Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County Ct. No. J511865, Elizabeth Riggs, Judge. (Retired Judge of the San Diego S.Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)
NARES, Acting P. J.
Karla L. appeals a judgment terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter, Mariah N., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Karla challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. We affirm the judgment.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Effective January 1, 2008, the Legislature amended and renumbered section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). (Stats. 2006, ch. 838, § 52.) Because the proceedings at issue here occurred before the statutory change, we refer to the earlier version of the statute.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mariah was born in March 2003. In December 2005 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (f) on behalf of Mariah. The petition alleged Mariah was at risk of harm because Karla had contributed to the death of one of Mariah's siblings when Karla left the sibling with a boyfriend Karla knew was violent and abusive. In addition to the sibling that died, Mariah has three other siblings. Karla was not the caregiver for any of her three children. One child had been freed for adoption after Karla failed to successfully reunify with the child. The second sibling became a dependent and was placed in foster care after he was born with a positive drug test. The third sibling lived in Mexico with relatives. The court held a detention hearing, detained Mariah in foster care and ordered Karla to comply with her case plan.
At the disposition hearing, the court declined to offer reunification services to Karla. The court continued Mariah's placement in foster care and scheduled a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
The social worker assessed Mariah as adoptable based on her good health and lack of developmental and emotional problems. Mariah's sibling, Jose, was placed in a foster home that was interested in adopting both Mariah and Jose. In addition, 35 other approved adoptive families were interested in adopting a child with characteristics like Mariah.
The social worker observed several visits between Karla and Mariah and found the visits generally went well. Karla interacted appropriately with Mariah and Mariah appeared to enjoy the time she spent with Karla. The social worker agreed the two shared a positive relationship but did not believe their relationship was a beneficial one, nor that Karla occupied a parental role in Mariah's life. Further, Karla's history with her three other children made returning Mariah to Karla's custody a risky placement.
Karla and Mariah participated in a bonding study conducted by Dr. Beatriz Heller. The study concluded that Mariah saw Karla as a stable figure in her life but it was unclear whether Mariah viewed Karla as a maternal figure. Dr. Heller observed that Mariah did not initiate affection toward Karla during the study. Mariah instead would ask to see her foster mother and needed reassurance that her foster mother was waiting outside for her. As the visit progressed, Mariah enjoyed playing with Karla and the two interacted well together. At the end of the visit, Mariah went to her foster mother and did not show signs of distress. Dr. Heller believed Mariah would not likely suffer "negative reactions" if she no longer had contact with Karla.
At the section 366.26 hearing, the court heard testimony from social worker Jose Santana. Santana testified regarding the visits he observed between Karla and Mariah and concluded the visits were appropriate. However, Mariah did not ask for Karla in between visits and Mariah instead looked to her current caregivers for all her emotional and physical needs. She did refer to Karla as "mom or mommy" but Mariah also called her foster mother "mom." Santana admitted the relationship was positive but believed Mariah would not suffer serious detriment if parental rights were terminated. Mariah instead would benefit from the stability she would receive through adoption.
The court found Mariah was adoptable. The court further found none of the exceptions to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) applied to preclude terminating parental rights. The court noted that Karla did maintain regular contact and visitation with Mariah but that Mariah would not suffer detriment if the relationship ended.
DISCUSSION
A
Karla contends the evidence is insufficient to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) does not apply to preclude terminating her parental rights. Karla asserts Mariah would benefit from continuing the parent-child relationship because she maintained regular visitation with Mariah and Mariah was bonded to her.
A
We review the judgment for substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. We do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate the weight of the evidence. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 53.) Rather, we "accept the evidence most favorable to the order as true and discard the unfavorable evidence as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact." (Ibid.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947; In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
"Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 573.) If the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of six specified exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(F); In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides an exception to the adoption preference if termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because "[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." We have interpreted the phrase "benefit from continuing the relationship" to refer to a parent-child relationship that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent[-]child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; accord, In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 811.)
To meet the burden of proof for this statutory exception, the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a substantial, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. (Ibid.; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.)
B
The court found Karla regularly visited Mariah. Thus, we examine only whether substantial evidence supports the court's finding Karla did not show she had a beneficial relationship with Mariah. Admittedly, the evidence shows Karla has a relationship with Mariah, but it was not shown to be a beneficial parent-child relationship within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). The visits between Karla and Mariah were appropriate and pleasant. Karla showed some parenting skills by feeding Mariah and taking Mariah to the bathroom. Mariah also referred to Karla as "mom or mommy." However, Mariah did not have difficulty separating from Karla when visits ended and Mariah did not ask for Karla in between visits unless a visit was about to occur. In the social worker's opinion, Mariah did not rely on Karla to meet her needs or view Karla as a parental figure. She instead looked toward her foster mother for her needs even when Karla was present.
In addition, to establish the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception, Karla needed to show Mariah would suffer detriment if their relationship was terminated. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The evidence here did not show terminating parental rights would likely cause Mariah great harm and deprive her of a substantial, positive emotional attachment. (Ibid.) Admittedly, the social worker believed Karla and Mariah had a strong relationship with one another and the bonding study indicated Karla was a stable figure in Mariah's life. However, the bonding study went on to report that it was unclear whether Mariah saw Karla as a significant maternal figure. The study also reported Mariah did not initiate affection with Karla and that Mariah would not suffer immediate negative reactions if the relationship was terminated. Thus, there was no showing Mariah would be greatly harmed. To require a parent show only "some, rather than great, harm at this stage of the proceedings would defeat the purpose of dependency law . . . ." (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 853.)
After balancing the strength and quality of the parent-child relationship against the security and sense of belonging that an adoptive placement would give Mariah, the court found the preference for adoption had not been overcome. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception is inapplicable. (See In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 425.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, J., McDONALD, J.