Opinion
No. 04-17-00292-CV
10-25-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF K.G. and K.G., Children
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2016-PA-00298
Honorable Peter Sakai, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice AFFIRMED
Lisa appeals the trial court's termination of her parental rights to K.G. and K.G., twins who were born in January 2016. In her sole issue, Lisa argues there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children's best interest. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to the appellant by her first name and to the children by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West 2014); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
BACKGROUND
When Lisa gave birth to the twins, she tested positive for benzodiazepines. A month later, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed the children from Lisa, citing concerns of prescription drug abuse and her relationship with the twins' father. The Department also filed a petition for conservatorship and to terminate Lisa's parental rights.
The Department also sought termination of the father's parental rights. The trial court terminated the father's parental rights to the twins, and he has not filed a notice of appeal in this case.
The case proceeded to a bench trial, at which Department caseworker Ruchi Rodriguez and Early Intervention Program monitor Julie Thornton testified. Lisa did not appear for trial, and her trial counsel stated he had had no contact with Lisa for approximately a month and a half before trial. In addition to finding multiple grounds for terminating Lisa's parental rights, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights is in the children's best interest. The trial court signed an order terminating Lisa's parental rights, and Lisa filed a timely notice of appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A judgment terminating parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2016). To determine whether this heightened burden of proof was met, we employ a heightened standard of review to determine whether a "factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations." In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). "This standard guards the constitutional interests implicated by termination, while retaining the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder's role." In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d 681, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.). We do not reweigh issues of witness credibility but defer to the factfinder's reasonable credibility determinations. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).
A legal sufficiency review requires us to examine the evidence "in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true." In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done so, and we disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found incredible. Id. When conducting a factual sufficiency review, we evaluate "whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding." Id. The evidence is factually insufficient "[i]f, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction." Id.
THE BEST-INTEREST FINDING
Lisa argues there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children's best interest. The best-interest determination is a wide-ranging inquiry, and factors relevant to that determination have been set by the Texas Supreme Court:
• the desires of the child;Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976). The list is not exhaustive, and not every factor must be proved to find that termination is in the child's best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Evidence of only one factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or conviction that termination is in the child's best interest—especially when undisputed evidence shows that the parental relationship endangered the child's safety. Id. "Evidence that the parent has committed the acts or omissions prescribed by section 161.001 may also be probative in determining the child's best interest; but the mere fact that an act or omission occurred in the past does not ipso facto prove that termination is currently in the child's best interest." In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d at 684 (internal citation omitted). "A factfinder may infer that past conduct endangering the well-being of a child may recur in the future if the child is returned to the parent." In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 471 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.).
• the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future;
• the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future;
• the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;
• the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child;
• the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody;
• the stability of the home or proposed placement;
• the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and
• any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.
At the time of trial, the twins were fourteen months old. When children are too young to express their desires, the factfinder may consider whether the children have bonded with their current caregiver and are well-cared for, and whether the children have spent minimal time with the parent. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). The twins were removed from Lisa one month after being born. Rodriguez testified the twins were placed with a foster family for several months, and then placed back with Lisa approximately six months after they were initially removed. Rodriguez further testified that approximately two months later, the children were removed again and placed back with the foster family because there was an altercation between Lisa and the twins' father. Rodriguez stated the twins experienced delays while in their parents' care, but they are now both doing well and thriving in foster care. Thornton testified the foster mother accompanied the children to their doctor's visits. According to Rodriguez, the Department's plans for the children include non-relative adoption.
Lisa and the twins' father tested positive for methamphetamines after the children were removed the second time. Rodriguez stated, "When [the parents] were confronted with that test, they said that they had had ongoing drug use during the case, as well as when the children were reunified." Rodriguez testified Lisa became pregnant while the case was pending, was advised to attend inpatient drug treatment, and did not seek inpatient treatment.
Rodriguez also testified Lisa voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to two other children in a prior termination proceeding, did not complete her family service plan, and reported multiple incidents of domestic violence with the twins' father. Rodriguez stated that although Lisa "is very active on her Facebook," Lisa would not return her text messages during the months before trial. Thornton testified the concerns causing the children's removal remained present at the time of trial: "domestic violence, drug use, continued instability with this family."
Having considered all of the evidence, we hold a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm conviction or belief that termination of Lisa's parental rights is in the children's best interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; In re T.R., 491 S.W.3d 847, 853-56 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (considering a parent's drug use as evidence supporting a best-interest finding); In re O.N.H., 401 S.W.3d at 685-86, 688-89 (considering domestic violence as evidence supporting a best-interest finding). We therefore hold there is legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's best-interest finding.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice