Opinion
No. 349147
02-20-2020
In re KING, Minors.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 06-453289-NA Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and GADOLA and LETICA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating his rights to his three minor children—ARK, WSK, and MTK—under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned home). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
ARK and WSK came into the care of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in September 2016. At that time, respondent lived with the children's mother, whose parental rights to ARK were terminated in 2011. Respondent left the two children in the mother's sole care, despite being aware of her substance abuse issues and her history of physical abuse. One night, two people found ARK walking on a street in Detroit. Children's Protective Services (CPS) was called and a doctor examined ARK. ARK had approximately 40 belt loop marks on her body and fingernail grip marks on her neck. ARK reported that respondent and the mother "whipped" her.
The mother appealed that decision and we affirmed. In re King, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 22, 2011 (Docket No. 303424). --------
The trial court took jurisdiction over the children after respondent pled to the allegation in the petition, admitting that he had failed to provide proper care and custody and to protect the children from the mother's abuse. The trial court then provided respondent a parent-agency agreement (PAA).
Shortly thereafter, the mother gave birth to MTK in the home she shared with respondent. Neither parent took MTK to the doctor. During CPS's investigation, MTK was located and taken in for medical evaluation. Doctors eventually discovered that MTK had an array of serious medical issues. DHHS also took MTK into care and the trial court held that it had jurisdiction after an adjudication trial. DHHS sought termination of respondent's parental rights to MTK, but the trial court denied that request and ordered respondent to comply with the PAA.
Over the course of the next two years, respondent consistently participated in the services DHHS offered. He completed parenting classes, always attended parenting-time visits when allowed, engaged in family counseling when it was offered, and participated in individual counseling. Despite respondent's compliance with his PAA, he did not benefit from the services. Instead, after about 18 months of services, respondent took ARK into the bathroom during a parenting-time visit and whipped her with his belt. Although respondent later denied doing so, he pleaded nolo contendere to fourth-degree child abuse and was sentenced to five years' probation.
At the time of termination, ARK and WSK had severe psychological issues caused by complex trauma from the time they had lived with respondent and the mother and MTK had significant medical issues that required consistent medical treatment. Upon learning of the fourth-degree child abuse conviction, DHHS sought permanent custody of the children. After a five-day termination hearing, the trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), and a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the children's best interests. This appeal followed.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it terminated his parental rights under subsections (c)(i), (g), and (j). We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's factual findings and ultimate determinations on the statutory grounds for termination." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 709; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). "The trial court's factual findings are clearly erroneous if the evidence supports them, but we are definitely and firmly convinced that it made a mistake." Id. at 709-710.
B. DISCUSSION
The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that there was clear and convincing evidence of statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights.
"To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been proved by clear and convincing evidence." In re Brown/Kindle/Muhammad Minors, 305 Mich App 623, 635; 853 NW2d 459 (2014) (quotation marks omitted). The first ground the trial court relied on, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), states that a parent's rights may be terminated if "182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order" and "[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age."
Here, the initial dispositional order regarding ARK and WSK was entered on November 4, 2016; for MTK, the initial dispositional order was entered on March 1, 2017. Respondent's parental rights were terminated on February 5, 2019. Thus, more than 182 days had passed since the initial dispositional orders, as MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) requires.
We next consider whether "[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue[d] to exist" at the time of termination. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). "This statutory ground exists when the conditions that brought the children into foster care continue to exist despite time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services . . . ." In re White, 303 Mich App at 710 (quotation marks omitted). Participation in and completion of certain portions of a service plan are not enough where a parent "fail[s] to demonstrate sufficient compliance with or benefit from those services specifically targeted to address the primary basis for the adjudication in th[e] matter[.]" In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).
ARK and WSK were brought into care after people discovered ARK wandering outside in the dark by herself. ARK underwent an interview and medical examination, telling CPS that she had been left alone with the mother. Respondent acknowledged that he left ARK and WSK at home with the mother, despite his knowledge that she was often abusive and had had her parental rights to ARK terminated. A medical examination revealed approximately 40 belt loop marks on ARK's body as well as fingernail grip marks on ARK's neck. ARK reported that respondent and the mother had "whipped" her. Respondent discovered that ARK was missing that night, but did not call the authorities until the following morning. WSK also reported respondent's abuse and neglect. Thus, WSK and ARK were brought into care because of respondent's physical abuse, his failure to provide proper care or custody, and his failure to protect them from the mother. MTK was brought into care shortly after she was born when it was discovered that she had been born at home, had not been taken to the hospital for a wellness check, and was sleeping on a queen-sized bed with respondent and the mother. When CPS finally brought MTK to the hospital, doctors diagnosed her with a wide array of medical issues. Thus, in addition to fears that MTK had suffered from the same abuse and failure to protect, MTK was also brought into care for medical neglect.
At the time of termination hearing, respondent had completed parenting classes, always visited the children when he was permitted, engaged in family therapy when it was offered, and participated in individual therapy. Thus, respondent was largely compliant with the PAA. However, respondent failed to benefit from the services provided. Id. First, as to the physical abuse, respondent whipped ARK with a belt in the bathroom of a mall in April 2018. Despite denying it, respondent pleaded nolo contendere to the charge and was convicted. Thus, there was evidence that respondent's physical abuse still persisted despite years of services. Moreover, respondent still failed to appreciate his physical abuse of ARK and WSK, and the role his abuse played in their psychological issues. Dr. James Henry, who conducted a trauma assessment of ARK and WSK, testified both that ARK and WSK suffered complex trauma that respondent perpetrated and that respondent had refused to accept his responsibility for their complex trauma. According to Dr. Henry, respondent's failure to admit fault and problems with his parenting meant that he had not, and would not, change. Consequently, in addition to the evidence that respondent had not stopped engaging in the physical abuse of his children, he also showed no sign of a psychological change that could lead to improved parenting. Therefore, the physical abuse component still existed at the time of termination.
Second, respondent still had not shown that he could provide proper care and custody for the children. Most importantly, respondent demonstrated an inability to address ARK and WSK's diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and their need for serious intervention to recover. Every mental-health professional who treated or evaluated ARK and WSK consistently reported that respondent was a trigger for their trauma, that they suffered from PTSD, and that they needed stability and structure to improve. Dr. Henry testified that, in order to properly care for ARK and WSK, respondent would have to be able to teach them resiliency. To do that, respondent would have to acknowledge his role in their trauma, understand that ARK and WSK actually were suffering, and, then, teach them to handle their emotions. Dr. Henry opined that respondent could not do that and would not be able to do so in a reasonable amount of time. WSK's therapist also testified that, despite her offer, respondent declined to learn skills related to caring for a child that had suffered trauma. Instead of engaging in those services to better himself, respondent chose to blame ARK for his problems by testifying that she had lied about him.
Similarly, respondent also showed an inability to properly care for MTK, considering her significant medical needs. According to DHHS and the children's foster mother, MTK had over 125 medical appointments since she had come into care. Respondent had only been to about 15 of those visits. At the time of termination, he acknowledged that he still did not know how to feed MTK through her surgically-placed tube, by which she received a majority of her nutrition. In sum, even after more than two years of services, respondent still was unable to provide the significant and intensive care his children needed.
Lastly, respondent admitted that he still spoke to the mother on a weekly basis, and that he had seen her on more than 10 occasions, even though his failure to protect the children from the mother was a condition leading to adjudication. Further, when asked about how the children felt about the mother, respondent opined that he was not sure that they were afraid of her and that he thought they missed her. Given this testimony, it is reasonable to assume that respondent would expose the children to the mother again if they were returned to his care. Indeed, he had already once done so after ARK was returned to his care following the termination of the mother's parental rights in 2011.
In sum, at the time of termination, respondent was mostly in compliance with his PAA, but the trial court did not clearly err in finding that he had not benefited from it. Id. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the conditions leading to adjudication still existed at the time of termination. In re White, 303 Mich App at 710.
Finally, we consider whether "there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age." MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Respondent was provided over two years' worth of services, but had shown no indication that he would or could improve. Dr. Henry testified that respondent would not be able to improve his parenting in order to properly care for ARK and WSK, who had significant mental-health needs. Testimony from WSK's therapist corroborated that allegation, as respondent declined her offer to teach him skills intended to help raise children who suffered from trauma. The family therapist, who had only recently started on this case, recommended that family therapy be terminated because it was more harmful than helpful given respondent's failure to benefit from the therapy. Respondent's own testimony also indicated that he would not improve his parenting. Specifically, respondent stated that he only needed individual counseling to vent about the fact that he did not have the children, suggesting that he was not prepared to work on his parenting. Most importantly, respondent refused to admit that ARK and WSK suffered from PTSD. While respondent acknowledged that they were anxious, he blamed the anxiety on the children being forced to lie about him. Considering the years of services, respondent's lack of improvement, his inability to acknowledge his children's medical needs, and his failure to work on himself and his parenting skills, "there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child[ren]'s age." MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Thus, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to terminate respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
Accordingly, we decline to consider the remaining statutory grounds for termination, as clear and convincing evidence of one statutory ground is sufficient to affirm. See Brown/Kindle/Muhammad Minors, 305 Mich App at 635.
III. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of his parental rights was in the children's best interests. We disagree.
We also review a trial court's determination regarding best interests for clear error. In re White, 303 Mich App at 713. We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that it was in the children's best interests to terminate respondent's parental rights.
"Once a statutory basis for termination has been shown by clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether termination is in the child's best interests." In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 732-733; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). "The focus at the best-interest stage has always been on the child, not the parent." In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 63; 874 NW2d 205 (2015) (brackets and quotation marks omitted). "Best interests are determined on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence." LaFrance, 306 Mich App at 733. In considering the issue of whether termination is in the best interest of the minor child, the trial court may consider "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, [] the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home . . . the length of time the child was in care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to her parents' home within the foreseeable future, if at all, and compliance with the case service plan." Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App at 63-64 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
As we have discussed, the minor children had significant psychological and medical needs. ARK and WSK suffered complex trauma from the time they lived with respondent. At the time of termination, respondent was still a trigger for their trauma and respondent had not shown any ability or inclination to address these problems. He denied that they existed or that he did anything to cause them. Similarly, MTK had numerous physical health problems that required treatment by an array of specialists and a feeding tube. Respondent went to very few of MTK's appointments and did not know how to feed MTK with the tube. Because the minor children required care that respondent could not provide, termination was in their best interests. This is especially true because the foster family had exhibited an ability to handle all of these issues over the more than two years that the children were in their care.
The trial court also found that the children looked to their foster parents as primary caregivers. The children had a stronger bond with the foster parents than they did with respondent. Moreover, the foster parents did not trigger ARK's and WSK's traumas, and the mental-health professionals testified that ARK and WSK needed time away from their triggers to heal. All three children needed permanency and stability in their lives, and the foster parents adopting them would provide that. And, as Dr. Henry testified, respondent could not provide that.
Moreover, the children had been in care for over two years, and there was no reasonable likelihood that they would be able to return to respondent's care in a reasonable amount of time. The trial court found that more than two years in care was too long for the children, who needed permanency and consistency. The foster parents were prepared to provide that for the children. The children were also permitted to stay together, which was in their best interests.
The record belies respondent's contention that he and the children needed more time to benefit from individual and family therapy. The therapist testified that family therapy should be terminated because it was more harmful than helpful and respondent was not benefiting from it. Thus, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that respondent would not get better even with further services. The record instead demonstrates that, if respondent was going to get better, he would have by now. Respondent either could not or would not improve his parenting. Thus, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to conclude that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests. Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App at 63-64.
Affirmed.
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Anica Letica