Opinion
No. 06-17-00033-CV
06-07-2017
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Lamar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 85005 Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Martha DePaulo's parental rights to her son, Laurence, were terminated after a bench trial in a suit brought by the Department of Family and Protective Services. DePaulo is represented on appeal by court-appointed counsel who has filed a brief in accordance with the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Court-appointed counsel has concluded that, after a thorough review of the record, this appeal is frivolous and without merit. Because we agree, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, in consideration of appointed counsel's continuing obligation to represent DePaulo for purposes of any further appellate review, we deny counsel's motion to withdraw.
In this opinion, we refer to the child and his parent by pseudonyms in order to protect the child's identity. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
The procedures set forth in Anders v. California are applicable to an appeal from a trial court's order terminating parental rights when an appellant's appointed appellate counsel concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues to assert on appeal. See In re P.M., No. 15-0171, 2016 WL 1274748, at *3 n.10 (Tex. Apr. 1, 2016) (citing In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. 1998)); In re P.M.H., No. 06-10-00008-CV, 2010 WL 1794390, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 6, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.). The Anders brief filed by DePaulo's counsel presents a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for reversal. Counsel has established that he provided DePaulo with a copy of the brief and the appellate record and has also notified DePaulo of her right to file a pro se response. By letter dated Wednesday, April 5, 2017, this Court informed DePaulo that any pro se response was due on or before Tuesday, April 25, 2017. DePaulo has not exercised her right to file a pro se response.
Court-appointed counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders by providing a professional evaluation of the record and stating why there are no arguable grounds for reversal on appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and counsel's brief, we agree with counsel's assessment that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in the record that could arguably support the appeal. See id. (emphasizing that the reviewing court—and not counsel—determines, after full examination of proceedings, whether the appeal is wholly frivolous). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's final order terminating DePaulo's parental rights to Laurence.
However, we deny counsel's motion to withdraw. In the parental-rights termination context, "counsel's belief that the client has no grounds to seek further review from the court of appeals' decision" is not "good cause" sufficient to justify counsel's withdrawal. See P.M., 2016 WL 1274748, at *3. Instead, counsel's duty to his client extends through the exhaustion or waiver of "the date all appeals in relation to any final order terminating parental rights are exhausted or waived." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.016(2)(B) (West 2014). If DePaulo wishes to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, "appointed counsel's obligations can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief." P.M., 2016 WL 1274748, at *3.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice Date Submitted: May 31, 2017
Date Decided: June 7, 2017