Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK74080, Stephen Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee.
Michael A. Salazar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel and Byron G. Shibata, Associate County Counsel.
No appearance for Minor.
DOI TODD, J.
Appellant B.P. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition order pertaining to his six-year-old daughter J.M. B.P. contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional findings that J.M. was at substantial risk of harm as a result of his sexual abuse of J.M.’s half sister. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
J.M. first came to the attention of respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the department) on August 18, 2008, after her 12-year-old half sister, E.A., was raped by their mother’s boyfriend in the same room where the mother was sleeping. The mother blamed E.A. for the incident and hit her with a broom. The boyfriend was arrested and the minors were removed from their mother and placed in foster care. During E.A.’s medical examination and in her interview with the department’s social worker, E.A. reported that she had also been sexually abused by B.P. from the age of nine to 11, while he resided in the same home. She reported that at first B.P. fondled her and then had full intercourse with her on almost a daily basis while her mother was at work. E.A. did not tell her mother because she did not want to be blamed and did not want J.M. to suffer the same abuse.
The department filed a petition on behalf of both minors pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. As to B.P., the petition alleged that his sexual abuse of E.A. for two years, including fondling and forcible rape, placed E.A. and J.M. at substantial risk of harm. (§ 300, subds. (b), (d) & (j).) At the detention hearing, the court found B.P. to be the presumed father of J.M., returned the minors to their mother over the department’s objection and ordered that B.P.’s visits with J.M. be monitored at the department’s office. Neither B.P. nor the boyfriend were to have any contact with E.A.
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references shall be to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
In its jurisdiction/disposition report, the department reported that E.A. stated that B.P. had sexually abused her five or six times while her mother was working at night and that she had not reported the abuse to anyone. B.P. denied sexually abusing E.A. He stated: “‘When [E.A.] came to the U.S. she was small like my daughter. I loved her like my own daughter.’” B.P. did not see E.A. after he and the minor’s mother stopped dating around June 2007, except when he came to the house to pick up J.M. for the weekends. J.M. denied any sexual abuse by anyone.
At the combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on September 8, 2008, E.A. testified that she came to the United States from El Salvador when she was nine years old to live with her mother, B.P. and J.M., who was almost two years old. E.A. did not tell her mother that B.P. was touching her sexually. When she was ten years old, E.A. began two years of medical treatment for an infection in her vaginal area that eventually required surgery. She did not tell any of the medical providers that she had been sexually abused. B.P. and her mother had stopped dating about a year and a half earlier. B.P. testified that he and E.A. had a good relationship until her mother’s sister came to live with them and told E.A. not to obey him because he was not her real father. He denied sexually abusing E.A.
The court found E.A.’s testimony credible and sustained the petition as to B.P. The court ordered reunification services for B.P. to include participation in a perpetrator’s sexual abuse program and individual counseling, monitored visits with J.M. and no contact with E.A.
DISCUSSION
B.P. does not contest the juvenile court’s finding that he sexually abused E.A. Rather, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the findings that such abuse placed J.M. at a substantial risk of sexual abuse.
I. Standard of Review.
Challenges to a juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1649; In re Clara B. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 988, 1000.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is “‘reasonable, credible and of solid value’” such that a reasonable trier of fact could make such findings. (In re Christina A. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1073, 1080.) “We review the record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or not, which supports the court’s conclusions.” (In re Kristin H., supra, at p. 1649.) “‘All conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict, if possible.’” (Ibid.) Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court and it is not our function to redetermine them. (In re Rubisela E. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 177, 195.)
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Findings Under Section 300, Subdivisions (b), (d) and (j).
Section 300, subdivision (b) provides that a child comes within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child....” Section 300, subdivision (d) permits dependency jurisdiction over a child who “has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused,... by his or her parent....” And finally section 300, subdivision (j) permits dependency jurisdiction over a child whose “sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions. The court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child.”
We find there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings that J.M. was at substantial risk of being sexually abused by B.P. J.M., who is six years old, is approaching the age at which B.P. began sexually abusing E.A. when she was nine years old. In In re P.A. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1339, the appellate court was convinced that “where, as here, a child has been sexually abused, any younger sibling who is approaching the age at which the child was abused, may be found to be at risk of sexual abuse.” (Id. at p. 1347.) Similarly, in In re Rubisela E., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 177, the court found that a nine-year-old female sibling would be at risk after her thirteen-year-old sister was removed from the home. (Id. at p. 197.) Likewise, here, B.P. no longer had access to E.A. and it was reasonable to assume that he would start focusing his abuse on J.M.
B.P. points out that for the past year or so that he was having weekend visits with J.M. there were no incidents of abuse and that J.M. denied any sexual abuse by B.P. But past abuse of a child is not necessary for a finding that the child is at substantial risk of future harm. If this were a requirement for dependency jurisdiction, the Legislature would not have included the disjunctive language of “or there is a substantial risk” in section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the nature of the sexual abuse cannot be ignored. B.P.’s abuse of E.A. was not limited to inappropriate touching, but included repeated acts of forcible rape of a young child he thought of as his daughter. The court in In re Karen R. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 84, 90–91 concluded that “a father who has committed two incidents of forcible incestuous rape of his minor daughter reasonably can be said to be so sexually aberrant that both male and female siblings of the victim are at substantial risk of sexual abuse within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (d), if left in the home.” The same can be said here.
III. Dispositional Order.
B.P. argues that in the event we reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order, the dispositional order is rendered moot. Because we are not reversing the jurisdictional order and B.P. has not provided us with any other basis for reversing the dispositional order, that order is affirmed as well.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition order is affirmed.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.