Opinion
SC 166512 COA 362706
11-01-2024
In re M. FLOYD, Minor.
Macomb CC Family Division: 2019-000015-NA.
Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice, Brian K. Zahra, David F. Viviano, Richard H. Bernstein, Megan K. Cavanagh, Elizabeth M. Welch, Kyra H. Bolden, Justices.
ORDER
By order of April 10, 2024, the application for leave to appeal the November 21, 2023 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decisions in In re Bates, Minors (Docket No. 165815) and In re Dailey, Minor (Docket No. 165889). On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been denied in both cases on July 19, 2024, __ Mich. __ (2024), the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Cavanagh, J. (concurring).
I concur with the majority's order denying leave to appeal. Respondent-father argues that because he shared a loving relationship with his son, MF, who was living safely with a paternal relative, the trial court clearly erred by terminating his parental rights. However, the trial court explicitly considered the availability of a juvenile guardianship before concluding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in MF's best interests. Because I discern no clear error in the trial court's rejection of guardianship as an alternative to termination, I agree that this Court need not intervene in this case.
The family court became involved with this family because of serious and tragic circumstances. In 2018, respondent's 18-month-old daughter died from a fentanyl overdose while in the care of respondent and the child's mother. After the child's autopsy revealed her cause of death, respondent's apartment was searched and items consistent with drug trafficking were seized. In early 2019, respondent and the mother were arrested, and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) petitioned the court to remove MF from the family home and placed him in foster care. DHHS also petitioned to terminate respondent's parental rights at the initial disposition on the basis of aggravated circumstances. The petition alleged that termination was warranted pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) and (ii), (g), (j), and (k)(vi).
The mother is not a party to this appeal.
The trial court also took jurisdiction over another minor child, ND. ND is not respondent's biological child, and she is not the subject of this appeal.
Respondent was criminally charged for the child's death and, although the termination trial was scheduled for June 2019, the case was adjourned pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. Eventually, respondent pleaded no contest to second-degree murder, second-degree child abuse, and related drug-related charges. He was sentenced to a minimum of five years in prison. During his time in prison, respondent maintained a relationship with MF through virtual parenting time and phone calls, facilitated by MF's relative placement, his paternal aunt.
Because of the criminal trial adjournments and COVID-related delays, the termination trial in this case did not take place until May 2022. Following the trial, the court found that DHHS had established the above-cited statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court also found that termination was in MF's best interests. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. In re Floyd, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 21, 2023 (Docket No. 362706). After respondent sought leave to appeal in this Court, we held the case in abeyance for In re Dailey, Minor (Docket No. 165889), and In re Bates, Minors (Docket No. 165815). In re Floyd, 4 N.W.3d 478 (2024).
Respondent's application for leave to appeal in this Court only raises one issue- whether termination was in MF's best interests when a guardianship with his relative placement was an alternative option available to the trial court that respondent argues would have better served MF's best interests. Although respondent argued in the Court of Appeals that MF's best interests and safety could be safeguarded through a structured guardianship plan, the Court of Appeals did not specifically address the guardianship issue. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals found no clear error in the trial court's best-interest findings.
"If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights . . . ." MCL 712A.19b(5). The trial court must weigh all available evidence to determine the child's best interests. In re White, 303 Mich.App. 701, 713 (2014). In weighing all the evidence, Michigan courts have identified several considerations that the court should take into account, including the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanence, and the advantages of the child's current placement over the parent's home. See, e.g., In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich.App. 35, 42 (2012). Looking to MCL 712A.19a(6)(a), this Court has further explained that "a child's placement with relatives" is a factor that must be weighed against termination. In re Mason, 486 Mich. 142, 164 (2010). Finally, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in a child's best interests, and we review a trial court's finding on best interests for clear error. In re Jones, 286 Mich.App. 126, 129 (2009).
A juvenile guardianship may be an appropriate permanency option in some cases. See In re Dailey, Mich.,; 8 N.W.3d 587, 589 (2024) (Welch, J., dissenting). In fact, DHHS guidance provides that, in some instances," '[i]t is in the child's best interest to maintain the parental rights of the birth parent(s) because the child and parent(s) have a meaningful relationship as evidenced by attachment and regular visitation.'" Id. at, quoting DHHS, Child Guardianship Manual, GDM 600 (August 1, 2022), pp 3-4. Guardianships "can promote permanency and stability without destroying a parent-child bond." Id. at . Moreover, the biological parent-child relationship is important and vital part of a child's development, even if the parent and child do not live together. In re Bates, Mich.,; 8 N.W.3d 578, 583-584 (2024) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). Accordingly, trial judges should not necessarily view their choice at a termination trial as binary. That is, their choice is not limited to only termination of parental rights or complete reunification of parent and child. Instead, when the facts of the case call for it, the trial court should consider whether an outcome less severe than termination, such as a relative guardianship, would serve the child's best interests. Only when all available options are fully considered can a reviewing court be confident that the trial court's best-interest analysis is thorough and sound. See Dailey, Mich. at; 8 N.W.3d at 590 (Welch, J., dissenting). That said, although the potential for a guardianship should be explored, that does not necessarily mean that a trial court errs if it decides that termination would better serve the child's best interests.
Even though it does not appear that DHHS meaningfully considered guardianship as a potential option for MF, the trial court did explicitly consider whether guardianship was in MF's best interests. The trial court made the following specific findings of fact:
Although placement with a relative weighs against termination, and the fact that a child is living with a relative must be considered, a trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in the child's best interests. . . . In this case, the Court has considered MF's placement with a relative, but rejects the possibility of a guardianship. Petitioner has established respondents' poor judgment, neglect, and inability to provide a safe environment for children. MF needs safety and permanent protection from respondents' ability to make decisions for him. Moreover, he needs to be placed in a safe environment for his growth and development. He is doing well in [the paternal aunt's] home.
Termination will pave the way for adoption by [the paternal aunt], who is a school teacher and in a better position to provide the emotional and moral guidance the child needs, in a safe and healthy living environment. Under these circumstances, the Court rejects guardianship.
In addition, the record demonstrates that MF's relative placement was made aware that guardianship was an available option, and she confirmed that she was open to guardianship or "whatever was best" for MF. This fact, along with the fact that the trial court explicitly considered the possibility of guardianship sets this case apart from the facts in Dailey, Mich. at; 8 N.W.3d at 589-590 (noting that without considering all available options, the trial court's best-interest analysis was incomplete).
I detect no clear error in the trial court's finding that guardianship would not serve MF's best interests, even though MF and respondent shared a close bond. In light of the aggravated nature of the circumstances that brought this family under the court' jurisdiction and the court's conclusion that respondent was likely unable to detach himsel from his criminal lifestyle, the trial court's focus on MF's continued safety was reasonable Therefore, I am not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred. commend the trial court for exploring guardianship as an alternative to termination and encourage other trial courts to carefully consider whether, when appropriate, a guardianship can provide the necessary permanency and stability for the child withou unnecessarily destroying the parent-child bond.
Welch, J., joins the statement of Cavanagh, J.