Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD225321, JD225322, JD225323
ROBIE, J.
Natasha A., mother of the minors, appeals from the judgment of disposition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 358, 395.) Appellant contends substantial evidence did not support removal of the minors from her custody. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTS
The Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) removed the three minors, J. B., age 8; J. A., age 10; and J. P., age 13, from appellant’s custody in January 2007, following an incident in which appellant physically abused J. P. by hitting him with a rope resulting in abrasions and severe bruising. J. B. had similar marks on his legs and body. Appellant also permitted her fiancé to hit the minors with a rope and a belt.
When interviewed by the Department, appellant admitted striking J. P. many times causing bruising and scarring. She stated J. P. was unmanageable and that the minors were previously removed from her care for a year in Texas for physical abuse. Information from the Texas case disclosed that appellant’s fiancé whipped J. B. and beat J. P., causing serious physical injury, although there was no prosecution because appellant confessed to hitting the minors with a belt. Each of the minors was examined and each showed effects of a history of physical abuse. The court ordered the minors detained.
Upon subsequent interview for the jurisdiction/disposition report, appellant denied the allegations of the petition and denied any responsibility for the abuse which was the basis of the Texas case. She did state she had hit and injured J. P. in January 2007, and further that J. B.’s and J. A.’s statements about being hit with a belt when disciplined were true. When questioned about the January 2007 incident with J. P., appellant told police that she hit him until her arm got tired and she was winded and out of breath. The minors said that appellant needed to control her anger but they were not willing to discuss any abuse and wanted to return home. Records in the Texas case stated that appellant tried to manipulate the minors to lie about the abuse but ultimately made progress in services leading to dismissal of the case. At visits, appellant showed little bond to the minors and J. P. left one visit because she ignored him. The Department assessment was that, despite a prior dependency case and voluntary services, appellant still had not shown she was capable of parenting the minors and providing them a safe life. The plan included a psychological evaluation, counseling to address anger and other issues, parenting and weekly visitation.
Pending the jurisdiction hearing, the minors were moved from the Children’s Receiving Home to foster care. Due to his extreme behavior, J. P. was separated from J. B. and J. A. and there was a question whether each minor should be separately placed. In April 2007, the court sustained the petitions and ordered further services pending the dispositional hearing.
At disposition in June 2007, appellant testified she had started a parenting class but missed too many sessions due to court appearances and had to restart class. She was unable to recall any specific information from the class, but believed the question of physical discipline was addressed. She noted she had already done a parenting class in Texas. Appellant testified that in California a parent was not supposed to whip a child, but it was different in Texas where she was taught proper spanking techniques and even spanking in schools was approved. Appellant further testified that she had promised J. P. she would not hit him when they came to California, but his behavior deteriorated and she resumed spanking. She stated she would now use alternative discipline. Appellant said she had completed three months of counseling and did not really need anger management therapy because she had the right to be angry after having been through so much in her life. She believed she could handle the minors but acknowledged she needed help with J. P. She explained that on the day of the incident which precipitated removal, she approached him with the belt and told him to lay across the bed for a spanking, but he grabbed the belt and hit her with it. She was not going to have him hitting her and punished him by hitting him until she was tired despite his attempts to get away. Appellant stated she now had a strategy to handle J. P., i.e., instead of hitting him she would take him to the Children’s Receiving Home as a scare tactic.
The investigating social worker testified that appellant initially had visits which were simply observed but that visits were now supervised because appellant had called J. P. derogatory names at a recent visit and the visit had to be canceled.
The court continued the minors in out-of-home placement and adopted the reunification plan, noting appellant’s anger and hostility while testifying.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s order removing the minors from her custody.
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value -- to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination we recognize that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (Jason L.,at p. 1214; In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
To support an order removing a child from parental custody, the court must find clear and convincing evidence “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) There is no question this standard has been met.
Appellant had a lengthy history of physically abusing her children by hitting them with belts and other objects in the guise of discipline. This resulted in removal of her children in Texas and a year of services. However, despite the services and a promise to her son, J. P., not to hit him, when sufficiently pushed by his behavior, she again resorted to brutally beating him, stopping only when she was unable to hit him anymore. She felt justified in her anger because of what had been done to her in the past. Following this removal, appellant had completed only three months of counseling and a few sessions of a parenting class whose topics she could not remember. Her continued anger and hostility was apparent to the court when she testified. In seeking the minors’ return, she was at best asking the court to rely on her good intentions and a safety plan she candidly described as a scare tactic. The court, observing her anger and hostility, was not required to place the minors’ well-being at risk by placing them in an environment which represented a continuing danger to them. Substantial evidence supported the court’s order removing the minors from appellant’s custody.
Incredibly, appellant argues the minors could have been protected without removing them by providing her intensive services. Given the level of violence and the history of abuse, nothing short of constant observation would have protected the minors if returned to appellant. Such a solution would be absurd.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of disposition is affirmed.
We concur:
SCOTLAND, P.J., SIMS, J.