Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J 37660
SIMONS, Acting P.J.
J.F. appeals after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging she committed two counts of felony vandalism. J.F. challenges the admission of her statements to school officials and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s restitution order for damages to the vandalized property. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 21, 2007, a petition was filed in the Solano County Juvenile Court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that J.F committed two counts of felony vandalism in violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a). The court sustained the allegations after a contested jurisdictional hearing and adjudged J.F. a ward of the court, placing her on probation in the custody of her parents. The court set the maximum term of confinement at three years eight months.
J.F. timely filed her notice of appeal on January 10, 2008.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the morning of March 20, 2007, students J.M. and L.C. separately drove to school and parked near the back entrance of the student parking lot. Each car had existing scratches or key marks. J.M.’s car had been keyed the day before with scratch marks running the entire length of the vehicle on both sides, while L.C.’s car had been keyed about two months earlier.
That afternoon sometime after 3:00 p.m., J.M. returned to his car and noticed new, deeper and more extensive scratches described as “key” marks, primarily on the passenger side of his car. He reported the incident to assistant principal Encalata (Encalata). The next day, on March 21, 2007, J.M. submitted a written report to the school office. He was then shown portions of a surveillance video of the school’s parking lot from the day before. From the video, he identified J.F. and co-responsible B.B. as the only two people in the parking lot near J.M.’s car during school hours. The car repair estimates ranged from $4,144 to $6,160.
L.C. also returned to her car after school on March 20, 2007, and found that her car had a new scratch on the driver’s side, a line running from the rear passenger door to the driver’s door. The next day L.C. reported the incident, filed a report with the school office, and also viewed portions of the same surveillance video shown to J.M. The estimate to repair the scratches on her car was $1,000.
The surveillance video, identified as the People’s exhibit 1, had footage from the school’s student parking lot on the afternoon of March 20, 2007. The school’s resource officer testified to viewing the entire tape for March 20, 2007, from about 7:00 a.m., the time that vehicles started to arrive in the parking lot, through the end of the day when most of the vehicles had left. The resource officer testified that during the school hours when students were supposed to be in class, the only two people seen walking through the parking lot were J.F. and B.B. The surveillance tape for March 20, 2007, showed J.F. and B.B. walking past J.M.’s car towards J.F.’s car, and then again on their way back to school. As J.F. and B.B. were walking next to J.M.’s car on the passenger side, J.F. stopped and squatted down next to J.M.’s car “to do something like they dropped something.” B.B. appeared to look down at the car, “put his hand to his mouth” and pointed in the direction of the car. Then, J.F. and B.B. continued to walk through the middle of the parking lot, stopping behind L.C.’s car. Standing about two or three feet from L.C.’s car, J.F. appeared to reach into her bag to take something out, and then both J.F. and B.B. continued to walk beside the driver’s side of the car that had been keyed. Witnesses who saw the surveillance video acknowledged it does not clearly show J.F. damaging the cars, but testified J.F. and B.B. were the only two people in the parking lot near J.M.’s and L.C.’s cars that day from 8:00 a.m. until almost 3:00 p.m.
On March 21, 2007, both J.F. and B.B. were called to Encalata’s office shortly after school began, and both Encalata and assistant principal Gillespie (Gillespie) questioned them about the incident. J.F. testified to the following facts:
Encalata took J.F. into his office, closed the door, told her that there were surveillance cameras in the parking lot, and asked, “What did you do yesterday?” J.F. testified that she tried to explain to Encalata why she was in the parking lot that afternoon, but that he “cut [her] off” saying, “ ‘No, no, no, no.’ ” J.F. said Encalata began yelling and pointed his finger in her face. Then Encalata told J.F. to write a statement, which she did. J.F. identified the People’s exhibit 5 as the first statement she wrote. In that first statement, she wrote that she and B.B. were in the parking lot because she had to go to her car to get a note her mother had written for a doctor’s appointment. She stayed in the car until the end of lunch when the bell rang at about 12:40 p.m. J.F. wrote that on their way back to school, as J.F. and B.B. passed by J.M.’s car, J.F. checked her purse and realized that she had forgotten another note and went back to her car to get it, and to change out of her stained shirt. After she got the other note, she and B.B. headed back toward campus when he dropped something on the floor and J.F. picked it up for him. J.F. testified that after Encalata read this first statement, he said “ ‘No, this is not true.’ ” After “maybe 30, 40 minutes,” Encalata excused J.F. to sit outside the office so he could talk with B.B.
J.F. stated that after Gillespie finished speaking with B.B., she asked J.F. what happened. J.F. testified that she told Gillespie the same story she told Encalata and then wrote another statement, denying criminal involvement. No such statement was introduced at trial. J.F. further testified that after she finished speaking with Gillespie, Encalata came in and told her, “You have a choice whether you want to go downtown. Either you write a statement saying you had keyed the car, or you will have to go downtown.” J.F. said she asked to talk to her mom, but contends that Encalata refused her request. J.F. was then left alone during which time she thought that if she did not write the statement confessing to the vandalism, Encalata would call the police. Because she just wanted to go home, J.F. wrote the statement admitting her role in vandalizing the cars. J.F. identified the People’s exhibit 6 as the last statement she wrote. While J.F.’s testimony referred to several statements, there are only two written statements that were introduced into evidence.
Encalata and Gillespie, however, disputed several key facts in J.F.’s version of the events leading to her statements. While Encalata was unable to recall several specific details regarding his role, he testified that he had a general practice of having students rewrite a statement when the written statement did not match or left out something the student had admitted to verbally. Encalata also testified that he believed he did call J.F.’s mother to notify her of J.F.’s suspension as he would normally do with any student, although he did not recall whether he did or did not do so in J.F.’s case. Finally, Encalata denied threatening to send J.F. “downtown.” He testified, “I don’t believe I would say something like that, because I don’t have the power to send somebody to the police station.”
Gillespie described a similar practice when explaining why she had B.B. rewrite his first statement, “His statement didn’t match up with what he said.”
Gillespie testified that she did meet with J.F. after she and Encalata had questioned B.B. about the keying incident. Gillespie testified that during the meeting with J.F., she told J.F. that “[B.B.] said you guys did this.” In response, J.F. said, “We did it” and told Gillespie that the reason she keyed the cars was because the other students had said some really bad things about B.B. Gillespie also testified that J.F. said that, “He scratched harder. I barely even scratched it.” After J.F. admitted to scratching the vehicles, Gillespie said that J.F. wrote a statement, which appears to this court to be the People’s exhibit 6. In this statement, J.F. provided facts consistent with the oral admission she provided to Gillespie. Gillespie testified that J.F. wrote the statement while sitting in the hall, and she later collected the statement from J.F. During cross-examination, Gillespie said that while it “would make sense” for J.F. to have shown this last statement to Encalata, he had already left the office when J.F. finished writing her statement.
DISCUSSION
I. Admissibility of J.F.’s Confession
J.F. contends her oral and written statements to Encalata and Gillespie should have been suppressed. Her argument proceeds in three steps. First, admissions or confessions to criminal offenses given by students to school officials are subject to the federal constitutional restraints imposed on statements to police officers. Second, the interrogation procedures utilized here resulted in involuntary statements by J.F. Third, the error in admitting these statements was prejudicial. Even if involuntary statements obtained from students as a result of an improperly coercive interrogation by school officials are inadmissible, the interrogation of appellant was not unduly coercive and her statements were properly admitted. In any event, any error resulting from their admission was harmless.
A. The Statements Taken from J.F. Are Not Involuntary
Both the federal and the California Constitutions prohibit the admission of involuntary confessions. (Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 385-386 ; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 778 .) A confession is considered involuntary if it was not the result of the suspect’s free will, but extracted by means of physical or psychological coercion or obtained as a result of “express or implied promises, on the part of law enforcement officials, of ‘leniency’ or ‘benefit’ in the event the defendant confesses.” (People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 485; accord, People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 238 .)
On appeal, the trial court’s determination is reviewed de novo, but “we accept the [juvenile] court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 992; In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 200, 207-208 .) Whether a statement is voluntary depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. (In re Shawn D., at p. 208.) “ ‘[I]n carrying out their interrogations the police must avoid threats of punishment for the suspect’s failure to admit or confess particular facts and must avoid false promises of leniency as a reward for admission or confession.’ ” (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115.) Characteristics of the accused, including the accused’s age, sophistication, prior experience with the criminal justice system and emotional state, should also be examined. (In re Shawn D., at p. 209.) The prosecution bears the burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Guerra (2006)37 Cal.4th 1067, 1093.)
The trial court was entitled to find that, as Encalata and Gillespie testified, they did no more than accuse J.F. of lying when she denied complicity in the crime, and insist that she provide a written statement consistent with the oral confession she had made to each. Further, the court was entitled to reject J.F.’s testimony and find Encalata did not threaten to have her arrested and “taken downtown” if she refused to confess. Encalata denied making such a threat because it was beyond his powers to have appellant arrested. No evidence of promises of leniency was presented.
Holloway is instructive. There, the defendant, a suspect in a murder case, was subject to “long and vigorous questioning” by two detectives. (Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 112.) When Holloway denied responsibility for the crimes, the detectives “repeatedly accused him of lying, confronted him with evidence contrary to his story” and suggested alternative scenarios for how the homicides may have occurred. (Id. at pp. 112-113.) In addition, one detective said, “ ‘I want you to understand something. We’re talking about a death penalty case here.’ ” (Id. at p. 113, italics omitted.) The Supreme Court ruled Holloway’s statement was properly admitted. “[T]he detectives in this case did not cross the line from proper exhortations to tell the truth into impermissible threats of punishment.” (Id. at p. 115.)
The questioning of J.F., as impliedly accepted by the trial court, was far less harsh than the interrogation condoned in Holloway. (See People v. Maestas (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1499, 1506.) The trial court did not err in admitting her statements.
B. Any Error Was Harmless
In any event, any error in admitting J.F.’s statements was harmless. The prejudicial effect of a confession obtained by means that render the confession inadmissible under the federal Constitution, “must be determined under the [harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt] standard.” (In re Shawn D., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 217.) In Cahill, the California Supreme Court noted that “[t]he erroneous admission of an involuntary confession properly might be found harmless . . . in a case in which the prosecution introduced, in addition to the confession, a videotape of the commission of the crime [citation].” (Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 505.) This suggests that “although in some cases a defendant’s confession will be the centerpiece of the prosecution’s case in support of a conviction, in many instances it will be possible for an appellate court to determine with confidence that there is no reasonable probability that the exclusion of the confession would have affected the result.” (Ibid.)
Without regard to J.F.’s statements, two pieces of evidence overwhelmingly establish her guilt. First, as shown in the surveillance video, J.F. and B.B. were the only people near the cars of both victims during the period of time in which the damage was inflicted. As the trial court stated after reviewing the surveillance video and the stills, “[t]he problem for both minors is that it is either a horrible coincidence or the only reasonable interpretation which can be drawn, and that is that they are the only ones there next to these vehicles. There are no other persons the entire day in those videos next to those vehicles.” Second, Gillespie testified, without objection, that B.B. told her he and J.F. keyed the cars. Thus, any error in admitting J.F.’s statements is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 505.)
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
J.F. contends that, even if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding J.F. vandalized both vehicles, there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that she caused at least $400 in damage to either car to sustain a charge for felony vandalism.
In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction, an appellate court “ ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) “ ‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trial court’s findings, reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citations.] The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact; it is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 1372)
Penal Code section 594, subdivision (b)(1), provides that an act of vandalism causing $400 or more is a felony. Where the amount of damage is less than $400, the offense is a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A).) J.F. argued that because the victims’ cars had previously been vandalized and since neither victim produced any “testimony or documentary evidence” allocating the repair costs between the preexisting scratches and the new scratches, the evidence was insufficient to prove that she caused at least $400 worth of damage to each vehicle. For this reason, J.F. submits that the counts should be reduced to misdemeanor vandalism under Penal Code section 594, subdivision (b)(2)(A). We disagree.
First, both victims did testify as to the estimated cost of repairing the damages from March 20, 2007. J.M. testified that it would cost between $4,000 and $6,000 to fix the key marks on his car. While it is possible that the estimated cost included the preexisting scratches, it is reasonable to conclude that the deeper and more extensive key scratches inflicted by J.F. would account for the bulk of the costs.
The same is true with L.C.’s car. This car had been previously scratched, and on March 20, 2007, she noticed “a line from the passenger door to the driver’s door on the driver’s side.” When asked how much it cost to repair the scratches from March 20, 2007, L.C. testified that “it was like $1,000” to fix the damage to her car. J.F. argues that L.C.’s testimony failed to identify whether the estimated cost was limited to the damage for which J.F. is responsible, or whether it included the preexisting scratches as well. J.F. argues that because the extent of the preexisting damage to L.C.’s car is unknown, the $1,000 repair cost does not accurately reflect the cost to repair the “single additional scratch” which occurred on March 20, 2007. However, the trial court was entitled to find she was referring to the March 20, 2007 scratch on her car when she testified as to the amount of damage caused. This testimony was substantial evidence of the cost of repairing the damage caused by J.F., providing a sufficient basis for the trial court’s conclusion the crime was a felony.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur. NEEDHAM, J., DONDERO, J.
Judge of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.