Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino CountySuper.Ct.No. J207238, Margaret A. Powers, Judge.
Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Deana L. Bohenek, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
McKINSTER, Acting P.J.
INTRODUCTION
Minor admitted violating the terms of her formal probation. The juvenile court ordered minor placed in the custody of a probation officer and housed at juvenile hall pending placement in a foster care facility. Minor contends the juvenile court erred by (1) ordering her to be placed in a foster care facility, and (2) failing to state a maximum term of confinement. We affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.
FACTS
On March 27, 2006, minor pled no contest to battering a deputy sheriff (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b)) on or about March 22, 2006. Prior to minor’s admission, the juvenile court determined the maximum term of confinement for the offense would be one year. Minor was declared a ward of the court and placed on formal probation in the custody of her grandparents, who are her legal guardians.
In February 2007, minor was 15 years old and approximately two months pregnant. Minor’s grandparents told minor’s probation officer that they no longer wanted to care for minor because she was unwilling to have an abortion. Minor’s grandparents requested that the probation officer take minor because “they didn’t want her any longer.”
On February 22, 2007, minor’s probation officer went to minor’s high school to inquire into her progress on probation. The probation officer discovered that minor was failing two classes and in danger of failing two other classes. The probation officer also found that minor had been “caught in a ‘tardy sweep’ by the school security and was given in house suspension for having ‘17’ tardies.” On March 27, 2007, a Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 petition was filed, alleging that minor violated term No. 6 of her probation requiring her to “[a]ttend school regularly, abide by all school rules and regulations and exert [her] best efforts.” On April 12, 2007, minor admitted violating this term.
On the first page of the petition, the box next to “§ 602(a)” is checked, indicating that the petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a); however, upon closer inspection, we conclude the petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 because that code section is referenced on page three of the petition and the district attorney was seeking a modification of minor’s probation, which is consistent with Welfare and Institutions Code section 777.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
At a contested disposition hearing held on April 23, 2007, minor’s probation officer testified that minor was able to perform on probation, but that he took minor into custody for her safety. Prior to being contacted by minor’s grandparents, the probation officer was planning to terminate minor’s probation if she improved her grades; however, if she did not improve her grades, the probation officer would continue her probation for two more months. After being contacted by minor’s grandparents, minor’s probation officer recommended placement because minor “has no other family relatives that are willing to provide supervision.” The probation officer stated that the recommendation that minor be placed in a facility was not based on her performance on probation, but “on the unique situation . . . with her grandparents.”
Minor’s grandmother testified that she thought minor should be placed in a foster care facility because minor does not follow her grandparents’ instructions to do her school work or clean her room. Minor also defied her grandparents’ wishes by having a boyfriend and becoming pregnant. Minor’s grandmother testified that she did not have the resources to adequately supervise minor. Minor’s grandmother stated that she would take minor home if minor had an abortion.
The juvenile court concluded that it would not be “fair to ask the grandparents to take care of [minor] and her child,” because minor’s grandparents said they are not capable of such a task and “sometimes we need to believe people when they say they can’t do something.” The juvenile court found that the fact minor was pregnant proved she did not obey her grandparents. Based upon those reasons, the juvenile court found that placement was in minor’s best interests. The juvenile court ordered minor placed in the custody of the probation officer and detained in juvenile hall while she awaited placement in a suitable foster care facility.
The contested disposition hearing took place on April 23, 2007. As of the most recent minute order, dated October 25, 2007, minor was still being detained in juvenile hall.
We take judicial notice of the minute order in minor’s case (case No. J207238), dated October 25, 2007 (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a)), which we obtained in order to determine whether the issue regarding minor’s maximum confinement time was moot.
DISCUSSION
A. Placement in Foster Care
Minor contends that the juvenile court erred by placing her in foster care because her grandparents were capable of supervising her, as proven by her acceptable performance on probation.
Section 726, subdivision (a), provides, in relevant part, “no ward or dependent child shall be taken from the physical custody of a parent or guardian, unless upon the hearing the court finds one of the following facts: [¶] (1) That the parent or guardian is incapable of providing or has failed or neglected to provide proper maintenance, training, and education for the minor. [¶] (2) That the minor has been tried on probation while in custody and has failed to reform. [¶] (3) That the welfare of the minor requires that custody be taken from the minor’s parent or guardian.” The findings pursuant to section 726 need not be made in the precise language of the section, as long as the substance of the findings is impliedly stated in the record. (In re John S. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 285, 290-292.)
Minor’s grandmother testified that she did not have the ability or resources to supervise minor. Minor’s grandmother further stated that she would take minor home if minor had an abortion, but that she did not want minor in her house while minor was pregnant or with a baby because as a 72-year-old woman, she could not care for minor and minor’s child. Minor did not want to terminate her pregnancy. The juvenile court referred to minor’s grandmother’s statements, that she was incapable of caring for minor, when it concluded that minor’s grandparents were not able to provide supervision for minor. Minor’s 17 truancies and defiance of her grandmother’s direction that she not become pregnant supported minor’s grandmother’s testimony that she was incapable of supervising minor. This evidence supports the reasonableness of the juvenile court’s implied finding that minor’s guardians were incapable of providing proper maintenance, training, and education for minor. Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by placing minor in foster care.
B. Maximum Period of Confinement
Minor contends that the juvenile court erred by ordering that she be held in juvenile hall while she awaits placement in a foster care facility without pronouncing a maximum confinement time. We disagree.
The People argue minor has failed to prove that she was held in juvenile hall and, therefore, is not entitled to relief. The record reflects that as of May 7, 2007, minor had been detained in juvenile hall for 48 days while she awaited placement at a foster care facility. Accordingly, we conclude the People’s argument has no merit.
If a minor is declared a ward of the court under section 602 and ordered removed from the custody of a parent or guardian, then the juvenile court is directed to specify the maximum period of physical confinement. Physical confinement is defined, in part, by placement in juvenile hall. (§ 726.) When a minor is confined to juvenile hall for more than 15 days, pending execution of the court’s order that minor be placed in foster care, then the court is directed to periodically review the case every 15 days “to determine whether the delay is reasonable.” (§ 737, subd. (b).)
We assume, without deciding, that the juvenile court must pronounce a maximum confinement time for a minor committed to juvenile hall pending placement in a foster care facility, despite the requirement for periodic reviews to be held at least every 15 days. In minor’s case, when she admitted the original charge of battering a deputy sheriff, the juvenile court informed her that the maximum confinement time for the offense would be one year. The minute order in the matter also reflects that the maximum confinement time for the offense would be one year. When minor was charged with violating her probation, the district attorney requested only that the disposition from the original case be modified, pursuant to section 777.
“Proceedings under section 777 . . . are related to the original dispositional order that granted probation.” (In re Brian K. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) “‘A grant of juvenile probation is not revoked upon sustaining a supplemental petition; rather, the entire underlying order is subject to modification “as the judge deems meet and proper.” (§ 775.)’ [Citation.] Section 775 states, ‘Any order made by the court in the case of any person subject to its jurisdiction may at any time be changed, modified or set aside . . . .’” (Id. at p. 44.)
After minor admitted violating her probation, the juvenile court modified its original order by placing minor in juvenile hall pending placement in a foster care facility. Assuming that the juvenile court was required to pronounce a maximum confinement time, then the one-year maximum confinement time pronounced as part of the original disposition in the case would still stand because the original order was simply modified, it was not revoked. Accordingly, we find no error because the juvenile court pronounced a maximum confinement time.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT, J., KING, J.