Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. JJ15603, Robert Ambrose, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Tara K. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MALLANO, P. J.
J.F. appeals from the order of wardship entered following his admission that he committed grand theft of an automobile (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1)). The minor was placed home on probation and contends that some of the conditions of his probation and an order regarding his maximum period of confinement are invalid. We affirm the order of wardship and order the juvenile court to strike reference to the minor’s the maximum period of confinement.
BACKGROUND
A juvenile petition alleged that the minor committed grand theft of an automobile. A probation officer’s report stated that on the morning of October 7, 2007, officers responding to a radio call observed four males removing parts from a Honda automobile. The four fled, and the minor was later found hiding under a parked car. He told officers that he had stolen two vehicles the night before and was removing parts from the vehicles with three members of his family.
The minor was placed home on probation under various terms and conditions. The court further ordered that the minor could not be confined for more than three years.
DISCUSSION
1. Search Condition
One of the conditions of probation ordered by the trial court was that the minor submit to being searched at any time without a warrant. The minor objected to this condition. The objection was overruled, the court commenting, “It’s a felony, so the court believes it’s warranted in this case.”
The minor contends that the search condition was improper because the court’s comment about the case being a felony demonstrated that it did not exercise individualized consideration of the minor’s situation. But irrespective of whether it might have been the court’s practice to impose a search condition in every felony case (an issue which is not before us), the condition was appropriate here based on the minor’s conduct in stealing cars and stripping them for parts. (See In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 205.) Accordingly, there is no basis to overturn this condition as it applies to the minor in this case.
2. Conditions Regarding School Performance
The court also imposed conditions that the minor obey teachers and school officials, report to his probation officer, and perform 40 hours of community service, following which the court stated: “I want you to go to school each and every day that school is in session, go to every class, don’t miss, don’t be late, don’t act up in school, and do your best to get A’s, B’s, or C’s. [¶] If you need any extra help, I want you to get tutoring help after school that may help you with any particular subject that you think you’re having a problem with.” The minute order that sets forth the minor’s conditions of probation includes a condition that the minor is to “[m]aintain satisfactory grades and attendance, and citizenship.”
The minor contends that orders to do his best to get A’s, B’s, or C’s and to get tutoring help are unreasonable and unconstitutionally vague. We disagree.
We do not read the language regarding tutoring as a condition of probation, but rather as advice from the court to the minor regarding how to do his best in school. As to the statement regarding A’s, B’s, or C’s, the court merely told the minor to “do [his] best” to get these grades. Therefore, the unambiguous condition set forth in the minute order that minor “[m]aintain satisfactory grades” is controlling (see In re Byron B. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1018), even if a grade of D is considered “satisfactory.” (See In re Angel J. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1102, fn. 7 [“passing grade” includes a D].) And assuming the condition of probation is interpreted to require a grade of C or above, school documents included in the probation report show that the minor received several A’s, B’s, and C’s, in addition to some D’s, and that the minor was dropped from his school program due to absences. As such, the record demonstrates that the minor has the ability to achieve A, B, and C grades, thereby supporting the condition of probation orally imposed by the court. (Cf. In re Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [requirement that minor maintain B average stricken where record showed that doing so was beyond minor’s capacity].)
3. Maximum Period of Confinement
The minute order of January 23, 2008, reflects in item No. 28 that the “[m]inor may not be held in physical confinement for a period to exceed three years.” The minor contends that this provision should be stricken. We agree.
Where, as here, “a juvenile ward is allowed to remain in his parents’ custody, there is no physical confinement and therefore no need to set a maximum term of confinement. Consequently, the maximum term of confinement . . . is of no legal effect.” (In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 571.)
The Attorney General concedes that Ali A. controls but argues that there is no need to strike the offending provision because it cannot prejudice the minor. We conclude it is better practice to order that the invalid provision be stricken. Accordingly, we shall do so.
DISPOSITION
The order of wardship is affirmed. The juvenile court is ordered to strike the portion of the January 23, 2008 minute order stating in item No. 28 that the “[m]inor may not be held in physical confinement for a period to exceed three years.”
We concur: ROTHSCHILD J., WEISBERG, J.
Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.