Opinion
J-S08015-17 No. 1355 WDA 2016 No. 1417 WDA 2016
03-27-2017
IN RE: L.C., A MINOR APPEAL OF: M.C., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County
Domestic Relations at No(s): CP-04-DP-0000057-2015/ Juv. No. 141-2015 Appeal from the Order Entered August 15, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 3022-2016 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and SOLANO, J. MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.:
Appellant M.C. ("Mother"), appeals from the orders that changed the goal from reunification to adoption and terminated her parental rights to L.C. (born February 2015) involuntarily. On appeal, Mother challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the trial court's decisions. We affirm.
We adopt the trial court's recitation of the facts and procedural history:
[L.C.] was placed voluntarily with Mother's cousin, [E.C.], and her family on April 5, 2015, when Mother was arrested and incarcerated. [L.C.] was approximately 6 weeks old at the time of his placement. CYS made two attempts to return [L.C.] to his Mother between April and December 2015, without success. At that time, CYS filed a dependency action and [L.C.] was formally placed with [E.C.] by the court in December 2015.
From the inception of this case, Mother . . . has failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the family service plan. She was told from the beginning of the case that she needed to complete certain services. A drug and alcohol evaluation was recommended on June 14, 2015. One was scheduled for December 29, 2015, but was not completed because she refused to sign a release. She finally obtained the drug and alcohol evaluation in May 2016, right before a scheduled court date of June 28, 2016, and nearly a full year after she was requested to do so. She failed to obtain her neuro-psychological report and went to Allegheny General Hospital (AGH) to inquire about scheduling part 2 of the exam on August 3, 2016, immediately prior to the hearing set for August 8, 2016.
Mother was to start parenting classes in December 2015. She started the classes and then no-showed, to the point where the classes had to be discontinued due to her lack of attendance. Another request for parenting classes was submitted on June 1, 2016. To date, Mother attended 7 sessions, but only completed 3-4 of the 16-20 lessons, needed to complete the course. Mother's lack of focus during the parenting sessions is still a concern.
Mother was offered 30 visits with [L.C.] since the last hearing. She missed two visits (because she did not confirm or tried to confirm too late) and she was late for 25 visits. As the foster father testified, being late for doctor's appointments means your child does not get seen. Being late for school, means your child gets reported for truancy. Mother was also late for both days of her court
hearings on the petition for a goal change and to terminate parental rights.
Mother's visits with [L.C.] go well. She brings toys and food for him. At least one time, she lost sight of him when she left him unattended. Mother's housing remains unstable. Although Mother currently has a lease for a house in Monaca, she refused to sign a release for CYS to speak with the landlord to confirm her housing arrangement until a week before trial. Throughout the course of this case, her housing has been an issue. She has resided in 4-5 different locations, and was homeless for several months. Despite moving to her current residence, a four bedroom home, in May 2016, she did not prepare a bedroom for [L.C.] until August 6, 2016, two days prior to the hearing to change the goal and terminate her parental rights. Her only explanation for not having this done sooner was they "have a lot going on." CYS tried numerous times to visit the home to see if it was appropriate for [L.C.], but no one ever answered the door. The only time CYS saw the home was twice when parenting choices was there for a visit. Each time CYS was there, the room for [L.C.] was filled with moving boxes and bins.
Mother's relationship with her current boyfriend [Mr. O.] remains unstable. She has been dating Mr. [O.] since late 2015. At the hearing in November or December 2015, she testified that she and Mr. [O.] were engaged. They broke up after cross PFA's were filed in January 2016. They were in a heated argument during a parenting class in February, 2016, where the parenting instructor thought she was going to have to call 9-1-1. The parenting instructor was concerned for Mother's safety. Apparently, Mother and her boyfriend are back together, but the police were called to their residence as recently as May 2016. Mother did not indicate that they were engaged at this time, but that they were working on their relationship. Mr. [O.] did not attend the hearing.
Due to the volatile relationship with Mr. [O.], CYS requested on February 2016 that Mother attend anger management. She did not start going until four months later, on June 3, 2016.
Mother identified 15 family members and friends who could provide support for her. A family group decision making conference was scheduled for April 2016, but none of the friends or family attended.
Mother's income is $741 per month from social security. She did not provide proof of her income at the hearing. She resides with Mr. [O.] in a rental home that costs $800 per month. She does not have a back-up plan for housing if they break up. She claimed that she and Mr. [O.] have a signed agreement, whereby he will continue to support her for some unknown length of time, in an unknown monetary amount. She did not provide a copy of this agreement. She has saved $1500 in the event of an emergency. She may start working for a friend who has a hair salon, but did not provide details about her prospective wages, hours, or daycare plans for [L.C.] if she were employed.
Although the court has no doubt that Mother loves [L.C.], the court does not believe that she can remedy the situation that led to the child's removal within a reasonable time given the history of this case, as discussed herein. Many of the conditions which lead to the removal of the child continue to exist. The child has now been in placement for 16 months, since he was only 6 weeks old.
Having found that CYS met its burden of proof, with respect to terminating Mother's parental rights, the court must also examine the bond between the juvenile and parent and between the juvenile and the foster parents. [L.C.] does have a bond with his mother, but the strength of that bond does not compare to the strong bond he has with his foster family. At this point, [L.C.] has been with his foster family for almost 500 days of the 550 he has been alive. Over 90% of his life has been in foster care. He now calls his foster mom and dad "mama and dada" without coaching from them. He has a very strong bond with his foster siblings, who adore him. Two of them came to the hearing to show their support for [L.C.]. They consider [L.C.] to be their brother and would be devastated if he were taken from them. Although [L.C.] is too young to voice an opinion, the court believes that
[L.C.] would also be devastated if he were removed from the only family he has known for most of his life. At this point, based on the lack of compliance and progress Mother has made while [L.C.] has been in foster care these past 15 months, the court believes it would be more detrimental to [L.C.] to break the bond with his foster family than with his natural mother. Any trauma caused by breaking the bond with his natural mother is outweighed by the benefit of moving [L.C.] toward a permanent home.Trial Ct. Op., 10/27/16, at 1-5. We add that a CYS caseworker testified without objection that if Mother's parental rights were terminated, then Child's father, who is not a party to this appeal, said to the caseworker that he would voluntarily relinquish his parental rights. N.T., 8/8/16, at 59.
Mother timely appealed and filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Mother raises the following issues:
Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of law in concluding the agency (CYS) established by clear and convincing evidence grounds to terminate [Mother's] parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)?
Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of law in concluding the agency (CYS) established by clear and convincing evidence grounds to terminate [Mother's] parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)?
Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of law in concluding that termination of [Mother's] parental rights would serve the needs and welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of law in concluding the agency (CYS) established sufficient grounds for a goal change from "return to parent" to "adoption"?
Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of law in admitting evidence and testimony over objections from [M]other's counsel?Mother's Brief at 4.
We consider Mother's issues in light of our established standard of review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The burden is on the petitioner seeking termination to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are met. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
We will affirm if we agree with the trial court's decision as to any one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a), and its decision as to Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied , 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004); see In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa. Super. 2011). Here, we affirm the trial court's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights under subsections 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide:
(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds: . . .
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
Mother also challenges the sufficiency of evidence with respect to termination under Section 2511(a)(5). Because we affirm the trial court's decision under subsection (a)(8), infra , we need not address her other subsection (a) arguments. See B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.
We review the order changing the goal from "return to parent" to "adoption" for an abuse of discretion. In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1172 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). The Court explained that "[i]n a change of goal proceeding, the best interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court, and the parent's rights are secondary. The burden is on the Agency to prove the change in goal would be in the child's best interests." Id. at 1173 (citations omitted). "[O]ur Supreme Court has instructed that we cannot find an abuse of the trial court's discretion where the record supports the trial court's decision that a goal change to adoption is 'best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.'" In re M.T., 101 A.3d at 1177 (citation omitted); see In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2010).
We summarize all of Mother's arguments together. Mother marshals evidence from the record in her favor and then contends that the evidence was insufficient for subsections (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). She disputes some of the trial court's findings. Mother also complains the court improperly weighed the bond between her and L.C. She reiterates these arguments with respect to her assertion that the court erred in changing the goal to adoption. Finally, Mother alleges that it was reversible error for the court to admit evidence of a protection from abuse petition filed against her because it was inadmissible hearsay.
Mother also contends the court erred by permitting a caseworker to testify, over her objection, about the protection from abuse petition and her prior arrests. This argument is waived as it was not raised in Mother's Rule 1925(b) statement. See generally Commonwealth v. Lord , 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998). --------
After careful review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the trial court's decision, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion by the Honorable Deborah Kunselman. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5-13 (holding (1) sufficient evidence existed to terminate Mother's parental rights under subsection (a)(8); (2) court evaluated Child's bond with his foster family and Mother and concluded it would be adverse to Child's best interest to remove Child from his foster family; (3) record established it was in Child's best interest to change the goal to adoption; and (4) court could take judicial notice of PFA petition involving Mother and an official copy was not required). Because we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law, we affirm the orders below. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267; In re M.T., 101 A.3d at 1172. The parties are instructed to include the attached trial court decision in any filings referencing this Court's decision.
Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/27/2017
Image materials not available for display.