Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. J221043. Michael A. Knish, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
R. Randall Riccardo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Michael T. Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ, P. J.
Minor J.H. appeals the juvenile court’s finding he resisted, obstructed, or delayed a peace officer. (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1).) He argues there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding. Minor also seeks to review the juvenile court’s ruling on his motion to compel discovery of confidential peace officer personnel records. We will affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleged that on or about April 17, 2008, minor violated Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1), by willfully and unlawfully resisting, delaying and obstructing a sheriff’s deputy who was attempting to discharge the duty of his office and employment.
At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court considered testimony by three sheriff’s deputies, Deputy Elder, Deputy Lopez, and Deputy Briscoe, as well as by appellant and his nephew, another juvenile, J.M. According to the testimony of the deputies, they all responded to a report that a large group of juveniles were gathering in a park for a fight. When they arrived, the deputies saw approximately 40 minors in the park gathering into different racial groups. The deputies ordered the minors to leave the park. Most of the minors complied but some did not. One of the minors, J.M., disobeyed several commands by the deputies to leave, swore at them, and took an aggressive boxer-style stance toward Deputy Elder with his hands clenched in fists. Deputy Elder therefore decided to arrest J.M., but J.M. resisted and struggled, causing the deputy to fall to the ground. Deputies Lopez and Briscoe assisted in subduing and handcuffing J.M.
While the deputies were attempting to subdue J.M., minor approached in an agitated manner with his fists clenched and yelled something like, “[T]hat’s my cousin,” and “[y]ou can’t do that.” Deputies Elder and Lopez stopped to look at minor while struggling with J.M. Deputy Lopez told minor to back away. When minor did not comply, Deputy Lopez pointed his taser at minor and again told him to leave, but minor remained. Because the deputies were still outnumbered by 15 to 20 minors who remained in the immediate area, they were concerned for their safety. Deputy Briscoe therefore disengaged from the struggle with J.M. and shifted his focus to minor. With minor still yelling, Deputy Briscoe was able to place him in handcuffs and arrest him.
Based on the testimony of the witnesses, the juvenile court stated: “I think it went... beyond just words. I think there were actions that [minor] did. He was furious. He came at the officers. He followed them, approached them. [¶]... [¶] I think his actions did delay, distract[] the officers, and I think the elements of the crime are met. [¶]... [¶] So I am going to find the charge to be true. I am going to sustain the petition.”
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant contends his words and actions while the deputies were attempting to subdue J.M. were “too cursory” to constitute a violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1), in that they only caused a “slight shift of focus” by the deputies for not more than five to 10 seconds while they had J.M. under their control. According to minor, the deputies would have had to shift their focus from the struggle with J.M. at various times anyway, because there were other juveniles nearby who did not leave the park.
In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, “[a]n appellate court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment in order to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1136.) “We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275.) In addition, “we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court.” (Ibid.) “The testimony of just one witness is enough to sustain a conviction, so long as that testimony is not inherently incredible.” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 830.) “The trier of fact determines the credibility of witnesses, weighs the evidence, and resolves factual conflicts.... On appeal, we must accept that part of the testimony which supports the judgment.” (Ibid.)
“In most cases, section 148 has been applied to physical acts, such as fleeing from a proper investigatory detention by a police officer [citations], brandishing a gun at an officer [citation], passively resisting an arrest by going limp [citation], or struggling physically with an officer making an arrest [citations] or attempting to break up a fight.” (People v. Quiroga (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961, 967 (Quiroga).) Section 148 has also been applied to “a combination of verbal and physical interference with an officer’s performance of his duties.” (Quiroga, at p. 967.) Section 148 does not criminalize “a person’s failure to respond with alacrity to police orders.” (Quiroga,at p. 966.) In addition, because the First Amendment protects “a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers [citation]... the statute must be applied with great caution to speech.” (Quiroga, at pp. 966, 968.)
The defendant in Quiroga was sitting on a sofa inside an apartment when police arrived to investigate a report of a noisy party. The odor of marijuana was present when the door of the apartment was opened, and one of the officers noticed what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette being passed around. (Quiroga, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 964.) The defendant stood up. The police told him to sit back down on the sofa but the defendant argued before complying with the order. Police noticed the defendant appeared to be nervous, was taking his hands in and out of his pockets, appeared to be holding onto something inside his pocket, and was reaching between the sofa cushions, so they told him to put his hands on his lap. Although uncooperative, the defendant finally complied. Police still did not feel comfortable, so the defendant was told to stand up. After refusing several times, the defendant complied and was then taken to a corner of the room where another officer could watch him. The defendant was arrested when police found a bag of cocaine under the sofa cushion where they had seen defendant reaching with his hands. (Id. at p. 964.) The appellate court concluded the defendant’s conduct prior to arrest was not enough to constitute a violation of section 148, because the statute did not criminalize “a person’s failure to respond with alacrity to police orders,” and the defendant’s verbal criticisms of the police were protected by the First Amendment. (Quiroga, at p. 966.)
In our view, minor’s reliance on the Quiroga case is misplaced. Quiroga is distinguishable, because the defendant in that case actually did comply with police orders even though he did so at a snail’s pace. In this case, minor completely disregarded several directives by the deputies to step back and/or to leave the area. Although minor’s argument relies heavily on Quiroga, another case entitled In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, is more closely analogous to the facts at issue in this case. The police in the Muhammed C. case arrested a suspect and placed him in the back of a patrol car. While the officers were across the street processing the suspect’s vehicle, a juvenile approached the patrol car and spoke to the suspect. The officers ordered the juvenile to step away from the vehicle at least three different times. The juvenile continued to talk to the suspect and at one point raised “his palm towards the officers.” (Id. at p. 1328.) One of the officers then grabbed the juvenile’s arm and told him he was under arrest. In support of the charge, one of the officer’s testified he “ ‘had to stop and deal with [appellant]’ ” while he was processing the suspect’s vehicle. (Ibid.) On appeal, the juvenile argued his benign hand gesture and his failure to step away from the vehicle as ordered “did not rise to the level of delaying an officer....” (Id. at p. 1329.) The appellate court disagreed, concluding there was substantial evidence to support a violation of section 148, because the juvenile court “was entitled to interpret the gesture as one of defiance” and to conclude that the juvenile’s defiant behavior “constituted more than a temporary distraction.” (Muhammed C., at p. 1330.)
As the juvenile court commented in this case, minor’s conduct “went beyond just words.” He approached the officers while they were attempting to handcuff a suspect who was actively resisting them. Minor appeared agitated and had his fists clenched, and as a result, the juvenile court was entitled to infer minor was a potential threat to the deputies’ safety. In addition, minor did not simply fail to respond with alacrity. Rather, he affirmatively failed to obey the directives of the deputies to the point where one of them felt compelled to brandish a taser in order to gain minor’s cooperation. When this was not effective in getting minor to retreat or to leave the immediate area, one of the deputies had to disengage from the struggle with J.M. and shift his focus to minor. Under these circumstances, minor’s refusal to obey the officers’ directives warranted his being handcuffed and arrested. As the officers explained during their testimony, minor’s noncompliance not only delayed them in the performance of their duties, it prevented one of the deputies from assisting his fellow officers in subduing a suspect who was struggling with them. Minor’s contention his conduct was “too cursory” to serve as the basis for a criminal charge is simply an interpretation of the evidence the juvenile court was not obligated to follow. Accordingly, on the record before us, we cannot disagree with the juvenile court’s conclusion Minor committed a violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1).
Discovery of Peace Officer Records
Prior to the dispositional hearing, minor filed a motion for discovery of peace officer’s personnel records seeking access to police department files and records pertaining to Deputy Elder and Deputy Briscoe. The juvenile court apparently found good cause for discovery of the records to the extent they related to honesty or dishonesty. As a result, the juvenile court held an in camera hearing with the custodian of records and released some information to defense counsel about a prior complaint made against Deputy Elder. Deputy Elder was then questioned about the incident during cross-examination. Minor has asked us to examine the confidential police files and the reporter’s transcript of the in camera hearing to determine whether the juvenile court “properly limited the materials that were discoverable.”
A criminal defendant has a limited right to discover peace officer personnel records in order to ensure a fair trial and an intelligent defense. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1141.) To compel discovery, an accused must show the requested information will facilitate the ascertainment of facts and a fair trial. (Ibid.) Therefore, in support of a motion to discover peace officer personnel records, the moving party must submit affidavits showing “good cause” for such discovery and setting out the materiality of the information requested. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b).) If good cause is shown, the trial court must examine the personnel files in camera to determine whether they contain any relevant information. (Evid. Code, § 1045.) The standards set forth in Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 carefully balance “two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer’s claim to confidentiality and the defendant’s compelling interest in all information pertinent to the defense. [Citation.]” (People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 109.)
“A motion for discovery of peace officer personnel records is ‘addressed solely to the sound discretion of the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 311.) We review the trial court’s determination for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228.)
We have reviewed the sealed reporter’s transcript of the in camera hearing, as well as the confidential records produced for the hearing by the custodian of records. Based on our independent review of these records, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion. The record demonstrates minor was granted access to all relevant documents.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT, J., KING, J.