Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. SWJ007598. Kenneth Fernandez, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Carole A. Nunes Fong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jacquelyn E. Gentry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minors.
OPINION
RAMIREZ, P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant K.L. (mother) appeals as an abuse of discretion the juvenile court’s order granting her mother and her mother’s fiancé (the maternal grandparents) de facto parent status in relationship to K.L.’s two children, K.A. and J.A. We will affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2007, A.A. (father), the father of two-month-old J.A. and two-year-old K.A., was the primary caregiver of the children while mother worked from 6:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., six days a week. About 11 a.m. on July 13 father called mother at work to report that J.A.’s head seemed unusually soft and flat. Mother told him the flattening was probably just from the infant having lain in the crib too long in one position. Father also thought that J.A. seemed unusually fussy and sleepy during the day. However, instead of going home and checking on the infant after mother finished working, mother and father went to the Lady Luck tattoo parlor, where mother got a couple of tattoos. When she later checked J.A.’s head, mother decided that it was indeed swollen. On the advice of their pediatrician, the parents took the infant to the Hemet Valley Hospital emergency room. The emergency room doctor found that J.A. had bilateral skull fractures, probably from having been struck once or twice on the back of the head, and transferred him to Loma Linda Children’s Hospital (Loma Linda). Hemet police later arrested father on suspicion of child abuse.
Mother told the investigating social worker that J.A. had been a fussy baby since birth, that he “had issues,” and that father had more patience with the children than she did. Mother thought K.A. might have caused J.A.’s skull fractures because she was very jealous of her brother and frequently threw her sippy cup and other toys at him. Maybe, mother suggested, K.A. had hit J.A. or had kicked him in the head. The social worker noticed that mother picked J.A. up in a very rough manner, which changed to a very careful one after she saw that the social worker was watching her.
Father told the social worker that J.A. had been unusually fussy around 11:00 p.m. on July 12 and had been screaming loudly around 2:00 a.m. on July 13 and had seemed fussier and had slept more than usual during the rest of that day. Father would not say that K.A. had caused J.A.’s injuries but could think of no other explanation. Father also said that mother had watched J.A. alone the night before he began having symptoms. Father admitted to using marijuana when he cared for the children but minimized his behavior as completely benign. K.A. was with her maternal grandmother from about 7:00 p.m. on July 12 until July 14, when she was taken to Loma Linda to be seen by a social worker.
At Loma Linda, mother initially refused to sign the permission forms for diagnostic X-ray and other procedures for J.A. She said that since she did not have custody of her children, she saw no reason to sign for the studies. On July 15, after their parental rights were explained to them, the parents signed a release for medical care. Studies done at Hemet Valley Hospital and at Loma Linda revealed that, in addition to the skull fractures, J.A. had a subarachnoid hemorrhage. The Loma Linda physician who performed the physical examination on July 14 concluded that J.A.’s skull fractures were most likely the result of nonaccidental trauma.
On July 14, mother suggested that her own mother and her mother’s fiancé would be an appropriate placement possibility. Because the maternal grandmother had a 10-year-old DUI conviction and could not have placement, she moved out of the home and K.A. was placed with the fiancé and a maternal aunt while J.A. remained in the hospital. Eventually the department discovered that the fiancé also had an old DUI and the children were placed with the paternal grandmother in Los Angeles on an emergency basis.
In its Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 jurisdictional/dispositional (J/D) report filed on August 3, the Riverside County Department of Social Services (DPSS or the department) recommended that, because of the severity of the physical harm inflicted on J.A., no reunification services be offered to the parents. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(5), (b)(6), & (b)(7).)
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
The social worker who wrote the report had interviewed the maternal grandmother and two maternal aunts for information about the family. The maternal grandmother told the social worker that she and one of the maternal aunts had noticed a bruise under J.A.’s eye sometime in June. When the maternal grandmother inquired about it, mother told her that it happened when father tripped and fell against the bathroom door while holding the baby. Later, the grandmother discovered that mother had told one of the maternal aunts a different story about how the injury occurred. The maternal grandmother also reported that she had seen mother become physically aggressive during an argument with father; that she had seen mother lock J.A. in a room “because she did not want to hear him cry anymore”; and that she had seen mother yell at the infant, “[A]ll right that is enough, just stop crying!” The maternal grandmother said that when she returned K.A. to the parents’ home after a visit, the child would go willingly to father, but would have “a fit” if mother was outside to receive her. The maternal grandmother believed that father smoked marijuana more frequently than he had admitted to police and that mother was using alcohol.
The maternal aunt confirmed the grandmother’s story about the injury to J.A.’s eye in June. She said mother told her that the bruise happened when a bottle or a sippy cup fell on the infant.
At the contested J/D hearing on October 9, 2007, the department changed its original “no reunification” recommendation to a recommendation that reunification services should be provided. Both parents had signed JV-190 waiver of rights forms. Thereafter, the juvenile court struck four of the original seven allegations in an amended section 300 petition. However, it found three true: that J.A. had suffered serious physical harm while in the care of his parents in that he had suffered bi-parietal skull fractures, which medical staff at Loma Linda considered suspicious for child abuse (a-1); that the parents had neglected J.A.’s health by waiting several hours before seeking medical attention (b-2); and that as the sibling of a child who had suffered serious physical harm, K.A. was at risk for similar harm (j-1). The juvenile court ordered the parents to participate in various reunification services, to drug test, and to submit to psychological evaluations. The six-month review hearing was set for March 10, 2008.
Three days later the maternal grandparents filed de facto parent petitions. Attached to the petitions were declarations detailing the dates and durations of the times the children had lived with the maternal grandparents. For K.A., the declaration stated, this consisted of numerous days and weeks at a time, including three months in the summer of 2005. For J.A., the times included regular overnight visits two to three nights a week from the time he was born. It is unclear from the record whether either of the parents was present during these periods, but the maternal grandparents declared that they were K.A.’s primary caregivers during the times she was with them. In addition, the maternal grandparents said they had bought cribs, a playpen, and a daybed, as well as car seats for the children.
The three months appear to have been June and July and the month following the end of August.
At the hearing on the de facto petitions held on November 5, 2007, counsel for the department confirmed that placement with the maternal grandparents was expected as soon as the exemptions to their criminal records came through. Counsel for the maternal grandparents represented that both exemptions to the placement requirements had in fact been issued: grandmother’s on September 26 and the fiancé’s on October 26. Counsel argued that his clients had a substantial ongoing relationship with the children and had cared for them for significant periods of time. They did not intend to interfere with—and indeed wanted to facilitate—reunification. Minors’ counsel concurred with the maternal grandparents’ requests, noting that there was no legal bar to granting the motions and that counsel always found it helpful for the juvenile court to have more information.
Counsel for father (who was not present) said that his client opposed the petitions and argued that the maternal grandparents had not really assumed the role of caring for the children on a day-to-day basis.
Mother also opposed the maternal grandparents’ petitions. Through her attorney she disputed a number of their statements about when and for how long the children had stayed with them and insisted that during the longer periods, she too had been living with the maternal grandparents. Her attorney argued that the petitions were premature. Mother was appreciative of the maternal grandparents’ past help, but felt that grandmother’s suggestions that she was a bad mother meant that the relationship between them was breaking down. Granting the petitions, mother felt, would interfere with her reunification with her children.
After noting that it had carefully read the petition documents and had listened “intently” to the statements and arguments of counsel, the juvenile court found that the maternal grandparents had developed a substantial interest in the companionship, care, and management of the children and granted the maternal grandparents’ petitions for de facto parent status.
Four months later, at the March 10, 2008, section 366.21, subdivision (e), review hearing, the children were returned to the parents’ custody under a family maintenance case plan.
On June 9, 2008, respondent filed a request for judicial notice of the minute order of March 10, 2008. We reserved our ruling on the matter for consideration with the appeal and hereby grant the request. The status review report of February 2, 2008, on which the court apparently based its decision, is not part of the appellate record.
Meanwhile, mother’s appeal of the order granting the maternal grandparents de facto parent status was filed on December 5, 2007. Her opening brief was filed on April 3, 2008, and respondent department’s brief was filed on June 9. Minors’ brief was filed on June 16 and mother’s reply brief on July 1.
DISCUSSION
Mother argues here, as she did below, that the juvenile court should not have granted the de facto petitions because the maternal grandparents had not demonstrated that they had taken care of the children on a day-to-day basis or that granting the petitions was in the best interests of the children.
De Facto Parent Status and the Standard of Review
A de facto parent is “a person who has been found by the court to have assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of parent, fulfilling both the child’s physical and psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.502(10).) A person other than a parent who has undertaken a parental role by raising the child in his or her own home may in time acquire a legally protected interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of the child. (In re Kieshia E. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 68, 75; In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 692.) The party seeking de facto parent status bears the burden of proving that he or she satisfies the statutory criteria. (In re Jacob E. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 909, 919.) Once de facto parent status has been granted, it ordinarily continues until dependency jurisdiction is dismissed, even if the biological parent regains custody of the child. (In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61, 67.)
Factors a court considers in making its decision regarding a request for de facto parent status include: the nature of the applicant’s psychological bond with the child; the applicant’s adherence to the role of parent over a substantial period of time; whether the applicant possesses unique information about the child; whether the applicant has regularly attended juvenile court hearings; and whether a future proceeding may result in an order that permanently forecloses the applicant’s contact with the child. (In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 256, citing In re Patricia L., supra, at pp. 66-67.)
We review the juvenile court’s decision regarding the granting or denial of de facto parent status petitions for abuse of discretion. (In re Michael R. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 150, 156.) Ordinarily, there is no abuse of discretion if the court’s order is supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.) To determine if substantial evidence supports an order, we review the entire record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) The standard is not whether substantial evidence supports the appellant’s position, but whether substantial evidence supports the ruling of the dependency court. (In re Charmice G. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 659, 664.) In evaluating a question of substantial evidence, all conflicts are resolved in favor of the prevailing party; issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact, not the appellate court. (In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.)
Analysis
Viewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the maternal grandparents, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the order to grant their petitions for de facto parent status.
It is true that through her attorney’s arguments—although as the department points out, not through any direct evidence—mother disputed some of the facts as recited in the maternal grandparents’ declarations. However, it was up to the juvenile court to determine the credibility of each party. (In re Steve W., supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 16.) Mother’s credibility had already been undermined by her apparently standard explanation—unlikely as it was—of how J.A. came to suffer his various injuries: via repeated exposure to the forceful application of his sister’s sippy cup.
And there was much in the record to support the grandparent’s claims that the children had spent substantial periods of time in their care and that during those periods they had acted as the children’s primary caretakers whether the parents also happened to be there or not. Mother argues from the negative: that there was no evidence that she was not the children’s primary caretaker when the whole family was staying at the maternal grandparents’ house. However, she ignores the maternal grandparents’ sworn statements. The very night of the injury to J.A., his sister was spending the night at their house and apparently did not come home the following day. There was also evidence of a questionable nature regarding mother’s commitment to J.A.’s well-being. Despite having been called by father in the morning about possible injury to the infant’s head, after work she went first to a tattoo parlor and only later checked on her infant son, called her pediatrician, and took the baby to an emergency room for examination.
Regarding other factors pertinent to an evaluation of a petition for de facto parent status, there was evidence of the bond between the children and the maternal grandparents and of their concern for the children. The maternal grandparents appear to have attended all of the relevant dependency hearings. They also appeared to possess unique information about the children and the family that was very helpful to the juvenile court. In view of the extreme seriousness of the unexplained injuries to J.A., the information grandmother gave the social worker regarding the children and the family dynamics might fairly be characterized as indispensable information that the juvenile court would never have obtained absent her cooperation. This information included the fact that K.A. had “a fit” when mother was outside to receive her back home after a visit, although she went willingly to father; that mother physically attacked father when she was angry; that mother gave different stories to different people regarding the source of earlier injuries to J.A.; that the grandmother had seen mother lock J.A. in a room “because she did not want to hear him cry anymore”; and that the grandmother had seen mother yell at the infant, “[A]ll right that is enough, just stop crying!” The fact that the grandmother criticized mother’s parenting did not mean that she would not facilitate reunification or that her petition for de facto parent status was somehow not in the best interests of the children.
In sum, we cannot find that the juvenile court’s decision to grant the maternal grandparents de facto parent status was in any way an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: HOLLENHORST, J., MILLER, J.