. It doesn’t exist. And there are another 25 to 30,000 in improvements, the sidewalks and paving . . . .” We conclude that Brian objected sufficiently to preserve this issue for appeal. (Redevelopment Agency v. City of Berkeley, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d at p. 167 [whether the forfeiture rule applies “is largely a question of the appellate court’s discretion”].)

The record is clear that the trial court’s valuation was based on the completed subdivision, despite the process being incomplete at the time of trial, and this method of valuation was improper (see, e.g., Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrim Corp., supra, 176 Cal.App.2d at p. 260.) The lower court therefore abused its discretion when calculating the value of the property.

Brian contends that we should reverse and correct the net distribution. He claims that the only other testimony regarding the value of the property was his testimony that the 3097 home was worth $350,000 and the 3099 home was worth $215,000. He therefore claims that we should award him the 18th Street properties for a value of $565,000, minus indebtedness of $433,000, for a net distribution of $132,000.

Vivian asserts that Brian’s value for the two homes excluded the 5700 square feet of land that was to comprise the third lot in the subdivision. We express no opinion as to the accuracy of Brian’s valuation, as factual findings regarding the worth of the 18th Street properties are clearly reserved for the trial court. We note, however, had Brian objected to the testimony of Rosenberg, Rosenberg could have provided the court with his appraisal of the non-subdivided 18th Street properties or Vivian could have introduced other evidence on this issue. Consequently, we remand for the lower court to determine the value of the 18th Street properties by using the method set forth in section 2552. The court may, in its discretion, permit the parties to offer additional evidence on this issue.

III. Reimbursement

The trial court did not order any reimbursement to Brian for the real estate payments he made after Vivian and he separated, because it found the reimbursement amounts were equal to the rents he could have collected on the homes on the 18th Street properties. Brian contends that substantial evidence did not support this finding.

In In re Marriage of Epstein, our Supreme Court held that a spouse may claim reimbursement for amounts spent after separation on preexisting community obligations. (In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84-85 (Epstein), superseded by statute on another issue; see also In re Marriage of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1271.) Courts have interpreted Epstein as not mandating full reimbursement in all cases, but permitting courts the discretion to determine the amount of reimbursement that is equitable. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Reilley (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1119, 1123-1124.)

In the present case, Brian paid the mortgages on the Walker Point property and the 18th Street properties. The parties appear to agree that the evidence established that he paid $63,049.00.

With regard to the amount of rent that Brian could have collected, Brian testified that a person had offered him $1,800 a month for the 3097 home, and that he was receiving $850 a month for the 3099 home. At trial, Brian agreed that both of these rental values were reasonable. During the 16 months between the couple’s separation and the trial, the reasonable rental value was therefore $2,650 a month for a total of $42,400. Brian, however, testified that he only collected a total of $4,700. Thus, the amount of rental offset appears to be the $42,400 he could have collected minus the $4,700 he did collect for a difference of $37,700. This amount is significantly less that the $63,049 he paid for mortgages and therefore it appears that he is entitled to reimbursement.

Vivian maintains that Brian is not entitled to any reimbursement because he received $15,750 from a line of credit that he admitted taking. Vivian adds this amount to the $4,700 rent he collected for a total of $20,450. She then subtracts this sum from his $63,049 mortgage payment, which results in a difference of $42,599. Vivian claims that this “net rental payment” of $42,599 is roughly equal to the rental value of the community properties.

Vivian calculated the reasonable rental value as $2,750 a month for 16 months for a product of $44,000. From the evidence we gleaned from this record the reasonable rental value is $2,650, not $2,750.

Brian objects to this calculation and argues that offsetting his mortgage payments by both the rent he could have collected and by the amount he did collect is a double offset. Additionally, he maintains that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the lower court considered an offset of $15,750 not related to the rent. We agree with Brian’s objections to Vivian’s calculations.

Brian also disputes the lower court’s offsetting his mortgage payments by the rental value because he claims the record establishes that the tenant he found would have paid that sum for the 3097 home only if given a six-month lease, and Vivian opposed such a lease. Brian contends that the rental value was considerably less for a month-to-month lease.

We are not persuaded by the foregoing argument. The record contains no evidence that the rental value was less for a month-to-month lease. Furthermore, Brian’s testimony about the fair rental of the property was not limited to a particular type of lease. At trial, Brian was asked, “Do you have an opinion as to the present fair rental value of [the 3097 home]?” Brian responded, “$1,800 a month.”

Finally, Brian contends that the collection of rent is not an exception to the reimbursement rule set forth in Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d 76. As already noted, the trial court is not obligated to order full reimbursement and may use its equitable powers to determine that a full reimbursement is inappropriate. (See In re Marriage of Lister (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 411, 419-420.) “The facts and circumstances of the parties in each family law case are different, which is why these cases are equitable proceedings in which the court must have the ability to exercise discretion to achieve fairness and equity.” (In re Marriage of Fini, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 1043.)

Vivian argues that it was equitable for the lower court not to provide Brian with reimbursement because he failed to pay any child or spousal support despite being ordered to do so. She also asserts that he did not contribute to the children’s health care or other expenses. Finally, she maintains that he deposited various sums from the credit line into his bank account. We conclude, however, that nothing in the trial court’s decision indicates that it considered any factor other than rental value of the 18th Street properties as an offset.

We hold that the trial court had the discretion to offset the rental value of the 18th Street properties by the mortgage payments made by Brian. This record, however, does not indicate that the rental value was roughly equal to the mortgage payments; we therefore remand for the trial court to set forth in more detail the basis for finding a complete offset or to calculate the reimbursement consistent with this opinion.

IV. Items Not Considered by the Trial Court

Brian claims that he submitted for decision his claims for postseparation payments of community debt, but the trial court did not rule on these claims. Specifically, he asserts that he paid $12,451.73 on credit card debt, $1,120 for the Wells Fargo student loan, $2,785.30 for insurance, $11,856.27 for property taxes, $5,606.65 for expenses to cure a default, and $121.78 for PG& E expenses for a total of $33,819.95. He claims that he is entitled to credit from the community for this debt. Additionally, he asserts that the trial court failed to divide the community debt of $19,437 to Pacific Affiliates, a civil engineering firm.

With regard to the debt to the civil engineering firm, Vivian acknowledges that the judgment does not consider this debt. She claims that the debt should be allocated to Brian because only he signed the contract and he permitted a default judgment to be taken against him. These are issues that were before the lower court and should be determined by it. We therefore remand for the lower court to address this issue.

As for the other postseparation payments by Brian, Vivian responds that the lower court was not required to give him credit for these payments and it could decide that such credit was not equitable. Further, she claims that the interest paid on the credit card debt could have been significantly less if Brian “had worked instead of played.”

It may very well be that the lower court considered these postseparation payments and decided not to credit Brian for these payments, but there is nothing in this record to indicate that the court considered these claims. Further, since the court did not address these claims, we are unable to conduct any meaningful review. Accordingly, we remand for the lower court to consider and rule on whether Brian should receive credit for these postseparation payments and to allocate or divide between the parties the community debt owed to Pacific Affiliates.

V. Diamond Ring

The trial court found that a diamond ring Brian gave to Vivian was a gift and that she should retain it. At trial, Vivian stated that Brian gave her the diamond ring at the time of their fifth wedding anniversary and that it was a replacement for her wedding ring. Brian testified that the ring was an investment and that it had been appraised as being worth $30,000. Brian claims that the court should not have awarded the ring to Vivian.

Vivian asserts without any supporting evidence that she had the ring appraised after the trial and the appraised value was $3,700. We will not consider a statement unsubstantiated by any evidence in the record as support for any argument.

Brian submits that ordinarily personal property acquired with community property funds can be transmuted into separate property only if the spouse adversely affected makes an express, written declaration changing the character of the property. (§ 852, subdivision (a).) There is an exception to the writing requirement for a gift of jewelry, as provided by section 852, subdivision (c). This provision reads as follows: “This section does not apply to a gift between the spouses of clothing, wearing apparel, jewelry, or other tangible articles of a personal nature that is used solely or principally by the spouse to whom the gift is made and that is not substantial in value taking into account the circumstances of the marriage.” (Ibid.)

The record contains no evidence of a writing, but the trial court did find that the ring was a gift to Vivian. Thus, the exception to the writing requirement applies if the record also indicates that the ring was “not substantial in value taking into account the circumstances of the marriage.” (§ 852, subd. (c).) The court’s decision is silent on this latter point.

Brian maintains that the record establishes that the ring, which he testified was worth $30,000, had substantial value and he relies on In re Marriage of Steinberger (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1449 (Steinberger). In Steinberger, the husband gave his wife a diamond ring appraised for the value of $13,000 to $14,000 on their fifth wedding anniversary and after she had just been promoted on her job. (Id. at pp. 1456, 1464, fn. 3.) The wife testified that it was a gift, but the husband said it was an investment. (Id. at p. 1456) The trial court in Steinberger expressly found that the ring was substantial in value taking into account the circumstances of the marriage, but it still ruled that it was a gift and therefore the separate property of the wife. (Id. at p. 1464.) The appellate court reversed because there had been no written transmutation and a writing was not necessary only when the gift of jewelry was “ ‘not substantial in value taking into account the circumstances of the marriage.’ ” (Id. at p. 1465.)

Brian maintains that, if the ring valued at $13,000 to $14,000 in Steinberger, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at page 1456, was considered substantial in value, then the ring in the present case, which he valued at $30,000, must be substantial in value. We disagree. First, Brian testified that the ring was worth $30,000, but it may be that the trial court did not believe this testimony and valued it for a lesser amount. Second, even if we presume the ring is worth $30,000, there is nothing in this record to indicate that this amount was substantial in value “taking into account the circumstances of the marriage” (§ 852, subd. (c)). Brian ignores that what may be substantial in one marriage may not be substantial under the facts of another marriage. In the present case, the parties appear to have lived an expensive lifestyle as they owned a Porsche, Mercedes, and Lexus. In Steinberger, the trial court had expressly found that the ring was substantial in value taking into account the circumstances of the marriage. (Id. at p. 1465.) From the record before us, all we can determine is that the lower court concluded that the ring was a gift to Vivian. Thus, even if we presume the ring had a value of $30,000, we cannot conclude from this record that this ring was substantial in value for this couple.

Accordingly, we reverse the award of the ring to Vivian and remand for the lower court to consider whether the ring should be awarded to Vivian under section 852 and to explain the basis of this finding.

VI. Spousal Support

The trial court found that Brian had a gross income of $75,000 and that Vivian had no income. It set monthly spousal support at $500. Brian argues that the lower court abused its discretion in calculating this amount because its decision does not indicate that it independently considered and evaluated the factors in section 4320.

Section 4320 provides: “In ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following circumstances: [¶] (a) The extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the standard of living established during the marriage, taking into account all of the following: [¶] (1) The marketable skills of the supported party; the job market for those skills; the time and expenses required for the supported party to acquire the appropriate education or training to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to acquire other, more marketable skills or employment. [¶] (2) The extent to which the supported party’s present or future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote time to domestic duties. [¶] (b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party. [¶] (c) The ability of the supporting party to pay spousal support, taking into account the supporting party’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living. [¶] (d) The needs of each party based on the standard of living established during the marriage. [¶] (e) The obligations and assets, including the separate property, of each party. [¶] (f) The duration of the marriage. [¶] (g) The ability of the supported party to engage in gainful employment without unduly interfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the party. [¶] (h) The age and health of the parties. [¶] (i) Documented evidence of any history of domestic violence, as defined in Section 6211, between the parties, including, but not limited to, consideration of emotional distress resulting from domestic violence perpetrated against the supported party by the supporting party, and consideration of any history of violence against the supporting party by the supported party. [¶] (j) The immediate and specific tax consequences to each party. [¶] (k) The balance of the hardships to each party. [¶] (l) The goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time. . . . [¶] (m) The criminal conviction of an abusive spouse shall be considered in making a reduction or elimination of a spousal support award in accordance with Section 4325. [¶] (n) Any other factors the court determines are just and equitable.”

“[T]he trial judge must both recognize and apply each applicable statutory factor in setting spousal support. [Citations.] Failure to do so is reversible error.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 304.) Here, the trial court did not provide any insight into whether it applied the statutory factors and, if it did, how it applied each of the factors. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Geraci (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1297.)

Vivian acknowledges that the trial court did not enumerate or discuss the factors in section 4320 in its ruling, but claims that substantial evidence supported the lower court’s award, especially since she was a stay-at-home mother. Further, she contends that the award was terminated effective September 2007 and has been reset for review in June 2008 to determine whether the circumstances have changed.

It is true that the lower court has broad discretion in determining the proper award of spousal support, but we cannot discern from this record whether the lower court recognized and applied the factors sets forth in section 4320. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to the lower court to apply and explain its application of the statutory factors when determining spousal support.

VII. Child Support

As already noted, the trial court found that Brian had a gross income of $75,000 and that Vivian had no income. It further determined that Brian had the children 30 percent of the time, and it set child support at $1,533 per month. Brian contends that the lower court erred in calculating the support based on his gross receipts from his business rather than his net business income.

Brian testified that his gross business income for 2006 was about $75,344 or $6,250 per month. He also testified that his net income was $4,179. Brian also reported on his income and expense declaration that his net income was $4,179. The declaration form provided in bold type the following: “Attach a profit and loss statement for the last two years or a Schedule C from your last federal tax return. . . .” Brian, however, did not attach a profit and loss statement or a Schedule C of his federal tax return.

We agree with Brian that the court’s decision seems to indicate that it used Brian’s gross income. The court, however, may have rejected $4,179 as his net income, especially since the required documents were not attached to his declaration. The court may have concluded that Brian had no business expenses, but that is not clear from the record. The court was required to use Brian’s net business income (§ 4058, subd. (a)(2)), and we thus remand for the court to determine Brian’s net income and to use that figure when calculating child support.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the superior court is reversed with regard to the following: the valuation of the 18th Street properties, the finding of no reimbursement for Brian’s real estate payments, the award of the ring to Vivian, the amount of spousal support, and the amount of child support. We remand for proceedings consistent with this decision. Additionally, on remand, the superior court is to address any credit to Brian for any of his postseparation payments of credit card debt, a student loan, home insurance, property taxes, expenses to cure a default, and PG&E expenses. The court is also to allocate or divide between the parties the debt owed to Pacific Affiliates. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. Brian is awarded the costs of appeal.

We concur: Haerle, Acting P.J., Richman, J.


Summaries of

In re Marriage of Dunlap

California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division
Jul 9, 2008
No. A118967 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 9, 2008)
Case details for

In re Marriage of Dunlap

Case Details

Full title:In re the Marriage of VIVIAN S. and BRIAN C. DUNLAP. VIVIAN S. DUNLAP…

Court:California Court of Appeals, First District, Second Division

Date published: Jul 9, 2008

Citations

No. A118967 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 9, 2008)