Opinion
04-22-00465-CV
01-04-2023
IN THE INTEREST OF J.A.J., N.Z.J., and N.V.J., Children
From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-PA-00188 Honorable Raul Perales, Judge Presiding
Order of Termination Vacated; Judgment Rendered Dismissing Case
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
On June 29, 2022, the trial court held a bench trial at which several witnesses testified. On July 19, 2022, the trial court signed an Order of Termination terminating A.D.'s parental rights to her three children and naming the Department of Family and Protective Services (the "Department") as permanent managing conservator of the children. On appeal, A.D. asserts the Order of Termination is void because it was rendered after the mandatory dismissal date and, alternatively, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's predicate ground and best interest findings. Because we agree the trial court lacked jurisdiction, we vacate the Order of Termination and render judgment dismissing the case.
To protect the privacy of minor children, we use initials to refer to the children and their biological parents. Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8(b)(2). The children were born on August 5, 2016; August 3, 2017; and March 4, 2019.
JURISDICTION
In her first issue on appeal, A.D. asserts the trial court automatically lost jurisdiction over her and her children on February 8, 2022, because it did not commence a trial on the merits prior to the February 7, 2022 automatic dismissal date. Therefore, according to A.D., the July 19, 2022 Order of Termination is void.
Texas Family Code section 263.401 provides as follows:
Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits or granted an extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1), on the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator, the court's jurisdiction over the suit affecting the parent-child relationship filed by the department that requests termination of the parent-child relationship or requests that the department be named conservator of the child is terminated and the suit is automatically dismissed without a court order. Not later than the 60th day before the day the suit is automatically dismissed, the court shall notify all parties to the suit of the automatic dismissal date.Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a).
The Department filed its Original Petition for Protection of a Child, for Conservatorship, and for Termination in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship on February 2, 2021. On that same date, the trial court signed an order naming the Department as the children's temporary sole managing conservator. Therefore, the mandatory dismissal date was February 7, 2022. The trial court commenced trial on June 29, 2022. Accordingly, because the trial court did not commence trial on the merits on or before February 7th, the trial court retained jurisdiction to render its final order only if it granted an extension pursuant to subsection (b) of section 263.401, which provides as follows:
Unless the court has commenced the trial on the merits, the court may not retain the suit on the court's docket after the time described by Subsection (a) unless the court finds that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department and that continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest of the child. If the court makes those findings, the court may retain the suit on the court's docket for a period not to exceed 180 days after the time described
by Subsection (a). If the court retains the suit on the court's docket, the court shall render an order in which the court:
(1) schedules the new date on which the suit will be automatically dismissed if the trial on the merits has not commenced, which date must be not later than the 180th day after the time described by Subsection (a);
(2) makes further temporary orders for the safety and welfare of the child as necessary to avoid further delay in resolving the suit; and
(3) sets the trial on the merits on a date not later than the date specified under Subdivision (1).Id. § 263.401(b).
On January 6, 2022-approximately one month before the dismissal date-A.D. filed a Motion to Retain Suit on Court's Docket. In her motion, A.D. contended extraordinary circumstances necessitated the children remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the Department and she needed additional time to successfully complete her service plan. The district clerk's Case Summary indicates a "merits hearing" was set for January 12, 2022, but "reset" and "dropped." The Case Summary does not indicate the purpose of the "merits hearing" and there is no record that a hearing took place. However, the clerk's record on appeal contains a copy of a "Judge's Notes," dated March 28, 2022, which state as follows:
No HRG. TODAY ... ADA 2 attnys conferred
apparently the Jan. 2022 setting was dropped the parties staffed the case agreed to extend the case RIS trial for today ... But order not yet signed by Mr. Willingham.
There is no dispute the trial court did not sign a written order prior to the February 7th mandatory dismissal date. Instead, on March 29, 2022-almost two months after the dismissal date-the trial court signed an Agreed Order to Retain Suit on Court's Docket and Setting Hearing Dates. This order scheduled the trial date for March 28, 2022 and set August 5, 2022 as the automatic dismissal date.
As a general rule, docket sheet entries are not sufficient to constitute a decree of the court. In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 297 (Tex. 2021). However, "the Texas Family Code alters this general rule in suits affecting the parent-child relationship, including parental-rights-termination cases." Id. at 297-98. "Family Code section 101.026 expressly provides that a court may pronounce or render an order on its docket sheet." Id. at 298; see also Tex. Fam. Code § 101.026 (pronouncement may be made orally in the presence of the court reporter or in writing, "including on the court's docket sheet or by a separate written instrument"). In G.X.H., an August 29, 2018 docket entry read as follows:
Motion for continuance - cps, strickling, cooper, parents, serious injury case, med recs missing for trial, agreed continuance - 10/17/18 for trial, extension granted to reach the agreed trial date; trial - 10/17/18
The Supreme Court noted the docket sheet "reflect[ed] that on August 29, 2018, [the trial court] granted both an agreed continuance of the trial date to October 17, 2018, and an 'extension . . . to reach the agreed trial date.'" 627 S.W.3d at 298. The Court "conclude[ed] the only reasonable interpretation of this docket entry-which was entered on the date of the hearing on the Department's motion for continuance-is that the trial court granted both a continuance of the trial date and an extension of the automatic dismissal date under section 263.401(b)." Id.
Here, the State relies on the "Judge's Notes" to contend the trial court may have orally extended the automatic dismissal date during the January 12, 2022 merits hearing. But no hearing occurred on January 12th and there is no record of the agreement between the State and the parents' attorneys. Nor is it clear exactly when the parties reached an agreement or whether they did so in the trial court's presence.
Even if we were to consider the March 28th Judge's Notes, they reflect only that the parties agreed to A.D.'s requested continuance of the dismissal date ("agreed to extend the case") and to a new trial setting of March 28, 2022 ("R/S trial to today"), presumably in January 2022. We do not believe the Judge's Notes reflect that the trial court in January 2022 granted a continuance of the dismissal date and set a new trial date. We construe the trial court's use of the word "apparently" in the Judge's Notes to mean that the trial court was not aware-in January 2022- of the agreement, and did not become aware of the agreement until March 2022. On appeal, neither party argues the parties' agreement to continue the case is sufficient to satisfy section 263.401, and we find no support in the statutory language for such an interpretation.
When construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent, and "'the truest manifestation of what lawmakers intended is what they enacted.'" In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 514 (Tex. 2020) (citations and footnotes omitted). We assume "the Legislature chose statutory language with care, included each chosen word for a purpose, and purposefully omitted all other words." Id.
Section 263.401(b) clearly requires that "the court shall render an order." A docket sheet entry may be sufficient under section 263.401(b) to avoid automatic dismissal and retain jurisdiction over the case. See G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 297-98. However, nothing in section 263.401 allows retention of the case based solely on the parties' agreement. Furthermore, Family Code section 263.402 states, "[t]he parties to a suit under this chapter may not extend the deadlines set by the court under this subchapter by agreement or otherwise." Tex. Fam. Code § 263.402; see also In re P.Z.F., 651 S.W.3d 147, 152 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2021, pet. denied) ("Father asserts the May 16 docket sheet entry shows the deadlines were extended by agreement in violation of this provision. We disagree. Docket sheet entries are made by the trial court, and reflect the court's decision to extend the relevant dates. We conclude the trial court, not the parties, extended the relevant deadlines, and the parties were in agreement with the decision to extend the deadlines.").
Also, reading subsections (a) and (b) together, we construe section 263.401 as requiring the trial court to take the appropriate action to retain the case before the mandatory dismissal date expires. Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a) (unless trial is commenced or the court grants an extension, the trial court's jurisdiction over the suit "is terminated and the suit is automatically dismissed without a court order"); id. at § 263.401(b) (allowing retention of case only if trial court makes certain findings); see In re J.S., No. 05-21-00898-CV, 2022 WL 620709, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 3, 2022, pet. granted) (mem. op.) (holding, trial court may commence trial after initial dismissal date by (1) taking action to retain the case on the court's docket after the initial dismissal date and (2) making the extraordinary circumstances and best interest findings "before the end of the initial dismissal date"); see also G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 298-99 ("section 263.401(b) requires a court to make these findings as a prerequisite to granting an extension," and "trial courts may likewise make required findings . . . on the record in the presence of a court reporter"); In re Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 643 (Tex. 2009) ("The court cannot just enter an extension order, though. In order for the suit to remain on the court's docket beyond the one-year dismissal date, the court must make specific findings to support the extension order . . .."). In this case, there is no reporter's record because the January 12th hearing was reset and there is no docket entry (or Judge's Notes) from January 2022. The only January 12, 2022 entry on the docket sheet is in the Case Summary section that states:
MERITS HEARING (1:30 PM)
RESET WITH VJ ON BECKYS ZOOM*****DROPPED********
We cannot conclude the only reasonable interpretation of the Judge's Notes is that the trial court granted both a continuance of the trial date and an extension of the automatic dismissal date under section 263.401(b). We must conclude the record does not show that the trial court, before the end of the initial dismissal period, made the extraordinary circumstances and best interest findings or made a written or oral pronouncement on the record granting both a continuance of the trial date and an extension of the automatic dismissal date. Therefore, at the end of February 7th, the trial court's jurisdiction terminated and the case was automatically dismissed. Because the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case when it signed the Order of Termination on July 19, 2022, that order is void. Accordingly, we vacate the July 19, 2022 Order of Termination and render judgment dismissing the case.