Opinion
81944-COA
07-21-2021
IN THE MATTER OF: J.C.-L., DOB: 4/19/2005, A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS. v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. J. C.-L·, Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
J.C.-L., a minor, appeals from a juvenile court order certifying him to stand trial as an adult. First Judicial District Court, Carson City; James E. Wilson, Judge.
In January 2020, J.C.-L., then 14 years old, participated in a robbery-shooting in Carson City. J.C.-L., along with other minors, planned to commit armed robbery of a known drug dealer. J.C.-L., armed with a nine-millimeter semi-automatic pistol, met the dealer, got into the backseat of the dealer's vehicle, held the barrel of the gun to the dealer's head, and demanded his property. When the dealer refused, J.C.-L. pushed the gun against his head with more force. During a struggle for the gun, J.C.-L. shot the dealer in the abdomen.
We recount the facts only as necessary for our disposition.
The State filed an amended petition seeking adult certification for the acts of (1) attempted robbery with a deadly weapon, (2) battery with a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm, (3) possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, (4) conspiracy to commit robbery, (5) burglary with a deadly weapon or firearm, (6) battery with intent to commit robbery, (7) assault with a deadly weapon, and (8) discharging firearms within a vehicle. The State also filed a motion to certify J.C.-L. to stand trial as an adult and for a preliminary prosecutive merit finding.
After a hearing, the juvenile court found there was prosecutive merit and proceeded to hold a certification hearing. During the 3-day certification hearing, J.C.-L. presented two expert witnesses. Both experts testified that J.C.-L. could be successfully rehabilitated by programs available in the juvenile court and that J.C.-L. should not be certified as an adult. The juvenile court ultimately granted the State's motion to certify in a 15-page order. The court concluded that transfer to adult court was necessary to protect the public's interest and safety. J.C.-L. raises several arguments on appeal.
J.C.-L. does not contest the prosecutive merit finding.
Juvenile certifications are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See In re Eric A.L., 123 Nev. 26, 32, 153 P.3d 32, 36 (2007). "An abuse of discretion occurs if the [juvenile] court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason." Id. at 33, 153 P.3d at 36-37 (alteration in original).
First, J.-C.-L. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion because it did not properly address all of the certification factors established in In re Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 434-35, 664 P.2d 947, 952 (1983). The juvenile court has discretion to certify a minor as an adult for criminal proceedings if the charged offense would have been a felony and the child is 14-years old or older at the time of the offense. NRS 62B.39O(1)(a). The court must consider "(1) the nature and seriousness of the charged offense(s); (2) the persistency and seriousness of past adjudicated or admitted criminal offenses; and (3) personal considerations such as age, maturity, character, personality and family relationships." In re William S., 122 Nev. 432, 441, 132 P.3d 1015, 1021 (2006) (citing Seven Minors, 99 Nev. at 434-35, 664 P.2d at 952). "The juvenile court must give primary consideration to the first two factors, although the decision to certify may rest on either or both of these factors." Eric A.L., 123 Nev. at 33, 153 P.3d at 36 (emphasis added). "[I]n close cases, where examination of the first two factors does not compel certification, the juvenile court may consider the third factor." Id. (emphasis added).
J.C.-L.'s argument that the juvenile court was required to address all three certification factors is clearly belied by the relevant authority. First, the court looked to the first factor-the nature and seriousness of the alleged offense. The court found that the offenses were egregious: the conduct resulted in a serious life-threatening injury; J.C.-L. willfully agreed to and carried out an armed robbery; if convicted of all charges, J.C.-L. could face up to 88 years in prison if he was sentenced as an adult; and J.C.-L. planned the offense in a way to increase the likelihood of success and decrease the likelihood of being apprehended. Therefore, the juvenile court determined "that the nature and seriousness of the alleged offenses clearly impel transfer to the adult court." The court's findings under the first factor alone are sufficient to support certification. See id.
Even so, the juvenile court made additional findings regarding the remaining two factors. Regarding the second factor, the court noted that J.C.-L. had three prior adjudicated delinquencies that were not as serious as the robbery-shooting offense: simple assault, unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, and destruction of property. For personal considerations, the court also discussed J.C.-L.'s age, immaturity, relationship with his parents, cooperation with police, interactions with a gang, school suspensions, concussion history, good behavior in detention, and various mental health and learning disorders. The court's findings are overwhelmingly supported by the record. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it granted certification based on the first factor.
Second, J.C.-L. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it disregarded his expert witnesses. He claims the court disregarded his expert witnesses because the court's order does not mention them. However, while the court did not specifically discuss the expert testimony in its order, the court did comment on J.C.-L.'s various mental health and learning disorders, which the experts testified about. The court found "there is no credible evidence that any of these disorders" contributed to the charged offenses. Thus, the juvenile court did not disregard the testimony. Further, J.C.-L. fails to show that the court must specifically state in its order that it considered the expert witnesses. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (explaining that this court need not consider an appellant's argument that is not cogently argued or lacks the support of relevant authority). Therefore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we
J.C.-L. next asserts that this court should revisit the certification factors articulated in Seven Minors, He does not elaborate on what the factors should be, nor does he cite to relevant authority. See id. Additionally, we are bound by the Nevada Supreme Court's decisions. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 720 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (noting that stare decisis "applies a fortiori to enjoin lower courts to follow the decision of a higher court"); see generally People v. Solorzano, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 659, 664 (Ct. App. 2007), as modified (August 15, 2007) ("The Court of Appeal must follow, and has no authority to overrule, the decisions of the California Supreme Court." (quotation marks and internal punctuation omitted)). Lastly, J.C.-L. asserts that his right to equal protection was violated. But he makes no argument that he has been discriminated against or treated differently than similarly situated minor respondents. See Gaines v. State, 116 Nev. 359, 371, 998 P.2d 166, 173 (2000) (holding that equal protection requires that a similarly situated person be treated similarly). J.C.-L.'s argument is not cogent and is not supported with any citations to relevant authority; therefore, we decline to consider it. See Maresca, 103 Nev. at 673, 748 P.2d at 6. J.C.-L.'s remaining arguments are unpersuasive. First, he contends that this court should clearly define the procedure for resolving prosecutive merit and certification motions. However, he does not articulate what clarification he believes is necessary and does not support his argument with relevant authority. See Maresca, 103 Nev. at 673, 748 P.2d at 6.
AFFIRM the juvenile court's order.
Gibbons, Tao, Bulla, J.
Hon. James E. Wilson, District Judge