Opinion
2013-10-16
In the Matter of TYRIKA L., appellant.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Mark Dellaquila of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo and Karen M. Griffin of counsel), for respondent.
Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Mark Dellaquila of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo and Karen M. Griffin of counsel), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Tyrika L. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Ambrosio, J.), dated October 19, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated October 10, 2012, made after a hearing, finding that she committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of assault in the third degree, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, and resisting arrest, adjudged her to be a juvenile delinquent and placed her on probation for a period of 18 months. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review the fact-finding order.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
*251Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d at 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621), we find that it is was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of assault in the third degree based on a theory of accomplice liability ( seePenal Law §§ 20.00; 120.00[1] ). Moreover, upon our independent review of the record, we are satisfied that this determination was not against the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Ashley P., 74 A.D.3d at 1076, 903 N.Y.S.2d 146). The evidence of the appellant's conduct before, during, and after the acts established beyond a reasonable doubt that she acted in concert to commit the charged acts ( see Matter of Kenyetta F., 49 A.D.3d 540, 541, 855 N.Y.S.2d 170;Matter of Devin R., 254 A.D.2d 221, 222, 679 N.Y.S.2d 138;Matter of Joseph J., 205 A.D.2d 777, 778, 614 N.Y.S.2d 39).
Further, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621;cf. People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest ( seePenal Law §§ 195.05; 205.30). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Hasan C., 59 A.D.3d 617, 617–618, 873 N.Y.S.2d 709;cf.CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see Matter of Ashley P., 74 A.D.3d 1075, 1076, 903 N.Y.S.2d 146). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that these determinations of the Family Court were not against the weight of the evidence ( see Matter of Ashley P., 74 A.D.3d at 1076, 903 N.Y.S.2d 146;cf. People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).