Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. J213836 Francis M. Devaney and Amalia L. Meza, Judges.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
At an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegations that appellant Luis D., a minor, aided and abetted in the commission of misdemeanor commercial burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459 and petty theft in violation of Penal Code section 484. The court made Luis a ward of the court, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, and placed him on probation.
On appeal, Luis contends (1) the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress because, he argues, police conducted a custodial interrogation without first administering a Miranda warning, in violation of Miranda v. State of Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602] (Miranda), (2) his confession was involuntary because it was coerced by police with threats and promises of leniency, (3) there was insufficient evidence presented at the adjudication hearing to support the court's true findings predicated on aiding and abetting, and (4) certain conditions of probation imposed by the court were invalid.
As we explain, we reject Luis's contention that his incriminating statement to the police was in violation of Miranda or coerced. We also reject his contention there was insufficient evidence to support the court's true findings. However, we reverse the imposition of two conditions of probation and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the court to exercise its discretion to determine whether these conditions are proper.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Certain portions of the factual and procedural history related to Luis's claims of error are discussed post, in connection with those issues.
A. Prosecution Evidence
Edward Rodrigues, the store manager of the Longs drug store in Escondido, California, testified he was working one evening in early April 2008 when he saw a young-looking Hispanic man, later identified as Julian Amador, enter the store. Rodrigues noticed Amador walk to the liquor department and put at least four 12-packs of beer into a shopping cart. Amador then walked quickly out of the store without paying for the beer.
Rodrigues and another store employee pursued Amador as he exited the store and went around the corner. Amador headed towards a truck parked toward the end of the building. Rodrigues testified there were about 15 empty parking spaces between the entrance of the store and the parked truck. Amador put the beer in the back of the truck and jumped into the cab. Rodrigues walked to within 15 feet of the truck, wrote the truck's license plate number on his hand and saw the truck's driver, who Rodrigues identified at the hearing as Luis.
Rodrigues next saw smoke and heard screeching from the truck's wheels spinning against the pavement as the truck sped away. The truck turned onto a main thoroughfare and almost collided with oncoming traffic. Rodrigues returned to the store, telephoned police and gave them the license plate number of the truck.
Using the information provided by Rodrigues, police traced the owner of the truck to a residence in Escondido. Police responded to the call, took a statement from Rodrigues, and then drove him to the residence. While sitting in the back of the police car, Rodrigues identified Luis as the driver of the truck involved in the beer theft.
Officer Lee Ann McCollough also testified at Luis's adjudication hearing. Officer McCollough received a call at about 6:30 p.m. on the night of the theft, contacted Rodrigues at the store and took down his statement. From the license plate number police traced the truck to a residence in Escondido. Officer McCollough next drove Rodrigues to that residence and admonished Rodrigues regarding identification procedures from a pre-printed laminated card. Rodrigues identified Luis as the driver of the truck used in the beer theft.
While Luis was sitting on the curb in front of his house, Officer McCollough asked Luis if he knew why police had contacted him. Luis responded, "yes," told Officer McCollough he agreed to give Amador a ride to the store, but said he did not know Amador intended to steal the beer until he saw Amador approaching his truck with the beer in the shopping cart.
Officer McCollough told Luis she did not believe his story, and asked him to tell the truth. According to Officer McCollough, Luis changed his story and admitted he and Amador had planned to do a "beer run"—take beer from the store—before they drove together to the store. Officer McCollough testified she then asked Luis to contact Amador; Luis sent Amador a text message and Amador called back. Officer McCollough heard Luis tell Amador on the telephone that Amador promised to "take the fall" if they were caught.
Luis challenges the admission of his incriminating statement to Officer McCullough on the basis of Miranda, as discussed post.
B. Defense Evidence
Luis testified in his own defense. He admitted driving Amador to the store and parking on the side of the store. Luis denied knowing that Amador intended to take the beer from the store. Luis testified he did not know why Amador wanted to go to the store that day, nor did Luis ask before he agreed to drive him.
Luis testified he "freaked out" when Amador approached his truck with the beer. As a result, Luis followed Amador's instruction to drive away quickly. Luis admitted that after he was contacted by police, he spoke with Amador on the telephone in front of police, and said aloud that Amador had promised to take the fall if they were caught. However, according to Luis, Amador agreed to take responsibility for the beer theft after he had stolen it.
DISCUSSION
A. Suppression
Luis contends the juvenile court erroneously admitted into evidence the statement he made to Officer McCullough—that he and Amador planned to steal the beer before they drove to the store—because the record shows Luis was "in custody" for Miranda purposes at the time he made the statement. According to Luis, Miranda warnings should have been given because a reasonable person would not have believed he or she was free to leave while being questioned by police.
1. Background
During the adjudication hearing, in response to an objection by defense counsel, the court stayed that proceeding and allowed the parties to call, question and cross-examine various witnesses to determine whether Luis was in custody for Miranda purposes.
Officer McCullough testified that when she arrived with Rodrigues at Luis's residence, there were three other officers present, including a police sergeant. The sergeant's patrol car was parked behind Rodrigues's truck, and two other police cars were parked on the street. As soon as Officer McCullough arrived, the sergeant left. After Rodrigues identified Luis as the driver of the get-away vehicle, another officer took Rodrigues back to the store, leaving only Officer McCullough and one other officer at the scene.
Officer McCullough next contacted Luis, who was sitting on the curb in front of his house. Luis's mother was behind him, in the front yard. Officer McCullough testified that Luis was not wearing handcuffs when she spoke to him; that she did not prevent Luis's mother from talking to Luis but that Luis's mother never asked to speak with her son; that she spoke with Luis alone for about 20 minutes as part of her ongoing police investigation; that the other officer at the scene acted as the "cover officer" for safety; and that Officer McCullough did not read Luis his Miranda rights before speaking to him because Luis was not then under arrest.
Luis's mother testified she went outside and found her son sitting on the curb, surrounded by three police officers. She approached Luis to speak to him but was told by one of the officers to wait because they were "interrogating" her son. Luis's mother did not believe her son was free to leave. She said two of the officers took turns speaking with Luis while he sat on the curb. She testified Luis was not handcuffed, none of the officers had their weapons out and they did not move her son from the curb while they spoke to him.
Luis also testified in connection with his suppression motion. Luis was sitting in his truck when he was first contacted by police. The officer told Luis to get out of his truck and sit down at the curb, and then called for backup. Luis testified two or three other police officers arrived. Luis said he felt scared and pressured by the presence of the officers and did not believe he was free to leave.
Luis also testified that while he sat on the curb, one of the police officers asked for his version of the events and whether Luis knew Amador intended to take the beer before entering the store. After Luis gave the officer his account, the officer said she did not believe him. According to Luis, the officer said she would take him to juvenile hall if he did not tell the truth. After Luis made additional statements, the officer told Luis he could avoid going to juvenile hall if he contacted Amador and asked him to cooperate.
After hearing the evidence and the parties' arguments, and based on the totality of the circumstances, the juvenile court ruled a reasonable person in Luis's position would not have believed he or she was restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest:
"THE COURT: The purpose of the Miranda rule is to counteract inherently compelling pressures to work to undermine the individual's free will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely, and such pressures apply after a person has been taken into custody or deprived of his freedom in any significant way. The Miranda warning is required only where there has been a formal arrest or restraint of freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. [¶] The question is whether the totality of the circumstances in this case amount to a formal arrest under the reasonable person's standard, whether a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would have felt restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. And I think given the totality of the circumstances, this did not amount to a formal arrest. Yes, the minor's freedom of movement was restrained. I don't think it rose to the level of a formal arrest. [The minor] was not moved, not handcuffed. Weapons were not drawn. He was in front of his house. His mother was within sight. So under the reasonable person standard, I think that could leave the reasonable person to believe that at the end of this counter, he could be let go. And so it appears that given all the circumstances, this was an investigative detention. So the motion to suppress is denied."
2. Governing Law
"Miranda warnings are required 'as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." ' " (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403, quoting Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 440 [104 S.Ct. 3138].) "The question whether defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact." (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401.) "We apply a deferential substantial evidence standard to the trial court's factual findings, but independently determine whether the interrogation was custodial." (People v. Pilster, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1403.)
"[I]n order to invoke [the] protections [of Miranda], a suspect must be subjected to custodial interrogation, i.e., he must be 'taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.' [Citation.] '[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest.' " (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 197, citing California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121 [103 S.Ct. 3517], quoting Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495 [97 S.Ct. 711].) The determinative question is "whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have felt he or she was in custody." (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830.) Thus, "Custody determinations are resolved by an objective standard: Would a reasonable person interpret the restraints used by the police as tantamount to a formal arrest?" (People v. Pilster, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1403.)
In making this determination, " 'the totality of the circumstances is relevant, and no one factor is dispositive. [Citation.] However, the most important considerations include (1) the site of the interrogation, (2) whether the investigation has focused on the subject, (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest are present, and (4) the length and form of questioning.' " (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1050.)
Our Supreme Court clarified in People v. Stansbury, supra, 9 Cal.4th at page 830, that evidence of an officer's subjective suspicions is relevant only if those views were manifested to the suspect and would have affected the suspect's perception of his or her freedom to leave.
"Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime." (Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 495.) "General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by [the Miranda decision]. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present." (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 477-478, fn. omitted.)
Thus, an officer who lacks probable cause for arrest but whose observations lead to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may briefly hold a person in the field and ask a "moderate number of questions" to "obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions" without the need for the formality of Miranda warnings. (Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 439-442; see also People v. Manis (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d 653, 668 [Miranda warnings "need not be given [by police] in every transitory, informal, or casual exchange"].)
3. Analysis—Suppression
Here, Luis was one focus of the criminal investigation when he made his incriminating statement to Officer McCullough—that he and Amador together had planned to take the beer. However, when viewed objectively, the other factors all tend to support a finding that he was not in custody. Officer McCullough questioned Luis in a public place, specifically while Luis was sitting on the curb in front of his house with his mother present behind him. (Cf. People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 198 [interrogation held noncustodial based in part on the fact "[t]he inquiry did not take place in jail or on police premises, but in defendant's own motel room"].) There likewise was no objective indicia of arrest—no restraints such as handcuffs, no weapons drawn by the officers and no verbal suggestion Luis was under formal arrest. (See People v. Herdan (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 300, 307, fn. 11 ["If the police officer uses physical restraint on the suspect [citation] or draws a gun [citation] it is more likely to be deemed custodial than if the questioning occurs without physical restraint or opportunity to restrain. [Citation.].")
The fact Luis was suspected of a crime at the time he made the incriminating statement to Officer McCullough was not, in and of itself, sufficient to put him "in custody" for Miranda purposes. (See In re Joseph R. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 954, 959-960, noting "More than two decades ago, the United States Supreme Court made it clear [in Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 495]that custody, as that term is used in connection with Miranda, does not occur simply because an officer focuses suspicion on the suspect," and noting the court's message "could hardly have been put with greater lucidity [when it said in Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 323 [114 S.Ct. 1526] 'Our decisions make clear that... custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned'].")
Moreover, the length and form of questioning of Luis by Officer McCullough was typical of a preliminary investigation by police before establishing probable cause for arrest. The record shows the questioning by Officer McCullough was of relatively short duration and casual, and had not become sustained and coercive. (See People v. Salinas (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 925, 935-936 [recognizing "no Miranda warnings need be given 'until such time as the point of arrest or accusation has been reached or the questions have ceased to be brief and casual and become sustained and coercive[,]' " and concluding there was no evidence appellant was in custody because her "questioning by police was of short duration and was conducted in front of [her] home with no evidence of any coercive environment"]; see also People v. Murphy (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 743, 748 [no custodial interrogation when police officer questioned appellant in front of his home in connection with a search warrant].) In addition, at the time of the incriminating statement, Officer McCullough was the only officer questioning Luis, as the other officer present was merely providing cover for safety.
Luis testified the encounter with police lasted about an hour, although he did not testify how long he was questioned by Officer McCullough, who testified she questioned Luis about 20 minutes. In any event, a trial court's factual findings, whether express or implied, must be affirmed on appeal if based on substantial evidence. (People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1050.)
Thus, the totality of the circumstances shows the exchange between Officer McCullough and Luis was the result of a temporary detention of Luis based on an ongoing police investigation, and not from a formal arrest. Therefore, we independently conclude that Luis was not "in custody" for Miranda purposes when he made the incriminating statement to Officer McCullough, and that the juvenile court properly considered this statement in support of its true findings.
4. Analysis—Coerced Confession
In reaching this conclusion, we also reject Luis's alternative contention that his statement was inadmissible because it was coerced. Luis contends his confession to Officer McCullough was involuntary because she threatened to take him to juvenile hall if he did not tell the truth and with promises of leniency if he helped police find Amador.
A plausible reading of the record suggests defense counsel's objection to the incriminating statement was limited to the issue of whether Luis was "in custody" for Miranda purposes. At one point during oral argument, defense counsel claimed Luis's incriminating statement was involuntary because it was coerced by police with the promise of leniency. The record shows, however, that defense counsel argued this point while claiming Luis was subject to custodial interrogation by police. In any event, the People did not challenge this claim of error on the basis Luis failed to raise it below. We thus consider it in this appeal.
Officer McCullough testified she told Luis he would not have to go to juvenile hall if he helped police find Amador. Significantly, however, Officer McCullough also testified she made this pronouncement after Luis made the incriminating statement that he and Amador together had planned to take the beer from the store.
Luis initially corroborated the testimony of Officer McCullough. However, Luis subsequently clarified his testimony and said after he gave Officer McCullough his version of events, the officer told Luis she did not believe him and that if he did not tell the truth she would take him to juvenile hall. According to Luis, once he made additional statements Officer McCullough told him a second time he could avoid juvenile hall if he contacted Amador and cooperated with police to help catch Amador.
The record thus shows a conflict in the evidence regarding when Officer McCullough told Luis he could avoid juvenile hall if he cooperated with police. We must, however, view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's ruling and defer to its factual findings, express or implied, when supported by substantial evidence. (See People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1050; see also People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 ["In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence."]; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089 ["In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court 'must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it disclosed substantial evidence—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.]' [Citations.]")
Here, the juvenile court impliedly found the incriminating statement by Luis was not coerced, inasmuch as Officer McCullough testified it was after Luis's statement that she told Luis he could avoid juvenile hall if he helped police catch Amador. (See People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1039, 1052 ["Even when there is a significant amount of countervailing evidence, the testimony of a single witness that satisfies the [substantial evidence] standard is sufficient to uphold the [trial court's] finding."]) In light of substantial evidence in the record to support that finding, we conclude Luis's statement was not coerced.
5. Analysis—Substantial Evidence
Luis next contends the juvenile court's true findings, that Luis aided and abetted in the commission of misdemeanor commercial burglary and petty theft, were unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
Substantial evidence in the record supports the implied finding of the juvenile court that Luis possessed the requisite intent to aid and abet Amador in the commission of the crime before or during the commission of that offense. Indeed, Luis told Officer McCullough that he and Amador together planned to take the beer from the store.
Moreover, circumstantial evidence also supports that finding. Rodrigues, the store manager, testified Luis parked his truck around the corner from the store's entrance, toward the end of the building, despite the existence of about 15 vacant parking spaces between the truck and the entrance. Rodrigues also testified the truck (driven by Luis) sped off after the theft, narrowly missing oncoming traffic. (See People v. Vu (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1030 [evidence of flight immediately after the commission of a crime is relevant to show consciousness of guilt].)
That Luis offered a different version of the events, including that he (allegedly) had no advance knowledge Amador intended to steal the beer and that he "freaked out" when he saw Amador coming toward his truck with the beer and in that state followed Amador's instruction to flee, does not compel a different result. The juvenile court heard Luis's testimony and rejected it—as the court was entitled to do as the trier of fact—when it found true the allegations that Luis had committed misdemeanor commercial burglary and petty theft. (See In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830 [in considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the "trier of fact determines the credibility of witnesses, weighs the evidence, and resolves factual conflicts."])
Indeed, the juvenile court also heard Luis testify that on the day of the crime Amador called him up and asked for a ride to Longs; that Luis did not ask Amador why he needed a ride or what he needed from the store; that Amador was a friend, but not a close friend; that Luis agreed to give Amador a ride and picked him up on some "street"; that Luis did not go inside the store with Amador, but instead waited around the corner for him in his truck; and that when Luis reached Amador on the telephone after Luis was contacted by police, Luis told Amador in front of police that Amador promised to take the fall if they were caught. We thus conclude the record contains ample evidence to support the juvenile court's implied finding that Luis possessed the requisite intent to aid and abet Amador before or during the commission of the offense.
In light of such evidence, assuming arguendo the juvenile court erred when it denied Luis's motion to suppress his incriminating statement to Officer McCullough, we conclude there was sufficient other evidence to support the court's true findings. (See People v. Watson (1954) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
B. Challenges to Probation Conditions
At Luis's disposition hearing, defense counsel objected to probation conditions 34 and 36. Condition 34 provides: "Minor shall not be on any school grounds unless an enrolled student and it is during regular school hours unless authorized by the Probation Officer." Condition 36 states: "Minor is not to appear in Court or any courthouse unless [he] is a party in the proceedings." The prosecutor stated she had no objection to removing condition 34 and submitted. The court without discussion imposed on Luis conditions 34 and 36, in addition to many other conditions of probation.
The prosecutor actually said she had no objection to removing condition 34 and then "submitted" on conditions 34 and 35. Probation condition 35 requires that Luis refrain from riding in a privately-owned vehicle with more than one person under the age of 18 unless certain terms are met. Defense counsel promptly corrected the prosecutor, noting it was actually conditions 34 and 36 that Luis was challenging, which is now clear in this appeal.
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b), the juvenile court "may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." The court has broad discretion in formatting juvenile probation conditions, and may impose a condition that is reasonable for a juvenile although it is not reasonable for an adult. (In re R. V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 246-247; Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).)
Conditions of probation are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) "Generally, '[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality...." [Citation.]' [Citation.] This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. [Citations.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality. [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 379-380.)
In the instant case, the record shows counsel agreed (at a minimum) to omit probation condition 34. Although the juvenile court was not bound by that agreement, and had "broad discretion" to determine whether to impose conditions 34 and/or 36 (see People v. Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379), the record does not show the court actually exercised that discretion when it imposed on Luis both conditions of probation. (See People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847-848 ["A failure to exercise discretion... may constitute an abuse of discretion."]) In light of the agreement of counsel to delete condition 34, and the lack of any evidence to show the juvenile court rejected that agreement in connection with a proper exercise of its discretion, we conclude the prudent course is to reverse the imposition of conditions 34 and 36 and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the court to consider whether to impose on Luis either or both conditions of probation.
As noted, the prosecutor "submitted" on conditions 34 and 36, immediately after stating she had no objection to the removal of condition 34. The record is thus ambiguous regarding whether the prosecutor, by "submitting," also agreed to delete probation condition 36.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of determining whether to impose on Luis probation conditions 34 and/or 36. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
I CONCUR: HUFFMAN, J.
McDonald, J., Dissenting.
I conclude Luis was in custody at the time he was interrogated by Officer McCollough and made incriminating statements to her. Considering all of the circumstances of this case, Luis was subject to custodial interrogation at the time he made those statements and it is undisputed that prior to the custodial interrogation he was not given the required Miranda warnings.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
Miranda warnings are required when a person is being subjected to custodial interrogation. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444, 478.) "By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." (Id. at p. 444, fn. omitted.) Custodial interrogation does not include "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning [by police] as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process...." (Id. at p. 477.) "In determining whether a suspect was in custody, we look at all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. The relevant inquiry is 'how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.' [Citation.]" (Tankleff v. Senkowski (2d Cir. 1998) 135 F.3d 235, 243 (Tankleff), quoting Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442.) People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, at page 830, stated:
"We review the record... to determine whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would have felt he or she was in custody. Disregarding the uncommunicated subjective impressions of the police regarding defendant's custodial status as irrelevant, we consider the record to determine whether defendant was in custody, that is, whether examining all the circumstances regarding the interrogation, there was a ' "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement" of the degree associated with a formal arrest.' [Citation.]"
The test for whether a defendant was in custody has alternatively been described as whether a reasonable person in that position would "have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." (Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 112 (Thompson).) "An accused is in custody when, 'even in the absence of actual arrest, law enforcement officials act or speak in a manner that conveys the message that they would not permit the accused to leave.' " (U.S. v. Kirsh (2d Cir. 1995) 54 F.3d 1062, 1067 (Kirsh).)
"Courts have identified a variety of relevant circumstances [for determining whether a suspect was in custody]. Among them are whether contact with law enforcement was initiated by the police or the person interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person voluntarily agreed to an interview; whether the express purpose of the interview was to question the person as a witness or a suspect; where the interview took place; whether police informed the person that he or she was under arrest or in custody; whether they informed the person that he or she was free to terminate the interview and leave at any time and/or whether the person's conduct indicated an awareness of such freedom; whether there were restrictions on the person's freedom of movement during the interview; how long the interrogation lasted; how many police officers participated; whether they dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation; whether they manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence to prove it; whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory; whether the police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect; and whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation. [Citations.] [¶] No one factor is dispositive. Rather, we look at the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on balance they created a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to an arrest. [Citation.]" (People v. Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162 (Aguilera).) Courts also have considered the "language and tone used by the police" in interrogating the suspect. (Tankleff, supra, 135 F.3d at p. 244.)
The appellate court applies the substantial evidence standard of review and defers to the trial court's findings of historical circumstances and other facts relating to the alleged custodial interrogation to the extent the evidence or inferences are conflicting. (Thompson, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 112; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401-402; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 779.) However, considering those historical circumstances and other facts, the appellate court independently determines whether a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. (Ochoa, at p. 402; People v. Aldridge (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 477.)
Considering the historical circumstances and other facts as explicitly and implicitly found by the juvenile court and applying the law discussed above, a reasonable person in Luis's position would not have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. (Thompson, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 112.) First, police initiated the contact with Luis. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161.) Luis testified he was sitting in his truck when an officer approached him and asked for his license. The officer called for back-up officers and told Luis to get out of his truck and sit down on the curb in front of his house. While he was sitting on the curb, two to three officers questioned him. Luis did not initiate the contact with police. (Ibid.)
Second, although neither McCollough nor presumably the other officers expressly informed Luis he was being questioned as a witness or as a suspect, considering Luis's knowledge of the events preceding and during McCollough's questioning, a reasonable person in his position would believe he or she was being questioned as a suspect. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) An officer told Luis to get out of his truck and sit on the curb. When McCollough arrived with Rodriguez in the back of her car, the officers told Luis to stand up and Rodriguez then identified him as the driver of the truck that drove away from the store. A reasonable person in that position would realize he or she had been identified as a suspect in the incident. Subsequently, Luis admitted to McCollough that he knew why he had been contacted by police and then gave his version of events. McCollough stated she did not believe his story and asked him to restate his story. A reasonable person with Luis's knowledge of preceding events would not consider McCollough's pointed interrogation to be merely questioning of a witness. (Ibid.)
Third, the questioning took place on the street curb in front of Luis's house. Although that location may not be considered to be inherently coercive, the other circumstances showing Luis's lack of freedom to leave that location (e.g., an officer told him to sit on the curb and two to four officers were present during that time), reflect a coercive environment. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.)
Fourth, although neither McCollough nor the other officers told Luis he was under arrest or in custody, the absence of an express statement of custodial status is not determinative on the question of whether a reasonable person in Luis's position would have felt his or her freedom of movement was restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest. (People v. Stansbury, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 830; Kirsh, supra, 54 F.3d at p. 1067.)
Fifth, neither McCollough nor the other officers informed Luis he was free to terminate the questioning and leave at any time and Luis's conduct did not evidence an awareness of freedom to leave. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) On the contrary, a reasonable person in Luis's position, having been told by police to get out of his truck and sit on a curb while two to four officers (who arrived in separate police cars) stood nearby and questioned him, would presumably believe he or she was not free to terminate the questioning and leave at any time. (Ibid.)
Sixth, Luis's freedom of movement during questioning was effectively restricted. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) The officer told Luis to get out of his truck and sit on the curb. A police car was parked directly behind his truck. Two to four officers stood near him while he sat on the curb. When McCollough questioned Luis, she stood directly in front of him. Although Luis was not handcuffed or held at gunpoint, the circumstances show Luis's freedom of movement was effectively restricted. The juvenile court expressly stated: "Yes, [Luis's] freedom of movement was restrained." Although the court further stated the officers did not move Luis, the record does not support that finding. Rather, it is clear an officer effectively moved Luis by instructing him to get out of his truck and sit on the curb between his truck and the police car. Luis's freedom of movement was restricted during McCollough's interrogation. (Ibid.)
Seventh, although McCollough's questioning leading up to Luis's statement was relatively brief in time (apparently less than 20 minutes), that factor alone does not weigh heavily against a custodial interrogation considering the totality of circumstances in this case. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162; State v. Miranda (Iowa 2003) 672 N.W.2d 753, 760 [custody found where questioning "merely consisted of a single inquiry directed to two handcuffed individuals and others"]; U.S. v. Griffin (8th Cir. 1990) 922 F.2d 1343, 1348-1349.)
Eighth, although McCollough apparently was the only officer who directly questioned Luis regarding the incident, the record shows one or more other officers questioned him prior to McCollough's arrival. Luis testified two to three officers questioned him while he sat on the curb for over one hour. McCollough's testimony merely showed that she was the only officer to question him after she arrived there. She testified three police officers were present in front of Luis's house when she arrived. Furthermore, the presence of two to four uniformed officers and their marked patrol cars weighs in favor of a finding of restraint on freedom and therefore custody. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.)
Ninth, McCollough apparently dominated and controlled the course of questioning. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) An officer directed Luis to get out of his truck and sit on the curb. McCollough stood in front of him while she questioned him regarding the incident and expressed her disbelief of his original version of events. Although Luis was not handcuffed, McCollough displayed her domination and control over him. (Ibid.)
Tenth, although McCollough apparently did not express to Luis her belief that he was culpable and there was evidence to prove it, that belief may have been implied in her conduct and questioning of Luis. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) McCollough had Rodriguez identify Luis as the truck's driver and she expressed her disbelief of Luis's original version of events. (Ibid.)
Eleventh, the police were fairly aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) An officer approached Luis in his truck and asked for his license. The officer then called for back-up officers, who arrived shortly in separate police cars. The officer directed Luis to get out of his truck and sit on the curb, where he remained for over one hour. When McCollough arrived, the officers told Luis to stand up while a single person lineup was conducted and Rodriguez identified Luis as the driver of the truck that drove away from the store. McCollough stood while questioning the seated Luis and expressed her disbelief of his original version of events. Police were aggressive, confrontational, and accusatory. (Ibid.)
Twelfth, although police apparently did not use any special interrogation techniques to pressure Luis, there were coercive circumstances. He was told to get out of his truck and sit on the curb and McCollough stood directly in front of him, questioned him, and expressed her disbelief in his original version of events. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.)
Finally, Luis was arrested shortly after McCollough concluded her interrogation. Although she did not arrest Luis until after she persuaded him to contact his companion in the incident, Luis's arrest followed shortly after her interrogation was concluded. (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.)
Considering the totality of the circumstances relating to McCollough's questioning of Luis, I believe on balance "they created a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to an arrest." (Aguilera, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) Alternatively stated, I believe a reasonable person (especially a 17-year-old reasonable person) in those circumstances would not have felt at liberty to terminate the questioning and leave. (Thompson, supra, 516 U.S. at p. 112; Kirsh, supra, 54 F.3d at p. 1067; People v. Aldridge, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 477.) Accordingly, I believe the juvenile court erred in concluding Luis was not in custody under Miranda at the time he made his incriminating statements to McCollough. I disagree with the majority opinion's conclusion that McCollough's interrogation of Luis was merely a temporary detention of Luis based on an ongoing police investigation.
Because McCollough did not advise Luis of his Miranda rights before engaging in a custodial interrogation, the juvenile court erred by admitting as part of the prosecution's case Luis's extrajudicial statement made during that interrogation. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 478-479; Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 306-307; Tankleff, supra, 135 F.3d at p. 242.) Furthermore, the juvenile court's error in admitting Luis's extrajudicial statement in violation of his Miranda rights was prejudicial under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. Based on my review of the record, I cannot conclude the court's error in admitting Luis's extrajudicial statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 24; Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 295-297.) The juvenile court's true findings on the allegations against Luis should be reversed.