Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Super. Ct. No. J206252. Marsha Slough, Judge. Affirmed.
Maryann M. Milcetic, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Dawn Stafford and Sandra D. Baxter, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
OPINION
King, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
T.M. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s January 29, 2008, orders denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition seeking additional reunification services for her two daughters, daughters 1 and 2, terminating her parental rights to the youngest of her two daughters, daughter 2, and placing daughter 2 for adoption. Mother does not contest the court’s concurrent order placing her oldest daughter, daughter 1, in a legal guardianship with daughter 2’s adoptive parents.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated
Daughter 1 was age 12 at the time of the hearings and repeatedly said she did not want to be adopted. Daughter 2 was age seven at the time of the hearings and wanted to be adopted. Mother claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition; insufficient evidence supports the finding that daughter 2 was adoptable; and insufficient evidence supports the finding that the sibling relationship exception did not apply to daughter 2. We find no error and affirm the orders.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Background
The present dependency proceedings were instituted in February 2006, after the San Bernardino County Department of Children’s Services (DCS) received a report that Mother was unable to care for daughter 1 due to daughter 1’s mental illness. In January 2006, daughter 1 was taken to Loma Linda University Medical Center (LLUMC) pursuant to section 5150, after she killed her maternal great-grandfather’s cat. Daughter 1 admitted killing several other cats and small animals. Daughter 1 was prescribed psychotropic medications Seroquel and Wellbutrin, and was released to Mother around January 25, after a two-week stay at LLUMC.
Since November 2005, Mother had been an inpatient at the Inland Valley Recovery Center (IVRC), a drug treatment center. Before being released to Mother, daughter 1 had been living with her maternal great-grandparents. Daughter 2 had also been living with the great-grandparents, but went to live with Mother at the IVRC shortly before daughter 1 was released to Mother. Since birth, both girls had been raised primarily by the maternal great-grandmother. The girls each had different fathers, neither of whom were involved in raising the girls. Daughter 1 claimed, but later denied, that the great-grandmother had abused her by hitting her in the leg with a board with nails in it. There were also unsubstantiated allegations that an uncle had sexually molested daughter 1 while she was living with the great-grandparents. The great-grandparents’ home was not considered for placement.
Mother had a lengthy history of drug use and criminal convictions for, among other crimes, burglary and receiving stolen property. Mother was currently on parole from state prison. Mother said she went into the IVRC because she wanted to get clean and be a mother to the girls, but also because she did not want to return to prison.
A social worker interviewed Mother at the IVRC on January 26. Mother said she did not want daughter 1 to be taking any psychotropic medications. The next day, daughter 1 went into a “psychotic rage,” bit a parole officer, and had to be restrained. Daughter 1 was again taken to LLUMC and discharged on January 30. On January 31, daughter 1 was taken to Canyon Ridge Hospital, her third section 5150 commitment in one month. It was then discovered that Mother had taken daughter 1 off her medications. After a lengthy discussion, Mother agreed it would be in the best interests of both girls for daughter 1 to be placed in protective custody so she could get the help she needed. Daughter 1 was later diagnosed with “[d]epression with psychosis versus bipolar disorder with psychotic features.”
B. The Initial Dependency Proceedings
In February 2006, DCS filed dependency petitions for both girls, based in part on Mother’s substance abuse and criminal history and her resulting inability to parent the girls. Daughter 1 was discharged from Canyon Ridge Hospital on February 15, and was initially placed in a level 12 group home under DCS supervision. Daughter 2 was continued with Mother at the IVRC. Mother was making good progress at the IVRC and was allowed supervised visits with daughter 1.
On May 23, the court declared jurisdiction over both girls and continued them in their placements. Then, on May 31, DCS filed a supplemental petition for daughter 2 seeking placement of daughter 2 in foster care. DCS had discovered that Mother left the IVRC with daughter 2 on May 22, only one week before she was scheduled to graduate and in violation of her Proposition 36 probation. At the May 23 hearing, Mother failed to inform either DCS, the court, or her attorney that she had left the IVRC with daughter 2.
On May 24, the social worker discovered a May 22 phone message from Mother, saying she was going to a sober living home and was taking daughter 2 with her. Mother later claimed the owner of the home would not allow her to live there without DCS consent, so Mother went to live with her boyfriend, T., and took daughter 2 with her. The social worker told Mother to return to the IVRC with daughter 2 or risk having daughter 2 placed in foster care. Mother agreed, but then “sabatoged” her return by asking various IVRC members to “vote her out” of the program. On May 26, DCS located daughter 2 at the home of T. and placed her in foster care.
At a July 19 hearing on the supplemental petition, daughter 2 was ordered removed from Mother’s care and Mother was allowed supervised visits with daughter 2. Mother’s revised service plan required her to complete an inpatient program, participate in a 12-step program, submit to drug testing, complete parenting and anger management programs, and participate in counseling.
C. The Termination of Mother’s Services
By September 2006, Mother was using drugs again, was no longer living with her boyfriend, T., and failed to inform her parole officer or the social worker of her whereabouts. Mother was terminated from her Proposition 36 program for nonattendance, and a bench warrant was issued for her arrest. Mother was also no longer visiting the girls. She failed to appear at the six-month review hearing in November 2006.
At the time of the originally scheduled 12-month review hearing in March 2007, Mother was in custody after having been arrested for possession of a controlled substance and violating her probation. She had not participated in her new case plan and had not visited the girls since June 2006, nearly 10 months earlier. DCS recommended terminating Mother’s services for both girls, but Mother contested the recommendation.
Mother testified at the contested 12-month review hearing on May 4. At that time, she had been released from custody on the condition she attend an 18-month drug court program, and she reported to drug court on April 17 shortly after her release from custody. As of May 4, she had been drug free for 37 days. She asked for six additional months’ services. The court denied Mother’s requests, terminated her services for both girls, and set a section 366.26 hearing. Pursuant to DCS’s request, the court terminated Mother’s visits with daughter 1 on the ground the visits were detrimental to daughter 1. Daughter 1 was angry with Mother for using drugs again and did not want to visit her. Supervised visits between the girls, and between Mother and daughter 2, were continued.
D. The Girls’ New Placements and Continued Visits With Mother
In January 2007, daughter 2 was placed in a new foster home—her second—because her original foster home was not in compliance with Foster Family Agency standards. By early April 2007, DCS wanted to move daughter 1 from her group home and place her with daughter 2 in daughter 2’s new foster home; however, the new foster mother was concerned that daughter 2 would not be safe around daughter 1.
The foster mother reported that, on April 17 and while playing a game of “doctor,” daughter 1 tied daughter 2’s hands with duct tape so tightly they were turning blue. The foster mother witnessed the incident and quickly cut the duct tape from daughter 2’s hands. Daughter 1 just “stood back smiling” and showed no remorse. The foster mother said daughter 1 “is not a bad child or person . . . [but] appears to have emptiness and that frightens me. She shows no compassion for other human beings when she becomes angry. . . .”
Daughters 1 and 2 had lived together their entire lives and were bonded. On July 26, 2007, the girls were placed together in a new foster home—daughter 2’s third and daughter 1’s first. At this time, daughter 2 was seven years old and daughter 1 was 11 years old. The new foster mother was daughter 1’s special education teacher and had known daughter 1 since September 2006. The foster father was also a school teacher. According to the new foster mother, daughter 1 was a good student at school and showed empathy and respect toward others. In addition, daughter 1’s therapist believed the previous foster mother had overreacted to the duct tape incident. Daughter 1 had been on “independent status” in her group home and was a role model to her peers. She was still being treated for her mental health issues, however, and was still on psychotropic medication.
By August, DCS was recommending that Mother’s parental rights be terminated and both girls be freed for adoption by their current foster parents. Then in late September, DCS changed its recommendation for daughter 1 to long-term guardianship. Although daughter 1 initially said she wanted to be adopted by her new foster parents, she had changed her mind and was now saying she no longer wished to be adopted. After transitioning into the new foster home with daughter 2, daughter 1 became confused about being adopted over returning to Mother. Daughter 1 was angry and jealous because daughter 2 was visiting Mother.
Daughter 1’s therapist recommended that daughter 1 have supervised visits with Mother to attain closure. On September 7, a supervised visit between Mother and both girls went well. On September 10, the court authorized visits between Mother and the girls in a therapeutic setting. DCS told the court it would prefer that daughter 1 be adopted, and would recommend adoption for her if she changed her mind about adoption. Daughter 2 still wanted to be adopted.
During September 2007, daughter 1 was becoming more defiant toward the new foster parents. She told them she could get the court to move her whenever she wanted, and threatened to move from foster home to foster home until the court returned her to Mother. Daughter 1’s therapist believed daughter 1 “idealized” living with Mother, and was “acting out” more in the hope of being returned to Mother. Daughter 2 cried uncontrollably and had become very withdrawn and angry because daughter 1 did not want to be adopted. The new foster parents were still willing to adopt daughter 2 and be daughter 1’s long-term guardians.
E. The Hearing on Visitation
In October 2007, DCS asked the court to terminate Mother’s visits with both girls, on the ground their negative behaviors had escalated since they both began visiting Mother. Daughter 1 was being even more defiant toward the new foster parents, and both girls were bed-wetting and being aggressive toward each other. The court met with the girls in chambers on November 16. Both girls said they wanted their visits with Mother to continue, so the court denied DCS’s request to terminate the visits.
The girls were appointed separate counsel shortly after daughter 1 changed her mind about adoption. In late November, counsel for each of the girls asked the court to discontinue the visits with Mother pending the section 366.26 hearing. Counsel for daughter 1 questioned whether the visits with Mother had been helpful to daughter 1. Similarly, counsel for daughter 2 questioned whether it was in daughter 2’s best interest to continue the visits. DCS was concerned that the visits were undermining the girls’ ability to adjust to living together in their new home, and jeopardizing their placement with the new foster parents.
A hearing on whether Mother’s visits should continue pending the section 366.26 hearing was held on December 5. The new foster father, Mr. P., testified at the hearing. Mr. P. explained that daughter 1 did not become interested in visiting Mother until daughter 2 had two or three visits with Mother following the girls’ placement in the home. Daughter 1 was jealous because Mother would give daughter 2 gifts like toys and jewelry. Moreover, daughter 1’s behavior had changed for the worse after she began visiting Mother. She was more defiant and disrespectful toward the foster parents, fought with daughter 2 more often, and threatened physical violence toward both daughter 2 and the foster parents. Daughter 2’s behavior had also changed. She would argue with the foster parents over things that weren’t an issue until daughter 1 became upset about them. Despite the problems, the foster parents were still willing to allow daughters 1 and 2 to remain in their home. The foster parents did not want the girls to visit Mother, however, at least for the present time.
Social worker Cynthia Crawshaw also testified at the hearing. She believed that ending the visits for both girls would give them a chance to stabilize in their new foster home. In her opinion, daughter 1 was suffering from “reattachment disorder” as a result of being detached then reattached to Mother and her various placements. Ms. Crawshaw stressed it was important to keep the girls together because they were very bonded to each other and separating them would be detrimental to both of them.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered Mother’s visits with both girls to continue, in a therapeutic setting, pending the section 366.26 hearing. The court observed that, although the visits were causing problems for the girls, the girls would also have problems if the visits stopped. The court further ordered, however, that if the girls’ therapist found the visits detrimental to the children, the court would reconsider the matter.
F. Mother’s Section 388 Petition and the Section 366.26 Hearing
Mother filed a section 388 petition on October 9, requesting return of the girls to her care or, alternatively, six months’ additional services. Although the court initially denied the petition without a hearing, the court later deemed the petition refiled and set a hearing on it immediately before the section 366.26 hearing. Both hearings were held on January 25, 2008.
Mother testified at the hearings. She was 28 years old at the time and began using drugs when she was 12. She had been in and out of prison several times and had violated her parole six times. She had been clean and sober for 10 months. She completed an anger management class “on her own” after her services were terminated in May 2007. She had obtained a driver’s license for the first time in her life and had enrolled in college. She completed a parenting class at IRVC in 2006. She was earning an income by providing in-home support services to her grandfather.
In addition, Mother was in phase 4 of a five-phase drug court program, and was expected to complete the fifth and final phase in June 2008. If she completed the program, the drug possession and other pending charges against her were to be dismissed following her completion of the after-care part of the program in October 2008. Since entering the program, she had had no positive drug tests and 71 negative tests. She was attending a 12-step program outside of drug court, four times a week.
Mother was living with her fiancé, M.K., whom she met in June 2007. M.K. was 48 years old and claimed he had had never drank or used drugs. M.K. did not know Mother when she was using drugs and had only known her since she had been sober. Mother said M.K’s sober lifestyle was an encouraging and positive influence on her. M.K. had a 12-year-old daughter for whom he was paying child support but was not involved in raising. Daughter 1 believed M.K. was too old for Mother but also believed M.K. was the best boyfriend Mother had ever had because he was employed and had an education.
Since September 2007, Mother had been visiting both girls every other week at the offices of the girls’ therapist. Before that, Mother had been visiting with daughter 2 approximately every other week since April 2007. From around September 2006 through March 2007, Mother was “on the run” and using drugs, and was not visiting with either of the girls.
Ms. Crawshaw also testified. She said daughter 2 had always wanted to be adopted by the new foster family, but also wanted to continue seeing Mother. Daughter 1 was still conflicted about adoption. In early January, daughter 1 said she wanted the court to decide whether she should be adopted. Daughter 1 also wanted to continue seeing Mother. Both girls were becoming increasingly comfortable with their new foster parents. Wraparound services and therapy were helping.
Ms. Crawshaw said it would be in the best interests of both girls to be adopted and it would be detrimental to them if they were separated from each other. Both girls called their foster parents “mom and dad” and were very affectionate toward them. Ms. Crawshaw also believed daughter 1 would challenge Mother’s relationship with M.K. if she went to live with them. Daughter 1 had already told Mother, “I come first.” And, given Mother’s lengthy history of drug use, there was a significant risk that Mother would relapse and begin using drugs again. Ms. Crawshaw did not believe Mother was sufficiently stable to have the girls returned to her. Mother was also financially dependent upon M.K.
Finally, daughter 1 testified. She was 12 years old at the time of the hearing and in sixth grade. She said she wanted to live with Mother “now” and it would be alright if that meant she could not live with daughter 2. She said she did not want to be adopted by her foster parents, even though she had grown to love them and they had treated her well. Later, she said she was unsure whether she wanted to be adopted. She would prefer to have both Mother and the new foster parents in her life.
G. The Court’s Rulings
On January 25, the court took the matters under submission and issued its rulings several days later, on January 29. The court denied Mother’s section 388 petition on the grounds that, although Mother was changing her circumstances, she had not “changed” her circumstances, and her requested relief—return of the girls to her care or six months’ additional services—were not in the best interests of the girls. The court was particularly concerned that Mother would be unable to properly parent daughter 1, given daughter 1’s history of mental health problems and propensity to manipulate others to get what she wanted, and Mother’s apparent vulnerability to daughter 1’s manipulation.
For daughter 1, the court selected long-term guardianship as the permanent plan. The court found that daughter 1, then age 12, had clearly objected to being adopted; thus, the exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii) applied (court not to terminate parental rights where child 12 years of age or older objects to termination). The court also ordered that Mother’s twice-monthly visits with daughter 1 would continue in a therapeutic setting.
For daughter 2, the court terminated parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan. The court found that none of the statutory exceptions, including the parental benefit and sibling relationship exceptions, applied for daughter 2. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) & (v).) Mother appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Mother Timely Appealed All Orders Regarding Daughter 2
As a preliminary matter, we address DCS’s claim that Mother has not timely appealed the January 29, 2008, order denying her section 388 petition.
1. Relevant Facts
On January 29, the juvenile court issued orders denying Mother’s section 388 petition, terminating her parental rights to daughter 2, and selecting adoption as the permanent plan for daughter 2. On March 11, Mother filed a notice of appeal. In it, she referred to the January 29 orders terminating her parental rights and placing daughter 2 for adoption, but she did not refer to the order of the same date denying her section 388 petition. On April 1, Mother filed an amended notice of appeal in which she purported to appeal the order denying her section 388 petition and “any other appealable order made at the hearing.”
2. Argument and Analysis
DCS first argues that Mother’s amended notice of appeal filed on April 1 is untimely because it was not filed within 60 days of January 29. We agree. Subject to an exception not applicable here, a notice of appeal from a juvenile court order must be filed within 60 days after the date the order was made. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.585(f); § 395; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1250.) The April 1 notice was untimely regarding the court’s January 29 orders.
DCS next argues that Mother’s original notice of appeal filed on March 11 should not be liberally construed to encompass the separately-appealable order denying Mother’s section 388 petition. We disagree with this argument. In re Madison W. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1447 (Madison W.) is directly on point. There, the Fifth District Court of Appeal announced it would “henceforth liberally construe” a parent’s notice of appeal from an order terminating parental rights to encompass an order denying the parent’s section 388 petition, provided the order on the section 388 petition was made within 60 days of the date the notice of appeal was filed. (Id. at p. 1451.) The reasons for this rule are sound and its requirements are satisfied here.
In Madison W., the order denying the section 388 petition was made three days before the order terminating parental rights, and both orders were made within the 60-day period preceding the filing of the parent’s notice of appeal. The parent and her counsel failed to reference the section 388 order in the parent’s notice of appeal but challenged the section 388 order on appeal. The social services agency disputed the court’s jurisdiction to address the section 388 issue, given the terms of the notice of appeal. Without condoning counsel’s failure to cite the section 388 order in the notice of appeal, the court reasoned that the rule of liberal construction should apply. The court pointed out that the section 388 order was appealable; the notice of appeal was entitled to liberal construction; the appellate court’s jurisdiction depended upon a timely notice of appeal; the notice of appeal would have been timely as to the section 388 order had the notice referred to the order; and respondent was not prejudiced. The court also noted it would be better to avoid associated claims of ineffective assistance and the judicial resources that would otherwise be expended in deciding such claims. (Madison W., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1450-1451.)
Here, the order denying Mother’s section 388 petition was made on the same date as the order terminating her parental rights to daughter 2, January 29, and both orders were made within 60 days of March 11, the date Mother filed her original notice of appeal. For the reasons discussed in Madison W., we liberally construe the March 11 notice of appeal as encompassing the order denying Mother’s section 388 petition.
B. Mother’s Section 388 Petition Was Properly Denied
Mother claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition in which she requested six months’ additional services for both girls. Mother maintains she met her burden of demonstrating changed circumstances and that granting her an additional six months’ services would serve the best interests of both girls. Mother concedes she did not show that the immediate return of the girls to her care would have served their best interests.
1. Applicable Law
A parent may petition the juvenile court to change, modify, or set aside a previous order on the grounds of changed circumstances or new evidence. (§ 388, subd. (a).) The petition must state why the requested relief is “in the best interest of the dependent child.” (Id., subd. (b).) The moving party parent bears the burden of proving both prongs by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) We will not disturb the juvenile court’s ruling on a section 388 petition absent a clear abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415-416.)
2. Analysis/Mother’s Changed Circumstances
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s petition. As the court indicated, Mother showed she was “changing” her circumstances by making significant progress in addressing her drug problem. At the time of the hearings, Mother had been clean and sober for 10 months, was earning some income, and was getting her life on track. But as the court also indicated, Mother did not show that her circumstances had “changed” within the meaning of section 388. Mother was at substantial risk of relapsing into drug use. She began using drugs when she was 12 years old and was 28 years old at the time of the hearing. She had yet to complete her five-phase drug court program, and she had failed to complete other drug programs in the past, including her inpatient program at IVRC and another Proposition 36 program.
3. Analysis/Best Interests of Girls
Mother also failed to demonstrate that granting her additional services would have served the best interests of either one of the girls. Daughter 2 was only seven years old at the time of the hearings. Daughter 2 had consistently expressed her wish to be adopted, and was less bonded to Mother than daughter 1. Daughter 2 at one point said she wanted to live with Mother, but also said she wanted to live with her new foster parents. Daughter 2 was extremely upset and even became withdrawn after daughter 1 changed her mind about wanting to be adopted by the girls’ new foster parents. Daughter 2’s best interests would not have been served by giving Mother yet another chance to reunify with her and delaying her permanent plan of adoption. Daughter 2 had found a stable home with her fos-adopt parents and did not need to bear the further delays and uncertainties associated with granting Mother additional services.
Daughter 1 had significant mental health issues and a propensity to manipulate others to get what she wanted. Mother appeared to be vulnerable to daughter 1’s manipulations. Mother had no experience in parenting daughter 1, because both daughter 1 and daughter 2 were raised primarily by their great-grandmother. As the court also indicated, daughter 1 was likely to challenge Mother’s relationship with her new fiancé, M.K., and Mother was financially dependent on M.K. Mother was apparently not up to the challenges daughter 1 would have presented to her. Given the fragile state of Mother’s recovery, her inexperience in parenting the girls, and daughter 1’s unresolved mental health and other issues, the court reasonably concluded that daughter 1’s best interests would not have been served by allowing Mother another chance to reunify with her at the present time.
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding That Daughter 2 Was Adoptable
Mother next contends that insufficient evidence supports the court’s finding that daughter 2 was adoptable. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The contention lacks merit.
1. Standard of Review
In order to terminate parental rights under section 366.26, a juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence “that it is likely the child will be adopted.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) On appeal, we must determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the child is likely to be adopted. (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.) We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the order, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in favor of the judgment. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)
Indeed, “[t]he ‘clear and convincing’ standard is for the edification and guidance of the juvenile court. It is not a standard for appellate review. [Citation.] ‘“The sufficiency of evidence to establish a given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination is not open to review on appeal.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘Thus, on appeal from a judgment required to be based upon clear and convincing evidence, “the clear and convincing test disappears . . . [and] the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied, giving full effect to the respondent’s evidence, however slight, and disregarding the appellant’s evidence, however strong.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re J. I. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 903, 911.)
2. Applicable Law
“The issue of adoptability requires the court to focus on the child, and whether the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt. [Citations.] It is not necessary that the child already be placed in a preadoptive home, or that a proposed adoptive parent be waiting. [Citations.] However, there must be convincing evidence of the likelihood that adoption will take place within a reasonable time. [Citation.]” (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624.)
“Usually, the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor’s age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650.)
3. Analysis
Mother argues that daughter 2 was not adoptable because she was an older child who wanted to continue contact with her biological family. (Daughter 2 was seven years old at the time of the January 2008 hearings and turned eight in March 2008.) Mother also argues that daughter 2 had medical issues, including asthma and recurring bouts of bronchitis, and seemed to suffer from small seizures. Her biological father apparently suffered from schizophrenia, which could have been genetically passed on to her. Mother also claims daughter 2 had behavioral issues. She was easily distractible, had difficulty focusing, and seemed to suffer from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. She demanded a lot of attention. Her therapist diagnosed her with “generalized anxiety disorder,” due to multiple foster care placements and her temporary separation from daughter 1.
We disagree with Mother’s interpretation of the evidence. First, daughter 2 did not have significant medical issues. Although she suffered prenatal exposure to a variety of drugs, including alcohol, methamphetamine and tobacco, and that exposure was likely the cause of her asthma and recurring bouts of bronchiolitis, she was being treated for her respiratory problems. The cause of what appeared to be “minor seizure activity” was being investigated. She was within normal variations for physical development and was meeting her psychosocial developmental milestones. She was considered a “well female child.”
Second, daughter 2 did not have significant behavioral issues. Her socialization skills were within age-graded expectations. She enjoyed school and playing with her friends. She had good school attendance and received all “A’s” on her report card. Her most significant behavioral problem involved sibling rivalry with daughter 1 over possessions, but that was being addressed through therapy and counseling. She was making “adequate progress” in therapy to address “the abuse and neglect she suffered while in her birth family’s care, the grief and loss issues resulting from the break up of her family of origin and her multiple foster placements . . . .” She “appear[ed] to be a happy child, always wearing a smile on her face.” She was friendly and got along well with others.
Nor did daughter 2’s age or desire to continue contact with Mother and other relatives undermine her general adoptabilty. She was bonded with her new foster parents and wanted to be adopted by them; she only wanted to continue visiting Mother and other relatives. Her ability to bond with her new foster parents—her third foster family within two years—was a testament to her resiliency and ability to adapt to new circumstances. Moreover, it showed she was generally able to bond with stable caretakers.
In sum, substantial evidence thus supports the court’s finding that daughter 2 was generally adoptable. She was a healthy, friendly child who performed well in school and got along well with others. She was able to bond with her current caretakers. She did not have significant medical or behavioral issues that undermined her general adoptability. Nor did her age or her desire to continue contact with Mother and other relatives undermine her general adoptability.
D. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding That the Sibling Relationship Exception Did Not Apply to Daughter 2
Mother also argues that the court erroneously found that the sibling relationship exception to the adoption preference did not apply to daughter 2. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) This claim also lacks merit.
1. Applicable Law
Pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), if the court finds a child is clearly adoptable the court must choose adoption as the child’s permanent plan and terminate parental rights, unless one of the exceptions set forth in subdivision (c)(1)(B) applies. The fifth of these exceptions is the sibling relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) The sibling relationship exception applies if placing the child for adoption would result in a “substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (Ibid.)
In determining whether the sibling relationship exception applies, the juvenile court should first consider the nature and extent of the sibling relationship, including whether the siblings were (1) raised in the same household; (2) share significant common experiences; and (3) have existing close and strong bonds. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 951-952; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) If the court finds that placing the child for adoption would substantially interfere with the child’s sibling relationship, the court must then weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefits of being adopted. (In re L.Y.L., supra, at pp. 952-953; In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 54-55 [ultimate question in applying sibling relationship exception is whether adoption would be detrimental to the adoptive child].) The court’s findings will be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. (In re L.Y.L, supra, at p. 947.)
2. Analysis
Mother argues that insufficient evidence supports the court’s finding that the sibling relationship exception did not apply. She emphasizes that the girls were very close and bonded. The girls had lived their entire lives together before daughter 1 was hospitalized in January 2006 and the dependency proceedings began in February 2006. They had both been raised by their great-grandmother. Everyone involved in the proceedings, including Ms. Crawshaw, the girls’ counsel, and county counsel, agreed that the girls should stay together if possible.
There is no question that placing daughter 2 for adoption while placing daughter 1 in a legal guardianship with daughter 2’s prospective adoptive family posed a risk of substantially interfering with daughter 2’s sibling relationship with daughter 1. Daughter 1 could be returned to Mother or placed with another family. In that event, the girls will be separated. But as the court implicitly recognized in selecting the different plans for the girls, the benefits to daughter 2 of being adopted outweighed the detriment she could realize if she is ever separated from daughter 1.
Daughter 2 was only eight years old, was bonded to her foster parents, and wanted to be adopted by them. Daughter 2 was very upset when daughter 1 changed her mind about wanting to be adopted. Daughter 2 needed the stability and permanency that adoption offered. Her best interests would not have been served by placing her in legal guardianship or long-term foster care. Either of those arrangements would have deprived daughter 2 of the stability and permanency she will realize through adoption.
In addition, placing daughter 2 in a legal guardianship or long-term foster care would not have guaranteed that the girls will never be separated. Daughter 1 is four and one-half years older than daughter 2 and still has significant mental and behavioral issues. Daughter 1’s best interests and ideal placement may not always coincide with daughter 2’s. By placing daughter 2 for adoption and daughter 1 in a legal guardianship with the same fos-adopt parents, the court made the best decision it could have made in serving the short- and long-term best interests of both girls. By placing daughter 2 for adoption, the court ensured that daughter 2 would not be subject to daughter 1’s changing preferences regarding her living arrangements and visits with Mother.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the sibling relationship exception did not apply. The evidence showed that the benefits to daughter 2 of being adopted outweighed the risk that, by being adopted, daughter 2 would lose her close and bonded sibling relationship with daughter 1.
Lastly, Mother maintains that the court was confused about the sibling relationship exception and failed to fully address or properly consider it at trial. For this reason, Mother asks that the termination order for daughter 2 be reversed or, alternatively, that the matter be remanded to the juvenile court with directions to fully address the sibling relationship exception. We disagree that the court either misunderstood or failed to fully address the issue.
After the court ordered daughter 2 placed for adoption, county counsel asked the court whether it was finding the sibling relationship exception “moot by virtue of the minors being together or for other reasons.” In response, the court said, “As I understand the sibling bond argument . . . as I view that argument in the context of the facts of this case, if the Court were inclined to allow [daughter 1] to go home, the sibling bond between [daughter 1 and daughter 2] significant enough, which could arguably allow [daughter 2] to go home as well. [¶] However, I do find that argument or that particular exception not relevant given the Court’s findings on the other issues.”
Based on the court’s comments, Mother argues it is unclear why the court viewed the sibling relationship exception as “not relevant.” She says the court may have believed the issue to be moot because the girls would both be staying in the same home. But, she argues, there was no guarantee the girls would remain in the same household, given the court’s orders. Thus, she argues, the court misunderstood the sibling relationship issue and failed to fully address it. We disagree with Mother’s interpretation of the court’s comments and the record.
As discussed, it is true that the court’s orders placing daughter 2 for adoption and daughter 1 in a legal guardianship with the same family did not guarantee that the girls would always live in the same home. But there would have been no such guarantee if both girls had been placed in a legal guardianship or in long-term foster care with the same family. As noted, daughter 1’s older age and her mental health and behavior issues meant that her best interests and ideal placement may not always coincide with daughter 2’s. This was abundantly clear to the court. The court was also aware that the girls’ counsel, county counsel, Ms. Crawshaw, and the girls’ therapists, all believed the girls should stay together if possible. The court’s selection of adoption for daughter 2 and legal guardianship for daughter 1 best served the interests of both girls, because it gave the girls the best chance they had of staying together in the long run while also serving daughter 2’s need for stability and daughter 1’s need to continue her relationship with Mother. The court implicitly recognized this when it carefully made its permanent plan selections for both girls.
IV. DISPOSITION
The January 29, 2008, orders denying Mother’s section 388 petition, terminating Mother’s right to daughter 2, and placing daughter 2 for adoption are affirmed.
We concur: McKinster, Acting P.J., Richli, J.