Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK67827, Albert J. Garcia, Commissioner. Affirmed.
Rich Pfeiffer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Owen L. Gallagher, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Minors.
DOI TODD, Acting P. J.
Appellant Beatriz T. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order sustaining a petition brought pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d) alleging that mother failed to protect her 14-year-old daughter, R.R., from 22-year-old Eric M. who is the father of R.R.’s child. Mother contends that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s findings because she neither knew nor should have known of R.R.’s and Eric’s sexual relationship. We affirm. In sustaining the petition, the juvenile court properly relied on evidence that Mother knew about a dating relationship between the two and allowed the relationship to continue even after R.R. became pregnant.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2002, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) received a referral that Mother’s daughter Melinda was caring for her younger siblings while Mother was at work and that she was wrapped in only a towel while standing in the bathroom with a 24-year-old male visitor. There was no sexual contact between the two. The Department provided Mother with daycare referrals and the maternal grandmother came from Mexico to help the family. With the situation stabilized, the Department closed the case.
On March 22, 2007, the Department received a referral that Mother’s daughter R.R. had given birth to a baby girl, D.M., one day earlier. The referral also reported that D.M.’s father was Eric, who was living with Mother and her family. In an interview with a social worker on March 23, 2007, Mother stated that Eric had been a family friend for many years and had been, but was no longer, living with her family. Mother was unaware of R.R.’s pregnancy until she was four or five months along, as R.R. did not tell Mother about the pregnancy until then and had exhibited no physical symptoms suggesting she was pregnant. R.R.’s 16-year-old brother told the social worker that he saw nothing wrong with Eric and R.R. living together with the family. According to R.R., she was still in a relationship with Eric and he was living in the family home, which was a one-room studio apartment. Eric worked two jobs to help support the family. At that time, the social worker did not see Eric and was unable to confirm whether he was living in Mother’s home.
Having received a suspected child abuse report from the Department, the police interviewed Mother and R.R. on April 10, 2007. R.R. said she met Eric at a family party in May or June 2006. Between June and August 2006 they had sexual intercourse approximately 10 times, when R.R. was 13 and Eric was 21. Mother knew the two were dating, but had advised them not to have sex until R.R. was older. Mother also stated that Eric helped the family pay for food and necessities, and that he had lived with the family when R.R. was pregnant but had since moved out.
The Department interviewed Eric on April 12, 2007. He stated that he resided in Mother’s home and was still in a relationship with R.R. When the social worker advised him to move from the home, he agreed to do so despite crying and saying that he was in love with R.R. On April 17, 2007, the social worker confronted Mother about her statement to the police that Eric still resided with her family. Mother then admitted that Eric was still living with her and that he contributed money towards the family’s bills. She also admitted having been aware of his relationship with R.R., stating “‘I knew there was a huge age difference, but I would rather accept it, instead of having them go behind [my] back.’” At that point, the Department determined that R.R. remained at risk and detained her.
At the Department’s urging, Mother filed a police report against Eric on April 18, 2007 and agreed to enroll in a parenting program. In view of these actions, the Department did not detain R.R.’s five male siblings and they remained with Mother.
The Department filed a dependency petition on April 20, 2007 pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), (g) and (j) as to all of Mother’s children, which alleged that R.R. was sexually abused by an unrelated adult male and that Mother failed to protect her. At the detention hearing, the juvenile court released R.R.’s siblings to Mother but ordered that R.R. be detained; it also permitted her unmonitored visits with Mother.
The Department did not file a petition as to D.M. and she has remained with R.R. throughout the proceedings.
The Department’s jurisdiction/disposition report contained a May 2007 interview with R.R., in which she stated that she had known Eric for three or four years before they began dating. They began having sexual intercourse in May 2006 and always at Eric’s mother’s home. R.R. stated that they never had sex at her home and that Mother was unaware of her relationship with Eric because she would sneak out to see him. When R.R. told Mother about her pregnancy in November 2006, Mother was “upset” and “speechless,” and would not let her speak with Eric for some time. About two months later, Mother let Eric reside with the family due to pressure from R.R., though Eric and R.R. were never alone in the home.
During Mother’s interview, she stated that she first found out about the dating and pregnancy at the same time—November 2006. At that time, Mother rejected Eric’s request for R.R. to come live with him because they were too young. Mother told him “‘when the day comes you can rent and furnish a place and save money’ that [R.R.] and the baby can live with him.” She denied that Eric was living with or supporting the family, stating that he stayed over only a couple of nights when R.R. was sick and gave her money only once.
The jurisdiction/disposition report indicated that the Department had concerns about R.R.’s and Eric’s relationship due to their age difference and resulting pregnancy, and about Mother’s conflicting statements regarding how long Eric had resided in the family home. Nonetheless, the Department believed that with appropriate supervision and services, coupled with an order that Eric not reside or spend the night with R.R., any risk to R.R. could be mitigated. Accordingly, it recommended that R.R. be declared a dependent of the court with family maintenance services, including family preservation services and conjoint counseling.
At the May 21, 2007 jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the Department offered into evidence only the jurisdiction/disposition report, which incorporated all prior reports. Thereafter, the juvenile court denied Mother’s motion to dismiss the section 300, subdivision (d) allegation pursuant to section 350, subdivision (c). Mother then testified that Eric never lived with her family in 2006 and that she was unaware of his relationship with R.R. until November 2006. In January and February 2007, he spent the night at her home occasionally when R.R. was sick, but the two of them were never alone. He would sleep on the floor in the same room with the rest of the family.
Following argument by counsel, the juvenile court sustained paragraphs (b)(1) and (d)(1) of the petition as to Mother. The juvenile court proceeded immediately to disposition, declaring R.R. a dependent child pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d), and permitting her to reside with Mother under the Department’s supervision. It ordered that Mother participate in parenting classes for teens and counseling, and that R.R. have no contact with Eric. At the Department’s request, the juvenile court dismissed the petition as to R.R.’s siblings.
The juvenile court also sustained certain allegations against the children’s fathers which we do not address here because none of the fathers appealed.
Mother appealed.
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that substantial evidence did not support either the juvenile court’s denial of her motion to dismiss or its sustaining the dependency petition against her. She asserts that there was no evidence to show she knew or should have known of a sexual relationship between Eric and R.R. and, for that reason, she could not have done anything to prevent it.
We review both the juvenile court’s denial of a motion to dismiss and its jurisdictional findings under the substantial evidence test. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1649; In re Clara B. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 988, 1000–1001.) Under the substantial evidence test, “[i]t is the trial court’s role to assess the credibility of the various witnesses, to weigh the evidence to resolve the conflicts in the evidence. We have no power to judge the effect or value of the evidence, to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of witnesses or to resolve conflicts in the evidence or the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from that evidence.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52–53.) Rather, we must presume in favor of the order and consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Department as the prevailing party. (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1427; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) Applying this standard, we have little difficulty in concluding that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s orders.
I. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Findings Under Section 300, Subdivision (b).
The juvenile court may assume jurisdiction over a child pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) where “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . .” (§ 300, subd. (b); see also In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [section 300, subdivision (b) requires a finding of “(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness”].) “Serious physical harm” includes sexual abuse. (See In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 398.) The Department bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 210.)
In support of jurisdiction, the Department relied on evidence contained in its reports that Mother was aware that R.R. and Eric were dating yet did nothing to prevent it, and that she allowed Eric to reside in the family home—either permanently or temporarily—after learning that R.R. was pregnant by him. The juvenile court ruled that the Department met its burden under section 300, subdivision (b), admonishing Mother not to “bury [her] head in the sand. . . . You can’t close your eyes. You can’t let that person back into the house. You can’t have him around. . . . You need to understand that it’s important these children be protected.”
Mother contends that substantial evidence did not support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) because there was no evidence to suggest that R.R.’s pregnancy was more than an isolated incident that would not recur. (See, e.g., In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1134–1135 [a single incident of mother’s striking her son, which she immediately admitted and regretted, without evidence that her behavior would recur, did not support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)]; In re Alysha S., supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at pp. 398–399 [single incident of father’s lewd touching that occurred one year before the petition was filed, without evidence that the same behavior had recurred or would recur, did not support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)].) The evidence here involved far more than an isolated incident. Contrary to Mother’s assertion that she forbid R.R.’s and Eric’s relationship once she learned of R.R.’s pregnancy, the evidence showed that Mother permitted Eric to reside in the home with R.R. after she was pregnant and that he continued to provide financial assistance to the family. Moreover, contrary to her assertion that she “immediately” filed a police report against Eric, Mother did not report him for five months after she learned of R.R.’s pregnancy, and did so then only at the Department’s urging.
Thus, the evidence showed that until the Department intervened, Mother had done nothing to ensure that a sexual relationship between R.R. and Eric would not recur. Under these circumstances, there was “‘reason to believe the acts [establishing jurisdiction] may continue in the future.’” (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.) This evidence stands in sharp contrast to that in In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396–1397, where the appellate court found no substantial evidence that a risk of harm would recur, given that upon learning of a family friend’s one-time sexual abuse of their daughter the parents immediately removed him from their house, reported the incident to the police and represented that they would never again create a similar situation that put their daughter at risk. Here, while Mother may have recognized the risk that her behavior posed, she nonetheless enabled R.R. and Eric to continue their relationship. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b).
II. Substantial Evidence Supported the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Findings Under Section 300, Subdivision (d).
The juvenile court may assume jurisdiction over a child pursuant to section 300, subdivision (d) where “the parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the child from sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the child was in danger of sexual abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (d).) For the purpose of section 300, subdivision (d), “sexual abuse” is defined in Penal Code section 11165.1, subdivision (a), which includes statutory rape in violation of Penal Code section 261.5.
In denying Mother’s motion to dismiss, the juvenile court relied on the same evidence that Mother was aware of R.R.’s and Eric’s dating relationship and implicitly condoned the relationship after R.R.’s pregnancy. Though Mother then testified that she was unaware of the dating relationship before R.R. became pregnant, she conceded that she permitted Eric to spend the night at the house while R.R. was pregnant. At best, Mother’s testimony that she did not know about R.R.’s and Eric’s relationship created a conflict in the evidence, which we must resolve in favor of the juvenile court’s findings. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319; see also In re Charmice G. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659, 664 [an appellant’s arguments are facially meritless where they “‘tend to establish a factual context which, had it been credited by the trial court, might have led to a different decision’”].)
Pursuant to section 350, subdivision (c), the juvenile court may dismiss a petition if it concludes that the Department has not met its burden of proof after the presentation of evidence.
Mother contends that jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (d) was unwarranted because there was no evidence to show either that she knew or should have known of the sexual abuse. But she points only to favorable evidence, including her statements that she was unaware of R.R.’s and Eric’s relationship before November 2006 and that she was upset and speechless when she learned of R.R.’s pregnancy. She ignores the balance of the evidence on which the juvenile court relied, which included Mother’s knowledge that Eric was interested in R.R.; her merely advising the two not to have sex once she learned they were in a dating relationship but doing nothing further to discourage or prohibit the relationship; and her allowing Eric to reside in the family home even after he had impregnated R.R. The evidence further suggested that Mother tolerated the relationship because Eric helped the family financially. Moreover, one of R.R.’s siblings indicated that the family accepted the relationship despite R.R.’s and Eric’s age difference.
As the juvenile court pointed out, given this evidence, Mother “crossed the line on it” and “knew enough . . . or should have known” that R.R. was in danger of sexual abuse. (See In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 862–863 [mother’s failure to express concern or call the police after her daughter reported that her father sexually abused her, coupled with her then leaving the daughter in her father’s care, supported jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (d)].) Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s denial of Mother’s motion to dismiss and jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (d).
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order sustaining the dependency petition is affirmed.
We concur: ASHMANN-GERST, J., CHAVEZ, J.