Opinion
2015-00945 Docket No. E-18093-14.
12-09-2015
In the Matter of ELJIHN C. (Anonymous), appellant.
Salvatore C. Adamo, New York, N.Y., for appellant. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Scott Shorr and Melanie T. West of counsel), for respondent.
Salvatore C. Adamo, New York, N.Y., for appellant.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Scott Shorr and Melanie T. West of counsel), for respondent.
Opinion
Appeal from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Michael Ambrosio, J.), dated January 21, 2015. The order adjudicated Eljihn C. a juvenile delinquent, upon an order of fact-finding of that court dated November 5, 2014, which, after a hearing, found that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, and grand larceny in the fourth degree, and placed him on probation for a period of 12 months. The appeal from the order of disposition brings up for review the order of fact-finding and the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of Eljihn C.'s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the evidence at a suppression hearing established that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to detain him for the purpose of conducting a showup identification (see People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562; Matter of Jose T., 127 A.D.3d 875, 876, 8 N.Y.S.3d 334; Matter of Madeline D., 125 A.D.3d 965, 966, 5 N.Y.S.3d 169; People v. Peterson, 110 A.D.3d 1103, 1103, 973 N.Y.S.2d 785). The fact that the officers used handcuffs to detain the appellant and other individuals while awaiting the arrival of the complainant for the showup identification “did not transform the detention into a full-blown arrest” (People v. Worthy, 308 A.D.2d 555, 555, 764 N.Y.S.2d 833; see People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378, 540 N.Y.S.2d 971, 538 N.E.2d 323; Matter of Jose T., 127 A.D.3d at 876, 8 N.Y.S.3d 334).
The showup identification procedure, which was conducted in close spatial and temporal proximity to the crime, was not unduly suggestive (see Matter of Jose T., 127 A.D.3d at 876, 8 N.Y.S.3d 334; People v. Peterson, 110 A.D.3d at 1104, 973 N.Y.S.2d 785; People v. Calero, 105 A.D.3d 864, 865, 962 N.Y.S.2d 665; People v. Rivera, 59 A.D.3d 467, 873 N.Y.S.2d 157; People v. Jay, 41 A.D.3d 615, 838 N.Y.S.2d 596). Furthermore, a showup identification is “not rendered unduly suggestive by the simultaneous display of multiple suspects” (People v. Bumbray, 259 A.D.2d 364, 688 N.Y.S.2d 9). Accordingly, the Family Court properly denied that branch of the appellant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621; Matter of Jamal G., 127 A.D.3d 1081, 1082, 7 N.Y.S.3d 500), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant was one of the perpetrators who committed the acts complained of (see Matter of Jamal G., 127 A.D.3d at 1082, 7 N.Y.S.3d 500; Matter of Tyquan C., 123 A.D.3d 502, 503, 998 N.Y.S.2d 188; Matter of Anthony A., 121 A.D.3d 885, 886, 994 N.Y.S.2d 384). Furthermore, the appellant's conduct before, during, and after the acts established beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted in concert to commit the charged acts (see Matter of Tyrika L., 110 A.D.3d 886, 887, 974 N.Y.S.2d 250; Matter of Kenyetta F., 49 A.D.3d 540, 541, 855 N.Y.S.2d 170). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Jamal G., 127 A.D.3d at 1082, 7 N.Y.S.3d 500; Matter of Hasan C., 59 A.D.3d 617, 617–618, 873 N.Y.S.2d 709; cf. CPL 470.155; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Jamal G., 127 A.D.3d at 1082, 7 N.Y.S.3d 500; Matter of Victor I., 57 A.D.3d 778, 780, 868 N.Y.S.2d 898; Matter of Brooklyn B., 77 A.D.3d 934, 935, 909 N.Y.S.2d 382). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-finding determination that the appellant was one of the participants in the acts underlying the charges in the petition was not against the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Jamal G., 127 A.D.3d at 1082, 7 N.Y.S.3d 500; Matter of Tyquan C., 123 A.D.3d at 503, 998 N.Y.S.2d 188; Matter of Anthony A., 121 A.D.3d at 886, 994 N.Y.S.2d 384).
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.