Opinion
1 CA-JV 21-0214
01-25-2022
IN RE KAYLEE S.
Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa By Joseph Munley Counsel for Appellant Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Quinton S. Gregory Counsel for Appellee
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. JV604159 The Honorable Jennifer E. Green, Judge.
Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Joseph Munley
Counsel for Appellant
Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix
By Quinton S. Gregory
Counsel for Appellee
Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
WEINZWEIG, Judge.
¶1 Kaylee S. appeals the juvenile court's finding that she violated the terms of her probation and its reinstatement. Because she shows no error, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Kaylee entered a plea agreement admitting to one count of disorderly conduct under A.R.S. § 13-2904, and the juvenile court placed her on 12 months of supervised probation. Her terms of probation had several requirements. Term 1 required Kaylee to "obey all laws," term 2 required her to "follow the rules of my parents, guardians and the juvenile probation officer," and term 4 required her to "tell my probation officer of any change of residence, address, and/or phone number within 24 hours." Kaylee reviewed the terms of probation with her current and former probation officers.
¶3 Kaylee promptly violated her terms of probation. Her probation officer requested a status review hearing, reporting that Kaylee had ditched school, used illegal drugs, missed drug tests, disobeyed her mother's rules and left home without permission. The court then ordered that Kaylee must "at all times" stay at her mother's home unless her probation officer "provided permission to leave." The court also ordered Kaylee to wear a tracking device for six weeks.
¶4 Just weeks later, on March 22, 2021, Kaylee hurled a pair of scissors at her mother and broke a window. Mother called the Department of Child Safety. DCS seized custody of Kaylee and took her to a long-term shelter, Crossroads. Later that evening, without telling anyone, Kaylee left Crossroads and never returned. Her court-ordered tracking device was found in a nearby field.
¶5 Kaylee's probation officer petitioned the court to revoke probation. The petition alleged that Kaylee violated term 4 when she "[ran] away from a DCS Shelter" and neglected to inform her "probation officer of any change of residence, address, and/or phone number within 24 hours." The probation officer filed the petition, and the court received it, on the afternoon of March 24. A warrant issued on March 25. Kaylee was located and detained on March 26.
¶6 The court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition to revoke probation, and found that Kaylee "violate[d] her terms and conditions of probation by running away from her DCS shelter." The court later reinstated probation, and ordered 90 days' deferred detention and 12 weeks' deferred electronic-tracking. Kaylee appealed. We have jurisdiction. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 8-235(A).
DISCUSSION
¶7 The superior court has discretion to revoke a probationer's probation. In re Anonymous, 16 Ariz.App. 597, 598 (1972). "We will not re-weigh the evidence, and we will only reverse on the grounds of insufficient evidence when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support a judgment or when a judgment is clearly contrary to any substantial evidence." In re Kyle M., 200 Ariz. 447, 448-49, ¶ 6 (App. 2001). We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court's findings. Id. at 449. Whether a probationer received due process is a question of law and thus reviewed de novo. In re MH 2006-002044, 217 Ariz. 31, 33, ¶ 7 (App. 2007).
I. Due Process
¶8 Kaylee argues she received no "meaningful notice of the charge" against her because the revocation petition only alleged she violated term 4, and then the State claimed she also violated term 2 at the evidentiary hearing. Kaylee also argues she cannot be punished for running away from the Crossroads shelter because her terms of probation say nothing about Crossroads or running away.
Kaylee also argues that term 2 was too vague. We need not reach that argument, however, because we affirm that she violated term 4. See State v. Ojeda, 159 Ariz. 560, 561 (1989).
¶9 Kaylee received due process. Due process ensures that defendants have written notice of the allegations against them before a probation revocation hearing. State v. Rivera, 116 Ariz. 449, 452 (1977). "[T]he allegations as to a violation should be fully and clearly set forth in the petition so that the probationer might be informed, by written notice, as to that which he will be called to defend." State v. Turnbull, 114 Ariz. 289, 291 (App. 1977).
¶10 Kaylee received adequate notice of the State's allegations against her. State v. Tucker, 124 Ariz. 120, 121-22 (App. 1979). The probation officer alleged she broke her probation terms "by running away from a DCS Shelter . . . in violation of A.R.S. §§ 8-201, 8-341(A)(1)(b), and 8-341(B)." The probation officer's affidavit alleged that "Kaylee ran away from a DCS shelter in violation of term 4 of the standard conditions." Still another filing said Kaylee violated "Term Number 4," describing:
Kaylee was placed in a DCS Shelter on 3/22/21. Later that evening she ran away from the DCS shelter and attempted to tamper with her JETS unit and remove it. She did not have permission to leave and her whereabouts are currently unknown.
¶11 Kaylee's final argument misses the point. She argues the court infringed her due process rights because she was never informed in writing that she could not run away from the shelter. But term 4 required Kaylee to "tell [her] probation officer of any change of residence, address, and/or phone number within 24 hours." Although term 4 did not expressly prohibit Kaylee from fleeing the Crossroads shelter, it did require her to keep the probation officers informed of her location within 24 hours of relocating. Both probation officers reviewed this term with Kaylee. As explained below, Kaylee violated this provision.
II. Other Arguments
¶12 Kaylee argues the evidence was insufficient to revoke her probation. We will not reverse the superior court's determination that a defendant violated a term of probation unless the court's finding is "arbitrary and unsupported by any theory of the evidence." State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. 72, 79 (1985). Because the court's decision is supported by reasonable evidence, we affirm. At the probation revocation hearing, the court heard testimony from Kaylee's original and current probation officers. Both officers said Kaylee violated the terms of her probation (terms 2 and 4) by running away from the long-term shelter.
¶13 Along the same lines, Kaylee argues the juvenile court erroneously found that she violated term 4 because she had not been missing for 24 hours when the probation officer moved to revoke probation. We discern no error. At a minimum, the juvenile court's file stamp shows it received the petition on the afternoon of March 24, and Kaylee left the shelter on the evening of March 22. We affirm.
¶14 And last, Kaylee argues the court did not make specific written factual findings supporting its determination that a probation violation has occurred. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 32(E)(4)(a)-(b) ("The findings of the court shall be in writing in the form of a minute entry or order and shall state specifically for the record: (a) [w]hether each allegation in the revocation petition has been proven, and (b) [t]he findings of fact which establish a violation of probation."). By not challenging the adequacy of the findings in the juvenile court, Kaylee waived this argument. See Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec, 214 Ariz. 445, 452, ¶¶ 20-21 (App. 2007).
CONCLUSION
¶15 We affirm.