Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK72888, D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
Michael A. Salazar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Fred Klink, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ALDRICH, J.
INTRODUCTION
In this appeal, appellant Craig C. (Father) challenges the jurisdictional findings with regard to his son Jayden C. Father also challenges the dispositional order directing that he participate in a parenting education program. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The initial facts.
Jayden C. is about five years old. His parents are Father and B.P. (Mother). Father and Mother had joint custody of Jayden. Mother was also the parent of I.P. (Jayden’s one-year old half-sister) and Koby B. (Jayden’s half-brother). Mother lived with her husband (D.W.), I., and Koby. D. was I.’s father.
On May 3, 2008, Father allowed a babysitter to care for Jayden even though a dog was present. Jayden was bitten on the lip by the dog. Father did not seek treatment for Jayden’s injury and Father did not return Jayden to Mother until 24 hours after the biting incident.
The next day, on May 4, 2008, Mother took Jayden to the hospital for treatment, leaving Koby in the care of her husband, D. Because the emergency room was crowded, Mother went home, intending to return later in the day. When she returned home, Mother found Koby unconscious. Mother immediately called 911 and the paramedics transported Koby to the hospital.
Jayden and I. came to the attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) when Koby was admitted to the hospital. Koby, who was less than two years old, was unconscious and hemorrhaging on the right side of his brain. Koby died two days later from the injuries consistent with shaking baby syndrome. Jayden and I. were placed in protective custody.
The social worker discovered that between July 2004 and August 2007, there had been six reports of abuse and neglect of the children. Four of the reports were determined to be unfounded, one was inconclusive, and one was substantiated. The substantiated report showed that Mother perpetrated emotional abuse on Jayden in January 2006 by assaulting a boyfriend’s grandmother. In this incident, Mother pulled the grandmother’s hair out of her scalp. Mother was arrested for battery and Father took custody of Jayden. At the time, Father was strongly advised to file for custody of Jayden through the Family Court. Father appeared in court on March 3, 2006, but two weeks later reported he did not have a future court date because Mother’s whereabouts were unknown. The social worker advised Father about the importance of protecting Jayden from Mother, and Father said he understood. The referral was then closed.
Additionally, in July 2004, the child protection hotline received an anonymous call about domestic violence between Father and Mother that had occurred in the presence of Jayden. Father declined the social worker’s offer of voluntary maintenance services. Father stated he would go to Family Court and request full physical custody of his son. The referral was closed as inconclusive. In July 2004, Mother was arrested for making terrorist threats.
2. The Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition.
On May 7, 2008, the Department filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 seeking to have Jayden and I. declared dependents. On that date, Jayden and I. were detained and Jayden was released to Father.
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
A court information officer reported that Father was on probation after pleading guilty in 2005 to a misdemeanor of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5(a)). According to Father, his conviction was the result of an incident where he and Mother were wrestling in a car in which Jayden was also an occupant. During the altercation, Mother shattered the car’s windshield. Father told the social worker that he decided not to fight the charges and was placed on probation. Although Father reported he had complied with all probation requirements, including a 52-week class for domestic violence/battery, the probation officer reported that the case was still open. Father’s 36 month probation was due to expire in September 2008.
Father’s criminal history also showed that he had been arrested on July 26, 2005, for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse/cohabitant.
As amended, the section 300 petition alleged the actions and inactions of Father, Mother, and D. endangered Jayden and I. As to Father, the petition alleged in counts a-2 and b-3 that Father failed to protect Jayden from risk of physical and emotional harm, damage, danger and death when Father “knew or reasonably should have known that the mother has failed to resolve her violent tendencies and has engaged in violent altercations in the presence of... Jayden.” These counts also alleged that Father’s failure to protect Jayden left the child at risk of physical and emotional damage.
The section 300 petition was prepared after the social worker interviewed Father. In the interview, Father reported he had left Jayden with Mother because he needed help while he was at work. He also stated that Mother had assaulted him so many times that he could not recall all of them, and that when Jayden was young, Jayden had been present during these incidents. Father told the social worker that after Jayden spent weekends with Father, Jayden was reluctant to go back to Mother.
Although the social worker warned Father that Jayden had to be seen for a pediatric medical evaluation at a HUB clinic (a multidisciplinary assessment and services hub), Father questioned the need for the appointment. By June 9, 2008, Jayden had not been seen at a clinic.
3. The adjudication and disposition hearing.
An adjudication and disposition hearing was held on August 15, 2008. The dependency court admitted a number of documents into evidence.
The documents received into evidence included, among others, the coroner’s report, medical reports relating to Koby’s death, and Mother’s criminal records.
The evidence showed the following: Mother had a January 2006 misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence on a co-habitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5 (a)). Mother started court-ordered domestic violence counseling, but did not finish the programs. Mother violated her probation. She had a felony conviction in February 2006 for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245(a)(1)). Mother never complied with any terms of her probation and there was an outstanding warrant for her.
Mother invoked her Fifth Amendment rights with regard to the death of Koby. She testified about other issues as follows: She did not have a relationship with Father, other than their mutual interest in Jayden. She had a domestic violence incident involving Father. She denied the incident involved the shattered windshield. She did not know that she was on probation, of a 2006 restraining order, or that she was violating probation. She remembered pulling the hair out of her boyfriend’s grandmother’s scalp in January 2006, and being convicted and placed on probation for that event. Mother recalled being convicted of domestic violence on a co-habitant. She also admitted failing to comply with court orders, such as finishing classes. She never completed anger management or domestic violence classes. She also acknowledged a domestic violence incident with Father.
Father objected to the court’s suggestion that he be ordered to participate in a parenting course.
As relevant to Father’s appeal, the dependency court found the allegations in counts a-2 and b-3 true. The court declared Jayden and I. dependents of the court and ordered Jayden be placed with Father under a home of father order. The court ordered the Department to provide family maintenance services to Jayden. Father was ordered to attend a parenting class, keep all medical and therapy appointments for Jayden, and follow up with all recommendations. The court continued the case for a section 364 hearing.
Additionally, the dependency court found true the allegations in a number of other counts relating to Mother and D. These counts are relevant insofar as they relate to Father’s knowledge of Mother’s propensities. In these findings, the dependency court found that Mother had a history of violent altercations in the presence of Jayden, Mother was on probation, Mother had assaulted Father in the past, D. and Mother neglected and failed to protect D., Mother and D. used illegal substances, Mother provided tainted breast milk to I., D. knew or should have known that Mother was providing tainted breast milk, D. caused Koby’s deadly injuries, and Koby’s injuries were the result of the abuse and neglect of Mother.
The court dismissed the allegations relating to the dog bite incident.
Father appealed from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders. Mother and D. are not parties to this appeal. I. is not a subject of this appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. The jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Father contends the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that he knew or reasonably should have known that the Mother had failed to resolve her violent tendencies is not supported by the evidence. We are not persuaded by this contention.
The dependency court may make jurisdictional findings if there was neglectful conduct by a parent in one of the forms specified in subdivision (b) of section 300, causation, serious harm or illness to the child or substantial risk of such harm or illness, and there was some reason to believe that the acts may continue to occur in the future. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820, 823-824.) Jurisdictional findings in dependency cases must be made by a preponderance of the evidence. (Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 248.) On review, we examine the record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the findings. Thus, we indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the findings. We do not reweigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. Those rulings are for the trial court. (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393-1394; In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733-734.)
Acts of domestic violence by a child’s parents may support such findings. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194.) For example, in Heather A. the appellate court upheld jurisdictional findings as to a father where the evidence revealed that acts of domestic violence occurred in front of the children and when the children were elsewhere in the home, which put the children in physical danger. “[F]or example, [the children] could wander into the room where it was occurring and be accidentally hit by a thrown object, by a fist, arm, foot or leg, or by [their stepmother] falling [on] them.” (Id. at p. 194.) Heather A. concluded that domestic violence in the same household where a child resides constitutes neglect. (Ibid.) “[I]t is a failure to protect [the children] from the substantial risk of encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it. Such neglect causes the risk.” (Id. at p. 194.) Further, children living with domestic violence experience psychological harm. (In re Sylvia R. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 559, 562.)
In re Sylvia R., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at page 562 stated: “[I]n In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1464, this court held that evidence of spousal abuse was relevant on the question of whether the child of the marriage was properly within the jurisdiction of the juvenile dependency court. ‘Both common sense and expert opinion,’ we observed, ‘indicate spousal abuse is detrimental to children.’ ” (Id. at p. 1470, fn. 5; see also In re Heather A.[, supra, ] 52 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 195 [recognizing that spouse battering is ‘secondary abuse’ which may sow in children the seeds of psychological predisposition to be victims of domestic violence]; Fields, The Impact of Spouse Abuse on Children and Its Relevance In Custody and Visitation Decisions in New York State (1994) 3 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 221, 228 [‘Studies show that violence by one parent against another harms children even if they do not witness it.’]; Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of DomesticViolence on Child Custody Decisions (1991) 44 Vand. L.Rev. 1041, 1055-1056 [‘First, children of these relationships appear more likely to experience physical harm from both parents than children of relationships without woman abuse. Second, even if they are not physically harmed, children suffer enormously from simply witnessing the violence between their parents.... [¶] Third, children of abusive fathers are likely to be physically abused themselves.’].)”
The facts showed that Mother had engaged in repeated acts of violence, including, being arrested for battery, wrestling with Father while Jayden was in the car and shattering the vehicle’s windshield, assaulting Father so many times that Father could not recall each event, being convicted of domestic violence on a co-habitant, being convicted of a felony assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, and pulling the hair out of her boyfriend’s grandmother’s scalp. He admitted that Jayden was present during many of these incidents. Additionally, Father had been warned by a social worker that he should obtain physical custody of Jayden. Thus, even if Father did not have first-hand knowledge of all of the acts of violence by Mother, Father had personal knowledge of her propensity for violence, as he was the victim of many of the incidents and he had discussed Mother’s violent behavior with a social worker. Additionally, Jayden would have suffered psychological injuries from being present during the many incidents of domestic violence. Jayden potentially could have been physically injured. For example, Jayden could have been injured from the shattered windshield when Mother and Father wrestled in the car. Yet, knowing of Mother’s predisposition to violence, violence that would be harmful to Jayden, Father left Jayden in Mother’s care. These facts support the jurisdictional finding that Father knew or should have known that Mother had failed to resolve her violent tendencies.
2. The dependency court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Father to complete a parenting program.
Father contends the dependency court abused its discretion in ordering that he must take and complete a parenting program. Father contends the parenting program order was not directed at the problems that led to Jayden’s dependency as he was not the person who inflicted harm on Koby. This contention is not persuasive.
Pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 362, once a child is adjudged to be a dependent of the court pursuant to section 300, the dependency court is authorized to “make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child, including medical treatment, subject to further order of the court” (§ 362, subd. (a)) and may require a parent regaining custody of a child to “participate in child welfare services or services provided by an appropriate agency designated by the court.” (§ 362, subd. (b).) Additionally, pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 362, the court is empowered to order parents of children who are subject to dependency court proceedings to “participate in a counseling or education program, including... a parent education and parenting program....” The only limitation is that the program must be “designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.” (§ 362, subd. (c).) Section 362 has been “ ‘broadly interpreted to authorize a wide variety of remedial orders intended to protect the safety and well-being of dependent children....’ [Citation.]” (In re Neil D. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 219, 224 225; see also, In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.)
Section 362 reads in part:
“ ‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order... with this discretion. [Citations.]’ ” (In re Neil D., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 225.) We do not reverse such an order unless the dependency court clearly abused its discretion. (Ibid.)
Here, the evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that Father would benefit from a parenting class, and that such program would eliminate the conditions finding Jayden a child described by section 300.
First, as discussed above, the evidence showed that Father left Jayden in Mother’s care even though Father knew of Mother’s violent propensities. Father had been warned by a social worker that he needed to obtain sole custody of Jayden, but Father did not do so. This demonstrated a failure by Father to appreciate his responsibility to ensure Jayden’s safety and proper care.
Additionally, the evidence showed that after Jayden was bit on the lip by a dog, Father did not seek medical attention for Jayden’s injuries, but waited 24 hours and then took Jayden to Mother rather than to a medical provider. The fact that the court dismissed the counts relating to the dog bite incident, does not mean that the court could not consider the incident in assessing the need for Father to attend parenting classes. (In re Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1006-1008 [upholding order directing parent to submit to drug and alcohol testing even though court had dismissed an alcohol related count from the petition because the record demonstrated he had a substance abuse problem that posed a risk to the child].)
The record contains other evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Father would benefit from parenting classes. The social worker had referred Father to a HUB clinic, but Father failed to keep an appointment, questioned the need for an appointment, and did not reschedule. When Father finally took Jayden for a medical examination, the physician noted that “ ‘Father appears reluctant to follow medical advice[.]’ ”
Thus, even though Father did not cause the physical injuries to Koby that led to the child’s death, the evidence supports the dependency court’s conclusion that parenting classes would assist Father in understanding his parental role and would protect Jayden. (Cf. with In re Jasmin C. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 177, 178-179 [mother intervenes to stop father’s physical assault on to children; dependency court abused its discretion in ordering her to attend parenting classes where there was no evidence mother would benefit from such classes].) The parenting classes were designed to alleviate some of the conditions that resulted in Jayden’s dependency. Therefore, the dependency court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Father to take parenting classes.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., CROSKEY, J.
“(a) When a child is adjudged a dependent child of the court on the ground that the child is a person described by Section 300, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child, including medical treatment, subject to further order of the court....
“(b) When a child is adjudged a dependent child of the court, on the ground that the child is a person described by Section 300 and the court orders that a parent or guardian shall retain custody of the child subject to the supervision of the social worker, the parents or guardians shall be required to participate in child welfare services or services provided by an appropriate agency designated by the court.
“(c) The juvenile court may direct any and all reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of the child who is the subject of any proceedings under this chapter as the court deems necessary and proper to carry out the provisions of this section, including orders to appear before a county financial evaluation officer. That order may include a direction to participate in a counseling or education program, including, but not limited to, a parent education and parenting program operated by a community college, school district, or other appropriate agency designated by the court.... The program in which a parent or guardian is required to participate shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court's finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.”