Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. VJ28228, Daniel Lopez, Judge.
Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TURNER, P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The minor, Manuel D., appeals from the August 22, 2007 order declaring him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice. On August 1, 2007, the juvenile court sustained the allegation of a delinquency petition filed July 9, 2007, charging the minor with burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) The juvenile court declared the offense to be a felony. The juvenile court also found true the allegation that in the commission of the burglary, the minor took, damaged and destroyed property of a value exceeding $50,000. (Pen. Code, § 12022.6, subd. (a)(1); Stats. 1998, ch. 454, § 2.) The minor’s maximum confinement time was set at 7 years, 8 months: 6 years for the burglary; 8 months for second degree robbery; and, 1 year for the section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(1) finding. The minor argues: there was insufficient evidence to support his burglary conviction; the trial court improperly committed him to the juvenile justice division; the commitment order should be reversed. We affirm the wardship order and remand to allow the juvenile court to calculate the minor’s confinement time.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319; People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466; Taylor v. Stainer (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 907, 908-909; see also In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089 [standard of proof is the same in juvenile proceedings as that required in adult criminal trials]; In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275 [same].) On June 3, 2007, Harootune Harry Vartanian traveled with his wife from their home in Whittier to Yosemite National Park. After they arrived in Yosemite on June 5, 2007, Mr. Vartanian received a telephone call informing him his house had been “robbed.” Mr. Vartanian immediately drove home, arriving at approximately 7 p.m. on June 5, 2007. Mr. Vartanian found the back window of his home had been broken. A flower vase had been smashed. Several drawers had been opened downstairs. Four cabinets in Mr. Vartanian’s den had been opened. Jewelry had been dropped on the floor. A drawer in the guest bedroom had been opened. Over $30,000 in one hundred dollar bills was missing from an upstairs cabinet. Approximately $45,000 worth of jewelry was also missing. Mr. Varatanian did not know the minor or Antonio E., who was also involved in the burglary. Mr. Varatanian had not given either of the two minors permission to be within his home or the perimeter of his sliding glass door or windows.
Los Angeles County Sheriff Deputy Miguel Campos arrived at Mr. Varatanian’s home on June 5, 2007. Mr. Vartanian’s brother had discovered the front door was open. Deputy Campos noticed that the rear window and the rear sliding glass door of the home were open. The rear window had pry marks on it. Several rooms of the home were ransacked. Based on his training and experience, Deputy Campos believed the house had been burglarized.
Irma Arceo, a law enforcement technician for the sheriff’s department, went to Mr. Varatanian’s home on June 6, 2007 to lift prints from several areas, including: the exterior and interior windows; a file cabinet; and jewelry boxes. Ms. Arceo lifted a total of nine prints. The print cards were numbered and forwarded to the San Dimas Sheriff’s station for physical testing. Susanah Baker, a forensic identification specialist with the sheriff’s department, received the fingerprints for processing. Ms. Baker entered seven of the prints into the automated fingerprint indexing system. Ms. Baker matched three sections of palm prints to the minor. Two other sections of prints were matched to Antonio. Ms. Baker took flat impressions of the minor’s right and left hands and compared them to the prints lifted from Mr. Varatanian’s home. Ms. Baker determined that the prints were made by the same individual. Ms. Baker also took impressions of Antonio’s hands and compared them with those lifted from the Varatanian home. Antonio’s prints matched those found in the Varatanian residence.
Detective Phillip Busch investigated the burglary. After receiving information regarding the fingerprint identification, Detective Busch obtained a search warrant for the minor’s home. A wallet containing $3,020 cash, including $2,900 in one hundred dollar bills was found in the minor’s home. The wallet also contained two traffic tickets issued in the minor’s name.
In the course of his investigation, Detective Busch learned that a Mercedes Benz automobile had been purchased on June 5, 2007, the day after the burglary. One of the traffic tickets found at the minor’s home listed a vehicle identification number for a Mercedes Benz. Detective Busch determined that the car had been purchased from A.S.K. Auto Sales. The car was purchased with cash for $19,940 by the minor and another individual, Gabriel Maldonado.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The minor argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s true finding that he committed burglary because there was no evidence that he entered the victim’s home. In reviewing a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the following standard of review: “[We] consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432, fn. omitted; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 631; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) Our sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 319; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 22; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331; Taylor v. Stainer, supra, 31 F.3d at pp. 908-909.) The standard of review is the same in cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208; People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932.) The California Supreme Court has held, “Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 331, quoting People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755; see also People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 370.) The Court of Appeal has held: “The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the minor’s guilt, and if the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]” (In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 872; see also People v. Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d. at pp. 932-933.)
Penal Code section 459 provides, “Every person who enters any house . . . with intent to commit grand or petit larceny of any felony is guilty of burglary.” As we held in People v. Figueroa (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1588, “The California Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that fingerprints are the strongest evidence of identity and ordinarily are sufficient by themselves to identify the perpetrator of the crime.” (See People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 211; People v. Johnson (1988) 47 Cal.3d 576, 601, overruled on another point in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 752-754; People v. Gardner (1969) 71 Cal.2d 843, 849; People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 589, overruled on another point in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 649; see also People v. Nguyen (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 32, 39-40.) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings. Over $30,000 in one hundred dollar bills and $45,000 worth of jewelry was taken from the victim’s home. In addition to the minor’s fingerprints on the window point of entry, a wallet containing $3,020 cash, including $2,900 in one hundred dollar bills was found in the minor’s home. Further investigation revealed that the minor purchased a Mercedes Benz automobile for $19,940 the day after the burglary. This constituted substantial evidence the minor committed a burglary.
B. Juvenile Court’s Confinement Time Determination
1. Factual background
The minor argues that the juvenile court erred when it committed him to the juvenile justice division without considering its section 731, subdivision (b) discretion to fix his maximum period of confinement at less than the adult maximum. In addition, the minor argues that the juvenile court relied upon inaccurate information regarding his 2005 sustained petition, which was for grand theft rather than robbery. On August 15, 2007, the juvenile court heard argument regarding the recommended disposition. At the time of the disposition hearing on August 22, 2007, the juvenile court noted: “In terms of disposition, the court wants to recite [the minor’s] history back prior to making my order. The court does note the probation report at age 13 a petition was sustained, 602 wardship was declared. That involved a misdemeanor vandalism case. [¶] Age 14 he was placed home on probation. Also for misdemeanor vandalism. Age 14 the court filed a 777. This was Department 250 in Los Padrinos, 777 petition was filed. He was suitably placed. He subsequently Ahwoled [sic] and was placed in suitable placement subsequent to that. [¶] Age 14 - - well, under a suitable placement order he picked up a burglary charge. He was ordered to camp on May 26, 2005. It appears from this further printout that was a 211 robbery petition that was sustained. [¶] Age 15, again, a 777 petition was filed. After his release from camp he was ordered suitably placed. He awholed [sic] from suitable placement. He was replaced in November of 2006. [¶] There are a few matters cited, no petitions were filed. At age 17 a 777 petition was filed, again October 25, 2006. He awholed [sic] from suitable placement. The court subsequently ordered him to a three-month camp on January 24, 2007. He was released from camp May 24, 2007. He was arrested on this matter June 5th, 2007. [¶] . . . [¶] Furthermore, the testimony the court heard and during the course of the contested disposition, the court finds [the minor] much too sophisticated for any probation efforts within the parameters of the probation department. [¶] The mental and physical conditions, qualification of this minor render it probable that he will benefit from the reformatory discipline offered by the agency previously known as the California Youth Authority, Department of Corrections operates it now. [¶] The minor is committed to the care and custody of probation for purposes of commitment to the California Youth Authority.” Thereafter, the juvenile court asked if counsel would waive the minor’s presence to “tabulate” presumably the confinement time. The commitment order dated August 22, 2007, sets the confinement time as seven years for the burglary and the section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement and one year for the robbery of 2005.
2. The matter should be remanded for further exercise of the juvenile court’s discretion
The juvenile court had a duty to select the maximum period of physical confinement. At the time the minor committed the burglary of the Varatanian residence, section 731, subdivision (b), provided in pertinent part: “A minor committed to the Department of Youth Authority may not be held in physical confinement for a period of time in excess of the maximum period of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. A minor committed to the Department of the Youth Authority also may not be held in physical confinement for a period of time in excess of the maximum term of physical confinement set by the court based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may not exceed the maximum period of adult confinement as determined pursuant to this section. . . .” (Stats. 2003, ch. 4, § 1, italics added; see In re Jacob J. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 429, 436.)
In In re Joseph M. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 889, 896-897, we held: “In the case of In re Jacob J., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 436-437, the court reviewed the Legislative history of Senate Bill 459 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 731, subdivision (b): ‘“This bill would authorize the court to additionally set maximum terms of physical confinement in the CYA based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This new provision would provide for court consideration of factors about the offense and the offender’s history which would be comparable to those employed now for the triad sentencing of adults, and have those considerations reflected in the CYA confinement term ordered by the court.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 459 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 13, 2003, pp. I-J.)’ (Italics added; see also In re Geneva C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 754, 759.) The legislative intent is clear. The amendment to section 731, subdivision (b), was intended to afford the juvenile court the discretion to consider the facts and circumstances of the minor’s case in setting a period of physical confinement that was less than the maximum adult term but within the sentencing triad described in Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (a)(3).”
At the disposition hearing held on August 22, 2007, the juvenile court stated it was committing the minor to the juvenile justice division because of his excessive record of delinquent conduct which indicated he had repeatedly been placed on probation and committed to the camp community placement program. However, in making the commitment decision, the juvenile court relied in part on the minor’s May 26, 2005 wardship order. The juvenile court mistakenly found the May 26, 2005 wardship order resulted from a finding the minor committed a robbery. In fact, the May 26, 2005 wardship order resulted from the minor’s admissions he committed a felony grand theft in violation of Penal Code section 487a and misdemeanor petty theft in violation of Penal Code section 484. These admissions and the wardship order are reflected in the May 26, 2005 minute order. Further, the reporter’s transcript of the August 22, 2007 disposition hearing contains no calculation of the maximum period of physical confinement. The clerk’s minutes for the August 22, 2007 disposition hearing state that the juvenile court set an eight year period of physical confinement based in part on the erroneous conclusion that the May 26, 2005 wardship order arose from a robbery finding.
We are confronted with two problems. First, there is no oral pronouncement of a maximum period of physical confinement. When there is a conflict between the reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts, the oral pronouncement of judgment or order control. (People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471; People v. Hartsell (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 8, 14.) Second, there was a misunderstanding as to the offense underlying the May 26, 2005 wardship order. Thus, we reverse the August 22, 2007 order setting the minor’s maximum period of physical confinement. Upon remittitur issuance, the juvenile court is to exercise its discretion in setting the minor’s period of physical confinement including calculating the terms resulting from the May 26, 2005 wardship order. (See People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070-1071; People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 188.) In light of the minor’s lengthy record of delinquency, we are satisfied the juvenile court’s erroneous belief the May 26, 2005 wardship order resulted from a robbery was harmless as it related to the decision to commit the minor to the juvenile justice division. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 729; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 826; People v. Llamas (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 35, 40-41.) Our resolution of this issue renders the minor’s arguments concerning other potential clerical errors moot. (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 860; People v. Valentine (1986) 42 Cal.3d 179-180, fn. 3.)
IV. DISPOSITION
The wardship order is affirmed. The order committing the minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice is affirmed. The order calculating the maximum period of physical confinement is reversed. Upon remittitur issuance, the juvenile court is to recalculate the minor’s maximum period of physical confinement in a manner consistent with the views set forth in the body of this opinion. The dispositional order is affirmed in all other respects.
We concur: MOSK, J., KRIEGLER, J.