Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. FJ40026 Rudolph A. Diaz, Judge.
Niccol Kording, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Sonya Roth, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WOODS, Acting P.J.
Julio R. appeals from the juvenile court’s order declaring him a ward of the court and ordering him home on probation under house arrest. He contends the evidence was insufficient to support the finding he committed aggravated assault on his father. We affirm the order as modfied.
Julio contends, the People acknowledge, and we agree the minute order should be corrected to reflect the juvenile court’s oral pronouncement of probation condition 16 that Julio not remain in the presence of anyone “he knows” to be unlawfully armed. (People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging then 16-year-old Julio R. (Julio) committed assault with a deadly weapon (a knife) (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury on his father Cesario R. (Cesario), the victim of the attack (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), making the crime a “serious felony.” (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).)
Julio R. has his father’s surname. To protect his anonymity and to simplify the opinion, we use first names in referring to him and to members of his family.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1. The Jurisdiction Hearing
a. The People’s Evidence
On November 21, 2006, Cesario discovered his wife, Maria Aguiar (Maria), was involved with another man. The next day, Cesario confronted Maria in the living room of their home and ordered her and their son Julio to leave until he had finished moving out. When Maria refused, Cesario went into the kitchen, grabbed a knife and displayed it. Maria and Julio could see the knife from the living room. Cesario demanded that his wife and son leave him alone, or he would kill them. Then, saying he did not want to kill them, Cesario returned the knife to the kitchen drawer and left for the bedroom. He was followed by Maria and Julio. Cesario again insisted that they leave so he could pack up his things. Maria again refused. Cesario left the bedroom, and Julio walked up to him. Father and son began pushing each other in the hallway. Maria came up behind Cesario; he attempted to hit her but she was too far away from him. Cesario picked up a vacuum cleaner in the hallway and threw it against a wall. He then picked up a nearby stool and threw it against a wall. At this point, Julio was in the doorway of his father’s bedroom, and Maria was in the living room. Julio approached his father, saying, “Is this what you want?” and stabbed Cesario with a knife. It appeared to Cesario that Julio then attempted “to finish [him] off.” Cesario asked why his son had stabbed him, and Julio pointed his middle finger and said, “Fuck you” to his father. Maria wrested the knife from Julio, and he fled to his bedroom. Julio returned with a baseball bat and “wanted to hit [Cesario].” Maria stepped between them and said, “If you want to kill him, you kill me first.” Julio dropped the baseball bat. Police were called; and Cesario was taken to the hospital. The stab wound left Cesario with one-foot long vertical scar on his abdomen.
Los Angeles Police Officer Brandon Barron arrived and spoke with Maria. She told him she and Cesario were arguing when Julio intervened and began arguing with his father. After father and son continued to argue, Julio pulled an object from his pocket and punched Cesario in the stomach. Maria realized the object was a knife, and Julio had just stabbed his father. When Julio thrust the knife again, Maria jumped in the way and stopped her son from stabbing his father a second time. Julio refused to surrender the knife to his mother. From his bedroom he retrieved a baseball bat and approached Cesario. Maria took the baseball bat from Julio before he could strike his father with it.
Maria testified and largely corroborated the testimony of Cesario and Officer Barron. However, Maria denied ever seeing the knife or telling the officer her son approached his father while holding the baseball bat. According to Maria, she took the baseball bat from Julio as soon as he appeared with it and ordered him to sit on the couch.
b. The Defense Evidence
Toni Giuliano, a social worker for the Department of Children and Family Services, interviewed Cesario and Maria in response to an emergency referral based on Julio’s disclosure of past physical abuse. Both Cesario and Maria told Giuliano about Julio stabbing his father on November 22, 2006. Giuliano’s testimony as to what they said corroborated their hearing testimony, except Maria never mentioned a knife or a baseball bat, or Julio’s attempt to stab his father a second time.
Gerardo R. (Gerardo), Julio’s older brother, testified their father had a drinking problem around the time of the stabbing. Cesario was quick to anger after consuming alcohol and had hit Maria in the past.
Julio testified in his own defense. In 2002, Cesario punched his mother in the face and stomach. When Cesario was angry with her, he yelled. On November 22, 2006, Maria took Julio out of school early. Maria explained she did not know how Cesario would react after learning she cared for another man. Maria was scared and wanted Julio and Gerardo to be with her at the house. Unable to find Gerardo, they went home without him.
Cesario arrived at the house and immediately went to his bedroom, saying he wanted to be alone. Cesario appeared to Julio to have been drinking. When Cesario consumes alcohol, he becomes quiet and prefers to be alone in his bedroom. On that afternoon, Maria kept trying to talk to Cesario in his bedroom, and Cesario repeatedly said he did not feel like talking; he wanted to be alone. Cesario went into the kitchen, picked up a knife and said to Maria, “Remember what I told you I was going to do if you ever cheated on me.” Cesario said he was going to kill Maria. He then “threw” the knife back into the kitchen. Julio was afraid. Cesario punched Julio and attempted to hit Maria.
At some point, Maria went to her bedroom and Julio was in an adjacent room. Cesario threw a vacuum cleaner towards Maria’s room and then threw the stool towards Julio’s room. Julio thought Cesario was attempting to hit Maria with the vacuum cleaner. When the vacuum cleaner was thrown, Julio ducked; when the stool was thrown, Julio “threw it down.” “That’s when [Julio] stabbed [his father] in the stomach.” Cesario had no weapon in his hands at the time. Julio stabbed Cesario because he believed his father was going to hurt him and his mother. He wanted to protect Maria. Julio attempted to stab Cesario a second time, but his mother stopped him. Julio retrieved the baseball bat because he feared his father would “do something; he was standing there.” But, Julio remained in the bedroom; this time he did not approach Cesario in the hallway.
After the presentation of evidence, the juvenile court listened to arguments by counsel which focused primarily on Julio’s claim he reasonably acted in self-defense or defense of his mother when he stabbed his father.
c. The Juvenile Court’s Findings
The juvenile court found beyond a reasonable doubt Julio had committed assault with a deadly weapon and had personally inflicted great bodily injury on Cesario during the assault. The court rejected Julio’s affirmative defense, finding Julio stabbed Cesario when his father no longer posed an imminent danger and Julio’s use of the knife was excessive force. The court found, “I do believe that Julio was, in his estimation, attempt[ing] to defend himself or his mom when he acted as he did. But I do believe and agree with counsel’s arguments, that he acted excessively in using the knife. If, in fact, it’s undisputed the father did take a knife and make threatening comments and gestures. That situation was defused when he rid himself of the knife, whether he threw it down or whether it went on the counter, whether he put it back where he found it. That threat is defused. There is no threat of great bodily injury or harm to either the minor or his mom. [¶] The minor may have believed in his estimation he needed to act like he did. He acted excessively in the use of a knife would have used it a second time if his mother had not been there to stop him.”
2. The Disposition Hearing
At the disposition hearing the juvenile court declared Julio a ward of the court and ordered him home on probation, under house arrest. The court also calculated the maximum term of confinement as seven years.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding of Aggravated Assault
a. The Standard of Review
In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile court order sustaining the criminal allegations of a petition made under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, “we must apply the same standard of review applicable to any claim by a criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction on appeal.” (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371-1372.) “‘To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 553.) We must draw all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 640.) It is not our function to reweigh the evidence, reappraise the credibility of witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts, as these are functions reserved for the trier of fact. We look for substantial evidence, and we may not reverse a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence unless it appears that upon no hypothesis whatever there is substantial evidence to support the conviction. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
b. The Finding Julio Did Not Act In Self-Defense Was Proper
It was undisputed Julio committed assault with a deadly weapon by stabbing his father with a knife. (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).) However, Julio argues the stabbing was an act in self-defense as a matter of law.
To justify an act of self-defense for aggravated assault, the defendant must have been “motivated by an actual (also referred to as ‘genuine’ or ‘honest’) belief or perception that (a) the defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury from an unlawful attack or threat by the victim and (b) the defendant’s acts were necessary to prevent the injury; and (2) a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have had the same perception and done the same acts. [Citation.]” (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1093.) “The threat of bodily injury must be imminent [citation], and ‘. . . any right of self-defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable under the circumstances.’” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064-1065; §§ 692, 693.) The test of reasonableness is objective; it is determined from the point of view of a reasonable person in the defendant’s position. (People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1082-1083.)
Generally, the determination of self-defense is a question of fact. (People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 378, disapproved on another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 92.) But, there are exceptions, among them, as Julio claims applies here, is where the evidence is uncontroverted and establishes all the elements for a finding of self-defense. (People v. Clark, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 379.)
On the other hand, “where some of the evidence tends to show a situation in which [the use of force] may not be justified then the issue is a question of fact for the [trier of fact] to determine.” (People v. Clark, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 379.) “Where the evidence is uncontroverted, but reasonable persons could differ on whether the resort to force was justified or whether the force resorted to was excessive, then the issue is a question of fact for the trier of fact.” (Ibid.)
The juvenile court properly found that even if Julio’s account of the stabbing and professed fear were credible and uncontroverted, his testimony failed to prove requisite elements of self-defense defense – namely, that Julio reasonably feared imminent harm at the time and used reasonable force under the circumstances. As the court noted, although Julio may properly have honestly and reasonably feared imminent harm when Cesario threatened Maria with a knife, Julio’s subsequent stabbing of his father had no such justification. Once his father discarded the knife, the danger passed; Cesario no longer posed a threat of deadly harm. According to Julio’s testimony, Cesario never again brandished a weapon and made no further threats of injury or death to his wife or son. Throughout the incident, Cesario either kept silent or demanded that Maria and Julio leave him alone.
Julio makes much of his testimony that Cesario subsequently punched him once and attempted to hit Maria, and then later threw household items towards each of their rooms while standing in the hallway. Yet, it is impossible to see how a reasonable person in Julio’s position could have perceived such conduct as amounting to a threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury. Cesario did not accost either his wife or son in their respective bedrooms. The evidence is undisputed it was Julio who advanced on his father as Cesario remained in the hallway; and it was Julio and not his father who was armed with a knife. Indeed, Julio did not testify he stabbed Cesario because his father was about to attack him. (Compare People v. Sherman (1894) 103 Cal. 409, 411-412 [right to use deadly force was justified after intoxicated victim threatened defendant with a knife, and when defendant declined to fight, victim then threatened defendant with a gun. Defendant then fired several shots as victim continued to approach defendant].) Rather, Julio testified to stabbing Cesario because he was “scared,” and “seriously thought [his father] . . . might have done something else” after throwing the vacuum cleaner and stool. However, imminent harm is not that which appears to be prospective or even in the near future. (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 783.) “‘“An imminent peril is one that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt with.””’ (Ibid.) Finally, after Julio had stabbed Cesario once, injuring him significantly, he attempted to stab his father a second time, before retrieving a bat from his room to hit his father again. “[A]ny right of self-defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable under the circumstances. [Citation.]” (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 966.) Therefore, even if Julio had initially felt threatened by his father’s conduct, his use of deadly force against Cesario was excessive. (See People v. Clark, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 380 [right to use deadly force not established as a matter of law where, although victim approached defendant with obvious intent of assaulting him, victim was unarmed and was not so physically overwhelming that defendant had reason to fear serious bodily injury].) The juvenile court properly found Julio was not entitled to rely on self-defense to justify stabbing his father.
He also then responded affirmatively to defense counsel’s questions: “Were you scared your Dad was going to hurt you?” “Were you scared he was going to hurt your Mom?”
DISPOSITION
Probation condition 16 is modified to read, “Do not have any dangerous or deadly weapon in your possession, nor remain in the presence of any person known to you to be unlawfully armed.” As modified the juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: ZELON, J., JACKSON, J.