Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. NJ013688, Harry M. Elias, Judge.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
Julie B. appeals a judgment declaring Edgar G. to be the presumed father of her daughter, Lucy B., under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d). We affirm the judgment.
Unless otherwise indicated, further statutory references are to the Family Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Julie B. is the mother of Lucy B., born October 2000. On April 29, 2007, Julie stabbed her husband, Cole B., in the arm with a kitchen knife. Lucy saw Cole's wound, which was bleeding badly, and ran to a neighbor for help. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) detained Lucy in protective custody and filed a petition under Welfare & Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). Lucy told the social worker that Julie and Cole often argued, and pushed, shoved, hit and threw things at each other. Lucy said Cole was the only father she knew but "he did not make me, someone else did."
On May 2, 2007, Julie filed a paternity declaration in which she named Cole as Lucy's father. Julie declared that she and Cole had had a relationship since 1999 and Cole supported Lucy financially and emotionally for the last five years. Julie also declared she had sexual relations with a man named Hector, and did not have any other information about him. Julie told the social worker that Lucy's biological father was Edgar G. and he was never a part of Lucy's life. Julie stated she did not have any personal information about Edgar.
The social worker interviewed Julie's husband, Cole. Cole stated that he and Julie had been together since Lucy was two years old, and he was the only father Lucy recognized. The social worker advised Cole the court might determine he was Lucy's presumed father and he was entitled to legal representation. Cole said he would contact the social worker if he wanted representation. The social worker did not believe Cole was interested in reunifying with Lucy.
On May 22, 2007, Julie submitted to jurisdiction. At disposition, the court removed Lucy from parental custody and ordered the Agency to provide family reunification services to Julie. After Texas social services approved the home of Lucy's maternal grandparents, the Agency placed Lucy with her grandparents.
On August 14, 2007, Texas social services gave the Agency information about Lucy's alleged father, Edgar G. The social worker immediately contacted Edgar. Edgar told the social worker he had tried to locate Lucy for two years. He said he was present during Lucy's delivery and was involved in her life for four years. Edgar lost contact with Lucy because Julie was constantly moving. Edgar told the social worker he wanted to be a part of Lucy's life and regain custody.
A special hearing to determine paternity was held on September 18, 2007. Julie was not present at the hearing but was represented by counsel. Edgar lived in Florida. He was present at the hearing and was appointed counsel. In his paternity questionnaire and offer of proof, Edgar declared Lucy lived with him until she was six months old and continued to visit him "on and off" on weekends at his home. Edgar told friends and family that Lucy was his daughter. He paid child support. Edgar agreed to be listed as Lucy's father on her birth certificate but was not on it. Julie's nickname for him was "Hector".
The court found that Julie's paternity declaration was unclear and Edgar's paternity declaration was credible. The court determined Edgar was Lucy's presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d), and ordered the Agency to complete a full assessment of Edgar for placement and custody.
DISCUSSION
A
Julie contends the court erred when it found that Edgar was Lucy's presumed father. She argues Edgar did not meet his burden to show he was entitled to status as Lucy's presumed father, and her credibility should not have been at issue.
The Agency contends the court properly weighed the evidence before it at the time of the hearing. The Agency maintains the court's paternity finding is supported by substantial evidence. Minor's counsel joins with the Agency's arguments.
B
"A father's status is significant in dependency cases because it determines the extent to which the father may participate in the proceedings and the rights to which he is entitled. (In re Christopher M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 155, 159, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 197.) Presumed father status entitles the father to appointed counsel, custody (absent a finding of detriment), and a family reunification plan. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 317, subd. (a), 361.2, subd. (a), 361.5, subd. (a).)" (In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209.)
Dependency law recognizes three types of fathers — presumed, alleged and biological. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449, fn. 15; see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5; see also In re Crystal J. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 186, 190 [discussing "de facto father" status].) A presumed father is one who meets one or more specified criteria listed in section 7611. (In re Zacharia D., supra, at p. 449.) For purposes of dependency proceedings, a presumed father is a man who "promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment" to meeting the child's emotional, financial and other needs. (In re A.A. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 771, 779 ; In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801-802; see Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 849.)
A man seeking status as the child's presumed father has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that he received the child into his home and held the child out as his own. (§ 7611, subd. (d); Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 585-586; see In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1653; In re T.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1209.) When determining whether section 7611, subdivision (d) applies, the court may consider:
"such factors as whether the man actively helped the mother in prenatal care; whether he paid pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with his ability to do so; whether he promptly took legal action to obtain custody of the child; whether he sought to have his name placed on the birth certificate; whether and how long he cared for the child; whether there is unequivocal evidence that he had acknowledged the child; the number of people to whom he had acknowledged the child; whether he provided for the child after it no longer resided with him; whether, if the child needed public benefits, he had pursued completion of the requisite paperwork; and whether his care was merely incidental. [Citations]." (In re T.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211.)
We will affirm a finding of presumed father status if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1650.) "[W]e review the facts most favorably to the judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in favor of the order. [Citation.] We do not reweigh the evidence but instead examine the whole record to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found for the respondent. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
C
Substantial evidence supports the court's determination Edgar met his burden to show he received Lucy into his home and openly held her out as his natural child. (§ 7611, subd. (d).) Edgar was present at Lucy's birth. He agreed to have his name placed on her birth certificate. Lucy lived with Edgar for six months. Edgar told his family and friends that he was her father. The maternal grandparents acknowledged Edgar as Lucy's biological father. Edgar provided child support and continued to visit Lucy for four years after he and Julie separated. He was unable to find Lucy for two years because Julie moved constantly. When the social worker contacted Edgar, he immediately told her that he wanted to be a part of Lucy's life and regain custody. Significantly, Edgar came to San Diego from across the country to assert paternity and to participate in Lucy's dependency proceedings.
We are not persuaded by Julie's contention the court erred when it determined that the paternity declaration she filed with the court about Lucy's parentage was less credible than Edgar's paternity declaration. Each paternity declaration was filed under penalty of perjury. Julie's and Edgar's declarations contained conflicting information. It is the juvenile court's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. (See In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.)
The court could properly determine that Julie's paternity declaration was intentionally vague and give it little or no weight. Julie declared that Lucy's father might be a man named "Hector" about whom she had no information. Julie's statements to the social worker were also avoidant. Edgar told the court that he was puzzled by the lack of information because "[Julie] lived with me the whole time."
In view of the evidence presented in Edgar's declaration, his unequivocal response to the social worker and his efforts to participate in dependency proceedings, the court properly exercised its discretion when it relied on Edgar's paternity declaration to determine presumed father status. "[T]he testimony of a single witness is sufficient to uphold a judgment even if it is contradicted by other evidence, inconsistent or false as to other portions. [Citation.]" (People v. Leigh (1985) 168 Cal.3d 219, 221.) Although the evidence of Edgar's paternal involvement with Lucy may be characterized as sparse, it is sufficient to support the court's judgment that Edgar is Lucy's presumed father.
The grandparents' application for de facto parent status and supporting affidavit was not before the court on September 18, 2007, and we do not consider it here. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405.) The reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence. (In re Spencer W., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1650.)
D
Julie argues the court erred when it determined Edgar was Lucy's presumed father without considering whether Cole was Lucy's presumed father. The Agency responds the question of whether Cole was Lucy's presumed father was not before the court at the time of the September 18, 2007 hearing. The Agency contends the court was not required to consider competing paternity claims because Cole did not request a parentage finding. (See § 7612, subd. (b).)
"Although more than one individual may fulfill the criteria that give rise to a presumption of paternity, there can be only one presumed father. (Brian C. v. Ginger K. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1223.) Where the evidence shows that more than one man qualifies as a presumptive father, section 7612, subdivision (b), directs the trial court to weigh the competing presumptions. It states: 'If two or more presumptions arise under Section 7611 which conflict with each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.' (§ 7612, subd. (b).)" (In re Kiana A. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1115.)
Here, Cole was advised of his potential status as Lucy's presumed father and his right to representation in the dependency proceedings. Even though Cole's military duties impeded his ability to appear at the dependency hearings, Cole did not contact the social worker, request representation or assert that he was Lucy's presumed father. Rather, Cole stated he "did not plan to be around the family any longer" and did not appear to be interested in reunifying with Lucy.
For purposes of dependency proceedings, a presumed father is someone who has promptly come forward and demonstrated a full commitment to the child. (In re A.A., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 779.) Unlike the circumstances in In re Kiana A., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at page 1109, in which the child's alleged father and stepfather filed competing petitions for declaration of presumptive paternity, Cole did not come forward to seek status as Lucy's presumed father. At the September 18, 2007 hearing, the issue of Cole's paternal status was not before the court. We do not believe section 7612, subdivision (b) requires the court to consider sua sponte whether there may be a competing claim to an applicant's status as the child's presumed father. (See, e.g., In re T.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210 [A presumption arising under section 7611 is a "rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence"].) Even were the court required to consider Cole's paternity status, we would be reluctant to find prejudicial error where there is no evidence in the record to show that after dependency proceedings were initiated, Cole promptly came forward to demonstrate a full commitment to Lucy. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; In re A.A., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 779.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, J., NARES, J.