Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. J04613
HULL, J.A.H. (mother) and K.H. (father), the parents of James H. and John H. (the minors), appeal from the juvenile court’s orders adjudging the minors dependent children of the court and returning the minors to parental custody under the supervision of Human Services Agency (HSA). (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395; further unspecified section references are to this code.) Mother and father, proceeding in propria persona, make multiple contentions of alleged prejudicial error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Facts and Proceedings
The May 2007 original dependency petition filed by HSA on behalf of the young minors alleged the minors were at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm because the mother and father had been diagnosed with depression, they had left James H. without adult supervision, and both stated feelings of wanting to harm the minors. According to social workers’ reports, mother and father wanted HSA to assume custody of the minors “out of fear that they may hurt their children.” After receiving psychiatric evaluations, mother was diagnosed with depression and a bipolar condition and father was diagnosed with “major depression.” The reports also noted mother had “verbalized” a fear of wanting to harm the minors and father admitted to “feelings of wanting to hurt” the minors.
The September 2007 disposition report noted mother and father displayed appropriate interactions with the minors during their visits. HSA recommended that mother and father complete psychological evaluations, which might include counseling and treatment, and participate in parenting education classes. A subsequent report noted that, according to psychological evaluations, neither mother nor father posed a danger to the minors.
HSA recommended placement of the minors with mother and father under its supervision and continuation of services for the minors and mother and father. According to its January 2008 report, mother and father had completed their parenting education and were receiving counseling. However, that report also noted mother and father had not been cooperative with the social worker.
At the January 29, 2008, disposition hearing, the juvenile court adjudged the minors dependent children but ordered them returned to parental custody under the supervision of HSA.
Discussion
I
Timeliness of Disposition Hearing
Mother and father contend the juvenile court committed reversible error for its failure to conduct the disposition hearing in a timely manner.
Mother and father make six identical claims of error.
The difficulty with the claim of mother and father in this case is that the record does not reveal counsel for mother and father raised the matter complained of by them. The record reflects mother and father had ample opportunities to bring the issue of a timely disposition hearing to the attention of the juvenile court if they had wished to do so. Yet they failed to avail themselves of those opportunities.
The California Supreme Court has stated: “‘An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been but was not presented to the lower court by some appropriate method . . . . The circumstances may involve such intentional acts or acquiescence as to be appropriately classified under the headings of estoppel or waiver . . . . Often, however, the explanation is simply that it is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.’” (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1.) “‘The purpose of the general doctrine of waiver is to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had . . . .’” (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023.) “‘“No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590; cf. In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [stating that the correct legal term for loss of right based on failure to assert it in a timely fashion is forfeiture, not waiver].)
As has been noted in dependency decisions, if waiver or invited error were not found, a party could “trifle with the courts by standing silently by, thus permitting the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable.” (In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886.)
Here, as the record shows, at no time did mother or father raise the matter they complain about now. Thus, mother and father are precluded from raising the claim here. (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; In re Gilberto M. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198-1200.) Mother and father have forfeited their claim. (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293, fn. 2.)
Mother’s counsel objected to a continuance for receipt of the disposition hearing report one time during the multiple continued disposition hearings, on the ground that the disposition report already was late.
II
Admissibility of Assessments
Mother and father assert the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence their initial mental health assessments.
Neither mother nor father tendered any evidentiary challenge to the mental health assessments. Both parents, who were represented by separate counsel in the juvenile court, had ample opportunities to make such a challenge. Yet, they failed to do so.
Although ordinarily waiver constitutes the “intentional relinquishment of a known right,” waiver also may be found from conduct that reasonably could be construed as the equivalent of an abandonment of that right. (Cf. Rubin v. Los Angeles Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 292, 298.) Alternatively, “[u]nder the doctrine of invited error, where a party, by his conduct, induces the commission of an error, he is estopped from asserting it as grounds for reversal.” (Redevelopment Agency v. City of Berkeley (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 158, 166.)
Here, as we have seen, mother and father tendered no challenge to the admissibility of the mental health assessments. Whether denominated estoppel, waiver, or forfeiture, mother and father’s conduct in the juvenile court precludes them from raising the issue here. (In re Erik P., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 403; In re Dakota S., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 501-502; In re Gilberto M., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1198-1200.)
III
Jurisdictional Findings
Mother and father claim the evidence is insufficient to support the jurisdictional finding pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 300. Claiming mere speculation was the basis of the finding, mother and father aver their statements referring purportedly to feelings of wishing to harm the minors were “vague.” Moreover, they argue, there was no allegation of neglect of or harm to the minors based on any incident caused by their mental health conditions.
Our “review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment is limited to whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence. Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court and not the reviewing court. The power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact.” (In re Christina T. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 630, 638-639.)
The purpose of section 300 is to protect minors from conduct or omissions by parents that place the minors at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. (§§ 300, subd. (b); 300.2.) In this case, the petition alleged generally that the minors were at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm as a result of mother and father’s neglect of James H. and their mental health conditions. In evaluating the evidence, the emphasis must be on circumstances existing at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824.) However, evidence of past problems may be relevant to current circumstances and thus may be considered. (Cf. In re Michael S. (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 348, 358.)
The evidence before the juvenile court at the jurisdiction hearing was in the form of the social worker’s report prepared for that hearing. The juvenile court indicated it had considered the jurisdiction hearing report. That report referred to the detention hearing, for which a report had been prepared previously.
Subdivision (b) of section 300 provides for jurisdiction where there is a substantial risk the minor will suffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of various types of conduct or acts of omission on the part of the parent of the minor.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment (In re Terry D. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 890, 899), the record in this case supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under subdivision (b) of section 300. Although the supporting facts are not numerous, they do suggest a causal connection between mother and father’s neglect of one minor, their specific statements of wanting to harm both minors, coupled with mental health difficulties, and an identified current, substantial risk of harm to two very young minors. Read together, the allegations in the petition aver sufficiently a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the minors posed by mother and father’s history and current conduct.
In sum, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this case. (Cf. In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169.)
IV
Failure to Return Minors Pending Psychological Evaluations
Mother and father also claim the juvenile court erred in failing to place the minors with them pending completion of the psychological evaluations, especially in light of the conclusions of the evaluations, which were that neither parent posed a danger to the minors.
We reject the claim. The genesis of these dependency proceedings was the determination, expressed by mother and father, to have HSA “take the children out of fear that they may hurt their children.” Preliminary assessments indicated mother and father each was diagnosed with mental health conditions that required treatment. Thereafter, the juvenile court ordered complete psychological evaluations of mother and father.
Under the circumstances presented, the juvenile court acted well within its jurisdiction in ordering the detention of the minors to continue. Until the results of the psychological evaluations were known, a substantial risk to the minors’ well-being remained. There was no error.
V
Reasonable Efforts Finding
Mother and father’s penultimate claim is that the juvenile court erred in making a finding that HSA made reasonable efforts to avoid removal of the minors from parental custody when there was no evidence that HSA had provided services to mother and father.
The record does not support the claim. First, the juvenile court found explicitly there were no reasonable means to protect the minors “without removal.” Moreover, the record also reflects mental health evaluations for mother and father were done, and parenting education also was a component of the service plan. Finally, HSA stated that mother and father would be required to complete psychological evaluations and participate in counseling, and the record discloses that they did so. There was no error.
VI
Retention of Jurisdiction
Noting the evidence in the record reflecting that they did the required services, and the alleged lack of any evidence of a substantial risk to the minors, mother and father’s last contention is that the juvenile court committed reversible error when it retained jurisdiction over the minors after the disposition hearing was concluded.
It is true that psychological evaluations concluded neither parent posed a danger to the minors. However, more remained to be done to ameliorate the conditions underlying these dependency proceedings. Mother and father had not completed their counseling. Moreover, the minors were continuing to receive services, including treatment and counseling. By retaining jurisdiction, the juvenile court could ensure that this family continued to receive services provided by HSA and benefited from them.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the dispositional orders, which the record reflects were supported by factual findings made by the juvenile court.
Disposition
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: SIMS, Acting P. J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.