Opinion
No. 10-19-00102-CV
09-18-2019
In the INTEREST OF J.S.S., a Child
Brandon S. Belt, Gatesville, for Appellee. Patrick O. Brady, for Appellant. Jamie Smith, pro se. Dori Mistic, for Real party in interest.
Brandon S. Belt, Gatesville, for Appellee.
Patrick O. Brady, for Appellant.
Jamie Smith, pro se.
Dori Mistic, for Real party in interest.
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Neill
(Chief Justice Gray concurs in the Court's judgment. A separate opinion will not issue. He notes, however, that he joins only the opening paragraph and the sections labeled "Anders Brief" and "Conclusion" of the Court's opinion. Moreover, he notes the remaining sections of the opinion are unnecessary to the Court's disposition and, therefore, are dicta.)
(Justice Neill concurs without a separate opinion.)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
REX D. DAVIS, Justice By Order signed March 8, 2019, the parental rights of J.S.S.'s mother ("Mother") were terminated. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother violated Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(N) and (O) and that termination was in J.S.S.'s best interest. Mother's attorney filed an Anders brief asserting that he has identified no reversible errors in this case. Mother filed a pro se response. The Department of Family and Protective Services and the ad litem informed the Court that they are not filing responses to Mother's pro se response to her attorney's Anders brief. After a review of the record in this case, we will affirm.
The parental rights of J.S.S.'s father were also terminated, but the father has not appealed.
Background
The affidavit in support of the original petition provides the following background:
Mother and J.S.S. first came to the attention of the Department in June 2013, shortly after J.S.S. was born, when a report was made that alleged neglectful supervision. The Department's investigation noted that Mother was hysterical, her speech was incoherent, and she would not answer direct questions posed by medical staff. Mother was also described as paranoid because she thought the hospital staff was trying to harm J.S.S. The hospital physicians diagnosed Mother as psychotic and believed she should not be the primary caregiver to J.S.S. Eventually, the allegation was ruled out by the Department because there was no evidence to support a risk of harm to J.S.S. Mother did not test positive for drugs, and a nurse at the hospital stated that Mother's behavior could be attributable to postpartum depression and hormonal changes. The case was dismissed at the adversary hearing, and J.S.S. was returned to Mother.
Less than a year later in April 2014, another report was made against Mother that alleged neglectful supervision of J.S.S. The investigator for the Department smelled marijuana in Mother's home, and J.S.S. was observed to be lethargic and have bloodshot eyes. Mother and a friend were also observed to be laughing about the fact that they were smoking. The allegation was ruled out by the Department because Mother stated that she smoked for the first time with the friend in the hopes that it would help physical pain, and there was insufficient information to prove drug use on a consistent basis.
On May 5, 2015, the Department received another report alleging neglectful supervision and physical abuse of J.S.S. by Mother. The intake reported that Mother was whipping J.S.S. with her hand every day, leaving J.S.S. unsupervised and alone in the home for five to six hours every day, and using unknown pills and smoking marijuana while caring for J.S.S. The Department could not substantiate the allegations.
The events that led to the present termination proceeding began when the Department received a report alleging neglectful supervision and sexual abuse of J.S.S. on September 23, 2017. The intake report noted that Mother was chronically homeless and was using illegal drugs and that J.S.S. was exhibiting sexualized behavior. Mother told the Department investigator that she had been using illegal drugs but refused to submit to a drug test. The investigator and three police officers all observed Mother to be under the influence of some illegal substance, noting that she displayed erratic behavior, constricted pupils, and incoherent speech. Mother was also observed to constantly scratch her arms and head, resulting in an approximately five-inch in diameter bald spot on the right side of her scalp, and she had multiple red marks and scabs covering her arms. Mother told the investigator and the police that J.S.S. had reported being sexually abused in the place they had been living, but she was unable to provide details of the assault. Mother then reported that there were children living in tunnels underneath the house where the assault occurred. Police conducted a welfare check on the residence and were unable to verify Mother's allegations. Mother also reported that she had been homeless for the previous four months and that she and J.S.S. had been staying at the homes of different friends. Prior to being homeless, Mother reported that she and J.S.S. lived in an apartment complex where J.S.S. was able to play outside unsupervised.
Mother also has a criminal history. She was convicted of a second-degree felony in 2016 and placed on probation for five years.
After an adversary hearing, the trial court granted temporary managing conservatorship of J.S.S. to the Department. The temporary orders directed Mother, in part, to submit to and cooperate in preparation of a psychological or psychiatric evaluation, to attend counseling and parenting classes, and to submit to drug and alcohol testing. The temporary orders further granted Mother one hour of supervised visitation with J.S.S. per week.
After the first adversary hearing, a family group conference was held wherein a Family Plan of Service was created. Mother and her attorney were present. The temporary orders entered by the court made the service plan an order of the court. The Family Service Plan required Mother to: obtain employment, pay child support, attend therapy, find stable housing, and submit to weekly drug tests. The Plan warned that failure to submit to a drug test would be considered a positive test for visitation purposes.
Anders Brief
As noted, Mother's appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief. Counsel asserts that he has diligently reviewed the record and that, in his opinion, the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) ; In re E.L.Y. , 69 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, order, no pet.) (applying Anders to termination appeal).
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 350, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). An appeal is "wholly frivolous" or "without merit" when it "lacks any basis in law or fact." McCoy v. Court of Appeals , 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1902 n.10, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988).
Counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders ; it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman , 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ("In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities."); Stafford v. State , 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court's order of termination. Counsel has informed us that he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel's motion to withdraw on Mother; and (3) informed Mother of her right to obtain a copy of the record and of her right to file a pro se response. See Anders , 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400 ; Stafford , 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3 ; High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) ; see also Schulman , 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.
Mother's Response to Anders Brief
Mother raises several issues, many of which were extracted from counsel's Anders brief. In her various pro se filings with this Court, Mother appears to argue that her appellate attorney could have raised the following, among others: (1) the family service plan was not entered into evidence at trial; (2) the family service plan did not contain her signature; (3) the judge did not take judicial notice of the status hearing order; (4) the copy of the record she was provided by her attorney is missing pages; (5) the dates on various documents do not correspond; (6) it is unfair to use J.S.S.'s time in the Department's custody as a ground because the Department is in charge of the dates; (7) the Department made no reasonable efforts to reunite J.S.S. with Mother—the Department merely gave her "to do" lists; (8) the trial court should have granted a continuance because she did not miss the trial intentionally or as a result of conscious indifference because she was in rehab and her trial counsel failed to tell her of the court date; (9) the therapist to whom she was assigned was abusive and did not assist her; and (10) her appellate attorney did not consider the information she had provided to him, relied on the "biased" transcripts from the Department, and included personal slights against her in his brief.
Discussion
A. Continuance. Mother appears to argue that the trial court erred in not granting her counsel's motion for continuance because she was not intentionally absent from the trial. On the first day of trial, Mother's counsel made an oral motion to continue until after Mother completed drug rehab on April 2nd. Mother entered rehab two days before trial began.
A trial court's ruling on a motion for continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re K.-A.B.M. , 551 S.W.3d 275, 283 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without any guiding rules or principles, or, stated another way, when the trial court's actions are arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied , 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986) ; see also In re M.R.R. , No. 10-15-00303-CV, 2016 WL 192583, at *7 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). Under Rule 251 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a continuance will not be granted "except for sufficient cause supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties or by operation of law." TEX. R. CIV. P. 251. When a movant fails to comply with those requirements, "we presume the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion." K.-A.B.M. , 551 S.W.3d at 283. In this case, counsel's oral motion did not comply with Rule 251 because it was not supported by an affidavit, it was not made pursuant to an agreement between the parties, and it was not required by operation of law.
Additionally, as the trial court noted, the dismissal date required by § 263.401 of the Family Code was March 30, 2019, prior to Mother's scheduled release from rehab. See Act of May 24, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 317, § 27, 2017 TEX. GEN. LAWS 615, 623 (amended 2019) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.401 ). The temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator of J.S.S. was signed and filed on September 25, 2017. At the time J.S.S. was removed from Mother's custody, § 263.401 of the Family Code provided that a termination suit would be automatically dismissed if the court did not commence the trial on the merits within one year of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator. Id. The trial court could maintain the suit on the court's docket after the one-year period if the court made a finding that "extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department and that continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest of the child." Id. If the court makes the foregoing findings, the court may retain the suit on the court's docket for a period not to exceed 180 days. Id. There is no provision for extending the trial date beyond this 180-day period.
In determining whether extraordinary circumstances justify a continuance, the focus is on "the needs of the child." In re A.J.M. , 375 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. denied) (en banc) (op. on reh'g). A circumstance such as incarceration, which is involuntary, is not necessarily an "extraordinary circumstance" that merits an extension. See In re E.F. , No. 07-18-00281-CV, 2018 WL 4997785, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 15, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Actions that are considered to be the parent's fault will generally not constitute extraordinary circumstances. In re O.R.F. , 417 S.W.3d 24, 42 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in not granting a continuance based upon Mother's voluntary entry into drug rehab, particularly when this was Mother's second trip to rehab while the case was pending. A 180-day continuance was granted previously when Mother entered drug rehab for the first time on May 22, 2018. Mother also presented nothing to the trial court that would indicate that delaying the final termination hearing would be in the best interest of J.S.S. See E.F. , 2018 WL 4997785, at *3 ; see also In re L.T. , No. 02-10-00094-CV, 2011 WL 582710, at *9-10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 17, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Mother's complaints regarding the denial of a motion for continuance do not form arguable grounds to advance on appeal.
B. Evidentiary Matters. Mother argues that the trial court erred in considering the family service plan because it did not contain her signature and it was not entered as an exhibit at trial. Mother also asserts that the trial court erred in considering the status hearing order because the trial court did not take judicial notice of the document.
Although Mother did not sign the family service plan, previous status orders entered by the trial court noted that Mother "has reviewed and understands the service plan...." Additionally, the caseworker testified at trial that she reviewed the plan with Mother and that Mother knew what services were being requested of her by the Department. Finally, the final order of termination specifically notes that the trial court examined the entire record in this case before arriving at its decision. Mother did not file a motion for new trial or otherwise object to the trial court's consideration of the entire record.
A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Solutions, Inc. , 464 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex. 2015). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the family service plan or the status hearing order. Mother's complaints regarding the trial court's consideration of the family service plan and the status hearing order do not form arguable grounds to advance on appeal.
Mother also complains about missing pages in the copy of the record she was provided. The record reflects that the missing pages concern matters related to J.S.S.'s father or are duplicative of other information contained in the record and do not impact the outcome of this case. Mother's complaints regarding incorrect dates also do not impact the outcome.
C. Standard of Review in Termination Proceedings. In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under § 161.001, the Department must establish by clear and convincing evidence two elements: (1) that the parent committed one or more acts or omissions enumerated under § 161.001(b)(1), termed a predicate violation; and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1), (2) ; Swate v. Swate , 72 S.W.3d 763, 766 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. denied). The factfinder must find that both elements are established by clear and convincing evidence, and proof of one element does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of proving the other. Holley v. Adams , 544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976) ; Swate , 72 S.W.3d at 766. "Clear and convincing evidence" is defined as that "measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." In re N.G. , 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam ) (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 ). As noted, the trial court determined that termination was justified under subsections (N) and (O).
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Mother's complaints, taken together, seem to argue that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that she violated subsections (N) and (O) or that termination is in J.S.S.'s best interest.
Both legal and factual sufficiency reviews in termination cases must take into consideration whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the matter on which the petitioner bears the burden of proof. In re J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d 256, 264–68 (Tex. 2002) (discussing legal sufficiency review); In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002) (discussing factual sufficiency review).
In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of
fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. To give appropriate deference to the factfinder's conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.
J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266.
In a factual sufficiency review, a court of appeals must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. Id.
[T]he inquiry must be "whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations." A court of appeals should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted); see In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 25.
If multiple predicate grounds are found by the factfinder, we will affirm based on any one ground because only one is necessary for termination of parental rights. In re S.N. , 272 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.). Because we find the evidence sufficient to support a violation of subsection (N), we need not address the evidence related to subsection (O).
2. § 161.001(b)(1)(N) . Constructive abandonment under subsection (N) requires four elements: (1) the Department had permanent or temporary conservatorship of the child for at least six months; (2) the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent; (3) the parent did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the child; and (4) the parent demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment. See § 161.001(b)(1)(N) ; see also In re M.V.G. , 440 S.W.3d 54, 58-59 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, no pet.). Mother challenges the second and third elements, claiming that the Department did not make reasonable efforts to return J.S.S. and that she regularly visited J.S.S.
Under the second element, "[r]eturning the child to the parent ... does not necessarily mean that the child has to be physically delivered" to the parent. In re D.S.A. , 113 S.W.3d 567, 573 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.). This element can be satisfied by proof that the Department prepared and administered a service plan. See In re K.M.B. , 91 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). The service plan prepared by the Department was admitted at trial without objection. The caseworker additionally testified that the Department monitored and assisted Mother in completing the plan. The evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the court's finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return J.S.S. to Mother.
In regard to the third element, the caseworker testified that Mother's last visit with J.S.S. was in November 2018 when Mother requested that the Department have no further contact with her. Although the Department re-established contact with Mother in mid-December, Mother did not resume visitations with J.S.S. There was, therefore, an approximately four-month period when Mother had no contact with J.S.S.
Considering all the evidence in a neutral light, we hold that the evidence is such that the court "could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction" that Mother failed to regularly visit or maintain significant contact with J.S.S. Thus, the evidence is factually sufficient on this element, and because the evidence is factually sufficient, it is necessarily legally sufficient. See In re M.V.G. , 440 S.W.3d at 62.
We conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the court's finding of constructive abandonment under § 161.001(b)(1)(N). Mother's complaint regarding the sufficiency of the evidence as to subsection (N) does not form an arguable ground to advance on appeal.
3. Best Interest of J.S.S. In determining the best interest of a child, a number of factors are considered, including: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individual seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist this individual; (6) the plans for the child by this individual; (7) the stability of the home; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley , 544 S.W.2d at 372. This list is not exhaustive, but simply indicates factors that have been or could be pertinent. Id. A single factor may be adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that termination is in the best interest of a child. See In re B.H.R. , 535 S.W.3d 114, 123 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.). We may also consider evidence supporting violation of one or more of the predicate acts in the best-interest analysis. In re A.M. , 495 S.W.3d 573, 581 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (citing In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 27-28 ).
The evidence presented at trial established that Mother had mental and/or emotional problems that she was failing to address (she quit attending therapy sessions), that she had drug and/or alcohol problems that she was failing to address (she tested positive for drugs and/or alcohol even after attending drug rehab), that she could not maintain gainful employment (she lost three waitressing jobs during the course of the proceedings), and that she could not maintain a stable residence (she lived in four different residences, one a homeless shelter, during the course of the proceedings).
Evidence of a parent's unstable lifestyle may support a conclusion that termination is in a child's best interest. In re M.R. , 243 S.W.3d 807, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). Additionally, "[a] parent's drug use supports a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child." In re E.R.W. , 528 S.W.3d 251, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). The factfinder can give great weight to a parent's drug-related conduct. Id. ; In re K.C. , 219 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). A parent's illegal drug use is a circumstance that can contribute to an unstable lifestyle and is relevant in determining present and future danger to a child's physical and emotional well-being. See In re D.M. , 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) ; see also In re S.N. , 272 S.W.3d at 52. Continued drug use can also demonstrate an inability to provide for a child's emotional and physical needs. See M.R.R. , 2016 WL 192583, at *5. A factfinder may reasonably infer from past conduct that endangers a child's well-being that similar conduct will recur if the child is returned to the parent. Ray v. Burns , 832 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. App.—Waco 1992, no writ) ("Past is often prologue"); see also In re W.S. , No. 10-17-00318-CV, 2018 WL 1528460, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial court could reasonably have concluded that Mother's past drug use and unstable lifestyle would continue in the future.
Applying the applicable Holley factors to the evidence, we conclude that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in J.S.S.'s best interest. Mother's complaint regarding J.S.S.'s best interest does not form an arguable ground to advance on appeal.
E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Some of Mother's complaints could be viewed as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as to either her trial or appellate attorney. An indigent parent in a parental termination case has the right to effective assistance of counsel, and the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) has been adopted as the appropriate standard in termination cases. In re J.O.A. , 283 S.W.3d 336, 341-42 (Tex. 2009) ; In re M.S. , 115 S.W.3d 534, 544–45 (Tex. 2003). To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, an appellant must prove both Strickland prongs, establishing that counsel's performance was deficient and that counsel's errors prejudiced the appellant by depriving her of a fair trial whose result is reliable. In re M.S. , 115 S.W.3d at 545 (citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064 ). Failure to prove either prong of the Strickland test will defeat an ineffective assistance claim. Thompson v. State , 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ; Walker v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs. , 312 S.W.3d 608, 623 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).
Under the well-established Strickland test, proving ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that (1) counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which "requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." In re M.S. , 115 S.W.3d [at 545] ... (quoting Strickland , 466 U.S. [at 687], 104 S.Ct. 2052 ...). In adopting the Strickland test for parental termination cases, we explained that, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the case, we "must primarily focus on whether counsel performed in a reasonably effective manner.... In this process, we must give great deference to counsel's performance, indulging a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, including the possibility that counsel's actions are strategic." Id. (internal quotes omitted). Challenged conduct constitutes ineffective assistance only when it is "so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it." Garcia v. State , 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
In re H.R.M. , 209 S.W.3d 105, 111 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam ). Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make frivolous arguments or undertake unreasonable courses of action. See Ex parte Chandler , 182 S.W.3d 350, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Mother's complaints regarding either trial counsel or appellate counsel do not rise to the level of "outrageous," and they do not form arguable grounds to advance on appeal.
Conclusion
We have reviewed the entire record, including counsel's brief and Mother's pro se response, and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order of termination.
In addition, we remind Mother's appointed appellate counsel that if Mother, after consulting with counsel, desires to file a petition for review, counsel is still under a duty to timely file with the Texas Supreme Court "a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief." In re P.M. , 520 S.W.3d 24, 27-28 (Tex. 2016) ; see in re G.P. , 503 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex. App.—Waco 2016, pet. denied) ; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.016(2).