From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

In re Marriage of Anthony

Court of Appeal of California
Sep 3, 2008
No. B198323 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 3, 2008)

Opinion

B198323

9-3-2008

In re Marriage of ANTHONY and VALERIE THERESA GLASSMAN. ANTHONY MICHAEL GLASSMAN, Appellant, v. VALERIE THERESA GLASSMAN, Respondent.

Glassman, Browning, Saltsman & Jacobs, Inc., Richelle L. Kemler; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland and Robert A. Olson for Appellant. Silberberg & Ross, Fred Silberberg and London Ahders for Respondent.

Not to be Published


Anthony Michael Glassman and Valerie Theresa Glassman were divorced under a stipulated judgment entered on July 1, 1998. On December 6, 2005, Anthony filed an order to show cause in which he requested that the court terminate his spousal support obligations. The trial court denied Anthonys request, and he appealed. We affirm.

FACTS

Anthony, who is a senior partner in the law firm of Glassman, Browning, Saltsman & Jacobs, Inc., and Valerie were married in December 1967 and separated in April 1996; they had one child, a daughter, who was an adult at the time of the divorce. Under the stipulated judgment, Valerie received $5,137 per month spousal support and a percentage of Anthonys annual bonus. The parties also divided the community interest in the law firms retirement plan. Anthony received the home in Ojai and Valerie was awarded the residence in Coldwater Canyon in Beverly Hills.

As is usual in family law cases, we refer to the individual parties by their first names, meaning no disrespect, in the interest of clarity and convenience. (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 475-476, fn. 1.)

The homes in Beverly Hills and Ojai appreciated between 1998 and 2006 and are substantial properties. The Beverly Hills residence has a tennis court with a maids quarters; the Ojai property is on one and a half acres of land with a separate guest house and office. Valerie sold the Beverly Hills house in 2006 for $2,725,000 and replaced it with a condominium in Westwood.

Valerie, who has the English equivalent of a high school education, stopped working as a receptionist when she married Anthony and did not work during her marriage. She was 58 at the time of the divorce. The trial court found that she has no marketable skills or education and has little or no earning capacity.

We set forth the balance of the facts as they are alleged in Anthonys petition and discuss them in greater detail as they relate to the contentions on appeal.

ANTHONYS PETITION

Anthony based his petition on what he called "significant changes in circumstances that have occurred since our separation in April of 1996 and the entry of the Judgment of Dissolution entered on July 1, 1998." Although the foregoing phrasing appears to suggest that Anthony is claiming a change in circumstances between April 1996 and July 1998, the balance of the petition makes clear that the contention is that circumstances changed between 1996/1998, on the one hand, and the year 2005, on the other.

The change in circumstances, according to the petition, is that Valerie disposed of a great deal more ready cash and assets in 2005 than she had on hand in 1996/1998. The petition alleges that Valerie has four principal assets.

First, the petition avers that the Coldwater Canyon house was valued at $935,000 in 1998 and was sold by Valerie in 2006 for $2,712,000 (the correct figure is $2,725,000). Taking into account the basis of the residence, taxes and exemptions, the petition calculated that the sale netted Valerie $1,984,000.

Second, Valeries IRA has a current balance of $657,000.

Third, Valerie has cash savings of $88,500. Since she had no cash savings at the time of the divorce, the petition claims that Valerie effected these savings from the spousal support payments made during the seven-plus years since the divorce.

Fourth, Valerie is drawing Social Security payments of approximately $900 per month. (The actual figure is $946.)

The petition goes on to assume that Valerie will pay around $1 million for an unencumbered condominium, which will leave her $1.6 million. This, together with Social Security, would produce, according to the petition, a monthly income of $7,566.

It turns out, however, that after the petition was filed Valerie bought a condominium in 2006 for $1,775,000 and paid cash. Anthony contended in the trial court that this purchase created " `a need where one does not exist, " i.e., that this unnecessarily expensive purchase made Valerie more dependent on spousal support than she would have been, if she had bought a property for around $1 million.

The petition also sets forth facts relating to Anthony.

The mortgage on the Ojai residence has increased from $328,000 in 1998 to $426,000.

Anthony invested $500,000 from his 401K retirement savings; all but $30,000 of this was lost because the investment "turned out to be a classic Ponzi scheme which several months later went into bankruptcy."

The balance of Anthonys 401K retirement account is $705,000. Given the mortgage balance and the retirement savings, "unless my spousal support is terminated I will have no reasonable hope of retirement until age 78 unless I elect to sell my home and invest the proceeds so as to generate additional retirement income."

Anthony rents for $2,000 per month a one-bedroom apartment near his law firm in Beverly Hills. His monthly mortgage payments plus the rental for the apartment total $5,567.

According to the petition, if spousal support is terminated, Anthony would be able to retire around the age of 70 and would then be in the same position as Valerie, i.e., "with a fully paid home and retirement savings approaching $1.5 million."

THE TRIAL COURTS ANALYSIS AND ORDER

The trial courts analysis of the evidence is contained in a document that is 30 pages long. In this section, we only state the highlights of that ruling. We refer to specific findings as they relate to Anthonys contentions on appeal.

The trial court noted that the stipulated judgment contains a finding that the division of assets and apportionment of obligations effected by the judgment resulted in a substantially equal division of the parties community property.

The trial court found that the "only changed circumstances supported by the evidence were [Anthonys] wish to plan for his retirement and his plan to retire at some time in the future. The Court does not find those to be significant or material changed circumstances which would warrant a termination or even a reduction of spousal support."

The court found that if Anthony retires at some point in the future, a modification of spousal support may be appropriate.

As far as the 2006 purchase of the condominium is concerned, the trial court found that Valerie has simply "exchanged one asset for another; she has, in effect, exchanged her place of residence." The trial court found that the Coldwater Canyon house was, prior to 2006, the bulk of Valeries estate and that the condominium purchased in that year is now the bulk of her estate. According to the trial court, had Valerie "not decided to sell the Coldwater Canyon property, it would not have been reasonable for her to be forced to refinance that property and use the refinancing proceeds to create income to support herself."

DISCUSSION

1. There Must Be a Material Change of Circumstances in Order To Modify Spousal Support

A support order may be modified or terminated at any time the court determines this to be necessary. (Fam. Code, § 3651, subd. (a).) The purpose of this provision, among other things, is to give the trial court continuing jurisdiction to increase or decrease the support initially awarded to meet changes in the circumstances and the needs of the parties. (Kroupa v. Kroupa (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 647, 650.) "Although the Family Code and earlier governing statutes have not expressly mentioned this condition [change in circumstances], the case law has established the rule that the trial judge may not modify an award in the absence of a material change in circumstances after the hearing on the original order. [Citations.]" (11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Husband and Wife, § 278, p. 362.) This rule rests on the consideration that it would be incongruous to allow an appealable award of spousal support to become final and thereafter to permit its modification on facts existing at the time of the original judgment. (Snyder v. Snyder (1933) 219 Cal. 80, 81.)

All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.

On appeal, Anthony cites two circumstances that he alleges have materially changed. First, he contends that Valeries needs have materially decreased. Second, he claims that Valerie has additional income that she did not have when the original support order was entered. Both of these circumstances — decreased need and increased income on the part of the supported spouse — have been generally recognized as circumstances that justify an alteration in the level of supports. (See generally 11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Husband and Wife, § 284, pp. 373-374.)

The first of the reasons Anthony advances, decreased need, is not supported by the record. While Anthonys claim that Valeries assets in 2005 had increased in value since 1998, when the stipulated judgment was entered, is factually correct, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to modify spousal support because of the increase in the value of Valeries assets.

We address these points in the order indicated.

2. The Trial Courts Finding That Valeries Level of Need Has Remained Constant Is Supported by the Record

The trial court found that Valeries need for support remained consistent, i.e., constant, between 1998 and 2005. Anthonys argument to the contrary rests on factually erroneous premises, which we set forth below.

Anthony contends that in 1998 Valeries "need, by her own figures, was $9,509" and that by March 2006 this had decreased "by her own admission" to $6,942. In addition, Anthony points to the fact that by 2006 Valerie was receiving $946 per month from Social Security. Thus, Anthony contends, her need had dropped to $5,996 per month, which is 37 percent less than it was in 1998.

Anthonys contention does not take into account two important factors.

First, as of June 30, 1998, the mortgage payment on the Coldwater Canyon property was $3,171. According to Valeries testimony, this payment was progressively reduced by refinancing between 1998 and 2005 until, as of November 1, 2005, the mortgage payment had been reduced to $1,187.

In our original opinion that was filed on May 14, 2008, we stated that the reduction in the mortgage payment between 1998 and 2005 was due to the fact that the second mortgage was included in the $3,171 figure and that under the judgment that mortgage had been paid off. Although it is true that the mortgage payment was reduced from $3,171 to $1,187 between 1998 and 2005, the reason we gave was mistaken and we granted the rehearing petition to correct this error.

Second, the couples daughter Alexandra was living with Valerie in 1998 and moved out sometime after 1998. Although we are not given a precise date when Alexandra moved out, this appears to have happened a year or two after 1998. In any event, Valeries need was further reduced when Alexandra moved out. There was testimony by an expert retained by Anthony, Barbara J. Gottlieb, that Alexandra accounted for 20 percent of Valeries expenses in 1998. When this figure is deducted from $9,508, Valeries need was $7,606. In fact, the trial court found that Valeries need in 1998 was $7,606, i.e., $9,509 less 20 percent spent for Alexandra until she moved out; this finding was based on Gottliebs testimony.

Valeries income and expense declaration (hereafter I&E) of March 2006, which was after the sale of the Coldwater Canyon property and the purchase of the condominium, shows a need of $6,942. This figure includes homeowner fees and property taxes for the condominium but, of course, no mortgage.

The trial court noted that despite the increase in the cost of living between 1998 and 2005, Valeries needs "have remained fairly constant." This is demonstrably the correct conclusion. We note that the slight decrease in Valeries need over the years in the teeth of an increasing cost of living, is explained by her success in decreasing the mortgage payment on the Coldwater House by nearly $2,000 between 1998 and 2005.

The trial court found that Valeries need in November 2005, prior to the sale of the Coldwater Canyon property, was $7,150. The difference between $7,606 and $7,150 is $456. One way of understanding the trial courts comment about the increase in the cost of living is to add the amount she saved on the mortgage by refinancing, i.e., $1,984, to $7,150, her expenses in November 2005. This comes to $9,134.

It follows that we reject Anthonys contention that in this case "no reasonable judge could have maintained the current support order. . . . The trial court found that her needs had dropped $2,567 since the 1998 Judgment (from $9,509 at the time of the 1998 Judgment . . . to $6,942 as of March 8, 2006 . . . and that her actual income has increased by the $946 per month in [S]ocial [S]ecurity benefits that she was drawing. . . . Her unmet need, thus, had dropped by almost 40 percent according to the trial courts own figures." (Original italics.)

The trial court did not find that Valeries needs "dropped $2,567 since the 1998 Judgment" and that her need "dropped by almost 40 percent." Anthonys claim is flatly contradicted by the trial courts affirmative finding, based on testimony of Anthonys own expert, that Valeries need in 1998 was $7,606. The difference between $7,606 and $6,942 is $664 and not $2,567.

We are not persuaded by the argument that the trial court erred in not taking into consideration, as a change in Valeries circumstances (In re Marriage of Bower (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 893, 899-901), that her daughter Alexandra moved out a year or so after 1998 and thus reduced Valeries expenses. First, the trial court specifically noted that Alexandrias expenses were factored into the $9,509, which was Valeries need as of the time the judgment was entered in 1998; by no means did the trial court ignore this fact. Second, it is undeniable that Valeries expenses, with the exception of the mortgage, increased between 1998 and 2005. Had she not saved $1,984 by refinancing the Coldwater Canyon property, her expenses in 2005 would have been $9,134. (See fn. 4, ante.) Thus, taking into account the entire picture, as the trial court was required to do, it was well within the ambit of its discretion to conclude that Valeries expenses remained "fairly constant," even considering the change brought about when Alexandra moved out.

In her answer to Anthonys petition for rehearing, Valerie points out that Alexandra moved out "shortly" after the judgment was entered and that Anthony did not seek a reduction in spousal support at that time.

We deem it important to emphasize that the issue on appeal is not the minutiae of the trial courts rulings but the exercise of that courts discretion. (See generally 11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Husband and Wife, § 275, pp. 357-358.) We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to modify or terminate the support Anthony is required to pay.

Finally, we disagree with the proposition that Valeries Social Security payments should be deducted from a statement of her needs. The Social Security payments are properly considered as additional income. In that sense, they are part of the "income" aspect of the I&E. The expense part of the I&E is not net expenses, or expenses after income, it is the total amount of expenses.

In light of the foregoing, we reject Anthonys contention that Valeries allegedly decreased need constituted a change in circumstances that justified a modification of support.

3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Refusing To Modify Spousal Support Because of an Increase in the Value of Valeries Assets

Anthony blends two arguments in support of his claim that the trial court should have required Valerie to rely for support on the increased value of her assets. First, Anthony contends that under section 4322 the trial court was required to terminate spousal support because Valeries assets suffice to meet her needs. Second, he contends that the increase in the value of Valeries assets effectively created income, or the possibility of income, that did not exist in 1998 and that this increase in income justifies a modification of support.

We find, as a matter of law, that section 4322 does not apply to this case. We also conclude that even though the value of Valeries assets has increased, the trial court acted well within its discretion when it concluded that recourse to these assets should be deferred until the time that Anthony retires.

a. Section 4322 Does Not Apply to This Case

Section 4322 provides that "[i]n an original or modification proceeding, where there are no children, and a party has or acquires a separate estate, including income from employment, sufficient for the partys proper support, no support shall be ordered or continued against the other party." (Italics added)

The trial court found, correctly, that Valerie "has not `acquired a separate estate. She simply sold one asset received in the `substantially equal division of the community estate through the dissolution and purchased another. [Valerie] has exchanged one asset for another; she has, in effect, exchanged her place of residence."

Anthony relies on In re Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921, 928 (Terry) where the court held that denial of continued support is "mandatory" under section 4322 if the "sufficiency threshold" is met. But Terry does not apply to this case. In Terry, the supported spouse, Ms. Terry, had what the appellate court referred to as "substantial separate property assets." (Terry, supra, at p. 925.) They were indeed substantial: they amounted to approximately $2 million at the time of the divorce (ibid.) and they were augmented by an additional $303,000 received after the divorce decree by Ms. Terry from her mothers estate. Thus, Ms. Terry disposed of $2.3 million in separate property. In the case at bar, Valerie has no, or minimal, separate property.

The reference is to the phrase "sufficient for the partys proper support" in section 4322.

All of Valeries assets are community property. This does not exclude the possibility that she possesses some personal items that are separate property.

The rationale behind section 4322 is of course obvious. When a spouse has sufficient separate property to support that spouse, it would be a windfall to the supported spouse and punitive vis-à-vis the supporting spouse to require spousal support. But the rationale of section 4322 is not implicated in this case since to our knowledge Valerie has no separate property.

Anthony misconstrues section 4322 when he contends that this provision requires "a court to terminate support if a spouse has a sufficient estate to support herself." This proposition is true only if the "sufficient estate" is the supported spouses separate property. Nor do we agree with Anthony that the trial court did not exercise its discretion in refusing to require Valerie to turn to her retirement account. As we point out below, and as the record clearly shows, the trial court took account of the fact that, upon Anthonys retirement, Valerie will in all likelihood have to rely at least in part on her 401K funds.

b. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Refused To Require Valerie To Turn to Her 401K Funds for Support

Anthony contends that since, by any reasonable definition, Valerie, who turned 65 in 2005, is retired, the trial court should have required her to turn to her 401K funds for support.

The trial court found that Valerie has $675,000 and Anthony has $721,092 in their respective 401K accounts. The trial court refused to require Valerie to turn to her 401K account, explaining that this may become necessary after Anthony actually retires.

We agree with the trial courts reasoning. Anthonys income during the last decade as a senior partner in his firm has apparently fluctuated between $300,000 and $600,000 per year, to use round numbers. Once he retires, this income stream will cease with obvious effects on Valerie. It is then that she will have to turn, at least in part, to her 401K for support. The trial court expressly recognized this when it found that once Anthony retires, Valerie "may be required to begin drawing from her retirement funds."

Barbara Gottlieb, Anthonys expert, testified that Valeries retirement account, depending on the amount of withdrawals and on the type of investment, will at one point be depleted. As an example, assuming a monthly payout of $4,600 and a rate of return of 4.5 percent, the account would be depleted in 13 years, by the time Valerie is 78 years old.

Anthony claims that the trial court would not consider Valeries retirement account because he was not as yet withdrawing monies from his 401K. While the trial court did note this circumstance, the fact is that the court expressly left open recourse to Valeries 401K when Anthony in fact retires.

We see no basis for Anthonys claim that the trial court "simply [chose] to ignore" Valeries retirement account. Instead of ignoring it, the trial court noted that recourse to it would in all probability be necessary once Anthony retires.

Citing In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43 (Schmir), Anthony contends that, as in that case, the court in this case had discretion to require Valerie to turn to her retirement account for support.

It is true that the appellate court in Schmir agreed with the trial court in that case that the supported spouses ability to draw on her IRA account without penalty was a changed circumstance that warranted a decrease in spousal support. (Schmir, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 50-51.) As an abstract proposition, it may well be true that penalty-free access to funds may be a changed circumstance, when previously withdrawals would have been penalized. Whether this change in circumstances should also bring about a reduction or, as Anthony seeks in this case, the elimination of spousal support is quite another matter. Each case must be examined on its own facts and circumstances; a change in circumstances in one case may justify a modification of spousal support and the same change, in another case, may not. This is an essential aspect of the rule that the decision to modify support is consigned to the discretion of the trial court. (See authorities collected in 11 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Husband and Wife, § 275, pp. 357-358.)

In the case before us, Anthony is now 68 years old and retirement does not appear to be far off. Once that happens, the question of spousal support must be reexamined and in all likelihood will have to be restructured; the trial court clearly recognized this fact. As we have already noted, in this case it is sound planning to conserve Valeries resources.

In Schmir, the calculus of facts yielded a different result. For one, there were other important changes in circumstances. The supported spouse had acquired the ability to earn a minimum of $2,500 as a licensed clinical social worker and her monthly medical expenses had decreased from $2,000 to $500. (Schmir, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 48-50.) The trial court found that the supported spouse could withdraw $2,220 per month from her IRA without reducing the principal, which more than compensated for the gap between what she needed to live on and her earnings as a social worker. (Id. at p. 53.) The totality of these circumstances justified the conclusion that spousal support should be terminated if the supported spouse obtained employment as a social worker. (Id. at p. 58.)

We add parenthetically that the rate of return on the IRA in Schmir was calculated at 4.5 percent (Schmir, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 53) and not the rather generous 6.75 percent that Anthony projects.

The case before us is certainly different from Schmir. Valerie has no prospects of employment and must look to Anthony and whatever assets she has to support her. Importantly, Anthony is nearing retirement. None of these circumstances can be found in Schmir.

In light of our conclusion that the trial court did not err in not requiring Valerie to resort, at this point, to her 401K account, we need not address the issue whether a projected 6.75 percent rate of return is reasonable.

c. Anthony Overstates the Value of Some of Valeries Assets

Anthony claims that Valerie has $453 per month income from investments and that she netted $300,000 from the sale of the Coldwater Canyon property. The first claim is dubious and is in any event a contested matter; the second claim is not supported by the record.

Anthonys claim that Valerie has investment income of $453 per month is based on his own declaration where he describes the net amount of investment income to himself and Valerie from two investments: "Since the net amount is approximately $450 per month to each party, the amount is not significant." Actually, according to Valeries I&E, she has $100 per month of investment income. The trial court found that it was not clear whether investment income was equally divided, but since both parties received this income, it was "unnecessary to analyze the amount received by each [party] for purposes of this proceeding."

The only aspect of this item that has real support in the record is Anthonys own observation in his declaration that, whatever this amount is, it is not significant. While it would have been preferable for the trial court to resolve the conflict between $450 (Anthony) and $100 (Valerie), it simply makes very little, if any, difference which of these amounts is correct. In any event, we do not find persuasive Anthonys unsupported claim that Valerie has investment income of $450 per month.

Anthonys claim that Valerie netted $300,000 on the sale of the Coldwater Canyon property is not supported by the record; in fact, it is refuted by the record. The facts are that the house was sold for $2,725,000. After the loan was paid off and the brokers fee was deducted, the profit was $2,405,889. Capital gains taxes were to be paid in the approximate amount of $445,000. The Westwood condominium was bought for $1,775,000, which left a profit of $185,000. The trial court found that the net gain was approximately $180,000.

4. The Trial Court Was Not Required To Determine How Much Support Anthony Is Paying

Section 4320 sets forth 13 factors that the court is required to consider in ordering spousal support. The trial court addressed and discussed each of these factors in its memorandum.

While a court must consider these 13 factors in arriving at the original order awarding spousal support, when the issue is whether changed circumstances justify a modification of the award, it does not appear to be necessary to track through each of the factors set forth in section 4320. Nonetheless, the trial court did so in this case.

Given the thoroughness with which the trial court parsed the facts of this case, we cannot credit Anthonys argument that the "record here is that the trial court never considered the level of current support being paid (and that it refused to modify)." (Original italics.) For one, the record demonstrates the exact opposite, i.e., that the court was well aware of the foundational facts of this case, the amount of current support being perhaps the most prominent fact. It is also a contradiction in terms to claim that the court did not consider the amount of support that it was being asked to modify. In any event, the record contains repeated references in Valeries I&E to her average monthly support payment as totaling $11,050. We cannot assume that the trial court ignored these references to the support Valerie is receiving.

We also do not agree with Anthony that the trial court never decided the "fundamental foundational fact" of how much support Anthony was paying. Simply put, this was not a decision this trial court was required to make; this decision had already been made when spousal support was awarded in 1998. It turns out that in addition to the $5,137 monthly support, the monthly percentage of Anthonys bonus was roughly the same amount. This is a matter of record repeated at several points in the record. The fact that this trial court tracked through all the 13 factors set forth in section 4320 should not mislead one into thinking that the court was required to reexamine de novo the support awarded. The courts reexamination of the amount of spousal support was limited to determining whether there were material changes in circumstances that justified a modification.

5. The Remainder of Anthonys Contentions Are Without Merit

Anthony contends that the trial court failed to address the fact that Valeries purchase of the condominium in Westwood "was a step up from the marital lifestyle." It is true that spousal support must be based "on the standard of living established during the marriage." (§ 4330, subd. (a).) But the court did not ignore the economic stature of the condominium; it held that selling the Coldwater Canyon house and buying the condominium was an exchange of equivalent properties. The court also found that Valerie lives "at the marital standard." We think that these finding are correct. For one, the prices paid for these two properties at practically the same time, i.e., $1.7 million for the condominium and $2.7 million for the house, reflect their relative worth.

We disagree with Anthony that the trial court focused exclusively on his ability to pay and ignored Valeries potential for self-support. As we have noted, the trial court took account of the fact that, upon Anthonys retirement, Valerie will in all probability have to rely at least in part on her own assets, and that for this reason those assets should be conserved until they are needed.

Finally, there is no merit to Anthonys contention that the court ignored the "relative financial positions" of the parties. On the contrary, the court compared in detail Anthonys and Valeries assets and income in its memorandum. We find it unnecessary to repeat that analysis. Anthony claims that the court failed to compare what Anthony describes as Valeries "luxury penthouse condominium" with his house in Ojai, which he now states was appraised in 2007 at $1.4 million. If this is supposed to mean that Valerie is living in the lap of luxury compared to Anthony, we must demur. The parties live under broadly equivalent conditions. The marked difference is that Anthony reports a monthly income of $32,248, inclusive of his bonus, and Valerie is entirely dependent on the spousal support that she receives.

Since it is not really material, we note only in the margin that according to the trial court Anthony failed to present evidence of the value of the Ojai property but Anthony claims he did so.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Anthonys petition to terminate or modify the support order is affirmed. Respondent is to recover her costs on appeal.

We concur:

COOPER, P. J.

EGERTON, J.


Summaries of

In re Marriage of Anthony

Court of Appeal of California
Sep 3, 2008
No. B198323 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 3, 2008)
Case details for

In re Marriage of Anthony

Case Details

Full title:In re Marriage of ANTHONY and VALERIE THERESA GLASSMAN. ANTHONY MICHAEL…

Court:Court of Appeal of California

Date published: Sep 3, 2008

Citations

No. B198323 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 3, 2008)