Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. CK67523, Jan G. Levine, Judge.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey F. Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KITCHING, J.
INTRODUCTION
A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s adjudication and dispositional orders in a dependency proceeding in which Mother’s daughter, Le.Z., was declared a child of the juvenile court. We conclude although substantial evidence did not support the jurisdictional finding pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (j), substantial evidence did support the jurisdictional findings pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b). Therefore the jurisdictional order and the dispositional order removing Le.Z. from her parents’ custody should be affirmed. We also find that the juvenile court’s denial of Mother’s request to represent herself was not an abuse of discretion. We reverse the jurisdictional finding pursuant to section 300, subdivision (j), but otherwise affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.
Unless otherwise specified, statutes in this opinion will refer to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Detention:
On March 8, 2007, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging emotional abuse of Li.Z., age 17, and Le.Z., age 16, by their mother, appellant S.Z. (Mother). The reporting party stated that Mother was verbally abusive toward Li.Z. and Le.Z., said “you fucking shit,” “you are the ‘F’ in my life, “I stopped living when you were born,” and “you’re a devil daughter,” and Mother spit on Li.Z. The reporting party stated that Mother was irrational, contradicted herself, and needed mental health services, that Mother stayed up all night to protect her children, and that two weeks earlier Mother brought a homeless person to live with the family, which endangered the children’s lives. The reporting party stated that an adult sister, La.Z., was “the protector” of Li.Z. and Le.Z. Father, L.Z. (Father), was ill with cancer.
On March 9, 2007, a CSW met with Li.Z. and Le.Z., who said that Mother was verbally abusive toward them, although she was more abusive toward Li.Z. because Li.Z. talked back and defended herself. Li.Z. stated that Mother physically and verbally abused them in the past, but now was just verbally abusive. Le.Z. stated that Mother used profanity and called them “assholes” and told Li.Z. she wished Li.Z. “was never born.” Le.Z. stated that Mother “gets in your face and screams.” Le.Z. and Li.Z. wrote down the things Mother yelled at them; that document was attached to the detention report.
On March 16, 2007, a CSW went to the home, met with Mother, Father, Li.Z., and Le.Z., and observed Mother with the children. Mother spoke to Father and her two daughters in a loud voice and hostile manner and threatened to force Li.Z. out of the home. When Father told Mother her behavior was inappropriate, Mother yelled at Father and said her behavior was appropriate.
Le.Z. stated that Mother had been violent in the past and had hit her on her head, to which Le.Z. responded by calling the police. Le.Z. said she and other family members had learned not to aggravate Mother, who became violent if they argued with her. Li.Z. stated that Mother physically abused them in the past, but had stopped recently “because she knows she’s not supposed to.” Li.Z. said Mother used objects to hit them and threw objects, and that Mother last hit them two months earlier.
Li.Z. believed Mother had a mental illness and described her as hyper and paranoid. Mother brought a homeless person to their home. A few weeks earlier, Mother came home, became paranoid and delusional, and called police, stating that there was a stranger in the house who was holding the family hostage. The police came to the home at 3:00 a.m. The police had come numerous times previously and recognized their home. La.Z. stated that Mother’s emotional stability had worsened over time, and the family had called the police more than 20 times. One of Mother’s friends, Father, Li.Z., La.Z., and a paternal aunt agreed that Mother needed to control her anger. Father said that stress may have triggered Mother’s symptoms of mental illness.
Li.Z. said that Mother stayed up at night and slept during the day, as she had done since Li.Z. could remember. Li.Z. wanted her mother to seek mental health treatment. Le.Z. also believed Mother had mental health issues, but Mother had never been hospitalized and took no medication.
La.Z. and Li.Z. stated that domestic violence occurred between Mother and Father, and that Father was the victim. Father had cancer and was physically weak and passive. All three sisters agreed that Mother verbally abused Father, yelled at him and threatened him. La.Z. and Li.Z. were concerned about Father’s well-being, and stated that they did not want to be separated from each other and Father did not want to leave them. Therefore they had stayed in the home and endured Mother’s abuse.
Section 300 Petition:
On March 26, 2007, the DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition alleging that 16-year-old Le.Z. and 17 year-old Li.Z. were persons described by section 300, subdivisions (a) [child suffered serious physical harm], (b)[serious physical harm, or substantial risk of serious physical harm, because of parent’s failure to protect the child], and (j)[abuse of sibling]. The petition alleged that Mother physically abused Le.Z. by striking her head, threw objects at her, and on many prior occasions emotionally abused Le.Z. by constant screaming. The petition alleged that Father’s illness left him unable to protect Le.Z. The petition alleged that Mother’s physical and emotional abuse and Father’s failure to protect her endangered Le.Z.’s physical and emotional health, safety, and well-being. The petition also alleged that Mother had a history of mental and emotional problems, including delusional and paranoid behavior, and could not provide regular care for the children, which endangered their physical and emotional health, safety, and well-being. The petition also alleged that Mother physically abused Li.Z. during arguments and emotionally abused Li.Z. through continuous fighting which caused Li.Z. unreasonable pain and suffering. Father’s illness left him unable to protect Li.Z. Mother’s physical and emotional abuse and Father’s inability to protect her endangered Li.Z.’s physical and emotional health, safety, and well-being, and placed sibling Le.Z. at risk of physical and emotional harm, damage, and physical abuse.
17-year-old Li.Z. was also named in the petition, but was removed from the petition because she became 18 years of age before issuance of the dispositional order on October 3, 2007.
Detention:
On March 26, 2007, the juvenile court found that a prima facie case for detaining Le.Z. and Li.Z. pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j) was established, ordered them detained from Mother, and ordered them released to Father. The juvenile court ordered the DCFS to provide referrals for family reunification services to Father (to include individual counseling, conjoint counseling, and parenting) and to Mother (to include a psychological evaluation, individual counseling, family counseling, and parenting), to include Mother in any family group decision-making conferences, and to assist Mother in locating shelter; ordered Mother to comply with recommendations of a psychological evaluations; and ordered Li.Z. and Le.Z. to receive individual counseling. Mother was to have monitored visits no less than once per week. The juvenile court set the matter for a pretrial resolution conference on April 24, 2007, and for a contested adjudication hearing on May 10, 2007.
Jurisdiction and Disposition:
An April 24, 2007, DCFS jurisdiction/disposition report reported Li.Z.’s statement that Mother threw things at the children, and missed “sometimes.” Mother had hit the children with her hands on their heads or arms. This occurred more frequently in the past but less frequently since the police and social workers had become involved. Mother yelled and argued with anyone, which could go on for hours and into the early morning. When Mother’s yelling persisted until 3:00 a.m., the girls called the police because they had to go to school the next morning. Li.Z. stated that Mother did not know how to control her anger or think rationally and that Mother’s behavior created problems in the home.
Le.Z., age 16 at this time, stated that the previous year when Father was resting when he first had colon cancer, Mother started arguing with him. Le.Z. told Mother to let Father rest. Mother and Le.Z. argued. The argument escalated, Mother pushed Le.Z, hit her on the back of her head, and then left. A social worker came. Le.Z. stated that Mother used to throw things a lot. Le.Z. did not see Mother hit Li.Z., but stated that when they fought they usually just pushed each other.
The eldest sister, La.Z., stated that Mother threw things that hit the refrigerator or the walls. Mother also kicked the door violently if a daughter went into the bathroom. The previous spring or summer, Mother hit and scratched Le.Z. La.Z. stated that Mother had anger management problem, became hostile, was easily angered about little things, and yelled and screamed for hours. During these arguments Mother said hurtful things and screamed directly into someone’s face while lunging or waving arms. Mother mostly targeted Li.Z., but also yelled and screamed at Father, who was not strong enough to fight back. The fights happened every other day, and usually ended only when the daughters called the police. Mother said vile things and used profanities when she argued, and made sexual remarks when arguing with Li.Z.
La.Z. stated that Mother did irrational things, like inviting a homeless person to live in the house, and sometimes stayed out all night and returned the next day without saying where she went. Mother’s behavior worsened over the past six years.
Mother reported to a DCFS investigator that she believed the “evil one” possessed Li.Z., who needed prayer and a priest’s help to remove the “evil one” from Li.Z.’s body. Mother stated that Li.Z. was disrespectful and her behavior was out of control at times. Mother denied that the family had problems except for Li.Z.’s mental health problems.
Father felt that he could not care for his daughters without Mother being in the home. Father confirmed that at times Mother yelled and screamed at Li.Z. and Le.Z. Father had been diagnosed with colon cancer. He stated that Mother cared for his needs and looked after the family finances. Mother and Li.Z. formerly got along well, but that had changed two years earlier. Mother described Li.Z. as disobedient, disrespectful, and defiant since the age of 12.
Both Li.Z. and Le.Z. were excellent students in high school, appeared to be responsible, and had a supportive relationship. They individually reported that they would like Mother to remain out of the home until she received counseling, parenting, and anger management services and a mental health evaluation.
Mother violated juvenile court orders by visiting her home without an approved monitor while the children were there. That had occurred on April 8, 2007.
The DCFS recommended that before returning home, Mother needed a full mental health evaluation to ensure her children’s safety. The DCFS requested that Mother be ordered to have an Evidence Code section 730 psychological evaluation.
Mediation:
On April 24, 2007, the juvenile court set the matter for a mediation on May 4, 2007. Mother initially did not agree to a psychiatric evaluation. The parties, including Mother and Father, agreed to mediation, and that Mother would submit to a psychological evaluation to be used for disposition purposes only. On May 10, 2007, the juvenile court appointed Barry T. Hirsch, Ph.D., to examine Mother, but informed all counsel that the adjudication would proceed on June 28, 2007, even if the section 730 evaluation was not received. The juvenile court also ordered the DCFS to investigate a new placement for Li.Z. and Le.Z., which would not interfere with their schooling, and which would allow Mother to return to the family home.
Dr. Hirsch reported to the juvenile court that Mother did not appear for a 9:00 a.m. appointment on June 12, 2007. Although she called from San Diego later that day to schedule the evaluation, Dr. Hirsch could not see her until after July 4, 2007, and therefore he could not complete the evaluation before the June 28, 2007, adjudication. Mother said she would seek a private psychiatrist for her evaluation.
In its June 22, 2007, report, the DCFS stated that both Li.Z. and Le.Z. reported that Mother continued to come to their home. Father insisted that Mother be allowed to return home, as he needed her care during his illness. The DCFS investigator informed Father that if Mother returned home, Li.Z. and Le.Z. would have to enter foster care. Father agreed to keep Mother out of the home so the girls could live there. The DCFS felt that because Li.Z. (who had graduated from high school and would enter college in the fall) would be moving out of the home during the summer, the main concern was Le.Z. Mother did not cooperate with the DCFS and continued to have unmonitored contact with her children and to yell and argue with them as she had before her removal. Mother did not cooperate with the section 730 evaluation, had not returned phone calls or responded to messages left by the investigator, and appeared to have significant mental health problems posing a serious risk to her children.
On June 21, 2007, two DCFS personnel made a home visit. Father’s health appeared to have worsened. He reported that he could not have Mother outside the home for much longer as he needed her to care for him. Father did not want his children in foster care. Father and the DCFS personnel formed a plan for Li.Z. to move into university housing in August 2007, and to have Le.Z. move to foster care.
On June 25, 2007, neither Mother nor Father appeared for mediation.
Dr. Hirsch submitted his evaluation of Mother on July 30, 2007. It stated that Mother had Bipolar I Disorder, Manic Type, with Paranoid Ideation, and could not return to live in her household without psychotropic medications to deal with her manic and paranoid functioning. Mother’s refusal to take medication made her compliance a major issue in her treatment, recovery, and ability to resume life with her family. Dr. Hirsch’s opinion was that Mother presently functioned in a severely disturbed manner, and in addition to psychotropic medication, Mother needed to participate in individual treatment and family therapy. Dr. Hirsch concluded that Mother could not presently live with her husband and children.
For the July 31, 2007, adjudication the DCFS reported three DCFS personnel witnessed Mother’s angry, irrational, aggressive behaviors that raised concerns about her mental health and the safety of Father and other family members. On July 11, 2007, a social worker met with Father, Li.Z., and Le.Z. to attempt to maintain the children at home. Mother arrived during the meeting, approached the social worker, and screamed that he was the devil. Family preservation workers could not calm Mother, who left the home only when the social worker said he was going to call the police. It did not appear that Li.Z. and Le.Z. could live in their home any longer, as Mother refused to follow the case plan and Father’s health was too poor to protect the children from Mother. Li.Z. was 18 and would move to student housing at college. Le.Z. had provided the name of family friends with whom she might be able to live, and the social worker was trying to approve that home so Le.Z. would not have to live in foster care outside her area.
The next day, on July 12, 2007, Mother and Father arrived unannounced at the DCFS office, asking to speak with SCSW Rogers. Father was in extreme poor health and could barely walk and talk. Mother was abusive toward Father, ordering him to tell Rogers what he wanted, then interrupting him when he spoke and stating that Father was about to say he wanted the children removed from the home. After this scene was repeated numerous times, the DCFS employees asked Father to join them for a private interview. Mother began yelling that the DCFS employees were not going to take her husband, appeared very angry, gritted her teeth, and intensely stared at DCFS employees. Mother demanded that Li.Z. and Le.Z. be removed from the home so she could return there, claiming she was homeless, financially ruined by the DCFS, and needed to care for Father. Eventually Father stated that he did not want his daughters to leave, but he needed his wife to take care of him.
On July 31, 2007, the juvenile court was informed that Mother was unhappy with her representation and held a Marsden hearing. Mother stated that her attorney informed her that he was not going to use her four witnesses. Mother stated that none of those four witnesses were present when she was alleged to have physically abused her children, which was the issue to be addressed in the adjudication. The juvenile court judge stated that there would be no trial because Mother had agreed to the mediation agreement and to do the adjudication and disposition after the Evidence Code section 703 evaluation was completed. The juvenile court further stated that Mother’s witnesses could not testify because they were not percipient to events in the case. Mother claimed that besides being charged with child abuse, she was the victim of parental abuse, was herself physically and verbally abused, and her friends would testify to that. The juvenile court said it would not allow Mother’s witnesses to testify, but the issue was whether Mother’s attorney would continue to represent her. Mother requested that she be allowed to represent herself. The juvenile court denied this request. Mother then requested a continuance to obtain another attorney, which request the juvenile court denied because the adjudication had been delayed since March, more than four months, a delay caused by Mother’s unwillingness to participate in the Evidence Code section 730 examination. The juvenile court set the adjudication for the next day
People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
On September 12, 2007, the DCFS recommended that Li.Z. be removed from the petition because she had turned 18 years of age before disposition. The DCFS also reported that Le.Z. was detained from Father, in order to be able to pay Le.Z.’s caregivers, who could not care for her for six months to a year without payment. Father’s age and health continued to prevent him from being able to protect his daughters from Mother. Father had also previously denied and minimized Mother’s mental health issues and ensuing emotional abuse against Le.Z. and Li.Z.
Adjudication:
The adjudication hearing began on September 12, 2007.
Le.Z., age 17, gave testimony repeating her prior statements about Mother and her violent conduct. The previous year, Mother and Le.Z. argued, Mother ordered Le.Z. from the room and started shoving Le.Z. out the door. When Le.Z. would not move, Mother hit Le.Z. on the back of the head with her hand. Le.Z. sustained a bruise, which hurt when touched and felt sensitive. As Mother shoved Le.Z. from the room, her fingernails left scratches on Le.Z.’s arms and a four-inch scratch on Le.Z.’s chest, which was bleeding. On another occasion, Le.Z. was with Li.Z. and Mother, who screamed and threw an empty water bottle at Le.Z. Le.Z. was not hurt. Mother yelled at Le.Z. almost every day; the yelling lasted from an hour to as long as four hours. Le.Z. testified that Mother brought home a male stranger, who lived there for a month or two, at which time Mother called the police because she thought the man was holding them hostage. Le.Z. testified that the man was not holding them hostage.
Le.Z. testified that when Mother became angry, she threw things around the room. Mother and Li.Z. fought, and occasionally they became physical with one another. Mother also said things to the effect that the devil was in the children, or that the children needed to be exorcised.
Le.Z. recalled telling a DCFS social worker that Mother sometimes screamed in her ear, and that Le.Z. and other family members walked on egg shells around Mother. Mother yelled at Li.Z. every day, and “targeted” Li.Z., blowing up at Li.Z. for something she did that would not anger Mother if Le.Z. did it. In the previous year, Mother and Li.Z. fought each other verbally. Mother had thrown things toward Li.Z., such as a hair brush or small objects, but those objects never hit Li.Z. Mother screamed, yelled, and screeched at Le.Z.
Mother testified, and denied allegations that she struck Le.Z. on the head or that she ever threw anything when Li.Z. or Le.Z. was in the room. Mother testified that when she argued with Le.Z., neither she nor Le.Z. yelled at each other and there was no hitting, throwing, pushing, shoving, or cursing. Mother denied leaving scratches on Le.Z.’s chest or arms, and did not recall Le.Z. telling the police that she had hit Le.Z. in the head. Mother had no idea why the dependency petition was filed, and was shocked that these allegations were being made against her. Mother denied that she assaulted Le.Z., emotionally abused her, or caused her emotional distress, and said Le.Z. would be lying if she said Mother did these things.
Mother admitted that she yelled at Li.Z. approximately three times a week and fought with Li.Z. approximately once a week since Li.Z. was 12. She called Li.Z. an incorrigible, uncontrollable child since the age of 12. They yelled at one another and had verbal, not physical fights. Father mostly stayed in his room during these fights, but did witness some arguments and yelling. Mother characterized Father as “a nice guy” who “wouldn’t say a word.” Mother denied calling Father a failure or a useless father or anything of that nature.
Mother admitted that on one occasion she and Li.Z. had a mutual pushing or shoving incident.
Mother was aware that Li.Z. and Le.Z. filed reports with a social worker accusing her of yelling at them and throwing things, but Mother characterized what was going on as parental abuse by Li.Z. She testified that Le.Z. lied when she said Mother hit her in the head.
Father testified that he could not recall most incidents involving the children and their mother. He did recall one incident in which there was pushing and pulling between Mother and Le.Z., but there was no physical violence. Father never saw Mother hurt their daughters or put them in danger of harm or emotional distress.
On September 17, 2007, the juvenile court adjudicated the matter, found that Le.Z. was a person described by section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), and declared Le.Z. a dependent child of the court. The juvenile court continued the matter for a dispositional hearing on October 3, 2007. Li.Z. was dismissed from the petition.
For the dispositional hearing, on October 3, 2007, the DCFS reported that a CSW spoke with Mother by telephone to schedule a meeting with Mother to discuss court orders and referrals, but Mother refused to speak or meet with the CSW. A dependency investigator left numerous voicemail messages for Mother during September, but Mother did not return those calls until October 1, 2007. Mother reported that she saw a counselor, Tanya, for two sessions, and asked Tanya to write a progress letter for Mother to the juvenile court. Mother stated, however, that her counselor wrote information she did not agree with, such as that Mother yelled at the counselor. Mother spoke with the counselor’s supervisor in an effort to get the letter changed, but when she did not succeed she stopped seeing this counselor. Mother also stated: “Your department needs to pay for this counseling. You started this whole mess.” Mother stated that there was no way for her and Li.Z. to be in a room without exchanging heated words. Mother stated that Li.Z. wanted Mother’s money and just wanted Mother to support her. Mother also told the dependency investigator that she worked for a corrupt government agency, that Le.Z. lied when she testified and her attorneys brainwashed her, and told the dependency investigator, “You are just like my kids: stubborn, disobedient and you do not follow rules.”
Mother said she had no visitation with Le.Z. and Li.Z.
Mother did not appear at the dispositional hearing on October 3, 2007. The juvenile court again declared Le.Z. a dependent child of the court under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), found by clear and convincing evidence that returning her home would create a substantial danger to her physical or emotional well-being, and there was no reasonable means to protect Le.Z. without removing her from her parents’ custody. The juvenile court ordered Le.Z. removed from Mother and Father, ordered the care, custody, and conduct of Le.Z. placed under DCFS supervision in an approved suitable placement, and ordered the DCFS to provide family reunification services to both parents. The juvenile court ordered a case plan requiring Mother to participate in individual weekly counseling with a licensed therapist to address case issues, including anger management, to have a psychological evaluation for psychotropic medication, and to take all prescribed medications. Father was ordered to participate in a parenting program. Le.Z. was ordered to participate in individual counseling and to have an ILP/IEP referral
Appeal:
Mother filed a notice of appeal on November 13, 2007.
ISSUES
Mother claims that:
1. The juvenile court erroneously found substantial evidence of serious physical harm to Le.Z.;
2. The dispositional order was not supported by clear and convincing evidence of danger to Le.Z.’s physical safety; and
3. Mother was deprived of her right to decline appointed counsel.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Findings Pursuant to Section 300, Subdivisions (a) and (b)
Mother first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s adjudicatory findings pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j).
In addressing whether the evidence supports the finding that a child comes under the definition of a dependent child pursuant to section 300, an appellate court’s assesses the sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the conclusion of the trier of fact. This court resolves all conflicts in favor of the respondent and indulges all legitimate inferences to uphold the verdict, if possible. (In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1378-1379.)
a. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Finding Pursuant to Section 300, Subdivision (a)
Section 300, subdivision (a) authorizes the juvenile court to adjudge a child to be a dependent child of the court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent . . . . For the purposes of this subdivision, a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child’s siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian which indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm.”
Mother argues that the evidence did not show she inflicted serious physical harm on Le.Z. and did not show the future risk of Mother’s serious physical harm to Le.Z.
The evidence for the statutory requirement that Le.Z. suffered serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by Mother is that Mother had been violent in the past and pushed Le.Z. and hit her on the back of her head. That left a bruise, which hurt when she touched it and felt sensitive. Mother also scratched Le.Z. with her fingernails, leaving a four-inch scratch on her chest, which bled, and other scratches on her arms.
There was also evidence that there was a substantial risk that Le.Z. would suffer serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon her by Mother.
On March 16, 2007, Mother threatened to force Li.Z. out of the home. Mother habitually spoke to Li.Z. and Le.Z. in a hostile voice, used profanity to insult them, accused them of being devils, made sexual remarks, spit on Li.Z., and said she wished Li.Z. had never been born. She stated that the “evil one” possessed Li.Z.’s body. Mother screamed into her daughters’ faces while lunging or waving her arms. Mother’s yelling continued for hours, and she yelled at Le.Z. almost every day.
Mother became violent when someone argued with her, used objects to hit Li.Z. and Le.Z., threw objects at them when she became angry, and kicked the door violently if a daughter went into the bathroom. Mother had hit the children with her hands on their heads or arms.
La.Z. and Li.Z. said that Father was the victim of Mother’s domestic violence. Mother verbally abused Father, yelled at him, and threatened him.
Family members, friends, a reporting party, and social workers described Mother as needing to control her anger; as irrational, hyper, paranoid, and delusional; and as manifesting angry, irrational, aggressive behaviors that raised concerns about the safety of Father and other family members. A psychologist’s evaluation concluded that Mother had Bipolar I Disorder, Manic Type, with Paranoid Ideation, could not return to living in her house without taking psychotropic medications to deal with her manic and paranoid functioning, and functioned in a severely disturbed manner. Mother denied her family had problems except for Li.Z.’s mental health problems, and claimed she was the victim of her children’s physical and verbal abuse. Mother testified that Le.Z. lied if she said Mother hit her in the head, insulted her, or caused her emotional distress.
This evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that there was a substantial risk of serious future injury, based on (1) “the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted;” (2) “a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child’s siblings;” and (3) “a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian which indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm.” We affirm the jurisdictional finding that Le.Z. was a person described by section 300, subdivision (a).
b. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Finding Pursuant to Section 300, Subdivision (b)
Section 300, subdivision (b) authorizes the juvenile court to adjudge a child to be a dependent child of the court if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child . . . or by the inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . mental illness[.]”
Father was ill with cancer and very weak, and himself needed care by another. As she did with her daughters, Mother threatened Father and was observed yelling at and being verbally abusive to him. La.Z. and Li.Z. stated that domestic violence occurred between Mother and Father, who was the victim. ~(CT 11-12)~ Le.Z.’s attempts to protect Father when Mother argued with him led to the incident in which Mother pushed Le.Z. and hit her on the back of her head. Father felt that he could not care for his daughters without Mother in the home, and confirmed that Mother at times yelled and screamed at Le.Z. and Li.Z. Later on June 21, 2007, Father stated that he needed Mother to help care for him and could not have Mother outside the home for much longer. By July 31, 2007, Father’s health was too poor to protect the children from Mother. Father stated that he did not want his daughters to leave the home, but he needed Mother to take care of him. As of September 12, 2007, the DCFS reported that Father’s age and health continued to prevent him from being able to protect his daughters from Mother. Father had denied and minimized Mother’s mental health issues and emotional abuse of Le.Z. and Li.Z. Thus substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional finding that there was a substantial risk that Le.Z. would suffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of Father’s inability to protect Le.Z.
We have already summarized the evidence of Mother’s mental illness, and we conclude that substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional finding that there was a substantial risk that Le.Z. would suffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of Mother’s inability to provide regular care for Le.Z. due to her mental illness. We affirm the jurisdictional finding pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b).
c. Substantial Evidence Does Not Support the Jurisdictional Finding Pursuant to Section 300, Subdivision (j)
Section 300, subdivision (j), authorizes the juvenile court to adjudge a child to be a dependent child of the court if “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions. The court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child.”
The section 300 petition contained the following allegation: “[M]other . . . physically abused the child Li.Z. in the course of arguments. She emotionally abused Li.Z. through continuous fighting[,] which such physical and emotional abuse was excessive and caused the child unreasonable pain and suffering. Further, the father, . . . due to illness [was] unable to take action to protect the child when the father knew that the child was being physically abused. Such physical and emotional abuse of the child by the mother and the inability to protect the child by the father endangered the child’s physical and emotional health, safety and well being, creates a detrimental home environment and placed the child and the child’s sibling, [Le.Z.] at risk of physical and emotional harm, damage, physical abuse and failure to protect.”
Although Mother emotionally abused Li.Z., section 300, subdivision (j) refers to abuse or neglect of a child’s sibling (Li.Z.) as defined in one of five subdivisions. Three of those subdivisions are not relevant to this case.
Section 300, subdivision (d) is not relevant because it requires sexual abuse of the child, and there is no evidence of that in this case. Subdivision (e) is not relevant because it requires severe abuse of a child under the age of five years, and both of Le.Z.’s siblings, and Le.Z. herself, were over the age of five years. Subdivision (i) is not relevant because it requires subjection of the child (Li.Z.) to an act or acts of cruelty by the parent, or the parent has failed to adequately protect the child from an act or acts of cruelty; the petition does not allege that subdivision (i) was a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction pursuant to subdivision (j).
The County makes no argument that substantial evidence supports the subdivision (j) jurisdictional finding. Since Li.Z. reached the age of 18 and was dismissed from the section 300 petition, there can be no substantial likelihood of future physical abuse of Li.Z. by Mother that would form a violation of subdivision (j) because of subdivisions (a) or (b). We therefore reverse the jurisdictional finding pursuant to section 300, subdivision (j).
Nonetheless, an appellate court can affirm a juvenile court jurisdictional finding if the evidence supports any one of the statutory bases. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875; In re Dirk S. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1045; Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 72.) We have found that substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional findings pursuant to section 300, subdivision (a) and (b), and those findings are sufficient to affirm the adjudication.
2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Dispositional Order
Mother claims that the dispositional order removing Le.Z. from her parents’ custody was erroneous. Mother argues that although the same evidence can support both adjudication and disposition, the juvenile court must base its finding of “substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being” of the child (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)) on a higher, “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof.
While the burden of proof in the adjudication is a preponderance of the evidence, in the disposition the burden of proof is heightened to clear and convincing evidence when the juvenile court awards custody to a nonparent. (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 528-529.) On appeal from a dispositional order, “ ‘the substantial evidence test is the appropriate standard of review. Thus, in assessing this assignment of error, “the substantial evidence test applies to determine the existence of the clear and convincing standard of proof[.]” [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 529.)
Our review of the evidence, ante, demonstrates the existence of substantial evidence that return of Le.Z. to the home of her parents would be a substantial danger to Le.Z.’s physical safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being. This evidence meets the clear and convincing standard of proof. We find no error in the dispositional order.
3. Denial of Mother’s Request to Represent Herself Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
Mother claims on appeal that the juvenile court erroneously denied her request to represent herself.
a. The Standard for a Ruling on a Parent’s Request for Self-Representation
Under certain circumstances, a parent in a dependency proceeding who desires, but cannot afford to employ, counsel has a statutory right to court-appointed counsel. (§ 317, subd. (b).) This statutory right “has been interpreted to give a parent in a juvenile dependency case a statutory right to self-representation.” (In re A.M. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 914, 923.) The parent’s right to self-representation, however, is statutory only; the United States Constitution and the California Constitution do not give a parent the right to self-representation. (Ibid.)
Section 317, subdivision (b) states; “When it appears to the court that a parent . . . of the child is presently financially unable to afford and cannot for that reason employ counsel, and the child has been placed in out-of-home care, or the petitioning agency is recommending that the child be placed in out-of-home care, the court shall appoint counsel for the parent . . . unless the court finds that the parent or guardian has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel as provided in this section.”
In ruling on a parent’s request for self-representation, the juvenile court must weigh the parent’s statutory right to self-representation against other rights, and particularly against the child’s right to a prompt resolution of the dependency proceeding. “Thus, the juvenile court has discretion to deny the request for self-representation when it is reasonably probable that granting the request would impair the child’s right to a prompt resolution of custody status or unduly disrupt the proceedings.” (In re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 925-926.) Either ground—undue disruption of the dependency proceeding or impairment of the child’s right to prompt resolution of custody—gives the juvenile court discretion to deny the parent’s request for self-representation; both grounds are not necessary. (Id. at p. 926.) At all stages of dependency proceedings, the juvenile court must consider how a waiver of counsel and request for self-representation would affect the child’s right to a prompt resolution of the dependency proceedings. (Ibid.)
b. Denial of Mother’s Request to Represent Herself Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
The adjudication hearing was originally set for May 10, 2007. On April 24, 2007, the juvenile court set the matter for a mediation. Mother initially refused to agree to a psychiatric evaluation, but later agreed to mediation and that Mother would submit to a psychological evaluation to be used for disposition purposes only. The matter was trailed to set a new adjudication date. On May 10, 2007, the juvenile court appointed Dr. Hirsch to examine Mother, but informed all counsel that the adjudication would proceed on June 28, 2007, even if the Evidence Code section 730 evaluation had not been received. On June 8, 2007, Dr. Hirsch informed the juvenile court that he had tried to contact Mother three times and left messages, but Mother had not responded. A dependency investigator was also unable to contact Mother, and had sent, by fax and registered letter, a request that Mother schedule an appointment with Dr. Hirsch. Mother failed to appear for a scheduled appointment with Dr. Hirsch on June 12, 2007, and had not contacted Dr. Hirsch to cancel or to reschedule for another date. Late on June 12, 2007, Mother called Dr. Hirsch and told him she was in San Diego at a conference and wanted to schedule the evaluation. Dr. Hirsch could not see her until July 4, 2007, which was after the June 28, 2007, adjudication date. On June 25, 2007, neither Mother nor Father appeared for the mediation. On June 28, 2007, the juvenile court continued the adjudication to July 31, 2007. Dr. Hirsch submitted his evaluation on July 30, 2007.
On July 31, 2007, Mother stated that she was unhappy with her court-appointed attorney because he was not going to use four witnesses who Mother wanted to testify. The juvenile court stated that those witnesses were not percipient to events in the case, and Mother’s counsel correctly informed her he would not call them. Mother stated she herself was the victim of “parental abuse.” The juvenile court stated that it was adjudicating the conduct of the parent, not the children. The juvenile court refused Mother’s request to represent herself. She then requested time to get another attorney. Noting repeated delays because Mother failed to appear for Dr. Hirsch’s section 730 examination, the juvenile court stated that the case was “too far down the road” to allow Mother to change her attorney, and denied Mother’s request.
The juvenile court had discretion to deny Mother’s request for self-representation, because it would have impaired Le.Z.’s right to a prompt resolution of custody status. (In re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 925-926.) We find no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional finding pursuant to section 300, subdivision (j) is reversed, but otherwise the orders are affirmed.
We concur: CROSKEY, Acting P. J., ALDRICH, J.