Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK61779. Joan Carney, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Mother E.S.
Ernesto Paz Rey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Father M.J.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WOODS, J.
Parents E.S. (“Mother”) and M.J. (“Father”) appeal the order terminating their parental rights to their daughter J.J. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Specifically, Mother argues that the court erred in terminating her parental rights in light of her “bond” with her daughter. Father, the non-offending parent, argues that the court erred in terminating his parental rights because: (1) no substantial evidence support the court’s finding at the disposition or at any other point in the proceeding that he was an “unfit” parent or that it would be detrimental to place the child with him; and (2) he was not provided with reasonable reunification services. The parents’ claims lack merit. As set forth below, Mother failed to carry her burden to establish beneficial parental relationship exception to the termination of her parental rights and the court had sufficient evidence to support its order terminating parental rights. Concerning Father’s claims with respect to parental fitness we conclude that he forfeited any challenge to the court’s finding of detriment at the dispositional stage and that sufficient evidence supported the court’s findings of unfitness/detriment during the proceedings. We further conclude the court did not err in finding the services provided to Father by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) were adequate in view of the circumstances of the case. We, therefore, affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Detention
J.J., born in April 2005, is the daughter of E.S. and M.J. The baby was born with a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine. Mother also tested positive for amphetamines on the day she delivered the baby but claimed that she had taken cold medicine before going into labor. While Mother initially denied any illicit drug use, she later admitted using illegal drugs, including methamphetamine. Mother agreed to a Voluntary Reunification Plan (VRP) which included a drug abuse program, and the baby was placed in foster care. Mother stated that Father was incarcerated and she had no idea when he would be released. Mother told the social worker that Father had a substance abuse problem.
E.S. and M.J. have never been married.
During the VRP, Mother enrolled in a drug treatment program, but failed to complete it. She enrolled in another program in the summer of 2005, but was discharged because of poor attendance and lack of participation. She also failed to complete required drug testing during this time. Father was released from prison and was on probation; he told the social worker that he had served time for dealing drugs. Both Father and Mother were given referrals for drug treatment programs. In October 2005, Mother admitted recently abusing drugs. The social worker reported that both parents had unresolved drug abuse problems and recommended that they enroll in in-patient drug abuse treatment programs.
In mid-December 2005 the DCFS filed a dependency petition under section 300 alleging that J.J. was a child described under subdivision (b) based on the allegations that she was born testing positive for drugs and that Mother was a current drug abuser which placed the child at risk of harm. The original petition did not contain any allegations against Father. Both parents appeared at the detention hearing. Father asked that the child be released to him. The court did not grant the request but did find M.J. to be the presumed father. The court found a prima facie case for detaining the child. The court granted the parents monitored visits and gave the DCFS discretion to release the child to Father and ordered the DCFS to provide family reunification services.
The jurisdiction and disposition report indicated that Father had a criminal history of arrests and misdemeanor and felony convictions dating back to the 1980s for use, possession, and sale of controlled substances, theft, forgery and carrying a concealed weapon. The report further stated that Father “was provided with referrals for substance abuse counseling and parenting classes and encouraged to participate in the [VFP] services” but that he had “failed to comply with recommended services and his current whereabouts is unknown.” The report also revealed that Mother stated that Father “has a drug problem” and that once when he was drunk he hit her in the face with a closed fist. According to the report, Mother entered an in-patient drug treatment program in January 2006.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in late January 2006, the court dismissed a first amended petition which included allegations that Father was a “current” drug abuser and had numerous criminal convictions. The court found that Father had not been properly served with the petition and that evidence presented in the DCFS’ report did not show a prima facie case to support a jurisdictional finding under section 300 based on a claim that Father was a “current” drug abuser. The court thought the language of the allegation against the father had to be “reworded” and recommended that the DCFS file it under section 342. Father was not at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing but was represented by appointed counsel.
The court stated: “You can file it as a 342. You can redo the language indicating what is the true situation regarding [the] allegation. . . . [¶] You want to add something involving B4 in domestic issues? He hit her once. She hasn’t seen him since. You can decide whether or not you want to do that. I don’t know, but I am dismissing the first amended. It’s not -- I’m just rejecting it. Refile it as a 342 and fix the language.” The DCFS never filed a section 342 petition to add allegations against Father.
Thereafter the court sustained the section 300, subdivision (b) allegations in the original petition concerning the exposure of the child to drugs and Mother’s drug abuse and that custody of the child would be placed with the DCFS. The court further found as follows: “There’s a substantial risk of harm for the child to remain in the home for the following reasons: Mother is unable to properly care and supervise the child based on her substance abuse issues. Father is not participating, and placement is vested with the Department. Reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal.” The mother was ordered to participate in a drug program including drug testing, parenting, and individual counseling, and the father was ordered “based on his history” to be in a drug program that includes testing. The court also ordered visitation for both parents.
Reunification
The report for the six-month status hearing indicated that by April 2006 Mother had been discharged from her in-patient treatment program because she tested positive for drugs and had failed to follow program rules. In May 2006, Mother enrolled in another program. While Mother was in the first program she had unmonitored visits with the child for two hours three times a week, but from May through July 2006 her visits had been restricted to one-hour monitored visits. During the visits Mother acted positively and appropriately with the child; Mother played with, fed and dressed the toddler.
During the first six-months of reunification Father completed a three-month drug treatment program, which included a course in parenting and counseling. He had 20 negative drug tests and one positive test and had spent two months in a sober living facility, where he attended AA and NA. He also had weekly monitored visits with his daughter during which he played with and interacted appropriately with his daughter. The DCFS recommended the court terminate Mother’s parental rights and give Father six more months of services. It was further recommended that Father be allowed to have unmonitored visits with the child and that once Father obtained suitable housing and childcare that the child be placed with him. Father indicated an interest in applying for Section 8 housing in Pico Rivera, and thus in May 2006 the social worker wrote a letter to the City of Pico Rivera in support of his application.
At the late July 2006 six-month review hearing the court found that Father was in compliance with the case plan and that Mother was only in partial compliance. The court granted six more months of services and granted Father unmonitored visits and if those proved successful the Father would receive unmonitored overnight visits.
During the fall of 2006 Mother and Father continued to have positive visits with the toddler. The Mother was still working through her treatment program and was having difficulty finding employment. Father informed the social worker that he had been denied Section 8 housing because he did not reside in Pico Rivera. He was not able to maintain housing on his own and was living in his sister’s house which at the time was being remodeled. He agreed that because of the house’s condition it would not be safe for the toddler to live with him there. The social worker also reported that the paternal aunt—Father’s sister did not want any involvement with the DCFS. Father had four hour unmonitored visits with the child on Sundays, which went well; his visits were increased to nine hours. Father had enrolled in random drug testing at Pacific Toxicology but had failed to test in July, August and October and had a missing test for September.
In December 2006 Father continued to live with his sister and had found steady, full time employment. He indicated that he was working overtime and was saving money to obtain housing. The social worker indicated that it was difficult for Father to schedule visits because of Father’s work schedule.
During this period the foster mother reported that J.J. began to cry at night and have nightmares.
In January 2007 Mother was discharged from her treatment program for testing positive for methamphetamines. Mother moved in with her adult daughter and began looking for an outpatient drug program. Mother continued her monitored one-hour weekly visits with the child. The visits continued to go well. The child responded positively to Mother laughing, playing and babbling with her.
At the 12-month hearing in late January 2007, the court found that both parents were in compliance, but that continued jurisdiction was necessary and that returning the child to her parents continued to pose a risk of detriment for the child. The court ordered six more months of services, including monitored visits for the Mother and unmonitored visits for Father.
In December 2006 and early January 2007 the DCFS offered to initiate overnight visits for Father with J.J. But Father stated that he was not ready or prepared for overnight visits because he had no place for the child to sleep at his sister’s house. The DCFS informed Father that once he had located a permanent home, the DCFS would assist him with preservation services including a deposit and first month’s rent.
In January 2007, after an eight hour unmonitored Sunday visit Father returned the toddler in urine soaked clothes to the foster mother. It appeared that only one of the five diapers that he had been given was used during the visit. The social worker discussed the matter with Father, but he did not respond. In March 2007, an interim report indicated that Father stated that because he worked seven days a week he could no longer visit. He also said he wanted to move away from Lynwood to a better area and he had been looking for an apartment but had not found one because they were too expensive.
At a progress hearing in mid-March 2007, Father’s counsel indicated that he was drug testing in connection with his probation program and the court ordered the DCFS to verify Father’s drug testing through the probation department. According to the social worker, numerous calls to Father’s probation officer were not returned.
During the spring of 2007 J.J. was doing well in her foster care; she was bonded to her foster mother and her needs were being met. Father did not visit J.J. during this period; and he had lost contact with the DCFS. Mother continued to visit appropriately with the child and the court ordered twice weekly visits. It was also reported that Mother had a number of “no shows” for random drug testing and that Mother was abusing alcohol.
In May 2007, the DCFS located a prospective adoptive parent for J.J. with an approved home study and in July J.J. was placed in the adoptive home. J.J. did well in the prospective adoptive home and became attached to the adoptive parent who met all of the child’s needs.
Mother’s visits were increased to three times a week, but out of 23 scheduled visits Mother missed ten. Mother stated that she missed the visits because she was working on getting her relief benefits, or searching for work, completing work study hours or because of illness. Nonetheless when she visited the child she played with her, showed affection, changed her diaper, and ensured that she ate the snacks she had brought. During some of the visits J.J. was resistant to Mother and at the beginning of other visits J.J. would not want Mother to touch her and the child stayed close to the social worker. As the visits progressed the child warmed up to the Mother and was able to interact more freely.
Mother began individual and group counseling in the summer of 2007 and participated in drug testing, but did not work. Other than one visit with the child in mid-March 2007, Father lost contact with the child and the DCFS and he did not provide proof of drug testing.
In July 2007, Mother filed a section 388 petition requesting that J.J. be placed in the home of the maternal aunt where Mother was residing. The DCFS reported that the maternal aunt, who had previously served as the monitor, had continued to allow Mother to drink alcohol while in the home.
On August 14, 2007, the court conducted the 18-month status review hearing and a hearing on the section 388 petition. The court denied the petition and found that continued jurisdiction was necessary and that return of the child created a risk of detriment. The court further found that the DCFS had complied with the case plan and provided reasonable services to both parents; the court noted that both parents had received more than 12 months of services and were not in compliance with the case plan. The court terminated reunification services for both parents and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. Mother, who was present at the hearing, was advised of her rights to seek review of the order by way of writ petition. Father did not attend the hearing though he was represented by counsel. There is no evidence Father was advised of his rights to seek appellate review. In addition, the record does not show that he was provided written notice of those rights.
Mother filed a petition for a writ challenging the order denying the section 388 petition. In December 2007, this court denied the petition. (Case No. B201628.)
Permanency Planning and Section 366.26 Hearing
Mother filed a second section 388 petition in December 2007 asking that the child be placed in the home of the maternal aunt. The court set the matter for a hearing in February 2008.
The social worker reported that J.J. was doing well in her prospective adoptive home and had developed a positive and warm relationship with the prospective adoptive parent who was meeting the child’s needs.
By December 2007 Mother had been discharged from her drug counseling program because she had exceeded the amount of time for the program; she had received nine months of treatment, but had failed to complete the program. It was also reported that she had a positive test for methamphetamines in September 2007. During the fall of 2007, the DCFS reduced Mother’s visits from three to two times a week because Mother had failed to attend some of the visits and had failed to call to cancel or reschedule them. Sometimes Mother arrived late, left early and brought other relatives. Mother continued to visit the child, and while the visits went well, the prospective adoptive mother reported that after J.J. returned from the visits she acted out aggressively, had nightmares and clung to the adoptive mother afterwards. On occasion Mother brought food for the child, other times the child ate food prepared by the adoptive mother. During some visits J.J. did not eat her lunch at all, which caused her to have behavioral problems later in the afternoon when she returned to her daycare. J.J. often appeared shy at the beginning of the visits and had to be prompted to approach Mother. On occasion she had difficulty saying good-bye at the end of the visits while other times she waved and gave Mother a kiss.
In December 2007 Father contacted the DCFS to request a visit. He stated that he loved his daughter and said that the reason he had stopped visiting was because the DCFS did not want to return J.J. He complained that even though he had followed all of the court’s orders, his daughter still had not been returned. He informed the DCFS that he had maintained a sober life and had completed probation. He also indicated that he lived with his girlfriend and her parents and he now wanted custody of J.J. Father was allowed to visit on Christmas Eve. Thereafter Father had an additional visit with J.J. in late January 2008.
On February 20, 2008, the court conducted the hearing on Mother’s section 388 petition and held the section 366.26 proceeding. The court denied the section 388 petition concluding that Mother had failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances.
As for the section 366.26 hearing, the court admitted the February 11, 2008, DCFS report which described the parents’ contacts and visits and case plan status in the fall of 2007. The social worker also testified that Mother’s attendance at visits with J.J. was good, and the visits were interactive and adequate. During the visits they played, watched videos and Mother fed and changed the child’s diaper. The social worker testified that J.J. was not emotional at the end of visits, but was sad when the Mother missed visits. According to the social worker, the prospective adoptive mother held, kissed, and played with the child and met all of her needs.
The social worker stated during the last year, Father visited J.J. only five times. Mother’s counsel made an offer of proof that the maternal aunt would testify she monitored Mother’s visits for a month, and Mother was J.J.’s sole caretaker, as she would change J.J.’s diapers, play with J.J., and interact with J.J. Further, the maternal aunt would say J.J. called Mother, “mommy,” and J.J. seemed bonded to mother.
Counsel for J.J. and the DCFS recommended the court terminate parental rights. The court agreed, finding that parental relationship exception to termination did not apply to either parent because Father had not sufficiently visited or maintained contact with the child in the preceding year and Mother had not demonstrated a sufficient parental bond with the child.
Both parents appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mother maintains the court erred in terminating her parental rights because sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination. Father argues that the court erred in terminating his parental rights because: (1) no substantial evidence supported the court’s finding at the disposition or at any other point in the proceeding that he was an “unfit” parent or that it would be detrimental to place the child with him; and (2) he was not provided with reasonable reunification services. We address these contentions in turn.
I. Application of the beneficial parental relationship exception to Mother.
At the section 366.26 hearing the court must select and implement a permanent plan for the dependent child. The court has a number of alternatives in doing so: (1) termination of parental rights and adoption; (2) identification of adoption as the plan but without immediate termination of parental rights; (3) appointment of a guardian without termination of parental rights; or (4) long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); In re Jessie G. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1, 3.) Because the express purpose of section 366.26 is to provide stable permanent homes for dependent minors, the preferred placement plan among the four alternatives is adoption. (In re Ronell (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)
Thus, in selecting a placement plan, the court must determine whether the child will be adopted based upon DCFS’s assessment concerning the likelihood of adoption if parental rights are terminated. (§§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); 366.21, subd. (i).) If the court finds the child is adoptable, findings made at previous status review hearings are sufficient to support the termination of parental rights unless the court finds the termination would be detrimental to the child under one of the enumerated exceptions to termination listed under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B). “The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
Effective January 1, 2008, the statutory exceptions to termination formerly in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A)-(F) have been re-numbered as 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)-(vi).
Here Mother does not challenge the court’s finding that J.J. is adoptable. Instead she asserts the court erred in terminating her parental rights because she presented sufficient evidence the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination in the former section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) (now § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) applied.
A party claiming an exception to adoption has the burden of proof of establishing by the preponderance of the evidence that the exception applies. (In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 449.) Generally, challenges to a juvenile court’s determination under the parental relationship exception are governed by a substantial evidence standard of review. (See, e.g., In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.) Under a substantial evidence standard of review “‘“the power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the findings below. [Citation.] We must therefore view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor in accordance with the standard of review so long adhered to by this court.’ [Citation.]” (Bickel v. City of Piedmont (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1040, 1053, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Eller Media Co. v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1219-1220, fn. 3.) We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52-53.) With these principles in mind we turn to Mother’s argument.
Other courts have applied an abuse of discretion standard of review. (See, e.g., In re J.J. D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351; In re Aaliyah R., supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 449.) Under an abuse of discretion standard of review, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision unless the juvenile court exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. (In re J.J. D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) In this case, we need not decide whether a juvenile court’s ruling on the parental relationship exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion or substantial evidence, because, under either standard we affirm the juvenile court’s decision.
Under the beneficial parental relationship exception, the juvenile dependency court may forego adoption and refrain from terminating parental rights only if a parent establishes he or she has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” Thus the exception is two-pronged, focusing on visitation and contact with the minor and benefit to the minor of continuing the relationship. (In re Aaliyah R., supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 450.)
“[T]o establish the [beneficial parental relationship exception], the parents must do more than demonstrate ‘frequent and loving contact’ [citation], an emotional bond with the child, or that the parents and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.]” (In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108.) Interaction between a natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. Even so, the parental relationship exception “requires that the parent-child relationship promote the well-being of the child to such a degree that it outweighs the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1342.) This exception must be considered in light of the legislative preference for adoption at this stage in the proceedings. The exception does not permit a parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child to derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307, 309.)
To trigger this exception, the parent must show the parent-child relationship is sufficiently strong that the child “would be greatly harmed” by its severance. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The court must take into account the many variables affecting a parent-child bond, including the age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between the parent and child, and the child’s particular needs. (Id. at p. 576.) In short, a “parental relationship” is necessary for the exception to apply, not merely a friendly or familiar one. (In re J.J. D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1348-1349.) A relationship sufficient to support the visitation exception “aris[es] from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.” (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.) “While friendships are important, a child needs at least one parent. Where a biological parent . . . is incapable of functioning in that role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of parent.” (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 854.)
Mother failed to provide evidence sufficient to invoke the beneficial parental relationship exception. Considering the various factors used to assess whether the parent-child relationship is beneficial and important, we cannot say the juvenile court erred in terminating parental rights. As the record reflects, Mother visited with the child during the more than 18 months of dependency proceedings with some regularity. Sometimes they met twice a week for several hours at a time and sometimes three times a week. But the visits never progressed beyond being monitored and in fact fluctuated in frequency in relation to Mother’s success, or lack of success in her drug treatment program. When she visited, Mother acted appropriately, played with the child and cared for her needs, but the visits appear to have been begun slowly but earnestly. J.J. often had to be prompted to interact with Mother. In addition, some visits appeared to cause the child distress resulting in behavioral issues afterwards. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that Mother is capable of functioning as a parent for a substantial period of time. J.J. had spent no significant time in Mother’s custody. Thus, we conclude she failed to show she occupied the role of a parent as required by the case law interpreting this exception.
Further, Mother failed to demonstrate that J.J. would be greatly harmed or suffer a substantial detriment from the termination of parental rights. While J.J. had some “bond” with Mother and identified her as one of her two “mommies,” Mother has not demonstrated the bond was so significant or unique that it outweighed the relationships the child had formed with her caretakers or those she would develop in a permanent home with an adoptive parent. In light of the history of this family, the broad deference given the lower court in making these determinations and the substantial burden appellant had to meet to overcome the preference for adoption, we cannot say the court erred in failing to apply this exception.
II. Father’s Challenge to the Court’s Finding of Parental “Unfitness” and Detriment to the Child.
Before this court Father argues that the order terminating his parental rights must be reversed because the juvenile dependency court’s finding of his parental unfitness and detriment to the child at the jurisdiction-disposition hearing, and/or at any of the subsequent proceedings was not supported by sufficient, clear and convincing evidence.
The California dependency scheme no longer uses the term “parental unfitness,” but instead requires the juvenile court to make a finding that awarding custody of a dependent child to a parent would be detrimental to the child. (In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1211.) We note, a finding of detriment is essentially “‘the equivalent of a finding of unfitness.’” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 224, fn. 3.)
Where, as here, a child is removed from a custodial parent or a legal guardian and there is a noncustodial parent who requests custody of the child, the court must assess whether the child should be placed with the noncustodial parent. (§ 361.2; In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1820-1821.) Section 361.2, subdivision (a) states, “[w]hen a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (Italics added.) (In re V.F. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 962, 970.)
Neither below nor before this court does Father claim the juvenile court erred in failing to make express findings under section 361.2.
Moreover by the time parental rights are terminated at a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court must have made prior findings that the parent was unfit. (In re Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254.) “Except for a temporary period, the grounds for initial removal of the child from parental custody have been established under a clear and convincing standard (see § 361, subd. (b)); in addition, there have been a series of hearings involving ongoing reunification efforts and, at each hearing, there was a statutory presumption that the child should be returned to the custody of the parent. (§§ 366.21, subds. (e), (f), 366.22, subd. (a).) Only if, over this entire period of time, the state continually has established that a return of custody to the parent would be detrimental to the child is the section 366.26 stage even reached.” (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 253.) “‘The number and quality of the judicial findings that are necessary preconditions to termination convey very powerfully to the fact finder the subjective certainty about parental unfitness and detriment required before the court may even consider ending the relationship between natural parent and child.’ [Citation.] The linchpin to the constitutionality of the section 366.26 hearing is that prior determinations ensure ‘the evidence of detriment is already so clear and convincing that more cannot be required without prejudice to the interests of the adoptable child, with which the state must align itself.’ [Citation.]” (In re Gladys L. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th at 845, 848.)
At the jurisdictional-dispositional hearing the court dismissed a first amended petition which included allegations that Father was a “current” drug abuser and had numerous criminal convictions, finding Father had not been properly served with the petition and that evidence presented in the DCFS’ report did not show a prima facie case to support a jurisdictional finding under section 300 based on a claim that Father was a “current” drug abuser. The court thought the language of the allegation against Father had to be “reworded” and recommended that the DCFS file it under section 342.
Thereafter the court sustained the section 300, subdivision (b) allegations in the original petition against Mother concerning the exposure of the child to drugs and Mother’s drug abuse. The court further found: “There’s a substantial risk of harm for the child to remain in the home for the following reasons: Mother is unable to properly care and supervise the child based on her substance abuse issues. Father is not participating, and placement is vested with the Department. Reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal.” Mother was ordered to participate in a drug program including drug testing, parenting, and individual counseling, and Father was ordered “based on his history” to be in a drug program that includes testing.
Father, who was not present at the jurisdiction-disposition proceeding, but was represented by counsel, successfully opposed the allegations in the amended petition. His counsel did not, however, object to the court’s subsequent finding of detriment. In addition, Father and his counsel remained silent during subsequent status review hearings when the court reaffirmed its detriment findings.
If Father believed that the juvenile court did not make the requisite findings or that the findings of detriment were not supported by sufficient evidence at the time made, he could have raised those challenges in an appeal from the disposition order. He did not appeal that order, and thus forfeited his argument that the juvenile court never made sufficient detriment findings before it terminated his parental rights. (Wanda B. v. Superior Court (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1396; In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293-1294 [“A reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citations.] The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. . . . [Citations.] Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule.”].)
In any event, the court had sufficient evidence to support its findings of detriment throughout at the various stages of the dependency proceedings. Father had a history of drug abuse and criminal involvement prior to the disposition proceeding and that although he was given referrals for drug programs and counseling before the dispositional and jurisdictional proceedings, there is no evidence that he participated in treatment until after those proceedings occurred. Thus, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s initial finding of detriment. Later at the various status review hearings the court also had evidence of detriment. There is no dispute that during the reunification period Father did not obtain stable, permanent or sufficient housing to enable Father to parent the child on a daily basis. Furthermore, for the last year prior to the termination of parental rights he did not regularly maintain contact and visitation with the child or contact with the DCFS—this is more than sufficient evidence to support the detriment findings made at the 18-month status review hearing prior to the termination of reunification services.
Father compares his case to that of In re G.S.R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1202, to no avail. In re G.S.R., the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of a non-offending father. He argued that his due process rights had been violated because he was a nonoffending parent who had never been found to be unfit. (Id. at p. 1209.) The appellate court found that the juvenile court did not make a finding of parental fitness as to the children’s father; rather the court’s findings concerned only the children’s mother. (Id. at p. 1211.) Further, the court found that all of the father’s issues with domestic violence and substance abuse had been resolved prior to the filing of the original dependency petition, and that the only matter unresolved at the dispositional stage was the father’s inability to afford appropriate housing. (Id. at pp. 1213-1215.) The reviewing court found that the father’s indigency, standing alone, was not a legitimate basis for deeming the father unfit. (Ibid.)
We do not find G.S.R. to be persuasive in this case. The court’s findings of detriment in this instance actually pertained to facts which occurred during the litigation and not factual issues which were resolved prior to commencement of litigation. In our view, substantial evidence supports the findings of the trial court.
In reaching this conclusion we also reject Father’s suggestion that to establish detriment by clear and convincing evidence the DCFS must file a section 342 petition. Father’s parental rights can be terminated in the absence of jurisdictional allegations against him. (In re P.A. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1212 [the lack of jurisdictional findings relating to father do not prevent the termination of that father’s parental rights where the court has found detriment/parental unfitness of father by clear and convincing evidence].)
In view of the foregoing, we find no error with respect to the court’s findings of detriment/parental unfitness as to Father; and thus no error in the court’s subsequent order terminating parental rights.
III. Father’s Challenge to The Court’s Finding on the Adequacy of Reunification Services.
Preliminarily we observe that Father failed to seek appellate review of the court’s ruling on this issue by way of a writ petition. However, as Father points out, and the respondent does not dispute, it appears that Father was not provided with any notice of his right to seek such review. As a result, Father is entitled to challenge the adequacy of the reunification services he received in connection with this appeal from the termination of his parental rights. (In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-724 [failure to properly advise parent of her writ rights entitled parent to obtain appellate review of the merits of the setting order on appeal from the termination order].)
Before this court, Father maintains the juvenile dependency court erred in finding that the DCFS provided him sufficient reunification services and thereafter terminating his services and setting the matter for the section 366.26 hearing. He claims the reunification services provided by DCFS were inadequate. Specifically, Father argues he complied with his case plan—he completed the drug treatment program, participated in drug testing, and visited the child. He maintains that but for his lack of housing, the child would have been returned to him. He complains to this court that the DCFS’s efforts to assist him in obtaining housing were not sufficient. As we explain below, in our view the court did not err in finding the services provided were adequate.
Once a child has been detained under juvenile court custody, family reunification efforts are required. (§§ 319, 361.5, subd. (a).) Reunification services are time limited. For a child who is three years old or younger on the date of initial removal from the custody of a parent, court-ordered services are not to exceed six months. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2).) Services may be extended up to a maximum of 18 months if it can be shown that a substantial probability exists that the child may safely be returned home within an extended six-month period, or if reasonable services had not been provided to the parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3).)
At the permanency review (§ 366.22), the juvenile court must consider whether reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parent. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249.) “[O]ne of the ‘precise and demanding’ substantive requirements [DCFS] must meet to satisfy due process is affording reasonable reunification services. Where reasonable services are not afforded there is a substantial risk the court’s finding the child cannot be returned to the parent will be erroneous. [Citation.] To put it another way: in order to meet due process requirements at the termination stage, the court must be satisfied reasonable services have been offered during the reunification stage.” (In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1215-1216.)
We review the court’s finding on reasonableness of the reunification services for substantial evidence. (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329; In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.) “Therefore, ‘[a]ll reasonable inferences must be drawn in support of the findings and the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1039.) When we review a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we inquire whether there is evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the court’s determination. We resolve all conflicts in support of the determination, indulge in all legitimate inferences to uphold the findings, and may not substitute our deductions for those of the juvenile court. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547; In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212.) We also recognize that in most cases more services might have been provided and that the services that were provided are often imperfect. In reviewing the reasonableness of reunification services, “[t]he standard is not whether the services . . . were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.)
Reasonable services should be tailored to the specific needs of the particular family. The DCFS must make a good faith effort to develop and implement a reunification plan. (In re Armando L. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 549, 545.) “[T]he record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult (such as helping to provide transportation and offering more intensive rehabilitation services where others have failed).’ (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, italics omitted.)” (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 793-794.) “The effort must be made to provide suitable services, in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success.” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777, italics added.) Nonetheless, reunification services “are voluntary and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.” (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.)
Here, the juvenile court found that DCFS had provided reasonable reunification services to Father. That finding is supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the DCFS facilitated visitation between Father and J.J. from December 2005 when the child was detained through the early spring of 2007 when Father stopped visiting and lost contact with the DCFS. The DCFS provided Father with drug treatment and counseling referrals and made some, albeit unsuccessful, attempts to verify his drugs tests through Father’s probation officer. When Father indicated an interest in applying for Section 8 housing in Pico Rivera, the social worker wrote a letter to the City of Pico Rivera in support of his application. In late fall of 2006 and early 2007, when the social worker proposed allowing Father to have unmonitored overnight visits with the child, the evidence in the record indicates that Father said he was not prepared for those visits because he was living in his sister’s house which was being remodeled. He agreed that because of the house’s condition it would not be safe for the toddler to live with him there. He indicated that he was working overtime and was saving money to obtain housing and he stated it was difficult to visit because of Father’s work schedule. The DCFS informed Father that once he had located permanent housing, the DCFS would assist him with services including a deposit and first month’s rent. Father, however, said he wanted to move away from Lynwood to a better area and he had been looking for an apartment but had not found one because they were too expensive.
In our view, the DCFS identified the Father’s problems—drug abuse, visitation and housing—and endeavored to assist the Father in resolving them. With respect to the services, Father took advantage of what he was offered in every respect, except the offer of housing assistance. The fact that Father did not obtain permanent or stable housing during reunification resulted not from any failing of the DCFS but instead ultimately from Father’s decision that he wanted to live in a different, better area than where he had been living. This was Father’s choice, not a determination of the DCFS. Father’s rejection of the offered assistance does not demonstrate the inadequacy of the services, especially because Father never complained about the housing assistance below. “If [the parent] felt during the reunification period that the services offered her were inadequate, she had the assistance of counsel to seek guidance from the juvenile court in formulating a better plan: ‘“The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal.” [Citations.]’” (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.) Reunification services are voluntary, and the social worker is not required to “take the parent by the hand and escort [her] to and through classes or counseling sessions.” (In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1463, fn. 5.) In this case, the record reflects that the DCFS complied with its obligation to provide services, but Father failed to take advantage of the services offered to him. In short, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the services offered to Father were reasonable under the circumstances of this case.
DISPOSITION
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P.J. ZELON, J.