Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK34867, Margaret S. Henry, Judge.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Frank J. Da Vanzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.
DOI TODD, Acting P. J.
Appellant Karen A. (Mother) and minors Kristopher M., Cody M., P.M. and K.M. (sometimes collectively the children) appeal from an order denying Mother’s petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. Mother sought modification of the order setting a hearing under section 366.26 and requested that the children be returned to her custody. Mother and the children contend that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Mother demonstrated neither changed circumstances nor that a change of order would be in the children’s best interests. We affirm. The juvenile court properly exercised its discretion in finding that Mother had not met her burden to show that any change of order was warranted.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother had five children—Kristopher born in August 1991, Cody born in December 1992, P.M. born in April 1996, D.A. born in June 1999 and K.M. born in September 2004. The three older children came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) in August 1998, when they were found to be without proper supervision and were placed with their maternal grandmother. In June 1999, the Department detained D.A. due to Mother’s inappropriate discipline, her inability to protect D.A. from her father Troy M. (Father), and Mother’s and Father’s history of domestic violence. All children were ordered suitably placed. By January 2002, all children were ordered to be placed with Mother and the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction over them in July 2002.
D.A. is not a party to this appeal, as Mother stipulated to the termination of her parental rights as to her and she is in an adoptive placement.
The Department became involved again when K.M. was born in September 2004. Though K.M. tested clean at birth, Mother tested positive for amphetamines. Because Mother had strong family support, the Department initiated voluntary family maintenance with Mother and Father. In December 2004, Father was arrested for second degree burglary and incarcerated. Then in January 2005, Mother was arrested for a probation violation (allegedly committing identity theft) and was also incarcerated.
The Department filed a section 300 petition on January 11, 2005, alleging that Mother had a history of substance abuse and that her current abuse rendered her incapable of caring for the children, that her criminal activity placed the children at risk, and that her children were prior dependents of the juvenile court and Mother had failed to resolve the problems that placed the children at risk. (§ 300, subds. (b) & (j).) The juvenile court ordered the children detained at a hearing the same day.
In a report submitted three days later, the Department stated that the children had not been placed with the maternal grandmother because she was unable to care for all of them at that time. At the January 14, 2005 hearing, the Department indicated that the maternal grandmother could care for one child, and the juvenile court ordered that she be evaluated for placement. D.A. was detained with her former foster mother.
The Department’s February 3, 2005 jurisdiction/disposition report indicated that Kristopher and Cody were in one placement and P.A. and K.M. were in another, and, though noting that this family had been the subject of seven referrals over the past seven years, recommended that reunification services be provided to both Mother and Father and that they be permitted monitored visitation. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, Mother (no longer incarcerated) and Father submitted on the section 300 petition, and the juvenile court found true the allegations contained in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) and (j) of the petition and declared the children dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). With respect to disposition, the juvenile court ordered the children removed from their parents’ home and suitably placed. Mother and Father signed a court-ordered disposition case plan requiring that Mother participate in a Department-approved drug rehabilitation program with random testing, parent education, conjoint counseling with the children and individual counseling to address case issues including her criminal history and inability to care for her children. She was also ordered to comply with the terms of her probation. Father received similar services. Mother received monitored visitation a minimum of three times per week and unmonitored reasonable telephonic contact.
We do not discuss Father’s progress with his case plan in any depth as Father has not appealed.
The Department’s six-month review report in August 2005 stated that Mother had begun working and was hoping to get her own apartment. She had also enrolled in a drug treatment program and had tested negative for drugs approximately one-half of the time and missed the other one-half of the tests. Mother had completed 13 drug education classes, but refused to continue with other courses required as part of the treatment program. Her drug counselor reported that although Mother’s attendance at classes began well for the first two months, she started attending only sporadically and was unfavorably discharged from the program. Mother reported that she did “not believe the other mandatory classes are a benefit to her or relevant to her drug recovery. Further, she believes they take her away from getting a stable job and saving to afford a stable home for herself, and eventually her children. She believes she has suffered for her mistakes that resulted in the detention of her children.” Mother’s visits with the children were going well. The Department opined that it remained detrimental for the children to return to live with Mother, but recommended that she be afforded six additional months of reunification services.
Mother appeared at the August 11, 2005 six-month review hearing. Mother explained that her drug treatment participation declined when she got a part-time job to pay court-ordered restitution. The juvenile court continued reunification services for six more months, specifically ordering Mother to participate in drug rehabilitation with random testing, conjoint counseling when the therapist deemed it appropriate and individual counseling. The juvenile court also permitted P.M. to begin weekend overnight visits with Mother.
In November 2005, the juvenile court granted D.A.’s request for the appointment of a court appointed special advocate.
The Department’s next review report in February 2006 determined that it remained detrimental for the children to be returned to Mother and recommended that further reunification services not be provided. The report indicated that Mother did not have a permanent home, though the children reported spending the night with her at a home close to the maternal grandmother’s residence. Mother completed a 12-week parenting class as of May 2005. With one exception in November 2005 when Mother tested clean, she failed to appear for all drug tests between August 2005 and January 2006. Mother attributed her lack of participation to her job, but was unable to verify her employment. She also indicated that she had participated in another treatment program; the staff at that program indicated to the contrary that Mother had made an intake appointment but then failed to attend. One of the children, Cody, was suspended from school for brandishing a pocketknife which he had taken from Father (then released from prison) when the maternal grandmother was supposed to be monitoring the visit. On February 9, 2006, when Mother did not appear, the juvenile court continued the matter for a contested 12-month review hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).)
In a March 2006 supplemental report, the Department stated that Mother had continued to miss her drug tests. Mother claimed she had been testing through a different program and would bring confirmation with her to the next hearing. At the March 16, 2006 hearing, the Department indicated that it was willing to provide Mother with six additional months of reunification services—primarily because the children were interested in reunifying with her—provided that the court would admonish her to comply. The juvenile court ordered six additional months of reunification services for Mother.
The Department’s 18-month review report submitted in July 2006 indicated that Mother, then pregnant, was compliant with the order that she complete a parenting program, partially compliant with the order that she attend a drug treatment program and noncompliant with the orders that she provide random drug tests and participate in individual therapy. Mother had participated in drug treatment for one and one-half hours weekly, but failed to submit to random drug tests between March and July 2006. Mother’s visits had reverted to monitored due to her noncompliance, and she continued to visit regularly. The children looked forward to and enjoyed the visits. The Department further reported that the boys had been replaced into a new foster home after Cody had been expelled from school and Kristopher had been ditching classes and inhaling aerosols to get high with friends. P.M. had also been replaced into a different foster home, as the previous foster mother believed she was ineffective in parenting her and could not continue to handle her insubordination. Kristopher, Cody and P.M. wanted to reunify with Mother and Father.
In recommending that the children not be returned to Mother and that further reunification services not be provided, the Department stated: “During the past 18 months, the mother has shown an overall level of noncompliance. She consecutively missed her random drug testing codes during this last period of supervision, citing forgetfulness or her own scheduling conflict. CSW [the social worker] approved her faith based drug treatment program after she accused the traditional, mainstream programs as being ineffective and degrading to her. CSW approved this on condition, however, that she participate in specific services that CSW assessed as case relevant and comparable to the court’s orders. Yet outside of a handful of weekly diversion classes, she still did not participate in the weekly individual counseling or other components that CSW stipulated. After 18 months of [reunification] services, mother’s services participation and completion level is considered noncompliant.”
A supplemental report in August 2006 indicated that Mother had twice tested positive for alcohol in the past month. Her blood alcohol levels were at .17 and .13 percent while she was six months pregnant. Mother’s housing remained unstable and she received general relief as her only income.
On August 11, 2006, the juvenile court held a contested hearing under section 366.22. It received the Department’s reports into evidence and heard testimony from the social worker, Juong Nguyen. The social worker reviewed several certificates that Mother had presented, including a certification of completion of a six-month substance abuse program at Fellowship Church, dated March 13, 2006; notations of attendance at 15 12-step meetings on dates throughout October to December 2004; notations of attendance at seven 12-step meetings on dates throughout September and October 2005; notations of attendance at the Los Angeles Centers for Alcohol and Drug Abuse diversion program on dates throughout March to July 2005; and a certificate of completion for 12 classes of chemical dependency training at the alcohol/chemical treatment series (ACTS) program dated July 24, 2006. The ACTS program had been approved for Mother on the condition that she also provide random drug tests and weekly individual counseling. The social worker testified that Mother had been terminated from the diversion program for poor participation and that he was unable to verify the ACTS program, as no one answered at the telephone number provided by Mother. The social worker opined that Mother presented a risk to the children on the basis of her failure to complete a drug treatment program during the course of 18 months, her transient and unstable lifestyle and her testing positive for alcohol while pregnant. He believed that the overall repetition of her previous history raised questions about the likelihood of her success. Nonetheless, he further testified that all children except D.A. appeared bonded to Mother.
Mother testified that she was able to complete the programs that her certificates indicated. She further stated that she had attended two individual counseling sessions through the ACTS program and that she could not afford additional sessions. She was unaware that she had recently tested positive for alcohol and denied drinking alcohol, stating her taking Nyquil must have accounted for the test results. She stopped testing earlier because she was working and would forget to call. She felt as if she tried to do the best she could in terms of complying with her case plan. She denied receiving a letter from the social worker indicating that her participation in the ACTS program was conditional on her providing random drug tests and attending weekly individual counseling sessions.
Characterizing the case as a “sad situation,” the juvenile court determined that the children could not be returned home. In Mother’s case, the reason for that decision was Mother’s persistent substance abuse problem, most recently evidenced by her positive alcohol tests during pregnancy. Moreover, Mother had failed to demonstrate that she could provide reliable, unmonitored care for her children over the past 18 months. The juvenile court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
A September 8, 2006 interim review report indicated that an adoption home study had been initiated for D.A.’s prospective adoptive parents and that the Department was searching for an adoptive home or adoptive homes for the remaining children. In December 2006, the Department reported that it had located a prospective adoptive parent for Cody—the same parent with whom Kristopher wanted to remain under a legal guardianship.
The Department’s December 8, 2006 section 366.26 report indicated that it was very likely all children except Kristopher would be adopted, the primary reason being that Kristopher opposed a permanent plan of adoption. A report by P.M.’s foster family agency indicated that in an August 2006 interview she stated she was opposed to adoption. All children expressed that they enjoyed their respective placements but wanted continued involvement with Mother and Father. The report also noted that Mother’s sixth child, Destiny, was born in October 2006 and was released to Mother. In discussing whether additional reunification services might be appropriate, the Department ultimately concluded that it was not foreseeable that Mother and Father would be able to make enough changes to enable them to care for the children. It also believed that further reunification might create additional anxiety and uncertainty for the children, which had already manifested itself in Kristopher’s aerosol inhalation, Cody’s expulsion and P.M.’s recently cutting herself after trying to keep Father’s most recent arrest a secret from the Department. The Department recommended a permanent plan of legal guardianship for Kristopher and adoption for all other children. On December 8, 2006, the juvenile court set the matter for a contested section 366.26 hearing. The court left the order for monitored visitation in effect, but gave the Department discretion to liberalize.
On January 24, 2007, Mother filed a section 388 petition seeking the return of all children to her custody. She asserted that the changed circumstances were her completion of a substance abuse program, her attendance at 12-step meetings, her completion of chemical dependency training and the placement of her newborn child with her. She further asserted that the requested change of order was in the children’s best interests because she had resolved the issues that brought her to the Department’s attention, as evidenced by the placement of her youngest child with her. She attached the same certificates that had been admitted into evidence at the 18-month review hearing. The juvenile court set the matter for a hearing.
On January 25, 2007, the date set for the section 366.26 hearing, the Department submitted an interim review report indicating that the children continued to enjoy monitored visitation with Mother and Father. The Department had not liberalized the visits to unmonitored due to concerns that Mother’s and Father’s sobriety needed to be monitored and that unmonitored visitation might undermine the permanency planning process. The Department had also investigated Destiny and found no substantial risk, notwithstanding that Mother had tested positive for amphetamines four months before Destiny’s birth. With respect to permanency planning, the Department reported that Kristopher and Cody’s foster father had a completed home study and remained willing to adopt Cody and serve as Kristopher’s legal guardian. The Department located a prospective adoptive family willing to take both P.M. and K.M. Finally, the adoption home study for D.A.’s prospective adoptive parents would be completed by February 2007. The court continued the section 366.26 hearing in the same day set for the hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition.
The Department’s report on Mother’s section 388 petition recommended denial of the petition. It determined that Mother’s certifications did not reflect changed circumstances because they were from suspect programs, Mother did not complete the programs and Mother’s participation did not result in her having a sober lifestyle. With respect to Mother’s custody of Destiny, the Department opined that the recent showing of no risk to that child could not overcome Mother’s history. Moreover, Mother’s recent behavior was consistent with that history, having tested positive for alcohol twice while pregnant with Destiny and failing to show up for a drug test after the last court hearing, despite promising to do so. The Department further indicated that despite the children’s relationship with Mother, return to her custody was not in their best interests both because of her own instability as well as her inability to protect the children from Father who was unable to remain sober and free from arrest during the reunification period.
The Department’s report for the section 366.26 hearing indicated that a prospective adoptive home with an approved home study had been located for K.M. but not P.M. Mother continued to have monitored visitation. When Destiny was not removed from Mother, Cody began to think about the possibility of reunification and expressed a preference for a permanent plan of legal guardianship instead of adoption. The Department proposed that the siblings visit each other twice monthly once a permanent plan was in place.
The juvenile court heard Mother’s section 388 petition on February 9, 2007. On Mother’s behalf, the court admitted into evidence the attachments to her petition and heard testimony from the social worker, Mr. Nguyen. He testified that he was still unable to verify Mother’s participation in a substance abuse program and that she had missed all her scheduled drug tests since October 2006. Additionally, Mother had never participated in individual counseling as ordered. He had also reported that Mother had one positive prenatal test for drugs while she was pregnant with Destiny. Despite the Department’s finding that remaining with Mother posed no immediate risk to Destiny, he opined that return of the other children did pose a risk due to Mother’s unconfirmed sobriety and continued association with Father, who remained involved in criminal activity and had violated the terms of his parole. The social worker also testified that he had additional information—obtained too late to include in the Department’s report—that both Mother and Father had been having unmonitored visits with the children. The Department offered into evidence its most recent reports.
Following argument from counsel, the juvenile court denied the section 388 petition. It found that Mother had demonstrated neither a change of circumstances nor that a change of order would be in the children’s best interests. Addressing the Department’s decision to let Destiny remain with Mother, the juvenile court stated: “I don’t see anything different in the family dynamics of the parents. And when you point to a decision by a different emergency worker for the Department, it doesn’t mean that there’s anything that has changed with respect to this family.” The juvenile court continued the section 366.26 hearing.
Mother and the children (except D.A.) appealed the denial of the section 388 petition in April 2007. At the Department’s request, we took judicial notice of a May 1, 2007 court order placing Kristopher and Cody into a permanent plan of legal guardianship and an October 4, 2007 order terminating jurisdiction over Kristopher.
DISCUSSION
Mother and the children contend that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the section 388 petition because Mother had established changed circumstances, reflected by the Department’s conclusion that she did not present a risk to Destiny. They further contend that return to Mother’s custody would be in the children’s best interests because Mother addressed the problems that brought her to the Department’s attention and had maintained a strong bond with the children. We conclude that the trial court acted well within its discretion in finding to the contrary and affirm the denial of the section 388 petition.
I. Section 388 and the Standard of Review.
“Section 388, subdivision (a) allows a parent to petition to change or modify a previous order ‘upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.’ The petition must allege why the requested change is ‘in the best interest of the dependent child.’ (§ 388, subd. (b).) ‘[T]he burden of proof is on the moving party to show by a preponderance of the evidence that there is new evidence or that there are changed circumstances that make a change of placement in the best interests of the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Andrew L. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 178, 190; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(f).) “It is not enough for a parent to show just a genuine change of circumstances under the statute. The parent must [also] show that the undoing of the prior order would be in the best interests of the child.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529.) Moreover, the change of circumstances or new evidence must be of a “‘significant nature.’” (In re Jamika W. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1451.)
In In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at page 532, the court summarized the factors the juvenile court should consider in ruling on a section 388 petition: “(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been.” The list was not intended to be exhaustive. (In re Kimberly F., supra, at p. 532.) Additionally, the petition must be considered in the context of the entire dependency proceeding. (See In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307.)
“‘Whether a previously made order should be modified rests within the dependency court’s discretion, and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established.’” (In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 685.) Thus, we will not reverse a juvenile court’s denial of a section 388 petition “‘“unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations].”’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
II. The Juvenile Court Properly Exercised its Discretion in Denying the Section 388 Petition.
Mother and the children contend that the juvenile court abused its discretion denying her section 388 petition because she established a significant and legitimate change of circumstances and because she established that a change of order would promote the children’s best interests. We disagree.
Mother asserted that her changed circumstances included her completion of substance abuse and chemical dependency training programs and her attendance at 12-step meetings. She submitted two certificates of completion as well as attendance logs to establish her participation in these programs. But these documents were not new; they were exactly what Mother had submitted at the section 366.22 hearing, where the social worker testified that he was unable to verify one of the programs and that Mother had been terminated from another program due to lack of participation. Mother presented no additional information at the section 388 hearing to verify the questionable program or demonstrate that she had fully participated in the program from which she had been terminated. Thus, the juvenile court acted within its discretion in determining that Mother’s efforts to alleviate her substance abuse problem did not constitute changed circumstances.
Indeed, we find Mother’s assertion on appeal that she had “completely changed her circumstances” completely disingenuous. Mother claims she was participating in a 12-step program, but cites to a sporadic attendance record from 2005; she further claims that she participated in individual counseling, but cites to a 2006 Department report showing that she attended one session during the entire reunification period.
The only potential remaining changed circumstance was the Department’s determination that newborn Destiny was not at risk with Mother. But as the juvenile court recognized, this determination was essentially based on a snapshot of Mother which, when balanced against other recent snapshots, was insufficient to amount to a changed circumstance. More specifically, Mother tested positive for alcohol when she was pregnant in July and August 2006 at blood alcohol levels of .17 and .13 percent, she tested positive for amphetamines once when pregnant and she consistently missed tests throughout both the months preceding and after her positive tests. Thus, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that Mother had not resolved the substance abuse problems which were the basis for detaining the children originally. Moreover, there was no indication that the Department’s finding of no risk took into account any resolution of the problems between Mother and Father or any assessment of the risk Father continued to pose. Though the two had lived apart for some period during reunification, when the social worker went to interview Mother regarding Destiny, Father answered the door, stating that “he and [Mother] had recently moved to the location where they are renting a room.” Thus, Mother continued to reside with Father, who had missed multiple drugs tests, continued to engage in criminal activity as recently as November 2006 and disregarded the juvenile court’s monitored visitation order, taking Kristopher and Cody to a concert that their foster father had prohibited them from attending.
These circumstances stand in sharp contrast to those presented in In re Michael D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074, the primary case on which Mother relies. There, the appellate court affirmed the granting of a mother’s section 388 petition to terminate her son Michael’s legal guardianship with his grandmother. (In re Michael D., supra, at p. 1088.) The mother’s evidence of changed circumstances included her ending her relationship with her abusive boyfriend and becoming engaged to a stable individual; her participating in parenting classes, drug counseling and drug testing; and her articulating the ways in which the information she learned helped her better parent her son. (Ibid.) Further, neither the Department nor the guardian presented any evidence that living with the mother would be contrary to Michael’s best interests. (Ibid.)
Here, on the other hand, Mother’s section 388 petition established that despite the Department’s declining to remove Destiny from her custody, Mother had neither taken significant steps to remedy or even acknowledge her substance abuse problem nor changed her relationship with Father in any meaningful way. Indeed, Mother’s showing of changed circumstances did not even rise to the level shown in In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423, where the court found that a father’s seven months of sobriety was insufficient to show changed circumstances in light of his long history of drug use that included intermittent periods of sobriety. Nor did Mother’s evidence of changed circumstances approach that in In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47, 48, where evidence that the mother had partially completed a 12-step program and was drug free for several months failed to establish changed circumstances in light of “[o]ther evidence indicat[ing the mother] had an extensive drug history with a tendency to engage in treatment programs when required to do so by outside agencies and then relapse once the requirement was lifted.” (See also In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531, fn. 9 [expressing doubt that a change of circumstances could ever be shown when a parent “loses custody of a child because of the consumption of illegal drugs and whose compliance with a reunification plan is incomplete during the reunification period”].) In light of Mother’s history and failure to comply with her case plan, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ruling that the Department’s finding no risk to Destiny fell short of establishing changed circumstances.
But even if the Department’s permitting Destiny to remain in Mother’s custody could be considered as a changed circumstance, Mother nonetheless failed to meet her burden to show that the proposed change of order was in the children’s best interests. Mother and the children contend the evidence showing that Mother had maintained regular visitation and that the children had maintained a desire to reunify with her showed that a return to Mother’s custody would be in the children’s best interests. In In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at page 531, the court discussed the significance of the parent-child bond in the context of a section 388 petition, explaining that the court must weigh and balance the child’s strength of the bond to the natural parent, the strength of the child’s bond to his or her present caretakers, and the length of time the child has been in the dependency system in relationship to the parental bond.
Here, the Department conceded in its reports that Mother had maintained a strong relationship with the children and that the children expressed at varying times their wish to remain with their parents. But a child’s wishes are not determinative of his or her best interests. (In re Melissa S. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1058.) Thus, in evaluating whether Mother’s relationship with the children was sufficient to show that return to her custody was in the children’s best interests, the juvenile court necessarily considered their current placements and their history in the dependency system. (In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.) The juvenile court acted within its discretion in concluding that Kristopher’s and Cody’s best interests were served by remaining in their current placement with a legal guardian who was ready to provide them with a permanent home. (See In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 465 [“there is a rebuttable presumption that, in the absence of continuing reunification services, stability in an existing placement is in the best interest of the child”].) Considering that K.M. had lived with Mother for only the first four months of her life, the juvenile court likewise acted within its discretion in finding that her best interests would not be served by removing her from a prospective adoptive home. (Ibid.) P.M. certainly posed the most difficult situation, given that she had lived with Mother for approximately one-half of her life, wished to return to Mother and had not yet been placed in a prospective adoptive home. Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that P.M.’s best interests would not be served by a return to Mother’s custody. Despite earlier receiving unmonitored visitation, Mother had only monitored visitation the time of the section 388 petition. As discussed above, Mother had failed to address her substance abuse problems. Moreover, P.M.’s acting out by cutting herself as a result of her trying to cover up Father’s recent arrest illustrated why a different and ultimately permanent placement that provided her with some stability would serve her best interests. As aptly noted in In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 310: “Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.”
DISPOSITION
The order denying Mother’s section 388 petition is affirmed.
We concur: ASHMANN-GERST, J., CHAVEZ, J.