Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. OJ05002726
Marchiano, P.J.
The juvenile court found that defendant J.P. received stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496. Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence he possessed or controlled the stolen property, and thus he did not violate section 496. We disagree and affirm.
Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. FACTS
The juvenile court proceedings occurred in Yolo County. This matter was transferred to Alameda County, the county of defendant’s father’s residence, for disposition.
Testimony of the Victim
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on October 11, 2006, Evonne Chaney returned to her West Sacramento home to find that it had been burglarized. The window to her daughter’s bedroom had been completely removed. She noticed that a pair of earrings and other items of jewelry were missing, along with her brother’s car stereo equipment that had been stacked on the floor near the living room couch.
Chaney testified that a neighbor called her and told her that two African-American juveniles had been “hanging out in front of” Chaney’s house when she wasn’t there. From her neighbor’s descriptions of the juveniles, Chaney “knew” they were defendant and his brother, T.H., who were staying nearby. Defendant’s sister was a friend of Chaney’s daughter. Defendant had stayed in Chaney’s home, along with defendant’s mother when she became homeless. Defendant had been in Chaney’s home long enough to “be familiar with” Chaney’s property.
That evening, Chaney went to the home where defendant and T.H. were staying. She “confronted the two [juveniles] as to why they broke into my house; if they had broken into my house.” The juveniles denied breaking into Chaney’s home. Chaney called her neighbor and had her describe the juvenile’s clothing; they were wearing clothes which matched the neighbor’s description. Chaney relayed this information to the juveniles and demanded the return of her property. The juveniles kept denying involvement in the burglary.
The juveniles told Chaney that they knew who had taken the property: “They seemed equally to know who had done it.” The juveniles got into Chaney’s car. Both of them gave her directions. They ended up on a dead-end street in the Broderick area.
Then both juveniles admitted breaking into Chaney’s home. Chaney asked them why they burglarized her home after “all the stuff that I did for you guys,” which included providing them meals and providing defendant showers and a place to stay. The juveniles said “they were sorry that they broke into the house. They didn’t know why they had done it other than to get things so that they could purchase things.” Chaney testified that she believed only one of the juveniles said “they needed money.” She believed it was defendant who made that statement, with T.H. nodding in agreement.
Chaney drove back to her home. Because her neighbor had mentioned seeing the two juveniles handing boxes over her backyard fence, she asked them where the car stereo equipment was. The juveniles “directed” Chaney to a fence “a house over from” Chaney’s. On cross-examination, Chaney admitted she could not remember which juvenile said what when they directed her to the fence.
The equipment was near the fence, apparently concealed by some boarding. The two juveniles “equally seemed to know” the location of the equipment. Chaney testified that the property was left there because “between the two of them, they said they were too heavy to carry, so they had left it behind.”
Chaney parted company with the two juveniles, who told her they might be able to recover more of the stolen property in the morning.
At approximately 8:00 or 9:00 the next morning, October 12, Chaney walked up to a van parked at the Glide Apartments. She knew the two juveniles were sleeping in the van. She woke them up and told them she wanted her property back. The juveniles at first denied knowing where the property was, then walked to one of the apartments in the complex. Neither defendant nor T.H. said that defendant was not involved with the burglary, but was just along to help.
On direct examination, Chaney testified that defendant told a woman or girl who answered the door that he wanted to get some things from the apartment. On cross-examination, Chaney admitted she could not recall “which of the minors said whatever to the occupant of the home.”
Both juveniles entered the apartment and returned with three bracelets that had been taken from Chaney’s house. They reentered the apartment to look for a fourth bracelet that Chaney described as valuable, but returned without finding it. The valuable bracelet was never recovered.
Chaney called the police, who entered the apartment and retrieved two of Chaney’s handbags. Defendant and T.H. were arrested. Days later, T.H. returned a fifth bracelet to Chaney and apologized. T.H. told her that defendant had nothing to do with the burglary, and that T.H. was going to take the blame because of defendant’s prior record.
Testimony of the Investigating Officer
Officer Jaliel Wilson of the West Sacramento Police Department investigated the Chaney burglary. He went to the Glide Apartments at approximately 8:00 a.m. on October 12, 2006, the day after the burglary. Chaney, defendant and T.H. were present. Chaney identified the two juveniles as the burglars. T.H. told Wilson he was one of the juveniles, or “a person” who broke into the house.
Chaney told Wilson that some of her stolen property was in apartment 29. According to Wilson, the two purses and some jewelry were already outside of the apartment. Wilson searched the apartment and did not find any more of Chaney’s property.
Wilson transported the two juveniles to the police department. They made “spontaneous statements saying that they both shouldn’t have been in the house.” Wilson elaborated: “[T]hey were talking, and they were making spontaneous statements back and forth. And one of the statements they said, that they shouldn’t have both been in the house.” On cross-examination, Wilson acknowledged he did not know exactly who said what.
At the police station, Wilson interviewed both juveniles. T.H. told Wilson he broke into Chaney’s house on October 11 and took numerous items. He placed some items that he couldn’t carry outside the house. He took the rest, including some jewelry, to apartment 29 of the Glide Apartments, whose occupants he knew. He then went to his mother’s house on Jefferson Boulevard, where he met up with defendant. The only reason defendant was with him at the Glide Apartments was to help him return property to Chaney. According to T.H., defendant was not involved in the burglary.
Defendant told Wilson he was at the Jefferson Boulevard address on the night of October 11 when T.H. arrived. Later that night, Chaney arrived and confronted T.H. about the burglary. T.H. admitted it. The three got into Chaney’s vehicle and “recovered some of the items,” presumably the car stereo equipment. T.H. told Chaney the other stolen items would be recovered in the morning, from apartment 29. Defendant got into Chaney’s car to “help [T.H.] so he wouldn’t get into trouble.” Defendant told Wilson that the only property “we could find” in apartment 29 were the two purses. Defendant did not explain how he knew what to look for in apartment 29 if he was not involved in the burglary.
On cross-examination, Officer Wilson acknowledged that his initial burglary report indicated that Chaney told him her neighbor reported that she saw only one African-American male leaving Chaney’s home, and that the neighbor’s description matched T.H.
Testimony of Defendant
Defendant testified that he was at his mother’s house on Jefferson Boulevard on October 11. T.H. arrived and told defendant he had burglarized Chaney’s home. He also told defendant the location of the stolen property. T.H. told defendant some of the property was at apartment 29, and the car stereo equipment was near an abandoned house next to Chaney’s house. Defendant didn’t tell anyone about what T.H. had told him, because “I’m not going to snitch on my little brother.” He also did not tell T.H. to return the property, and made no effort himself at that time to return it to Chaney or to contact her.
It is unclear whether T.H. came home at noon or sometime in the evening.
Just about dark on October 11, Chaney arrived with her brother and her 16-year-old daughter. Defendant and T.H. stepped outside to talk to Chaney. At that point, Chaney’s brother threatened the two juveniles with bodily harm if they didn’t give Chaney back her property: he “actually threatened to shoot us in our heads.” Defendant took the threat seriously.
On cross-examination, Chaney testified it was “possible” that her brother was with her when she confronted defendant and T.H. She also testified she could not recall who was in the car when she drove around the night of the burglary, but it was “possible” her brother was in the back seat with the two juveniles. She had “no knowledge” of any threat by her brother to shoot the juveniles.
T.H. “was sticking with his story that he didn’t do it” because he was frightened by Chaney’s brother’s threat. Defendant was “scared for me and my brother’s life,” and when he realized T.H. was not going to admit the burglary “I put me in it and said we both had did it.” Because of the threat, defendant decided it would be best to return Chaney’s property. He believed they would avoid being hurt by Chaney’s brother “by confessing that we had both [done] the crime and [by] getting their stuff back.”
The two juveniles got into Chaney’s car along with Chaney, her brother, and her daughter. Chaney’s brother sat in the backseat with the two juveniles. The group drove around for 30 to 45 minutes. Although defendant’s testimony is less than clear, apparently defendant told Chaney where the car stereo equipment was, because T.H. had previously told him. The two juveniles took Chaney to where the car stereo equipment had been hidden by the fence near her house.
Defendant also directed Chaney to apartment 29 the next morning, October 12, because T.H. had told him that’s where he took the other stolen property. Apartment 29 was the home of defendant’s ex-girlfriend. Defendant believed T.H. took the items to apartment 29 because it was “the closest spot he could.” Defendant was “friends with [his ex-girlfriend’s] older brother, and she was my girlfriend, and [T.H.] was always over there with me, so we both know them.”
Defendant testified that while he and T.H. were in the backseat of Wilson’s patrol car, he told T.H. “you shouldn’t have [gone] into the house in the first place.”
Defendant denied he was involved in the burglary. He testified he tried to help T.H. return the items so he wouldn’t suffer the consequences of his actions—Chaney had told them she would not call the police if her property was returned.
The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
Defendant was charged with first degree residential burglary (§ 459, count 1), and receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), both on the day of the burglary, October 11 (count 2), and the following day, October 12 (count 3). The juvenile court ruled as follows:
“[H]ere’s what I see: Count One, burglary in the first degree, we have clear evidence that the property was taken by [T.H.], but [T.H.] is not the person who is the matter of this hearing. We have conflicting evidence about whether or not this minor, [J.P.], was actually in the house.
“I feel very strongly that Ms. Chaney was not only burglarized, she was doubly-victimized by having people whom she knew and had embraced into her home take things that she worked very hard for and she obviously valued, and that must be a very bitter pill for her. Perhaps that affected some of her view of the following events.
“Since the testimony is conflicting as to who was in the house, I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that Count One is true.
“However, Count Two is receiving stolen property, [section] 496(a) as a felony, on October 11, 2006. It’s very clear that you put your brother’s interest above the victim’s and, sadly, above your own.
“And I know it’s a tough thing at your age. It’s very hard for a kid your age to snitch, as you say, on your brother.
“You weren’t going to snitch on your brother, while snitching is the best thing you can do for you and for your brother and everyone else involved, and that’s a very hard lesson to learn.
“I do find that the allegations of Count Two for receiving stolen property are true beyond a reasonable doubt, because you didn’t call the cops. You tried to fix it yourself. That might have been noble, but it was stupid. And as a result, you end up admitting [sic: committing] the allegations charged in Count Two.
“Count Three, the same offence [sic ] for the following day, for October 12th, there’s no evidence in the record that the minor was anything but cooperative on that second day, making sure that he made every effort to get the items back.
“And so I find that there is not sufficient evidence to find Count Three beyond a reasonable doubt. So Count Two, receiving stolen property, is a felony. Other two counts are not found true.”
After the dispositional hearing, the Alameda County juvenile court declared defendant a ward of the court and placed him on probation.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the jurisdictional and dispositional orders should be reversed because there was insufficient evidence he possessed or controlled the stolen property, and thus he did not violate section 496. We disagree for the following reasons.
Section 496, subdivision (a) provides: “Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year. . . .”
“A conviction for receiving stolen property cannot withstand appellate scrutiny unless substantial evidence was presented to the trier of fact” to establish the three elements of the offense. (People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 249.) To sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, “the prosecution must prove (1) the property was stolen; (2) the defendant knew the property was stolen; and, (3) the defendant had possession of the stolen property. [Citations.]” (People v. Land (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 223 (Land).)
Possession need not be exclusive, and is either actual or constructive. (Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.) Constructive possession does not require direct physical control over the stolen property, but does require that the defendant have dominion and control over the property. (People v. Howard (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1419; Land, supra, at p. 224.)
“[M]ere presence near the stolen property, or access to the location where the stolen property is found is not sufficient evidence of possession, standing alone, to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property. [Citations.]” (Land, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 224.)
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s adjudication in this case, we follow accepted standards of judicial review. Our task “is to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The federal standard of review is to the same effect: Under principles of federal due process, review for sufficiency of evidence entails not the determination whether the reviewing court itself believes the evidence at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but, instead, whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, italics added.)
At first blush it might appear that defendant in this case was found not to have received stolen property, but to have concealed it from the rightful owner by failing to report the location of the property to the police on October 11. Indeed, the juvenile court admonished defendant that he should have called the police—i.e., “snitched” on his brother—and the court seemed to base its finding of guilt on that omission.
But as noted above, we are bound to look at the entire record when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, and to view that evidence in the light most favorable to the People. Chaney, the burglary victim, testified that both defendant and T.H.—i.e., “they”—admitted breaking into her house because “they” needed money to buy things. “They” also told Chaney “they” left the car stereo equipment behind because it was too heavy to carry. While the juvenile court declined to find defendant guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt, Chaney’s testimony, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, supports the conclusion that defendant had actual or constructive possession of the stolen property—especially the car stereo equipment. It is reasonable to assume he knew the location of the equipment because he and T.H.—the components of “they”—had left it behind because it was too heavy to carry.
We are aware that Chaney’s testimony differs from aspects of the report she gave to police. But we must review the entire record, including her sworn testimony under oath, and determine whether the evidence is sufficient. And while the juvenile court stated that Chaney’s “view of the . . . events” may have been “affected” by her having been “doubly-victimized by having people whom she knew and had embraced into her home take things that she worked very hard for and she obviously valued,” the court did not find her testimony to be not credible. The court simply declined to find defendant guilty of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the conflicting evidence.
We conclude that Chaney’s testimony is “reasonable, credible, and of solid value,” and provides sufficient evidence that defendant had the requisite possession of the stolen property.
In the original round of briefing, the parties did not focus on the impact of Chaney’s testimony on the substantial evidence determination. At our request, the parties filed supplemental briefs on that issue.
III. DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed.
We concur: Swager, J., Margulies, J.