Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County No. S-1501-AT2464, John L. Fielder, Judge.
David S. Springs, in pro. per., for Petitioner and Appellant.
Marylou A., in pro. per., for Objector and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Hill, J. and Kane, J.
David S. appeals from the denial of his petition (Fam. Code, §§ 7820, 7822, subd. (a)) to terminate the parental rights of Marylou A., his children’s mother. In the trial court, David alleged Marylou left the children in David’s exclusive custody for a period exceeding one year without provision for their support and any communication or contact and did so with the intent to abandon the children.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.
We will refer to these parents by their first names for the sake of convenience. We mean no disrespect to them.
Following a contested trial, the court denied David’s petition by finding there was no clear evidence that Marylou intended to abandon the children. The court also found that Marylou lacked the ability to pay support. Further, the court recited the conflicting evidence presented by David and Marylou regarding the alleged lack of contact and communication. In particular there was conflicting evidence, even from David, regarding the last time Marylou actually visited the children and the frequency with which she contacted the children by telephone. The court repeated, however, it did not find that Marylou intended to abandon her children.
On appeal, David asks us to reverse the trial court’s decision because he alleges there was an error at trial regarding the date of Marylou’s last visit. Even if Marylou’s last visit occurred in December 2005, rather than April 2006, as David claims, he would not be entitled to reversal. To find in David’s favor, the court also had to find that Marylou intended to abandon the children. (§ 7822, subd. (a).) However, as previously mentioned, the court found there was no clear evidence of an intent to abandon on her part.
The court’s finding against an intent to abandon is presumed correct unless David can establish it was error. (Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 718.) On appeal, David does not dispute the court’s finding in this respect. Having failed to establish reversible error, David may, in this court's discretion, be deemed to have abandoned his appeal. (Berger v. Godden (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119.)
Even if David did challenge the court’s finding on the intent to abandon issue, we would not reverse because the court’s decision involved a credibility determination which we may not second guess on appeal. (In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 859-860 [issues of fact and credibility are matters for the trial court alone].)
Under these circumstances, we hereby dismiss this appeal.