Opinion
14-20-00303-CV
02-15-2022
IN THE MATTER OF L.H.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1 Denton County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. JV-2019-00777
Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles A. Spain Justice.
Appellant L.H., a child, agreed at an adjudication hearing to a stipulation of evidence stating that she intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caused bodily injury to her teacher, whom she knew at the time to be a public servant lawfully discharging an official duty. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1). In accordance with an agreement between the State and L.H., the trial court signed an adjudication and disposition holding that L.H. engaged in delinquent conduct and placed her on probation beginning March 10, 2020 until midnight on December 9, 2020.
In four issues, L.H. argues that (1) this court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this appeal, (2) the trial court reversibly erred by not appointing a guardian ad litem before conducting adjudication and disposition hearings, (3) the trial court reversibly erred by providing required admonishments and explanations without the presence of a parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem, and (4) the conduct of the trial court deprived L.H of the effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial.
The Supreme Court of Texas ordered the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas to transfer this case (No. 02-20-00101-CV) to this court. Misc. Docket No. 20-9048 (Tex. Mar. 31, 2020); see Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 73.001, .002. Because of the transfer, we decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis if our decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with the transferor court's precedent. See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
We begin with subject-matter jurisdiction. In circumstances when, as here, the child agrees to a stipulation of evidence at an adjudication hearing and the trial court makes a disposition in accordance with an agreement between the State and the child, the child may appeal only if the trial court gives the child permission to appeal or the appeal is based on a matter raised by written motion filed before the proceeding at which she agreed to the stipulation:
(n) A child who enters a plea or agrees to a stipulation of evidence in a proceeding held under this title may not appeal an order of the juvenile court entered under Section 54.03, 54.04, or 54.05 if the court makes a disposition in accordance with the agreement between the state and the child regarding the disposition of the case, unless:
(1) the court gives the child permission to appeal; or
(2) the appeal is based on a matter raised by written motion filed before the proceeding in which the child entered the plea or agreed to the stipulation of evidence.Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(n); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.034 (trial court must warn child of limited right of appeal before accepting stipulation of evidence). The requirements of section 56.01(n) are jurisdictional. In re A.M.L., No. 14-06-00874-CV, 2007 WL 1290527, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 3, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam) (collecting cases).
L.H. concedes that the trial court did not give her permission to appeal. Likewise, she does not contend that her issues on appeal are based on matters raised by written motion filed before the proceeding at which she agreed to the stipulation. Instead, L.H. argues that the required warning regarding the limited right to appeal was ineffective because it was made without a parent, legal guardian, or guardian ad litem present, such that her ability to agree to a plea bargain was compromised. Cf. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.034 (warning requirement). Without addressing the merits of these contentions, we conclude that, under the plain language of the Family Code, L.H. may not proceed with an appeal on these issues without satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of Family Code section 56.01(n), namely that the appeal must either be by permission of the trial court or based on matters raised by written motion as provided by statute. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(n); see A.M.L., 2007 WL 1290527, at *2; cf. Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 78-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (rejecting argument that appeal based on involuntariness of plea was exempt from rule-based limitations on right of appeal) (discussing Tex.R.App.P. 25.2).
We note that, in her motion for new trial, L.H. requested that the trial court grant her permission to appeal. While the record does not contain an order specifically denying the request, it does contain a signed order by the trial court denying the motion for new trial. In any event, by its terms the statute requires affirmative permission by the trial court for a child to appeal in these circumstances. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(n)(1) (child has right of appeal in stipulation-of-evidence case only when trial court "gives the child permission to appeal") (emphasis added). Although both L.H. and the State requested a ruling from the trial court on L.H.'s request for permission to appeal at the hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court did not give the requested permission. Instead, at the hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court declined to rule on the request on the grounds that this appeal was already in progress: The boilerplate language of the adjudication and disposition suggests that the trial court granted L.H. permission to appeal: "Pursuant to Section 54.04 of the Texas Family Code, the Respondent was informed in open Court of the right to appeal under Section 56.01[.]" Read in context, however, the adjudication and disposition's language concerning a "right to appeal" indicates that L.H. was given the required statutory warnings regarding the right to appeal, not that the trial court granted her permission to appeal. Specifically, section 54.04 requires that "the court shall inform the child of (1) the child's right to appeal, as required by Section 56.01." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(h)(1). Section 56.01, in turn, provides that "[a] child has a right to (1) appeal, as provided by this subchapter[.]" Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(d)(1). As discussed above, this right of appeal is limited in stipulation-of-evidence cases. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(n). The record indicates that L.H. was warned of the limited right to appeal both in writing and orally.
[THE COURT:] In regard to the permission to appeal, I am unwilling to substitute this Court's judgment for what the 2nd Court of Appeals - and the Supreme Court of Texas is already involved in this as well. And, that is, the 2nd Court of Appeals - I believe this occurred before the transfer - reached out to the attorneys, reached out to the court reporter. I believe the Respondent's attorney was notified that she must file her docketing statement. And then after that, the Supreme Court got involved and transferred this case to another Court of Appeals, so I don't want to substitute this Court's opinion for theirs since they've already put in all of these rules for other people to follow.
That is what I want to be the ruling, not that I've granted permission on an - on a plea bargain case, nor that I've denied permission; simply that the Court of Appeals has already accepted this and proceeded.
So that probably satisfies neither of you. And they may tell me that they want a ruling, which I'm happy to do, but they have taken this appeal, and it's pretty far along.
Does anybody want to object to that for the record?
MR. HORTON: Judge, we would respectfully request a ruling, so
THE COURT: And what about the State?
MS. ANDERS: The State would too, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay. So at this point, that's what - I'm going to continue to say that I'm not substituting my opinion for theirs. If they tell me they want a ruling, then I will definitely give you all a ruling.Because the trial court did not definitely rule on the request, we cannot say the trial court met the affirmative requirement that it "give[] the child permission to appeal" in cases such as this, thereby depriving us of jurisdiction over this appeal. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 56.01(n)(1). However, nothing prevented the trial court from giving an explicit ruling as the parties requested, which would have avoided injecting needless confusion into this case.
We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Because the parties briefed the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, notice of involuntary dismissal is unnecessary. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).