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In re Maria R.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Second Division
Sep 16, 2008
No. B204432 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 16, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. No. JJ14643 Robert Ambrose, Juvenile Court Referee.

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels, Peggy Z. Huang and Stephanie C. Brenan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


DOI TODD Acting P. J.

After the probation officer found Maria R. (minor) was not in compliance with her informal probation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2, the juvenile court held an adjudication hearing and found that minor had committed misdemeanor battery in violation of Penal Code section 242. The juvenile court found that minor came within the provisions of section 602 and placed her home on probation under certain terms and conditions. The juvenile court set the maximum term of confinement at six months.

All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

Minor appeals on the grounds that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to find a violation of Penal Code section 242 because the prosecution failed to establish that minor was acting unlawfully in hitting the victim; (2) the maximum term of confinement of six months should not stand because minor was not ordered into custody; and (3) probation condition No. 15 is unconstitutionally vague and must be modified.

FACTS

Stephanie M. testified at minor’s adjudication hearing that she and minor were involved in a fight on September 14, 2006. Minor and her two sisters started the fight, and they punched Stephanie while Stephanie “just defended [her]self.” At first, Stephanie did not remember exactly where she received the blows. Upon having her memory refreshed from her doctor’s report, she said that she was hit from the shoulders up.

On cross-examination, Stephanie said she did not say anything to the girls or argue with them before the fight started. Minor was not the girl who hit Stephanie first, and Stephanie did not know at what point minor joined in hitting her. Stephanie admitted that her mother hit the girls, but she said her mother did not start the fight. Stephanie did not know at what point her mother joined in, or whether minor joined in before or after Stephanie’s mother did.

Raquel M., Stephanie’s mother, testified that someone knocked on her door between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. She opened the door to find minor’s brother and another girl. Standing at the door, minor’s brother began asking questions, and Raquel asked him what was happening. He said nothing was happening, and Raquel then asked him what he was doing there. The girl with minor’s brother began hitting Stephanie, and Raquel tried to defend her daughter. Minor then arrived with two of her sisters, and minor began hitting Stephanie. According to Raquel, Stephanie did not hit minor first. Raquel acknowledged that minor and one of her sisters are smaller than Stephanie and herself. Raquel stated she did not hit anyone, but only tried to take the girls off her daughter.

Minor, who was 17 at the time of the hearing, testified that Raquel was hitting minor’s little sister, and minor defended her sister. Then, “Stephanie’s mother got violent and was hitting, and that is how we started fighting.” Minor said she had seen her sister being hit from across the street. She was able to see because everyone was outside Stephanie’s house. Minor said she did not go to the house with the intention of getting into a fight but only to defend her sister.

Minor admitted hitting Stephanie, but testified it was because Stephanie started hitting minor when minor tried to separate her sister from Raquel. Minor said that she was never inside the house. She stated at first that she did not know how her sister ended up inside the house with Raquel, but she then said that Raquel pulled minor’s sister inside by pulling on the girl’s hair. Minor claimed she was able to see inside the house from across the street. She then stated she could not see her sister after her sister was inside.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Minor’s Argument

Minor asserts that a true finding of a violation of Penal Code section 242 requires a showing of a willful and unlawful use of force or violence against another person. She argues that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proving an unlawful use, since minor had the lawful purpose of defending herself from Stephanie’s blows. Therefore, the true finding was contrary to minor’s due process rights, and the finding and subsequent order must be reversed and the petition dismissed.

B. Proceedings Below

After hearing argument, the juvenile court stated, “The telling point to the court is—and it just won’t go out of my mind—that this didn’t happen even on the sidewalk. This happened at the house doorway, inside, outside, different views of that. Not on the sidewalk or the yard, but at the doorway.” The juvenile court then found that the People had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that minor committed a battery upon Stephanie.

C. Relevant Authority

“‘The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088–1089.)

“‘Although it is the duty of the [finder of fact] to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the [finder of fact], not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’” [Citations.]’” (People v. Figueroa (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1587.)

D. Evidence Sufficient

Minor rests her argument on the assertion that she was “already under attack by Stephanie at the time that [minor] hit her,” that she hit Stephanie only in response to Stephanie’s attack, and that the prosecution presented no evidence that minor used excessive force out of proportion to the circumstances.

Penal Code section 242 defines battery as “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” Self-defense is the only legal justification for battery. (People v. Mayes (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 195, 198.) To establish self-defense as a justification for battery, “‘the defendant must have an honest and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The threat of bodily injury must be imminent [citation], and ‘. . . any right of self-defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable under the circumstances. [Citation.]’” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064–1065.)

We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that minor committed a battery on Stephanie and that there was reasonable doubt concerning minor’s asserted justification of self-defense. According to Raquel, the fight was begun by the act of minor’s brother and a female, not identified as minor’s sister, going to Stephanie’s home and confronting Stephanie and her mother. The female began hitting Stephanie, and Raquel tried to separate them. The fight was joined by minor and two of her sisters. Stephanie suffered injuries from blows by minor and her two sisters, although Stephanie did not know which of the three girls punched her first. Stephanie said she was being punched by the three sisters while she “just defended [her]self.”

According to minor, nothing violent happened until Raquel pulled her sister into Raquel’s house by the hair. Only then did minor run over to the house and try to defend her sister. Minor claimed that Stephanie then hit minor. Several discrepancies in minor’s testimony justify the trial court’s implied credibility findings and therefore its true finding on the allegation. Minor insisted she went across the street to defend her sister, yet the female who arrived at Stephanie’s and Raquel’s home with minor’s brother was not identified as minor’s sister. In addition, minor at one point stated that she was able to see inside Stephanie’s house from across the street. She then stated she could not see her sister after the girl went inside, but she did see the actions of Raquel because they took place outside the house. Minor at one point testified that she did not know how her sister “ended up” inside the house. She then said Raquel dragged the girl inside by the hair, and minor could see inside the house. The juvenile court as the trier of fact did not believe minor, and we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s credibility findings.

Furthermore, whatever the actions of the female who first arrived at the house, there was no justification for minor and her two sisters to cross the street and go to Stephanie’s and Raquel’s front door and engage in a full-scale attack on Stephanie. Self-defense is not available to a defendant “who, through his own wrongful conduct . . ., has created circumstances under which his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified.” (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, fn. 1.) Minor’s own testimony was the only evidence offered to support her claim of self-defense. On the other hand, although Stephanie said she was not sure which girl hit her first, she stated that she was only defending herself. In addition, Raquel testified that Stephanie did not hit minor first.

In light of the evidence, the juvenile court, acting as the trier of fact, had substantial evidence to support its conclusion that minor was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Figueroa, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1587.) Minor’s argument is without merit.

II. Maximum Confinement Time

Citing In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569 (Ali A.), minor contends that a maximum period of confinement may not be set when a juvenile is placed home on probation in a parent’s custody. Minor requests that the order setting the maximum term be stricken. Respondent agrees that no maximum period of confinement should have been set but asserts that the maximum confinement time need not be stricken.

In Ali A., the court concluded that, since the minor had not been committed to the CYA or removed from the custody of his parents, and therefore neither section 731, subdivision (b) nor section 726, subdivision (c) was applicable, the juvenile court was not required to set a maximum term of confinement and had no discretion to do so. (Ali A., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 571, 573.) The Ali A. court simply affirmed the order of probation, finding that the maximum term of confinement contained in the dispositional order was “of no legal effect” until such time as the minor violated the terms of his probation, a new section 777 hearing was held, and the minor was removed from his parents’ custody. (Ali A., supra, at pp. 573–574.) We believe that in order to accurately record the punishment imposed upon minor at the dispositional hearing, the better practice is to strike the order setting a maximum term of confinement.

Section 726, subdivision (c) provides, in pertinent part, “If the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. [¶] As used in this section and in Section 731, ‘maximum term of imprisonment’ means the longest of the three time periods set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code . . . .”

III. Probation Condition No. 15

Minor argues that the condition that prohibits her from association with anyone disapproved of by her parents or the probation officer is unconstitutionally vague. Neither the juvenile court’s oral explanation nor the written condition contained a knowledge requirement. Respondent agrees that the condition should be modified.

The appellant in In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 was placed on probation, subject to the condition that she not “‘associate with anyone disapproved of by probation.’” (Id. at p. 880.) The Supreme Court agreed with appellant that the condition was unconstitutionally vague and overly broad because it did not include an express knowledge requirement. The court reasoned that, as written, the condition gave the probation officer unlimited power to preclude the minor’s association with anyone without requiring any prior knowledge of those individuals the probationer must avoid. (Id. at pp. 890–892.) We therefore modify the condition to include a knowledge requirement. (Id. at p. 892.)

DISPOSITION

The order of wardship is modified by striking the order setting a six-month maximum term of confinement and by modifying condition of probation No. 15 to state that minor must not associate with anyone she knows to be disapproved of by her parents or the probation officer. In all other respects, the order of wardship is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to correct the adjudication/disposition hearing minute order with respect to condition No. 15 and to strike the maximum confinement time.

We concur: ASHMANN-GERST, J., CHAVEZ, J.

Section 731, subdivision (b), as modified effective January 1, 2004, provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] minor committed to the Department of the Youth Authority . . . may not be held in physical confinement for a period of time in excess of the maximum term of physical confinement set by the court based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court . . . .”


Summaries of

In re Maria R.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Second Division
Sep 16, 2008
No. B204432 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 16, 2008)
Case details for

In re Maria R.

Case Details

Full title:In re MARIA R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Second Division

Date published: Sep 16, 2008

Citations

No. B204432 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 16, 2008)