Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. FJ40227, Charles Q. Clay, Judge.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WILLHITE, J.
INTRODUCTION
Jonathan H., a minor, appeals from the judgment of the juvenile court declaring him a ward of the court (§ 602) based on the finding that he had committed a robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). The trial court ordered appellant to Community Placement Camp. This appeal contends that there is insufficient evidence that appellant participated in the robbery and that the trial court’s order placing him in camp was an abuse of discretion. We disagree with both contentions and therefore affirm the judgment.
All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF THE ROBBERY
Ramiro Valdivia was robbed on December 20, 2006. He testified that five men approached him and demanded money. As Valdivia started to take his wallet out of his right pants pocket, the men punched him in the face, kicked him in the stomach, groin and knee, and tore off a portion of his pants. During the “middle of the struggle,” Valdivia’s eyeglasses fell off. Without his glasses, Valdivia’s vision is “foggy” or “cloudy.” Valdivia’s face was covered with blood. The men fled with Valdivia’s wallet containing $900. The dispositive issue, both below and on appeal, is whether Valdivia sufficiently identified appellant as one of his attackers.
Valdivia could not identify who tore his pants off. He explained: “I couldn’t tell because I was full of blood here and my glasses and everything.” In addition, when asked: “[W]ere you able to see a general description of the people or person that hit you and took your wallet and your pants?”, he replied: “To tell you the truth, no, because I – right away, I was in bad shape.”
Two weeks after the attack, Detective Danetta Menifee showed Valdivia a six-person photo show-up. She admonished him that the individuals in the photos might or might not be those who had attacked him. Valdivia identified appellant by circling his photo. Valdivia signed and dated the photo show-up. In addition, Valdivia wrote on the photo show-up: “The [person] I recognize was the one that grabbed me by the neck.” Valdivia also identified another individual, Deandre W. who, five months prior to appellant’s section 602 hearing, had admitted in juvenile court the allegation that he had participated in the robbery of Valdivia.
On cross-examination at the section 602 hearing, Valdivia testified that when he made the photo identification of appellant, he “was dizzy” because of his diabetic condition. All of the photos were dark and he was not able to discern one person from another. When defense counsel asked: “And why did you circle that picture [of appellant]?”, Valdivia replied: “Like I just explained to you, my head was feeling real bad.” Defense counsel next asked whether Valdivia had felt that he had to circle one of the photos, Valdivia replied: “Almost I did feel like I had to, yes.” He explained that he had been “yelled at real strong” by the officer who had telephoned and directed him to go to the police station to review the photographs. Valdivia testified that when shown the photographic display: “I didn’t recognize it. I said it was maybe like this style (indicating).” Valdivia did concede that at the station, the police told him “that it was possible it [the photo show-up] wasn’t them [his assailants].”
In the trial court, Valdivia did not identify appellant. The prosecutor asked Valdivia: “Do you see anybody that is in court today that you recognize from [December 20]?” Valdivia replied: “No, nobody.”
After the prosecution completed its case, the defense moved, pursuant to section 701.1, to dismiss. In opposition, the prosecutor argued, among other things, that Valdivia had come “in court reluctantly.” He asked the trial court to take notice of Valdivia’s “fearful” demeanor. In denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court stated that it was “particularly struck” by the fact that when the prosecutor asked Valdivia whether he saw any of his assailants in court, Valdivia did not even look around the courtroom. The court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that when Valdivia made the out-of-court identification, he “believed [appellant] to be . . . one of the persons involved . . . and for whatever reason did not wish to – didn’t make an identification here in court one way or another. [Valdivia never] said that the person wasn’t here.”
The statute provides, in relevant part: “At the hearing, the court, on the motion of the minor . . ., shall order that the petition be dismissed and that the minor be discharged . . . after the presentation of evidence on behalf of the [People] has been closed, if the court, upon weighing the evidence then before it, finds that the minor is not a person described by Section 601 or 602.”
The defense elected to present no evidence and the matter proceeded to adjudication. The trial court sustained the petition, finding that “there is substantive indication by Mr. Valdivia at the time that he identified [appellant] to [the police] as . . . having actively participated, having actually placed his hands on Mr. Valdivia and participated in that robbery.”
The petition had also alleged that appellant had robbed and assaulted Maria Rodriguez on January 3, 2007. Four days after that attack, Rodriguez, while in the hospital recovering from injuries inflicted during the assault, identified appellant in a photo show-up as having been involved in the crimes. At the adjudication hearing, Rodriguez was afraid to look around the courtroom to identify any of her attackers. The trial court found the lack of evidence about any specific action(s) appellant took in regard to Rodriguez to be fatal. It therefore did not sustain the allegations based upon the crimes committed upon her.
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant’s first contention is that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the finding that he participated in the robbery of Valdivia. We disagree.
It is well-established that an out-of-court identification is sufficient to sustain a finding that an individual committed a crime. No corroborating evidence is required. (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, overruling People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621.) The sufficiency of an out-of-court identification is determined under the substantial evidence test used to determine the sufficiency of other forms of evidence. In that regard, we “view the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—to support the [trier of fact’s] finding” (People v. Beeson (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1398), bearing in mind that it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact (here, the juvenile court) to determine a witness’s credibility. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) In particular, “[p]urported weaknesses in identification testimony of a single eyewitness are to be evaluated by the [trier of fact].” (People v. Elwood (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1365, 1372.) “‘[I]t is not essential that a witness be free from doubt as to [the perpetrator’s] identity.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Prado (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 669, 674.)
Here, Valdivia was robbed on December 20, 2006. On January 4, 2007, Detective Menifee showed him a photographic display. She admonished Valdivia that the individuals who had attacked him might or might not be in the photos. Valdivia unequivocally identified appellant as one of his assailants and wrote on the display that he recognized appellant as the individual who had grabbed him by the neck. The accuracy of this identification, made so shortly after the events, is corroborated by the fact that Valdivia also correctly identified Deandre W. as one of his assailants, an individual whose participation in the robbery was conclusively established when he admitted the allegations of a section 602 petition filed against him. Taken together, this constitutes substantial evidence of identification from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had robbed Valdivia.
That Valdivia did not identify appellant in court does not compel a contrary conclusion. In argument, the prosecutor characterized Valdivia as a reluctant and fearful witness. The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe Valdivia’s demeanor, implicitly credited that characterization when it found that Valdivia had not even looked around the court when requested to do so. In addition, the trial court considered the fact that Valdivia’s glasses were knocked off in the middle of the struggle, Valdivia’s inability to give a detailed description of his assailants and Valdivia’s testimony about how he felt during the photo identification and, nonetheless, credited Valdivia’s out-of-court identification of appellant and found it to be a sufficient basis upon which to sustain the petition. “‘To entitle a reviewing court to set aside [the trier of fact’s finding] the evidence of identity must be so weak as to constitute practically no evidence at all.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Prado, supra, 130 Cal.App.3d at p. 674.) This is not such a case.
B. The Trial Court’s Dispositional Order
1. Factual Background
Prior to the dispositional hearing, the probation department prepared a report. In relevant part, the report noted an apparent “lack of parental control and supervision” of appellant by his mother who has seven other children. Nonetheless, the report recommended home probation for “no less than one year.”
At the hearing, the prosecutor argued against the probation department’s recommendation. He noted that two other youths (in addition to Deandre W.) had recently admitted in a judicial proceeding their culpability for the robbery. From that fact, the prosecutor argued: “[Appellant] was with at least three other individuals that swarmed and assaulted Mr. Valdivia so they can take his property. We believe that type of conduct not only that they took property from the individuals but that he [appellant] used extreme violence and force on that individual. [¶] Clearly this crime of violence is clearly one that home on probation would not be a suitable means to rehabilitate the minor to separate him from . . . the life of crime that he chose to engage with, with at least three other individuals and also to rehabilitate him at this age. He’s 15 years old, not particularly young, not particularly old, but in our juvenile system, he’s right in the age in which [he] can basically stop or continue on in his criminal career, and we believe a camp community placement is what is necessary to show [appellant] that his conduct . . . on December 20th, is not appropriate[.] [¶] . . . [A] midterm camp would sufficiently rehabilitate or assist in rehabilitating [appellant.]” (Italics added.)
Defense counsel argued for home probation, noting that this was the first petition that had been sustained against appellant. He concluded: “I believe this is not the type of minor that does not deserve a first time home on probation. . . . I don’t think at this time that camp is in order for him.”
The trial court ruled:
“[Mr. Valdivia] appeared to the court to be in excess of 55 years of age. I can’t be sure how old precisely he was, but in looking at the selection of that particular victim, a lone older man who was preyed upon by, it appears, at least three or four or perhaps even more young men, and the level of violence that was inflicted upon him, his testimony was such that he, in the course of the attack, wasn’t even able to respond to the requests or demands for his property because of the way that – and the fierceness of the attack itself.
“He couldn’t get the money out of his pocket. He couldn’t get the wallet out, and there’s something above and beyond a simple taking of property that’s at play here. Fear alone would probably have established or resulted in Mr. Valdivia parting with his property, and any force doesn’t appear to have been necessary let alone the level of force that was used here, and the court is very troubled by that. . . .
“. . . [T]his attack on Mr. Valdivia is certainly one that concerns the court for the safety of the community, and I don’t believe that home on probation is appropriate for the minor under those circumstances.
“I think in terms of protecting the community that [appellant] certainly needs to be committed to the camp program, and that’s what I intend to do. [¶] . . . . [C]ontinuance in the home of the parent or guardian is contrary to minor’s welfare.” (Italics added.)
As for the term of commitment, the court imposed a six-month period.
2. Discussion
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering appellant to camp instead of home probation because the court’s findings did not satisfy the requirements of section 726. We disagree.
Subdivision (a)(3) of section 726 provides that a court can remove a juvenile from his parent’s custody if “the welfare of the minor requires that custody be taken from the minor’s parent.” The trial court made that finding twice in its comments which we have set forth above. That finding is sufficient to sustain its order placing appellant in camp. (In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616, 620-621 [trial court not required to make findings beyond those set forth in section 726].) Appellant’s claim that the trial court “act[ed] more out of a desire to punish [him] than out of a concern for [his] rehabilitation” is not supported by the record.
DISPOSITION
The order of wardship (§ 602) and dispositional order (§ 726) are affirmed.
We concur: EPSTEIN, P. J., MANELLA, J.