Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. J232732 William Jefferson Powell IV, Judge.
Sarah A. Stockwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Pamela Ratner Sobeck, Heidi T. Salerno, and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, Acting P.J.
A petition was filed against minor and appellant L.M. (minor), pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging that he committed the following offenses: unlawfully driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 1) and possession of a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 12020, subd. (a)(1), count 2). Minor filed a motion to suppress evidence (the motion), based on the claim that the evidence seized (brass knuckles) was the product of an unlawful detention. The People opposed the motion. The juvenile court held a hearing and denied the motion. Minor then admitted count 2. Upon a motion by the People, the juvenile court reduced count 2 to a misdemeanor and dismissed count 1. The juvenile court did not declare minor a ward of the court, but placed him in the custody of his parents and imposed probation conditions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 725, subdivision (a).
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
Minor now contends that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He also asserts, and the People concede, that the minute order should be amended to delete the reference to a maximum term of confinement, since he was not declared a ward of the court. We agree that the minute order should be amended. Otherwise, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following statement of facts is derived from the hearing on the motion to suppress: At approximately 3:19 a.m., on February 14, 2010, Deputy Garcia responded to a dispatch call concerning a stolen vehicle. Another deputy told Deputy Garcia that the vehicle was unoccupied, and that even though there were no keys in the vehicle, it was still running. In his experience, Deputy Garcia testified that it was common for suspects to steal a vehicle, “dump [it] off, ” and try to get away. He noted that the report was made by a witness who had been following the stolen vehicle. Thus, Deputy Garcia thought the suspect could have been hiding in the area for some time, in order to avoid being seen by the witness. Deputy Garcia searched the surrounding area and observed minor walking down the middle of the road, about half a block from where the stolen vehicle was found. Minor was the only person he saw in the area. Deputy Garcia believed minor’s presence in an area, located within half a block from the stolen vehicle, was suspicious. He also considered it suspicious that minor was out at 3:30 a.m., walking down the middle of the road. Deputy Garcia turned on his patrol vehicle’s light to illuminate minor. As Deputy Garcia got out of his patrol vehicle and walked toward minor, minor promptly put his hands in his pockets. Deputy Garcia considered this behavior suspicious. He testified that in his experience, when suspects place their hands in their pockets, it could be because they are trying to conceal something or they have contraband. Deputy Garcia asked minor to remove his hands from his pockets, and minor complied. Standing at an arm’s length distance from minor, Deputy Garcia was immediately able to see brass knuckles in minor’s pocket. He saw three rings of the brass knuckles in plain view. He then arrested minor for possession of a deadly weapon.
ANALYSIS
I. The Juvenile Court Properly Denied Minor’s Motion to Suppress
Minor argues that his detention was unlawful because Deputy Garcia lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that he was involved in criminal activity. He concludes that the brass knuckles found as a result of the unlawful detention should have been suppressed. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, “[w]e defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.) Because a Welfare and Institutions Code section 700.1 proceeding is the juvenile court counterpart to the adult Penal Code section 1538.5 motion, the same standard of review applies. (In re Steven H. (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 449, 453; In re H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136, 140-142.)
B. The Detention Was Reasonable
“A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231.) In other words, “the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must be such as would cause a reasonable law enforcement officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his or her training and experience, to suspect that criminal activity has occurred... and that the person to be stopped or detained is involved in the activity.” (People v. Conway (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 385, 389 (Conway).)
Here, Deputy Garcia received information about a stolen vehicle, which was still running and unoccupied. Based on this information, he searched the surrounding area for suspects. The only person he observed in the area was minor, who was located half a block away from where the vehicle was found. It was approximately 3:30 a.m., and minor was walking down the middle of the road. Deputy Garcia found it suspicious that minor was walking down the middle of the road, in close proximity to the alleged stolen vehicle, and that he was out at that time of night. Deputy Garcia also found it suspicious that minor quickly put his hands in his pockets when he approached minor. Based on his experience, Deputy Garcia testified that when potential suspects place their hands in their pockets, it could be because they are trying to conceal something or have contraband. Under the totality of the circumstances, the detention was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Minor claims that Deputy Garcia admitted he only detained him because minor was walking down the middle of road. While, at one point in the hearing, Deputy Garcia did say that he initially contacted minor because he was walking down the middle of the road, he also testified that there were several factors he found suspicious. (See ante.)
Minor further asserts that his mere presence in a high crime area is insufficient to justify a detention, citing People v. Pitts (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 881 and People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117 (Loewen). He then argues that the same rationale in these cases applies to his presence in the vicinity of a crime scene “because, just as with a high crime area, there is no articulable suspicion that [he] was involved with this specific crime.” We initially note that Deputy Garcia did not cite minor’s mere presence near the scene as the only justification for the detention. Moreover, minor cites no authority to support his proposition that the same rationale applies to his presence in the vicinity of a crime scene. “‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made.’” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) The reason courts reject reliance on the “high rate of crime” of the area to justify a detention is that “‘[t]he spectrum of legitimate human behavior occurs every day in so-called high crime areas.’” (Loewen, at p. 124.) As a result, courts have been reluctant to conclude that “‘a location’s crime rate transforms otherwise innocent-appearing circumstances into circumstances justifying the seizure of an individual.’” (Ibid.)
This same rationale does not apply to a person’s presence in the vicinity of a crime scene. Here, minor was located half a block away from where the stolen vehicle was found. His proximity to the crime scene was a proper factor for Deputy Garcia to consider. (See People v. Fields (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 555, 565; People v. McCluskey (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 220, 226.) Considered along with the other factors identified by Deputy Garcia, this factor provided an objective basis for Deputy Garcia’s suspicions. (See People v. McCluskey, at p. 226.)
Minor also asserts that Deputy Garcia did not have a description of the suspect. However, a description of the suspect was not required, since there were other factors that made the deputy suspicious of minor. (See Conway, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 390.) Minor also claims “[t]here [was] no indication he was acting any differently than anyone else walking down a street and [Deputy] Garcia did not explain why this fact led him to believe that minor was involved in criminal activity.” However, Deputy Garcia testified that minor was the only person he saw in the area. Moreover, Deputy Garcia’s suspicion was also based on minor’s proximity to the stolen vehicle, the fact that he was walking down the middle of the road, and the fact that he was doing so at approximately 3:30 a.m.
We conclude that the circumstances known or apparent to Deputy Garcia would cause a reasonable law enforcement officer in a like position to suspect that criminal activity had occurred and that minor was involved in the activity. Since the detention was reasonable, the juvenile court properly denied the motion to suppress. (See Conway, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 389-390.)
II. The Minute Order Should Be Corrected
Minor contends that the minute order, which appears to designate a maximum term of confinement, does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement by the juvenile court. Thus, he argues that the reference to the maximum term of confinement should be deleted. The People agree.
If the judgment entered in the minutes fails to reflect the judgment pronounced by the court, the error is clerical, and the record can be corrected at any time to reflect the true facts. (People v. Rowland (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 119, 123.)
Here, the June 21, 2010 minute order states: “The court finds the maximum period for physical confinement would be 01 years and 00 months.” However, the only time the juvenile court referenced the maximum term was when it was taking minor’s plea. It asked minor, “Do you understand that you could not be detained in juvenile hall or placement for more than one year based on this charge?” The juvenile court was not setting a maximum period of confinement, but was simply asking minor if he understood the maximum time he could be confined for the offense, if he had been declared a ward of the court.
We also note that a court is required to specify the maximum term of confinement if a minor is removed from the custody of his parents, as the result of an order of wardship made under section 602. (§ 726, subd. (c).) Here, minor was not removed from his parents’ custody, and the juvenile court was not required to specify a maximum term of confinement. Thus, the reference in the minute order to the maximum term for physical confinement should be stricken. (In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541.)
DISPOSITION
The superior court clerk is directed to amend the minute order dated June 21, 2010, to delete the reference to the maximum period for physical confinement. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER J., KING J.