Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County No. 07JQ0150. George L. Orndoff, Judge.
Robert P. Whitlock, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Tia M. Coronado, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Dawson, J., and Poochigian, J.
Following a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true an allegation that appellant, J.G., a minor, committed a violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a) (receiving stolen property). At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court, declared the offense to be a felony, and ordered appellant committed to the Kings County Juvenile Center for a period not to exceed one year, but not less than 60 days.
On appeal, appellant’s sole contention is that the evidence was insufficient to support the instant adjudication. We will affirm.
FACTS
Petitioner’s Case
At approximately 5:30 a.m., on November 18, 2009 (November 18), Jack Schrueder, the maintenance operations and transportation supervisor for Corcoran Unified School District (the District), received a call from the Corcoran Police Department (CPD) informing him that a van owned by the District had been found in a canal. He went to the canal to meet with a police officer, and upon his arrival he saw the van, its engine still running, partially submerged in the canal. Upon inspection, he determined that the van had been ransacked, and District-owned tools and plumbing parts were missing from the van.
At approximately 10:00 a.m. that same morning, Schrueder received a call from the police, informing him that tools and materials had been found at the end of Patterson Street in Corcoran. Schrueder went to that location, where the police had found, in an alley behind a residence, plumbing materials, tools and a ladder. Schrueder identified these items as belonging to the District. He had seen these items in the van one or two days before.
CPD Officer William Smith was informed that at approximately 10:30 a.m. to 10:45 a.m. on November 18, an individual who wished to remain anonymous called the police department and reported seeing “two dark skinned Hispanic male subjects” and “a heavy-set Hispanic female, ” whom the caller identified by name as “the [G.’s], ” “carrying property” in the area of Patterson Street, heading toward the residence of the G. family. The informant could not identify which members of the G. family she saw. Officer Smith, who had “extensive contact” with the G. family, knew that one member of that family, whose first name was either George or Manuel, was on parole. Thereafter, at approximately 10:30 a.m. on November 18, officers conducted a search at that residence of George and his wife, Rosie G.
In the interests of brevity and clarity, we will refer to this person as George.
In the backyard of the residence, officers found a ladder belonging to the District and, inside two vehicles parked in the yard, other property belonging to the District.
In the garage, in a storage area above the washing machine and dryer, officers found a backpack. Inside the backpack, officers found the following items, which Schrueder identified as belonging to the District: “zip ties” of the kind used for securing wire, some small batteries, a pipe wrench, and a pair of wire cutters. Police also found in the backpack “school related paperwork” bearing appellant’s name. Officer Smith did not recall if the papers were dated.
In the washing machine, police found a load of laundry, as well as sand and dirt in a quantity which indicated the washed clothing had been “heavily... soiled.” Asked if the sand and dirt was of the “same type” as that found in the area of the canal, Officer Smith testified, “I can’t say that it would or wouldn’t be.” Officer Smith further testified that the items of clothing found in the washing machine―“a couple of pairs [of] jeans, a couple of sweatshirts, a shirt and things like that”―appeared to be clothing belonging to one person, and were very wet, indicating the washing machine had recently been running. When asked if the clothing was appellant’s size, Officer Smith testified, “I didn’t specifically check the size of the clothing [appellant] was wearing.”
Appellant admitted to Officer Smith the backpack was his. Appellant told the officer that his mother had done his laundry. Appellant “denied involvement” in the theft of the van and “he remained adamant that he had no involvement in anything [he and the officer] were discussing.”
Defense Case
Appellant’s sister, B.G., testified to the following: She was at the home of George, Rosie G., and appellant on November 18, but she does not live there. She found the stolen tools next to a brick wall in the rear of the apartment complex where she lived. She put some of the tools in appellant’s backpack, “[b]ecause [she] didn’t have anything else to put them in.” Appellant was in his room, sleeping at the time.
DISCUSSION
Applicable Law
The crime of receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)) requires proof of three elements: “(1) the property was stolen; (2) the defendant knew it was stolen; and (3) the defendant had possession of it.” (In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 728.) “The requisite possession of the stolen property may be either actual or constructive....” (Ibid.)
Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a), provides, in relevant part: “Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a state prison....”
“Actual possession means the object is in the defendant’s immediate possession or control.... Constructive possession means the object is not in the defendant’s physical possession, but the defendant knowingly exercises control or the right to control the object.” (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 831.) “The inference of dominion and control is easily made when the [item] is discovered in a place over which the defendant has general dominion and control: his residence [citation], his automobile [citation], or his personal effects [citation].” (People v. Jenkins (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579, 584 (Jenkins).) The prosecution need not establish that a defendant has exclusive possession of the stolen property. (Anthony J., supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 728.) “[P]ossession may be imputed when the [item] is found in a place which is... subject to... joint dominion and control of the accused and another.” (People v. Newman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 48, 52, overruled on other grounds in People v. Daniels (1975) 14 Cal.3d 857, 862, italics added.) However, when contraband is found in such a place “‘no sharp line can be drawn to distinguish the congeries of facts which will and that which will not constitute sufficient evidence of a defendant’s knowledge of the presence of [contraband]....’” (People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 345.) “‘[P]roof of opportunity of access to a place where [contraband is] found, without more, will not support a finding of unlawful possession.’” (Id. at p. 346.)
“[P]roof of knowing possession by a defendant of recently stolen property raises a strong inference of the other element of the crime: the defendant’s knowledge of the tainted nature of the property. This inference is so substantial that only ‘slight’ additional corroborating evidence need be adduced in order to permit a finding of guilty.” (People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 421 (Anderson).) “Our Supreme Court has indicated that the slight corroboration that permits an inference that the possessor knew that the property was stolen may consist of no explanation, of an unsatisfactory explanation, or of other suspicious circumstances that would justify the inference.” (People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1575.)
In general, in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding in a juvenile court proceeding, the reviewing court is bound by the same principles as to sufficiency and the substantiality of the evidence which govern the review of adult criminal convictions. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.) Those principles include the following: “The court must ‘review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138.) “‘Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 933.) “‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.”’” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.)
Contentions and Analysis
Appellant does not dispute that items stolen from the District were found in his backpack. Rather, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish he knew the items were was stolen and that he was in possession of them. Specifically, he argues it cannot be reasonably inferred that he was in possession of the contraband because the backpack containing the stolen items was found in the garage where the other residents of the house had access to it. We disagree.
Although appellant was not the only person having access to the backpack, it is undisputed that the backpack belonged to him. It is also undisputed, based on the school papers belonging to appellant also found in the backpack, that he had used the backpack at some point in the past. The presence of contraband among appellant’s “personal effects” (Jenkins, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 584) supports the inference that appellant was in possession of the contraband.
Substantial evidence also supports the knowledge element of the offense. The discovery of the stolen van, with its motor running, only hours before the discovery of the backpack establishes that appellant was in possession of recently stolen property. As indicated above, this factor gives rise to a strong inference, requiring only “‘slight’ additional corroborating evidence, ” that appellant knew the property in the backpack was stolen. (Anderson, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 421.) Officer Smith’s testimony that appellant denied any “involvement” with the stolen property supports the inference that appellant offered no explanation to the officer as to how the stolen property came to be in the backpack. This factor provides further support that appellant knew the property was stolen. On this record, substantial evidence supports appellant’s adjudication.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.