Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
Superior Court County of Ventura, No. SD15401, Charles W. Campbell, Jr., Judge.
Law Offices of Judith L. Wong and Judith L. Wong for Appellant.
Lascher & Lascher, Wendy C. Lascher, Aris E. Karakalos; Law Offices of Guy C. Parvex, Jr., and Guy Parvex for Respondent.
PERREN, J.
Under the terms of a 1995 judgment of dissolution incorporating the parties' marital settlement agreement (MSA), appellant Bruce Bullock was ordered to pay spousal support to respondent Cheryl Bullock pursuant to an agreed schedule. Bruce appeals the orders of the trial court denying his motion to terminate spousal support and increasing support from $3,500 to $5,200 per month. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Bruce and Cheryl Bullock had been married more than 25 years when their marriage was dissolved in May 1996. They had no minor children. The judgment of dissolution provided that Bruce shall pay Cheryl "the sum of $8,700 per month . . . commencing January 1, 1996, and continuing thereafter until the death of either party, order of court, or termination by operation of law." The amount of support was based on Bruce's annual earnings of $232,332 as chief executive officer of ISX Corporation. The MSA also provided for annual increases in spousal support if Bruce's annual earnings increased by at least three percent. The MSA provided for an equal division of the couple's 915,000 shares of ISX stock.
In November 1998, Bruce was forced to resign from ISX. In April 1999, Bruce began employment with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) for an estimated annual salary of $150,000. In 1999, Cheryl earned her teaching credential and found employment as a teacher earning $32,556 per year.
Bruce filed a request for modification of spousal support in April 1999. He requested a step-down order providing $4,500 a month for 12 months, eventually decreasing to $2,000 per month by May 2005. The trial court lowered Bruce's spousal support obligation to a fixed $3,500 per month. The court explained its ruling: "Petitioner has shown a significant change in circumstances as to the earnings of both parties. His has involuntarily reduced from over $200,000 per year to $150,000 per year.
The agreement does not preclude modification. The original Judgment provided for substantially more support than what a court would probably order based on the marital standard of living. (Mr. Bullock's average earnings for the last five years of covature was $116,000 per year and Ms. Bullock's was $0.)" Cheryl did not appeal the order. After the trial court granted the modification request, Cheryl learned that Bruce's income in 1999 was not $150,000, as he had told the court. His tax return for that year showed a total income of $332,318.
In 2006, the outstanding shares of ISX stock were bought out in a merger with Lockheed Corporation. Bruce and Cheryl each received approximately $600,000 in cash from sale of the stock. Soon after the proceeds of the stock sale were distributed, Bruce filed a motion to terminate spousal support. Cheryl's salary was approximately $65,000 per year at the time of the motion. Bruce's sole argument was that Cheryl's increased wealth due to the sale of the stock was a material change in circumstances. Cheryl opposed the motion but did not seek an increase in monthly support. The trial court denied the motion and ordered (1) an equalization payment of $13,108 to Cheryl from the sale of the ISX stock, (2) an upward adjustment of spousal support from $3,500 to $5,200 per month, and (3) $5,310 in attorney fees.
In this appeal, Bruce contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to terminate spousal support because the proceeds from the stock sale constitutes a material change in circumstances. We disagree and affirm.
Discussion
Spousal Support
We review an order modifying spousal support for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Drapeau (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1096.) "'"Because trial courts have such broad discretion, appellate courts must act with cautious judicial restraint in reviewing these orders." . . .'" (Ibid.) An appellate court must accept as true all evidence tending to establish the correctness of the trial judge's findings regarding modification of spousal support, resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prevailing party and indulging all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment. (In re Marriage of Bower (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 893, 899.)
A party may seek an adjustment in the terms of a spousal support order upon a showing of a material change in circumstances. (Fam. Code, § 4320.) Bruce argues that Cheryl's receipt of $600,000 from the sale of stock constitutes a material change in circumstances. Cheryl argues that her receipt of the proceeds from the stock sale does not constitute a material change in circumstances because the sale of the ISX stock was contemplated at the time the parties entered into the MSA. Cheryl is correct.
The language of the MSA clearly and unequivocally states that spousal support will continue for 15 years and will increase if Bruce's income increases. Nothing in the MSA provides for a decrease in spousal support upon the sale of the stock. "As set forth in the judgment, the parties 'carefully bargained' concerning this provision. . . . [Bruce] asks this court to add qualifying language to the agreement. To do so would substantially alter the agreement reached by the parties as clearly and explicitly stated in the judgment. This we cannot do." (In re Marriage of Iberti (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1440; see also In re Marriage of Rabkin (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1081 ["The parties' agreement . . . provided that wife would receive her share of the community property and spousal support. It makes no more sense to reduce wife's spousal support because she received her rightful share of the community property than it would to increase wife's spousal support because husband received his rightful share of the community property"]; see also In re Marriage of West (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 240, 250 [same].)
Bruce argues that the award of $5,200 exceeds the marital standard of living. He bases his argument on a comment in the 1999 modification order that "[t]he original Judgment provided for substantially more support than what a court would probably order based on the marital standard of living." This comment does not support Bruce's position; it does show, however, that at the time of the dissolution, Bruce intended to provide support for Cheryl above the marital standard of living. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 308 ["where the supporting party has the ability to pay, a trial court has discretion to award spousal support at a level above the actual marital standard of living"].)
The trial court ordered an upward modification of support to $5,200 even though Cheryl's opposition sought only to maintain support at the current level of $3,500. As Bruce does not challenge the order on this ground, we will not address it.
We have reviewed Bruce's remaining contentions and conclude they are without merit.
Attorney Fees
An award of attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Drake (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1166.) Bruce's only argument in this regard is that the trial court erred in finding that Cheryl was the prevailing party. We affirm the trial court's finding. Accordingly, the attorney fee award will not be disturbed.
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., YEGAN, J.